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ABSTRACT 
This Thesis evaluates the role of tax incentives in promoting sustainahle economic 
development in developing countries, comparing the South African and Kenyan 
experiences with that of Nigeria, with a view to suggesting ways in which Nigerian tax 
incentive law andpolicy may be improved. 
After a general introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 considers the nature of tax 
incentives as polig tools for economic development, reviews ýYpical forms of incentives 
and. highlights traditional arguments for and against their use as found in the 
literature. While there is a general consensus among economists that tax incentives are 
generally ineffective and inefficient polig tools the use of which should be generalo 
discouraged, this view has not been universaI4 accepted among developing country 
poligmakers. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 present findings from bibliographical and qualitative research into 
the role o tax incentive laws, practices and policies in Nigeria, South Africa and ýf 
Kenya (respectiveo). Chapter 6 considers important regional and international tax, 
trade andfinance issues which constrain or otherwise influence the use of tax incentives 
b developing countries with particular reference to the circumstances of these three ýy 
countries. 
Chapter 7 traces the evolution and critiques the content of contemporary Nigerian tax 
I. ncentive _Polig. 
It finds that Nigerian tax incentive law and 
_polig 
while clear is not 
entirely consistent, prudent or appropriate in view of contemporarj development needs, 
available resources and national priorities. However, it also finds that Nigerian tax 
incentive polig may be significant4 improved if certain lessons from the South African 
and Kenyan experiences are careful4 considered and applied with an appreciation of the 
peculiar realities of Niaerian tax culture. 
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In particular, Nigeria should: target tax incentives to only those sectors where the 
benefitsjustify the attendant revenue loss; ensure that tax incentives are not on4fitfor 
purpose but are also cost-effective; dispassionately review the true economic rationales 
for tax incentives; count the cost of tax incentives to assess their cost-effectiveness; and 
adequately consult with the private sector. Further, Nigeria should: keep tax incentive 
policies and practices simple; use non-tax measures wherever possible to encourage 
growth in key sectors; and stripe for a dynamic, sustainable and responsive tax 
incentive polig. Finally, as tax polig is only as effective as tax administration allows, 
sufficient and sustained attention must be placed on improving the capaciq, qualio and 
effectiveness of Nigerian tax administration. 
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1. PROEM 
1: Prorm 
"In the beginning there was a river. 
The river became a road and the road branched out to the whole world. 
And because the road was once a river it was always hungry. In that land of beginnings 
spirits mingled with the unborn ... As we approached another incarnation we made _pacts 
that we would return to the sbirit world at the first opportuniýy ... Those of us who made 
such pacts were known among the Living as abiku, spirit children 
We were the ones wbo kept coming andgoing, unwilling to come to terms witb life. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION: THE ABIKU'S PATH To LIFE 
This Thesis considers the role of tax incentives in promoting sustainable 
economic development. This theme may be depicted by the plight of the Abiku 
child in her journey up the winding road towards the river of life. In Yoruba2 
traditional lore, an Abiku is a spirit-child who lingers on only a little while 
after birth, often dying before puberty. Such spirit-children keep coming and 
going, being reincarnated as subsequent children; until the appropriate rites are 
performed, their chances of survival remain uncertain. 
So it seems to be the case with Nigeria: a still-born nation that lingers between 
its unfortunate past and the possibility of a future of new hope, ushering in a 
time of increased prosperity of her people. As the tales of the Abiku are 
intertwined with life and death, joy and despair, so also has the 
history of 
Nigeria been chequered with prosperity and austerity, growth and decline, 
unity and division. Unfortunately, the saga of Ni economic 
development 
is fact and not fiction, a grim reality of false starts and unfulfilled potential. 
But like the Abiku, Nigeria can choose to take the opportunities presently 
I Ben Okri The Famished Road (VIntage, London: 2003), pp-3-4. (Emphasis mine. 
) 
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available to her, perform the necessary 'rites', and remain and indeed,, thrive in 
the land of the living this time around. This Thesis critically considers the 
possibilities surrounding of one of such 'rites' - the use of tax incentives law 
and policy - in promoting sustainable economic development in Nigeria, 
drawing parallels and exemplars from two other Sub-Saharan African nations: 
South Africa and Kenya. 
TAX INCENTIVES AS SELECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 
Commercial transactions are conducted within a matrix of legal and regulatory 
infrastructure which influences the nature of the investment environment. 
Such economic regulation is composed of multiple facets including corporate 
and commercial law, trade law, competition law, and banking and finance law. 
Taxation is also often seen as a policy tool which may be used to influence the 
business environment and promote economic development, not by its uniform 
levy by but its selective absence, to encourage certain types of economic 
activity over others. 
Although policies targeted at improving the investment climate may ultimately 
impact all firms and activities, specially targeted incentive policies may benefit 
some sooner than others. Consequently, governments often seek to accelerate 
economic growth through the implementation of selective support for 
particular firms and special activities. 3 Early beneficiaries of such selective 
interventions include the English wool industry in the 14th/15th centuries, 
post-World War II Latin America 4 and export enterprises of East Asian 
countries in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Such selective interventions included 
competition and market restrictions, information-based policies, credit 
initiatives, public-privat e sector interventions and tax incentives. 5This Thesis 
2 The Yoruba are one of the main ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, to which this 
Researcher belongs. 
3 
- World Bank 
Vorld Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate For Everyone, 
(World Bank/Oxford U. niversity Press, New York: 2004) Chapter 8. 
4 E. g. the import protection of infant industries in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
5 World Bank, Vorld Development Report 2003, op cj'i, p. 159. 
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seeks to critically explore one of such paths - tax incentives law and policy 
with a view to determining what role this policy tool may play in assisting the 
Nigerian Abiku to gain purchase on the road to sustainable economic 
development. 
A Focus ON THE ROLE OF TAx INCENTIVES 
Taxation plays a crucial role in economic policy by generating revenue for 
governments to finance public services, facilitate growth, increase productivity, 
improve their investment climates and enhance the overall quality of life of 
their peoples. However, taxes raise the cost of doing business and weaken the 
link between investment and resultant returns, thereby impeding economic 
growth and development. 6 
Tax incentive laws have consequently been used by governments as a policy 
tool for accelerating investment in specific economic sectors, shaping the 
investment environment of a country or economic region and so overcoming 
some of the challenges posed by adverse investment conditions. 7 on 13 
February 2008, US President George W. Bush signed into law the Economic 
Stimulus Act of 2008 (H. R. 5140)8 to complement monetary policy interventions 
in the American economy. The Act provides timely, targeted and temporary tax 
incentives of over US$152billion (1% of US GDP) by way of tax rebates9 and 
accelerated capital expenditure'O write-offs to mitigate recessionary pressures 
6 Ibid, Chapter 5. 
7 Jacques Morisset and Neda Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Review' in Wells el al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreýsn 
Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Occasional 
Paper 15 (IFC/World Bank, Washington D. C.: 2001) pp. 69-108. 
8 See <hrtp- / /taxprof. typepad. com /taxprof blog/files //h. R. %2051 40.12df>. 
9 Tax incentives include rebates of US$600 per person, 
US$1200 per married couple 
and an additional 
US$300 per child. 
10 Allowable capital expenditure deductions are to be doubled to US$250,000 for 
businesses- 
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on the US economy exerted by the 2007/2008 credit crunch crises and 
stimulate consumption, investment and job creation. " 
Tax incentives typically utillsed in Sub-Saharan African economies include tax 
holidays, investment allowances, tax credits, reduced corporate taxes, VAT and 
duty exemptions, subsidies, special regulatory exemption and investment zones, 
and accelerated investment write-offs. 12 Candidates for such selectively 
preferred treatment range from export-oriented industries, industrially- 
intensive enterprises, rural development schemes and advanced technological 
projects to environmentally friendly extractive undertakings. 
Yet as with all tools, where ineptly handled, tax incentives may hinder the very 
ends their wielders seek to advance. Interactions between source country tax 
concessions and tax laws in capital- exporting residence countries may distort 
or negate the incentive value of such initiatives if these issues are riot carefully 
considered. 13 Tax incentives may potentially whittle down a developing 
country)s tax base, distort investment decisions by local and foreign investors, 
reduce transparency in tax administration, hamper innovation and efficiency, 
and divert attention from effecting more fundamental economic and political 
reforms necessary to guarantee a sustainable and favourable investment 
environment. 14 Indeed., the link between tax incentives and increased foreign 
direct investment has been criticised as tenuous and studies indicate that 
excessive costs may attend such incentives due to high redundancy rates. 15 
11 Jeremy Grant, 'House passes Bush stimulus package', FT. com (Washington D. C., 
-11dc-8 USA 30.01.08) <httl2: //wv-w,. fi. com/cms/sý/0/7Oe52clc6-cec 1 '17 !a- 
00 77 7j)Q7658. h-r. rnl> accessed on 01.02.08. 
12 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survej,, ASIT Advisory 
Studies No-16 (UN, New York/Geneva: 2000) [E. Ol. II. D. S. ]. 
13 Timo Viherkentdi Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation 
(Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer: 1991). 
14 Louis T. Wells Jr. and Nancy J. Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from 
Two Experiments' in Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Competefor Foreign Investment: 
Are The), Vortb the Costs?, op cit, pp. 1-67. 
15 Ibid, pp. 21-26,45. 
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1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Although there is much debate over their economic rationales and actual 
effectiveness, tax incentives still play a significant role In Improving economic 
conditions in the region given the numerous fiscal incentives in current 
Nigerian, South African and Kenyan statutes and policies. There is a dearth in 
recent comparative academic literature on the role of tax incentive laws 
spanning these economic regions within Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, 
much of the literature on Nigerian tax incentives stems from the discipline of 
economics16 and is dated. 17 
Consequently, this Study seeks to fill this lacuna through the critical 
examination of the actual and perceived role tax incentives play in three Sub- 
Saharan African countries. While the use of statistics and econometrics in 
traditional economics has advanced understanding of the challenge of 
economic development, policy prescriptions should, not be sterilised from the 
dynamic cultural, political, administrative and legal environments within which 
they are intended to operate. 18By considering tax incentives primarily from a 
legal perspective, this Thesis recognises these fundamental, environmental 
frameworks which not only shape the manner in which tax incentives are 
fashioned, but also affect their implementation, administration and review. 
By analysing the various incentive laws of these countries, reviewing the 
practical realities of their administration, evaluating conflicting perspectives on 
their efficacy, and considering local and international evidence on their roles in 
advancing regional economic development, this Thesis makes a distinct and 
original contribution to knowledge in this field. This Thesis provides an 
original exposition of the Nigerian legal regime for tax incentives; compares 
16 See Shamsuddeen Usman 'Tax Incentives & Investment in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
(1966-1977)' (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics & Political Science, 1980). 
Dr. Sharnsuddeen Usman is currently Nigeria's Finance Minister. 
17 See Idowu Salaudeen Lajire Agboola 'Company Taxation in Nigeria: with Special 
Reference to the Anti-avoidance Provisions and to the Tax Incentives' (PhD Thesis, 
University of London, 1968). 
18 Michael Todaro, Economic Developmenf, (7th edition, Pearson Education Limited; 
Addis on-We sleY, Essex: 2000) pp-11-13. 
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1: Proem 
this exposition with a review of tax incentive practices in South Africa and 
Kenya; considers the influence of key international tax, regional integration, 
trade and finance issues; and concludes with a critical analysis of contemporary 
Nigerian tax incentives policy using exernplars derived from the experiences of 
South Africa and Kenya. 
More specifically, this Thesis addresses the following research questions: 
What is the general role of tax incentives in promoting sustainable 
economic development in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya? 
What kind of tax incentives are currently used in Nigeria, South Africa 
and Kenya? 
What are the contemporary trends in tax incentives law and policy in 
these three study countries? 
What constraints do international tax law,, regional integration 
arrangements and international trade/financial architecture impose on 
the use of tax incentives in South Africa, Kenya and more specifically, 
Nigeria? 
Is contemporary Nigerian tax incentives policy clear, consistent, prudent 
and appropriate in view of contemporary development needs, available 
resources and national priorities? 
What lessons can Nigeria derive from the South African and Kenyan 
experiences to improve tax incentive law and polJC3T? and 
0 What matters limit the scope of this Study and therefore impose 
constraints on the applicability of its findings? 
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Where the potential role of tax incentives is considered to be significant and 
positive, this Thesis suggests how best underlyi ing economic and policy 
objectives may be achieved through the use of tax incentives. Where, however, 
this role is perceived to be marginal or indeed, counterproductive, this Thesis 
considers why the use of tax incentives persists despite being proven to be 
suboptimal or otherwise adverse to economic development. 
1.5. THE STUDY'S REGIONS,, COUNTRIES & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1. A Focus on East, West & Southern Africa 
This Study focuses on three regions in Sub-Saharan Africa: West Africa, 
Southern Africa and East Africa. A number of reasons inform the exclusion of 
Central and North Africa from this Study. The Central African region has 
recently been hobbled by political instability, armed conflicts and coups d'itat, 
particularly in the Great Lakes region. 19 Tax incentives often play an important 
though secondary role in inducing desirable types of investment behavior. This 
role may be significantly hampered where crucial economic and political 
fundamentals are lacking or inadequate. Unlike most Central African countries, 
all three study countries are coastal nations with major shipping ports and a 
long history of international trade. Tax incentives tend to be optimally utilised 
in export-oriented industries. Finally, given the complicated political, lingual, 
historical and cultural development of Central Africa, the scope of this Study 
would be unduly broadened by including this region. 
North Africa has been excluded for analogous reasons. North Africa is 
relatively the most prosperous region, leading continental growth in recent 
times. Most of the countries of this region are well on their way to meeting 
their Millennium Development Goals by 2015. However, recent events in the 
North African and Middle East region2() have negatively affected the region's 
19 Particularly recent armed conflict in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Rwanda; 
. 
and attempted or successful coups d7tat in the Central 
African Republic, 
Equatorial Guinea arid Sao Tome & Principe. 
20 Particularly the crisis in Darfur (Sudan) and the war in Iraq. 
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economic prospects. The geographic proximity to the Middle East and the 
shared religious and cultural connections further differentiate this region from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it is considered best to confine this Study to the 
selected economic bourses (vi, -., ECOWAS/WAEMU, 21 SADC/SACU22 and 
COMESA/EAC Customs Union23) and the role of tax incentives in the North 
and Central African regions would not be examined. 
1.5.2. A Focus on Nigeria, South Africa & Kenya 
This Thesis focuses on the role of tax incentives in a trio of Sub-Saharan 
countries: Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. These study countries are all 
among Africa's Ten Largest Economies, a class which collectively constitutes 
55% of Africa's population and 75% of its GDP. 24The study countries have the 
largest economies in their respective regions and trade surpluses with their 
regional neighbours. Consequently, they have the economic size and potential 
to alter the fortunes of their respective regions and improve the economic 
fortunes of Sub-Saharan Africa. Each of the study countries has different 
socio-political challenges to overcome in their journeys towards similar 
economic goals. The recent historical development, political con stitution and 
economic performance of these countries are noted in Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
1.5.3. Research Methodology25 
This Study uses doctrinal and reform-oriented legal research methodologies to 
trace the evolution and incorporation of tax' policy into legislation and 
21 The Economic Community of West African States and the West African Economic 
Monetary Union (respectively) which both include Nigeria. 
22 The Southern African Development Community and the Southern Africa Customs 
Union (respectively) which both include South Africa. 
23 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and ýhe East African 
Community Customs Union (respectively) which both include Kenya. 
24 In 2003, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya ranked as fourth, first and tenth 
respectively in terms of GDP: AfDB, African Developmenl Report 2004: Africa in the 
Glohal Trading System (Oxford University Press, New York: 2004), p. 5; African 
Development Report 2007: ATatural Resources for Sustainahle Development in Africa (Oxford 
University Press, New York: 2007) p. xx. 
25 See generally Terry Hutchinson, Researching and IF'riting in 
Lanv (2nd ed, Lawbook Co., 
Sydney: 2006); Steinar Kvale, InterViews: an introduction to qualitative research 
z. nterviewing (Sage Publications, 
Thousand Oaks: 1996); and Jennifer Mason, Qualitative 
Researching (Sage Publications, London: 2002). 
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common law in the study countries. While much of this Study was conducted 
by doctrinal research in libraries in Abula, Amsterdam, lbadan, Johannesburg, 
Lagos and London, this research was complemented by qualitative personal 
interviews, teleconferences and focus group discussions with senior 
government officials, policymakers, civil servants, tax accountants, lawyers and 
other experts, conducted mainly during Field Trips to Nigeria and South 
Africa. These qualitative techniques were appropriate given the policy-oriented 
nature of this Study. A comparative methodology was utilised to derive valid 
exemplars from the historical and descriptive review of the South African and 
Kenyan experiences that may prove useful in criticising and reforming Nigerian 
tax incentive law and policy. 
This Researcher obtained a great deal of information and data during Field 
Trips to Nigeria and South Africa. While some difficulty was encountered in 
obtaining data, information and perspectives on tax incentives in Kenya, these 
challenges were largely overcome by the invaluable assistance of professional 
tax and accounting firms in Kenyan and other key individuals whose efforts 
helped this Researcher to procure relevant data, statistics and perceptions. 
Consequently, the challenges encountered in researching Kenyan tax law and 
policy do not materially impair comparisons made with (or possible lessons 
for) Nigeria. 
THE THESIS IN OUTLINE 
This Chapter introduces this Study by highlighting its scope, subject matter, 
objectives and research methodology. Chapter 2 will critically consider the 
nature and use of various types of tax incentives as policy tools for economic 
development highlighting key issues, noting relevant debates to further 
demonstrate the importance of extended scholarly examination of this topic. 
Chapter 2 reviews typical forms of tax incentives and highlights traditional 
arguments for and against their use. This literature review sets the scene 
for 
subsequent policy articulation and analysis. 
Bode Oyetunde 
PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mag, Universit :I _), of 
London 
PqTe 22 of 418 
The Role of Tax Incenlit, es in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 1: Proem A Comparatit)e Study o. f Nigerian, Sonib A. frian & Keýyan Tax Lan, 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 are the outcome of bibliographical and qualitative research 
into the role of tax incentive laws, practices and policies in each study country. 
However, while Chapters 4 and 5 merely review South African and Kenyan tax 
incentive regulations, an original exposition is made of Nigerian tax incentive 
laws and policies in Chapter 3. This exposition was necessary as this 
Researcher did not find any singular text or resource that comprehensively 
reviewed the whole gamut of Nigerian tax incentives law and practice. Chapter 
3 forms. the backdrop against which South African and Kenyan tax incentives 
may be compared. Chapters 3,4 and 5 collectively form a prequel to the review 
in Chapter 6 of regional and international tax, trade and finance issues which 
influence the use of tax incentives in developing countries. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 also provide the foundation for the critical analysis in 
Chapter 7 of contemporary Nigerian tax incentive policy using exemplars 
derived from the South African and Kenyan experiences. The concluding 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this Study. Essentially, this Thesis traces 
and illuminates the journey of the Nigerian, South African and Kenyan AbIku 
along the rivulets of tax incentive laws, towards the river of sustained 
economic development. But first it is proper to critically review the literature 
on the role of tax incentives as a policy instrument for advancing of 
sustainable economic development. 
This Thesis is based on information available up to 1 February 2008 in respect 
of South Africa and Kenya, and 1 March 2008 in respect of Nigeria. 
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2. TAX INCENTIVES AS A POLICY TOOL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE ECONomic DEVELOPMENT 
'Tor the rational study of the law the black letter man may be the man of the present but 
the man of the future is the man o statistics and the master of economics ... ýf 
We learn thatfor evegthing we have to give up something else, and we are taught to set 
the advantage we gain against the other advantage we lose, 
and to know what we are doing when we elect. 1126 
OVERVIEW 
This Chapter explores the nature of tax incentives by examining various 
aspects of these policy instruments. It evaluates the diverse ends tax incentives 
may serve in promoting sustainable economic development in developing 
countries. It delves into the debate over the efficacy of tax incentives by 
highlighting perceived difficulties that attend their use. In conclusion, it finds 
that though their use is fraught with challenges, tax incentives may, when 
prudently designed, implemented and reviewed promote sustainable economic 
development in certain circumstances. How this venture has been undertaken 
in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya forms the subject matter of Chapters 3,4 
and 5. 
26 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 'The Path of the Law' 
10 Harvard Law Review (1897) 
pp. 475,469,474. 
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1 1). BASIC DEFINITIONS 
Tax Incentives 
The phrase 'tax incentive), though subject to much academic analysis, has not 
been exhaustively defined. 27 Shah provides a good working definition of tax 
incentives as: 
... those provisions in the tax code that afford preferential treatment 
to some activities over others (say, tax holidays and credits for 
investment in manufacturing industries), some assets over others 
(accelerated depreciation provisions for specified assets), some form of 
organization over others (for example, lower tax rates for small rather 
than large businesses), or some forms of financing over others (debt 
over equity). 28 
This paradigm focuses on fiscal measures that are specifically designed to 
encourage capital accumulation in specific economic sectors, change the time 
distribution of the use of assets and positively influence the investment and 
financing aspects of business decisions. 29 
Vlherkenttd rightly emphasises the intentional nature of tax incentive policies, 
arguing that tax concessions which ultimately promote foreign investment, 
though not originally intended to have such an effect, should fall beyond the 
scope of tax incentives per se. 30Viherkenttý also argues for limiting the phrase 
ctax incentivesý to encompass fiscal measures influencing active business 
operations of domestic and foreign investors as opposed to policies for passive 
investment more commonly associated with tax havens. 31 However, an 
exceptionally low corporate tax rate which promotes economic activity (say, in 
financial services) could conceivably qualify as a tax incentive given the 
27 Most definitions in the literature correspond more closely with (foreign) investment 
I. ncentz . Pes: IBFD International Tax Glossary, Barry 
Larking (ed) (5th edition, IBFD, 
Amsterdam: 2005), pp. 179,237. 
28 Anwar Shah 'Overview' in Fiscal. Incentives for Investment and Innovation, Anwar Shah 
(ed) (oxford University Press, New York: 1995), p. 2 (emphasis mine). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Viherkentta, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries 6- International Taxation, op cz . t, 
pp. 6,17-19. 
31 Ibid, p. 6- 
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intended and actual effect such policies have had on investment. 32 To the 
extent that such incentives are intended to and actually influence financing and 
investment decisions of economic agents, these measures shall be considered 
here as tax incentives. 
Tax incentives for the present purposes broadly correspond to Shah's 
definition33 insofar as these affect actual financing and investment decisions. 
As much of the literature on tax incentives considers their role in encouraging 
Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter: FDI), many common definitions 
correspond to that of FD1 incentives. 34These have been described elsewhere as 
any measurable advantages accorded to specific enterprises by governments to 
encourage them to behave in a certain way which include measures specifically 
designed to either increase the rate of return to FDI or to reduce associated 
costs and risks. 35 
As this Thesis primarily considers tax incentives for sustainable economic 
development, the bias in some of the literature towards FDI incentives shall not 
be replicated here. Although the vast majority of foreign investment in the trio 
of study nations is constituted by inflows from Western industrialised nations,, 
investments from and trade with other developing nations are becoming more 
important. 36The role of domestic and regional private capital formation should 
also not be overlooked. 37 Consequently, the approach adopted here will be 
consistent with this Thesis' objectives to consider Sub-Saharan African 
regional development, and how, if at all, fiscal measures can assist in 
promoting economic development in a sustainable way. 
32 E. g. in Hong Kong and Ireland: UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Foreign 
Direct Investment: 
A Global Survey, op cit, p. 15. 
33 Shah, 'Overview' in Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation, op cit, p. 2. 
34 Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: 
Are They Vorth the 
Costs?, op cit; Vlherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries 6- 
International Taxation, 
0 cit; UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Fore *n Direct Investment: 
A Global Survey, op cit. P 119 
35 UNCTAD/DTCI, Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment, Current Studies, Series A, 
No. 30 (UN, Geneva: 1996) [E. 96. II. A. 6], p. 3. 
36 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2003104 - Country Studies: South Africa, 
pp. 285,287. 
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Sustainable Economic Development38 
In this Thesis, the concept of sustainable39 economic development adopted 
would be that espoused by contemporary development economists such as 
Todaro and Smith, 40 who conceive of development as a 
multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, 
popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of 
economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of 
poverty ... represent(ing) the whole gamut of change by which an entire 
social system, tuned to the diverse basic needs and desires of individuals 
and social groups within that system, moves away from a condition of 
life widely perceived as unsatisfactory towards a situation or condition 
regarded as materially and spiritually better. 41 
The work of Amartya Sen on freedom as a capabilities approacb to function 
provides deep insights into the nature of underdevelopment and poverty. 
Crucially, development is seen as a process of enhancing the quality of human 
existence and the spectrum of individual liberties: to be'42 to achieve43 and to 
be free. 44While increasing growth in incomes measured by economic statistics 
may indicate improvements in economic development, narrowly defined, this 
may not necessarily correlate with higher levels of broader human 
'development'. 
37 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services (UN, New York: 
2004), p. 3. 
edition, Pearson 38 See Michael Todaro and Stephen C. Smith Economic Development (9th 
Education Limited, Harlow/Essex: 2006), chapter 1. 
39 See Sharachandra A. Lee (1991) 'Sustainable Development: A Critical Review', World 
Development, Vol. 24, pp. 215-255. 
40 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9th ed), op cit, chapter 1. 
41 Ibid, p-17. 
42 Corresponding to the innate human desire for self-esteem, respect, dignity and to be 
recognised by and contribute to one's society: ibid, pp. 21-22. 
43 Essentially the instinctive yearning to meet life-sustaining basic needs consistent 
with human existence: ibid. 
44 This connotes the inborn desire to be free from external physical and social 
constraints on the ability to choose: ibid. 
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As Sen observes: 
Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of 
development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross 
national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with 
industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social 
modernization. Growth of GNP or of individual incomes can, of course, 
be very important as means to expanding the freedoms enjoyed by 
members of the society. But freedoms depend also on other 
determinants, such as social and economic arrangements ... as well as 
political and civil rights... 45 
Therefore 'economic development is a necessary condition for the 
improvement in the quality of life that is development'. 46 Sen attributes the 
divergence between the economic progress and broader human development to 
factors such as personal heterogeneities flowing from individual traits and 
circumstances, environmental and geographical diversities, social climate 
variations, differences in perspectives across communities, and the distribution 
of wealth and opportunities in families, clans and social units. 47 
In this Thesis, a multidisciplinary approach would be adopted where necessary, 
drawing insights from law, economics, accounting, corporate finance and other 
disciplines. This emphasis on sustainable development assumes added urgency 
in the quest to increase economic growth and reduce poverty across a wide 
section of contemporary developing economies - economies which do not 
always conform to theoretical hypotheses espoused by traditional neoclassical 
economics, but which are significantly influenced by the broader political, 
historical., legal, social, cultural and religious contexts within which they evolve 
and exist. 
The next section (§2.3) considers types of contemporary tax 
incentives. 
45 Amartya Sen Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
1999), p. 3. 
46 Todaro and Smith Economz*c Development (9th ed), op cit, p. 
21. 
47 Sen Development as Freedom, op cit, chapter 1. 
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2.3. TYPES OF TAx INCENTIVES 
2.3.1. Overview 
While there is a great deal of variety in investment incentives, subsidies and 
outright grants are more common in developed nations unlike the tax holidays, 
preferential treatment of investment costs and tax rate reductions favoured by 
many developing countries. 48 However, some of the tax incentives typically 
used in developing countries have been criticised as being of the least effective 
types. 49Tax incentives range from tax exemptions, tax deferral, tax deductions, 
special or preferential tax rates to tax credits. These measures operate at 
successive stages in the process of determining the liability of taxpayers. 51 Tax 
incentives may be broadly classified into the categories enumerated below. 
2.3.2. Preferential Tax Rates & Tax Holidays 
Tax-paying firms may be granted the reduction or removal of tax liabilities on 
a temporary or permanent basis. Reduced tax rates may be restricted to 
certain geographic regions and apply to key economic sectors or categories of 
taxes. 51 Reduced corporate income tax rates have been successfully used in 
countries with relatively small economies such as Hong Kong, Lebanon, 
Ireland, Cambodia and Estonia. 52 The resulting tax systems reduce tax 
avoidance or evasion, and indicate a preference for a more market-led 
economy. However, if the general tax rate suddenly drops significantly below 
those of neighbouring countries, the short-term revenue implications may be 
48 Morisset and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment A Review' in Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign 
Investment Are They lForth the Costs? op rit, p. 84; UNCTAD Tax Incentives & Foreign 
Direct Investment: A GlobalSurvey, op cit, pp. 16,29. 
49 Vito Tanzi and Howell H. Zee (June 2000) 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: 
Developing Countries' National Tax journal Vol. 53 No. 2, p. 315. 
50 S. S. Surrey The Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge/Massachusetts: 1973), pp. 92-126; Raymond Luja 
Assessment & Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC & the WTO: a View on State Aids, 
Trade Subsidies & Direct Taxation (Intersentia, Antwerp: 2003), p. 10. 
51 Vlherkenttii, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, p. 26. 
52 UNCTAD Tax Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, op cit, p. 15. 
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severe and more international tax distortions may occur than under a more tax- 
neutral system. 53 
A common variant of preferential tax rates is the tax holiday whereby a firm is 
granted tax-free status for a specified period of time. This incentive usually 
comes 'with strings attached': contingent on the achievement of certain 
requirements ranging from quantum of capital invested, novelty of enterprise, 
amount of local employment created, to location in designated priority sectors, 
activities or regions. Milestones signalling the commencement of the tax 
holiday include the year of grant of investment licences, year of first 
production, year of first profit or year of net cumulative profit. The duration 
of tax holidays varies from 2 to 25 years and may be extended on a 
discretionary basis. Tax holidays are attractive to investment authorities in 
developing and transition economies with rudimentary corporate tax systems 
given their ease of administration. 54 
Despite their popularity, tax holidays have been criticised by numerous 
commentators. If time-bound and not linked to specific profit caps, they 
operate as blunt policy instruments favouring high-profit projects with short- 
term investment horizons as opposed to longer-term and arguably more 
socially beneficial undertakings. To the extent that projects are undertaken 
irrespective of tax holidays, these measures are wasteful. Tax holidays also 
distort the timing of capital investment by discriminating against sequential or 
incremental post-holiday investment oUtlayS. 55 
The arbitrary designation of qualifying categories and the possibility of 
negotiating extensions may expose tax holidays to exploitation by aggressive 
53 1 Morisset and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Review' in Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign 
Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? op cit, p-85. 
54 Viherkerittii Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, p. 26; 
UNCTAD, Tax Incentives 6- Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, op cz . t, p. 23 
55 Ibid, p. 24. 
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transfer pricing, foot-loose 'phoenix' enterprises 56 and tax avoidance. Unless 
coupled with generous tax-loss carry-forward periods, tax holidays could 
constitute a tax disincentive, particularly for small or risky firms by depriving 
these firms of tax advantages from depreciation deductions, capital allowances 
and tax-deductible interest. 57 
Tax holidays cause adverse consequences for the corporate tax base where 
transfer pricing or reverse loans 58 are used to shift income among related 
companies. 59 Tax holidays constrain the narrow tax bases most developing 
countries tend to have which rely predominantly on corporate taxation. Finally, 
unless tax holiday firms are required to keep records of capital expenditures 
and aggregate taxes exempted, post-holiday tax compliance and assessment of 
revenue costs could be impaired. 60 
-2-3.3. Investment 
Tax Credits & Allowances 
Investment tax credits are deductions for specified depreciable capital or 
other expenditure permitted to be credited by a firm against its tax liabilities. 
Tax credits include flat investment tax credits 61 and incremental investment tax 
credits 62 which lower the effective cost of capital acquisition. Investment 
allowances are similar incentives though here, a deduction as a percentage or 
factor of investment expenditure is provided against taxable income reducing 
56 Formed by the designation of old industries as newly qualifying firms which migrate 
to neighbouring jurisdictions within the same region when the tax 
holiday in the first 
jurisdiction expires. 
51 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, 
p. 3 16. 
58 Where a tax-exempt subsidiary lends to its taxpaying parent company, the 
latter's 
interest expenses would be above-the-line and the 
former's interest income would be 
tax-exempt, achieving a perfectly symmetrical tax-exempt result. 
59 Away from those which are tax-paying to those which enjoy tax holidays: 
Morisset 
and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives 
Affect Foreign Direct Investment: A 
Review', o_P cit, pp. 85-86,102. 
60 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: 
Developing Countries' op cit, 
pp. 307,316. 
61 Where credit is computed as a fixed percentage of annual qualifying investment 
expenditures: UNCTAD, 
Tax Incentives 6- Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, op 
, -it, p. 16. 
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ultimate tax liability. The operation of the general tax rate affects only the 
investment allowance: the higher the general corporate income tax rate, the 
greater the incentive. 63 Investment allowances reduce pre-tax income by 
operating 'above-the-line', while investment tax credits reduce the ultimate tax 
bill, operating 'below- the-line'. 
As both investment tax credits and allowances are computed in relation to 
qualifying capital expenditures, their value is contingent on the relevant 
treatment of tax losses. For non-taxpaying firms to benefit from these 
incentives their negative tax liabilities require a treatment symmetrical to any 
positive tax liabilities, rendering such liabilities refundable or, at least 
permitted to be carried forwards or backwards, at the election of the relevant 
firm, with or without intereS t. 64 
Investment tax credits and allowances may be more effective in promoting new 
investment than preferential tax rates 65 and tax holidays. 66 For instanceý tax 
credits or allowances may be granted for value addition in processing 
industries by rewarding firms which increase dome, stic productivity and net 
local content. 67 Tax credits could also be granted for activities like export 
processing and tourism which earn foreign currencies and improve the national 
balance of trade position. Revenue costs associated with investment tax credits 
and allowances are relatively easy to assess and assist tax administrations to 
generate useful information. Unlike subsidies, tax credits and allowances do 
62 Where credit is computed as a fixed percentage of qualifying investment 
expenditures but provided in excess of a moving-average or other capital base: ibid, 
p. 16. 
63 Variations in corporate tax rates have no effect on the value of tax credits (indeed, 
non-deductible pioneer period losses may increase tax burden especially where the 
first few years involve large expenditures): ibid, p. 23. 
64 Otherwise, tax-loss firms would be adversely affected by partial loss-offsetting 
measures and effectively give the government an interest-free loan: Robin W. 
Boadway and Anwar Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries, ' in Anwar Shah (ed) Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation, OP cit, 
p. 33. 
65 Which may only increase economic rents accruing to existing capital. 
66 Which reward new firms and not new investment: Morisset and, Pirnia 'How Tax 
policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct Investment: A Review', op cit, pp. 86-87. 
67 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives 6- Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, op cz . t, P. 19. 
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not require up-front cash outlays from public funds and only benefit profitable 
firms. 11 However, drawbacks associated with investment tax credits and 
allowances include encouraging abuses and distortions such as multiple claims, 
funnelling allowances and credits through conduit companies and encouraging 
investment in short-lived capital assets. 69 
2.3.4. Accelerated & Enhanced Depreciation 
Investment allowances are similar to accelerated and enhanced depreciation. 
Accelerated depreciation permits qualifying capital expenditure to be written 
off over a shorter period than would otherwise obtain under accounting rules 
based on normal economic depreciation. The incentive provided by rapid 
write-offs may be increased by enhanced depreciation whereby depreciable 
expenditure is multiplied by a factor. 70 Generous initial allowances permitting 
the bulk of capital costs to be written off in the year of acquisition increase 
the present value of these incentives. Such allowances may be coupled with or 
operate in lieu of regular depreciation allowances by reducing the depreciable 
tax base and quantum of capital consumption stock in later years. Qualifying 
capital expenditure may include both tangible assets (plant, equipment, 
buildings and production facilities) and intangibles such as research and 
development (hereafter: R&-D) outlays and marketing expenditure. 71 
Where limited to actual capital expenditures, accelerated depreciation (unlike 
investment allowances) exerts less pressure on firms to invest in short-lived 
assets. Indeed, investors might be encouraged to accelerate the timing of 
planned projects. As the revenue cost in early years is partially recovered in 
later years, only the timing of capital consumption is altered. Consequently, 
there is less incentive for firms to engage in arbitrage transactions associated 
68 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op cit, 
p. 318. 
69 Unless minimum holding periods are required or investment in newer technologies 
produces more dynamic and efficient firms: ibid, p. 317. 
70 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives 6- Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, op cz . t, p. 18. 
71 Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on . the 
Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries', oP cit, p. 36. 
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with investment allowances and credits. For these reasons some commentators 
prefer accelerated depreciation over other incentives. 72 
2.3.5. Favourable Treatment of Tax Losses & Deductions 
In certain circumstances, the treatment of tax losses whereby negative tax 
liabilities are permitted to be carried forwards or backwards against taxable 
income in later or previous tax periods may operate as a tax incentive by 
improving cash-flow. For small, risky firms such incentives may be critical. 
When firms experience lumpy cash-flows the ability to defer or bring forward a 
tax charge may prove invaluable. 73Where loss carry-forwards are not time- 
bound, losses may be set-off indefinitely against future profits. 
Full and multiple deductions against taxable income may be permitted for 
qualifying expenditure. These incentives typically target economically desirable 
activities such as transfer of technology and export marketing. While full 
expensing or multiple deductions may not greatly affect the quantum of 
investment outlays, they may influence the timing of expenditure by 
influencing firms to accelerate projects. 
2.3.6. Incentives for Finance & Employment 
Developing countries often provide incentives to lower the general cost of 
capital, encourage capital market development and improve the allocation of 
resources to deserving investments. As regards FDI, capital-importing 
countries often provide reduced withholding taxes on outbound dividends and 
interest. This policy may be criticised for providing foreign investors with 
perverse incentives to strip source country assets of income instead of 
reinvesting revenues. 74However, preferential treatment of capital gains 
by tax 
rate reductions may ameliorate this bias. 75 
72 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing 
Countries, ' op c1l, 
p. 3 17. 
73 Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment 
in Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, p. 33. 
74 Preferring foreign investors in this way may lead to lobbying for the extension of 
incentives to indigenous investors who may not actually 
be influenced by these 
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Cash grants, disbursements from investment funds, subsidised loans, corporate 
tax imputation and flow-through of tax write-offs to shareholders illustrate the 
range of investment incentives available for corporate finance. Favourable tax 
treatment of income for municipal debt instruments and collective savings 
schemes may positively affect capital market growth, harness longer-term 
investment funds and deepen emerging bond markets. However, there may be a 
tension between tax incentives for capital market development and the 
opportunity to collect (at low administrative costs) large revenues by taxing the 
formal and well-organised financial sector. 76 In weighing the merits of domestic 
capital market development against the costs of tax incentives for corporate 
finance, adequate consultation among policyrnakers, investment promotion 
bodies, central banks and tax authorities is desirable to ensure that the right 
balance is struck between these important, yet often conflicting ends. 
Governments may also find it expedient to utilise employment tax credits or 
allowances, wage subsidies and deductions for training costs to ease the 
burden of social security contributions,, reduce unemployment, rectify other 
labour market imperfections or achieve other objectives. 77 
2.3.7. Indirect Tax Incentives & General Policy Instruments 
The effectiveness of indirect tax incentives and other general policy 
instruments depends on the appropriateness of the particular policy tool to 
deliver desired economic outcomes. Governments often use zero or reduced 
tariffs and taxes on imported capital equipment and increased tariffs on 
imported goods to protect infant industries from foreign competition. 
However, such incen tives may contravene international trade agreements, 
foster capital and commodity market distortions, stifle competition and 
incentives: Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two 
Experiments', op cit, pp. 3-67., 
75 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survej, op cil, pp. 18-19. 
76 Developing Government Bond Markets: A Handbook (World Bank/IMF, New York: 2001), 
p. 3 8. 
77 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survej, o-P cit, P-19. 
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perpetuate inefficiencies by protecting unproductive industries to the 
detriment of consumers. 78 
Tanzi and Lee suggest that providing rapid VAT refunds would be more 
effective in improving the cash-flow of firms than exempting capital inputs 
from VAT. On the other hand, exempting inputs for the production of export 
goods from import tariffs would be. an effective way to eliminate this added 
cost component provided the inputs are properly utilised and arbitrage 
transactions seeking to exploit the tax wedge between allowed and disallowed 
inputs are effectively blocked. 79 
2.3.8. Export Processing & Free Trade Zones 
Governments often create special investment zones with tax exemptions, 
investment concessions 80 and bespoke infrastructure for (exp ort- oriented) 
investments which foster value-adding services, create employment and 
facilitate the transfer of technical skills and cutting-edge technology. Although 
zone incentives may be protected from abuse by physical controls (e. g. secure 
customs perimeters), administrative and institutional defects may lead to 
revenue leakage. 81 Zone incentives may be contrasted with more extreme 
incentives by way of reduced or non-existent income taxes in tax havens 
designed to attract global, internationally- agile multinational corporations 
especially in banking, internet and insurance services. However controversial 
they may be, tax haven incentives have contributed to enhanced economic 
growth in services for such countries despite global efforts to combat harmful 
tax competition. 82 
The next section considers certain justifications for tax incentives. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op 
p. 318. 
80 For foreign exchange controls and the employment of expatriate staff. 
81 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op cit, 
p. 31 8. 
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2.4. THE ROLE OF TAX INCENTIVES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
2.4.1. Overview 
Tax incentives have promoted diverse types of entrepreneurial activities, 
ranging from daring feats of glant-slaying in Biblical times 83 to more modern, 
less risky ventures such as those promoted by Singapore's Operational and 
Regional Headquarters Programme. 84The latter scheme grants tax incentives by 
way of 3-year reduced tax rates to multinationals and foreion nffflintf, 
companies of various sizes which establish their international or regional 
headquarters in Singapore. The relatively successful programme was revised in 
2003 and has been reported to have created over 1,600 highly skilled jobs and 
US$600million in new wealth. Such initiatives have established Singapore as 
premier hub for corporate headquarters in Asia despite competition with 
similar schemes in the region. 85 Tax incentives serve various other uses 
between these extreme ends of the spectrum as considered below. 
2.4.2. Offsetting the Corporate Tax Distortion 
One of the roles served by the corporate income tax in developed countries is 
to effect the withholding of tax at source on corporate equity income. 86 In its 
absence, direct or indirect personal income taxes levied on households would 
not result in the comprehensive taxation of corporate capital gains on an 
accrual basis. By retaining and reinvesting earnings in corporate vehicles, 
individuals and households defer tax liabilities. This problem would be more 
accentuated in 'growth' companies with low dividend pay-out policies which 
82 Tax havens attracted FDI inflows of over US$200billion between 1985 and 1994 in 
the Caribbean and Pacific regions: Morisset and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and 
Incentives Affect Foreign Direct Investment: A Review' op cit, pp. 81,87-88. 
83 VI. Z., the tax holiday reportedly offered by the Israelite King Saul to any hero who 
would slay the Philistine giant, Goliath. However, it is unclear from the record 
whether the qualifying candidate, David, and his family ultimately received the 
promised, indefinite income tax holiday: 1 Samuel 17: 17-27,48-58 in the Holy Bible 
(Thomas Nelson, Nashville: 1982). 
84 Box V. 6: 'Singapore: Going for Headquarters' in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2004, op cit, p. 198. 
85 See Box 'V. 7 'The Republic of Korea: a regional business services hub for North-East 
Asia? ': ibid, p-199. 
86 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op cit, 
pp. 299-300; Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in 
Developing Countries, ' op cit, pp. 41-43. 
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attract investors with a preference for capital appreciation and would be less of 
an issue where a significant proportion of revenues are regularly paid out as 
dividends. 87 However, where accumulated capital gains remain untaxed, 
investors effectively receive an interest-free loan from the government. While 
governments would be understandably dissatisfied with this result, finding a 
satisfactory solution such as integrating the personal and corporate income tax 
systems may prove elusive. 88 
In open economies, imputing corporate taxes on dividends to foreign 
shareholders would unwind the cost-less tax transfer from residence (home) 
countries to source (host) countries by the use of tax credit systems. 89 In such 
open economies, it has been argued that corporate tax creates distortions in 
capital markets in that equity finance would be optimal for households while 
firms would favour debt finance. This distortion would remain even if the 
personal and corporate tax regimes were merged. 90 Consequently, care must be 
taken in designing and implementing tax incentives to ensure that domestic 
investment and capital accumulation is not hindered by these distortions and 
equally, the beneficial aspects of the transfer of taxes from source to residence 
countries by the tax credit system are not lost. The best means of achieving 
this may be by implementing tax incentives specifically targeted at sources of 
domestic capital, perhaps in subtle ways such as focusing on economic sectors 
with large or dominant domestic participation (as such selective targeting 
minimizes tax transfers abroad without simultaneously appearing 
87 R. A, Brealey and S. C. - 
Myers The Principles of Corporate Finance (5th International 
Edition, McGraw-Hill: New York: 1996), p. 434. 
88 Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, pp. 37-41. 
81 Where the residence country adopts a tax credit system and the source country sets 
its withholding tax or corporate tax rates at levels below the general rate of tax in 
home countries, a pure tax transfer occurs from the residence to source country as 
taxes paid by foreign companies in the source country would be credited under 
relevant rules against tax liabilities in the residence country: ibid, pp. 40-41. 
90 As (a) in open economies, the savings and investment segments of the domestic 
capital markets are effectively segmented due to the free entry and egress of 
finance 
from abroad; and (b) interest income would be taxable at the personal level but 
deductible for corporations. The tax system therefore favours equity income 
accruing to investors and simultaneously creates incentives 
for corporations to 
prefer debt over equity 
finance: ibid, p. 41. ' 
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discriminatory). 91 But if the outcome introduces undesirable distortions 
between industries, reduced tax rates may be preferable. 
2.4-3. Attracting & Retaining Foreign Investment 
Developing countries' views on foreign direct and portfolio investment have 
evolved from the welcoming approaches of the 1950s/1960s, through the more 
cautious, critical postures of the late 1960s/early 1970s to open, positive 
attitudes characterising the 1980s/1990S. 92These changing attitudes have been 
informed by shifting perceptions of the benefits and demerits of foreign 
investment. At one extreme, the immense economic power wielded by modern 
corporations is resented due to the adverse influence that may be (or perceived 
to be) brought to bear on the political and economic affairs of developing 
countries. 93 These concerns lie at the heart of the nationalisation/ expropriation 
exercises,, non-repatriation of earnings and other restrictions Imposed on 
foreign investors in many developing nations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Contemporary developing countries seek to simultaneously realise the 
advantages of foreign investment and minimise any disadvantages in response 
to the pressures and potentials of globalisation. The ability of foreign 
investment to improve local economies - by integrating developing economies 
into international value chains; facilitating the transfer of technology, skills 
and best practices; creating new industries and employment; improving the 
productivity of human and natural resources; complementing domestic capital; 
and increasing tax revenues by expanding the domestic tax base - may 
outweigh any perceived disadvantages. 94 Consequently, developing countries 
use various strategies including tax incentives to attract and retain FDI. 
Indeed, some commentators suggest that the' grant of tax incentives in a 
91 Ibid, p. 53. 
92 V"iherkenad Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cz . 1, 
pp. 1; 13-15. 
93 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9th ed), op cit, pp. 115-117. 
94 UNCTAD, Tax Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey, o-P cz . t, p. 2 0; 
Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, p. 52. 
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temporary basis could serve as signals of the 'quality' of the country as a 
destination for FDI. 95 
2.4.4. Promoting Infant Industries & Domestic Investment 
Selective investment interventions may be more important for indigenous firms 
than foreign investors given the reality that the vast majority of private 
investment in developing economies is local. 96Tax incentives may be useful in 
this regard, particularly for domestic infant industries. These infant industries 
might be engaged in risky, though potentially highly-profitable ventures, 
increasing the adverse effect of asymmetrical information on their financing 
options and cost of capital. 
Under imperfect market conditions, the literature on adverse selection and 
moral hazards suggests that lenders and external investors would be unable (or 
unwilling) to expend resources to discern the quality of firms. Internal 
managers of high-quality firms would be privy to exclusive information about 
their firms' prospects but would be unable to convincingly convey this 
information to external investors and lenders as low-quality firms could 
successfully mimic such signals. As the motives of internal managers and 
external investors may not be perfectly aligned, this moral hazard creates a 
distorting conflict of interests. Consequently, the terms on which financing 
would be available may be too expensive for high-quality firms but too 
favourable for low-quality firms, leading to suboptimal levels of investment. 97 
In these circumstances, tax incentives (e. g. investment tax credits) which 
95 E. W. Bond and L. Samuelson (1986) 'Tax Holidays as Signals, ' American Economic 
Review 76 (4), pp. 820-826; Boadway and *Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of 
Investment in Developing Countries, ' op cit, p. 57. 
96 UNCTAD, Forld Investment Report 2004, op cit, p. 3. 
97 See S. C. Myers 'Determinants of Corporate Borrowing', 5 journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 146-175; Michael C. Jensen and William Meckling (1976) 'Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', journal of 
Financial Economics pp. 305-360; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1986) 'Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control' journal of Political Economy 94 (3) pp. 461- 
488; and George Ackerof, (1970) 'The market 
for lernons, ' Quarterly journal of 
Econornics 84, pp. 488-500. 
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provide up-front funds, operate on a temporary basis and are targeted in a 
discretionary manner to domestic firms would be desirable. 98 
Developing economies tend to be characterised by low levels of efficiency in 
infrastructure. These inefficiencies sometimes are a legacy from previous 
colonial rule when inherited administrative systems were poorly structured and 
designed primarily to extract and transport natural resources to the seaports 
and not to connect domestic markets and communities. " Larger firms have the 
scope of operations to be able to deal with disincentives created by poor 
infrastructure. For instance, in countries where domestic electricity utilities are 
unreliable, it would be easier for larger firms to adapt by acquiring private, 
alternative sources of power. Microenterprises may find the challenges of 
coping with these difficulties in the business environment monumental or even 
insurmountable. 100 
Directly resolving failures in basic services by privatising inefficient utilities 
may create fewer distortions than incentives. However, where this cannot be 
done immediately due to political difficulties or the lack of adequate 
structures, 101 there may be a temporary role, albeit at the margin, for tax 
incentives to mitigate the challenges adverse operating environments pose for 
microenterprises-102 
2.4.5. Promoting Public Gains from Externalities 
Tax incentives are frequently used by policymakers to correct perceived market 
failures (e. g. free-rider problems and information asymmetries) which may 
result in a dearth of investment in high-tech industries, R&D and 
98 Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, p. 55. 
99 Particularly with African transportation networks: Commission for Africa, Our 
Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa, op cit, p. 109. 
100 Box 6.10 'The Power to Improve Productivity in Nigeria' in Vorld Development Report 
2003, op cit, p. 132. 
101 Like a comprehensive competition law Policy, competitive services markets and 
enforcement institutions. 
102 Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
. 
Countries,, op ^it, p. 55. 
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environmentally friendly technologies. One of the greatest advantages of 
private investment is its potential to create positive externalities which exceed 
the returns 'captured' by owners of private capital. 103 Policyrnakers in 
developing countries often offer incentives for private investment to enhance 
associated public goods. 
These outcomes differ fundamentally from the neoclassical counter- 
revolutionists' prescriptions that free-market reforms which reduce (or indeed, 
eliminate'04) the government's role in the market place would lessen economic 
inefficiencies, distortions and rent-seeking. 105 While the notable failure of the 
state- controlled economies of the former Soviet Union underscores the greater 
efficiencies of free-market economies, there have been significant failures of 
free-market policy prescriptions in some developing economies. 106 These 
failures have been attributed in part to the conceptual foundations of much 
neoclassical coun ter- revolutionist thinking. The assumptions underpinning 
free, open and perfectly competitive markets may not be entirely applicable in 
the fundamentally different realities of developing markets, institutions and 
economies. In developing countries there may be a case for a genuine role for 
governments in making necessary economic interventions which promote 
general welfare, encourage the social benefits of increased investment and 
reduce the undesirable effects of free market-based reforms. 107 
Conversely, contemporary economic theories highlight the ability of 
externalities from consistent, complementary investments in human and 
physical capital to generate positive spillovers not captured by private 
investors which ultimately benefit the economy and contribute to sustained, 
long-term economic growth. For instance, endogenous growth theory, O-Ring 
103 Ibid, p-53. 
104 In the case of the new political economy variant of publIc-choice theory which 
argues for no public or government intervention in the economy 
due to the corrupt 
activities of selfish, self-interested government 
functionaries and their rent-seeking 
private sector collaborators. 
105 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9tb ed), op cit, p. 121. 
106 Joseph E. Stiglitz Globalisation and its Discontents (Allen Lane/Penguin Press, London: 
2002), chapters 4&5. 
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'Y 
theory and Big-Push economic model all recognise the capacity for minor 
distortions in markets and the behaviour of market participants to interact and 
create more significant, global distortions which may hamstring economic 
development. These economic models also support constructive government 
policy interventions to kick-start the process of development and provide the 
compulsion to lift developing economies out of poverty traps and cyclical 
underdevelopment. 101 
2.4.6. Generating Employment & Controlling Urbanisation 
Unsustainable urbanisation is one of the most significant problems facing 
developing countries. Current population projections presage dire 
consequences should uncontrolled rural-urban migration remain unaddressed. 
At current projections, the global population is expected to exceed 9billion by 
2050, increasing by 34% from current levels of 6.7billion souls. More 
disconcerting is the expectation that most of this growth is expected to be in 
the developing world where the population is set to increase from 5.7billion to 
7.9billion between 2007 arid 2050.109 
Sub-Saharan Africa is currently the most rapidly urbanising continent. "O The 
respective populations of Nigeria, South Africa are to grow from 
158.313million, 49.278million and 40.645million to 288.696million,, 
55.590million and 84.757million between 2010 and 2050-111 The growth rate of 
107 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9th ed), op cit, pp. 123-125. 
10, See further Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9th ed), op cit, chapter 4; Michael 
Kremer (1993) 'The O-ring theory of economic development', Quarterly journal of 
Economics, vol. 108, pp. 600-621; Kevin M. Murphy, Andrew Shleifer, and Robert W. 
Nrishny (1989) 'Industrialisation and the big push', journal of Political Economy 
vol. 97, pp. 1003-1026; and Paul Krugman Development, Geography, and Economic Theory 
(MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts: 1995). 
109 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Press Release 
POP/952 of 13/03/2007, available at 
<httý. 2: //wwv7. un. org/News/11'ress /docs//20(: )7ý/ýý12ol2952. doc. htm>. 
110 United Nations Habitat Globalisation and Urban Culture Report on 'The State of the 
World's Cities: Trends in Sub-Saharan -Africa', 
Urbanisation and Metropolisation, 
available at 
httl2: /ýNITý, N;, w. ui-ic. hs. orý4, /medi, -tccntre/docunientsý/sowc/Reg-ional-, -ýfrica. 12df on 
23.08.05. 
111 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Press Population 
Database available at <httl-2: //esa. uri. or, (. ý,, /unl2l2ý/>. 
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Lagos, Nigeria illustrates this frenetic pace of population growth. Its 
population exceeded 1million for the first time by 1970112but the 2006 national 
census figures exceed 9million inhabitants. 113By 2015, Lagos may well be the 
third most populous city in the world with a population of 24.4million. 114 
Although such mega-cities come with some advantages, unchecked growth oil 
the scale predicted pose serious human and environmental concerns for 
developing nations. The problem of urban congestion in developing countries 
is closely linked to labour market distortions5 unemployment and low 
productivity. 115 Labour distortions are exacerbated by related phenomena 
including the unregulated growth of the informal sector and the growing 
number of educated but unemployed residents in megacities. 116 
One plausible explanation for rural-7urban migration is the Todaro/Harris- 
Todaro model which considers the broader horizon some urban migrants 
would consider when choosing between the expected income in the rural areas 
and the present value of expected urban income over a longer-term, discounted 
for the increasing probability of urban migrants obtaining gainful employment 
over time in the urban areas. 117 These outcomes suggest that selective 
interventions, by way of wage subsidies and well targeted tax incentives may 
provi 11 ions to these d*fficulties. Tax *ncentives could also soluti 11 
be granted for private investment in rural areas particularly for investment 
which improves basic infrastructure, promotes small-scale and labour-intensive 
'cottage' industries, and fosters the development of technology appropriate to 
rural realities. 118 
112 United Nations Habitat Globalisation and Urban Culture Report on The State of the 
World's Cities: Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, Urbanisation and Metropolisation, op 
Cit. 
113 'Kano Tops Population Charts', This Day newspaper report, 1()th January 2007 
<httl2: //www. th. isdaN, online. com/nNY-iC-, ý7.12hl2ýýld=6ý/668> accessed 10.01.07. 
114 Todaro and Smith Economic Development 
(9th ed), op cit, pp. 314-315. 
115 Deepak Lal and H. Myint, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equiýy and Growth: A 
Comparative Study (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1996), pp. 177,178; 209-210. 
116 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9tII ed), o_p cit, pp. 330-333; 345. 
117 Ibid, pp. 347-348. 
118 Ibid, pp. 314-315. 
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Some commentators have argued that while tax incentives may be useful as 
second-best interventions to remedy distortions in labour markets, a more 
basic solution would be to implement appropriate labour market policies. 119 
However, the use of tax incentives as selective interventions would be 
particularly useful where efforts at implementing labour market policies are 
fraught with political or administrative difficulties. Tax incentives could also 
promote the development of 'edge cities' located outside the axis of urban 
agglomerations by directing the growth of the mega-urban area away from a 
congested centre. 120 Regional incentive schemes providing accelerated 
depreciation write-offs and other incentives to corporations investing in such 
sectors may prove attractive. 
2.4.7. Sectoral & Regional Incentives for Sustainable Development 
Tax incentives could be utilised in the promotion of vital economic sectors 
such as agriculture. While global average agricultural production has increased 
in tandem with growth in population, production in the Sub-Saharan African 
sub-region has lagged behind, resulting in periodic food shortages, famines and 
human suffering. The dearth of mechanised, modern farming techniques; 
inadequate biological inputs by way of hybrid and genetically enhanced seeds; 
poor irrigation systems; erratic climatic conditions and poor rains; ineffective 
means of combating pests; and the lack of cheap and widely available fertilisers 
have all contributed to low agricultural productivity. 121 Tax incentives which 
improve conditions for agricultural productivity may help address these 
challenges. 
Similarly, other sectors have the capacity to improve the economic fortunes of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Small and medium sized enterprises and export-market 
industries play important roles in improving incomes and increasing regional 
Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries, ' op cit, p. 56. 
120 Todaro and Smith Economic Development 
(9th ed), op cit, p. 324. 
121 Ibid, chapter 9. 
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industrial bases. Tax incentives could be utilised to improve the performance 
of firms and individuals in export-market manufacturing, tourism, information 
technology and other services. Efforts in the way of more mundane adaptation 
of technology to fit the peculiar circumstances of developing countries could 
also be encouraged by tax incentives. 122 Given the concentration of R&D 
expenditure in the developed world and the latent need in developing countries 
for simple products targeted at local problems, a greater emphasis on capital- 
saving technological initiatives is desirable. 123 Finally, governments must not 
overlook the need for sustainable development and the preservation of the 
environment. Efforts to adopt environmental accounting124 and conform to 
sustainability guidelines such as the Equator Principles 125 have assisted in 
redressing the depletion of environmental capital by pro)ects in the developing 
world. Tax incentives targeted at extractive industries may provide support for 
the introduction of new, environmentally- friendly technologies. 126 
S2.4 has highlighted some of the uses to which tax incentives have been 
applied in developing countries. From offsetting the corporate tax distortion 
to controlling rapid urbanisation, policymakers seek to achieve various 
economic and social ends by wielding these tools. However, tax incentives have 
certain drawbacks as seen next in §2.5. 
122 E. g. full expensing of and multiple deductions for R&D expenditures, investment tax 
credits and allowances, tax holidays, export processing zones, 
high technology 
clusters and science parks: World Bank, World 
Development Report 2005, op cit, pp. 173- 
174. 
123 Todaro and Smith Economic Development (9th ed), op cZt, pp. 77,99. 
124 Factoring the implications and consequences of environmental degradation 
into 
evaluating the costs and 
benefits of projects. 
125 See further: <ht. tp:, I/wvk7v,. equator-12rincil2le, ý,. comý/ýii-idex. html>. 
126 See below at §3.2.2.1.6. 
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2.5. THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFICACY OF TAX INCENTIVES 
2.5-1. Overview 
The previous sections have examined the definition and nature of tax 
incentives, considered various types of incentives and noted possible roles in 
achieving sustainable economic development. Early economic studies analysing 
the efficacy of tax incentives consider their use in attracting FDI to developing 
economies. Numerous findings were made using evidence from selective 
surveys of multinational companies and time-series econometric analysis. In 
the main, these surveys 127 indicated that while tax incentives might have some 
incentive value, this tended to be at the margin and was secondary to more 
fundamental economic factors. 128 Time-series econometric studies evaluated the 
sensitivity of FDI to variations in tax rates using regression analyses 129 and 
found that market and political considerations tended to outweigh the effect of 
any tax pOlicy issues. 130 
However, as demonstrated by the 1980s' literature on FDI, tax incentives 
sometimes have a real and decisive effect on investment decisions. This finding 
is valid particularly regarding the location of pro)ects within a geographic 
region; export-market oriented production, especially for highly competitive, 
high volume/small margin businesses; mobile, 'footloose' multinational groups 
which have a wide range of alternative investment sites; small, start-up 
enterprises which may suffer from cash constraints; and banking, insurance and 
other financial firms engaged in sophisticated tax avoidance /planning 
strategies. 131 Later empirical studies scrutinising actual investment decisions 
121 By Barlow and Wender (1955); by Robinson (1961); by Aharoni (1966); and by the 
Group of Thirty (1984). More detailed investors surveys were conducted by Ernst & 
Young in 1994, by Deloitte Touche in 1997 and the Japan External Trade 
Organisation in 1995. 
128 Morisset and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Review', op cit, pp. 76-77. 
121 However, the drawbacks of these studies include the inability of aggregate data to 
differentiate between other trade and policy factors that could influence FDI flows 
and difficulties in determining which classifications to adopt and 
how to interpret 
analytical results. 
130 Morisset and Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Review', op cit, pp. 69-108. 
131 Ibid, pp. 82-83. 
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seem to support these conclusions particularly for investors with alternative 
sites in view or whose ventures target export-market opportunities. 132 
Some theoretical studies 133 on the effect of tax incentives on hypothetical 
investments projects calculate the financial impact of tax incentives on 
expected returns based on the traditional economic assumption that all 
investors behave in simple, profit-maximising ways. These studies find that tax 
incentives may influence investment decisions in the selected scenarios. Many 
of these studies use marginal effective tax rates which measure the tax collected 
by revenue authorities on marginal investments to determine the sensitivity of 
investment to changing tax burdens induced by tax incentives. Marginal 
effective tax rates tend to perform this function better than other alternative 
tools such as average effective tax rates and rate-of-return calculations, hence 
their preference by some commentators. 134 
Auerbach criticises the use of marginal effective tax calculations by some 
scholars and argues that unless certain adjustments are made 135 these 
calculations may be erroneous. 136Mintz analyses the incentive effect on the 
cost of capital and effective tax rate of firms in periods during and after tax 
holidays. 137His findings reveal that tax holidays would be effective only to the 
extent to which depreciation allowances and tax losses are deferred to post- 
132 Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments', op 
cit, pp. 17-19. 
133 Auerbach, 'The Cost of Capital and Investment in Developing Countries, ' in Fiscal 
Incentives for Investment and Innovation, op cit, pp. 137-139; Jack Mintz, 'Tax Holidays 
and Investment, ' in Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation, op cit, pp. 165-193; 
Boadway and Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries' op cti, pp. 131-136. 
134 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
135 Le. assessing the tax wedge between the required rate of return and the return to 
investors after all taxes; making allowances for the extent that such taxes are borne 
by imperfectly immobile factors of production; trade-offs between incentives which 
lower tax burdens but also lower tax transfers from residence to source countries; 
the effect of gross return/local and international pricing models; and the operation 
of complex tax incentives. 
136 Auerbach argues for more general cost of capital models and the analysis of dynamic, 
non-corporate tax considerations: 
Auerbach, 'The Cost of Capital and Investment in 
Developing Countries' op cit, pp-137-164. 
137 Mintz, 'Tax Holidays and Investment, op ci . t, pp. 165-193. 
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holiday periods. However, investment tax credits and allowances would equally 
induce investment in long-term, durable capital without the large revenue costs 
associated with tax holidays. 138 
These theoretical results have been criticised as being too simplistic for failing 
to take account of the complexities of real investment decisions. Modern 
multinational concerns have at their disposal sophisticated tax planning tools 
that could render their investment responses to source country tax policies 
complicated and opaque to policyrnakers relying on simple tax calculations and 
scenarios. 139 Finally, research into how mana,,, -ýýrs make real investment 
decisions indicate that simple profit-maximising models of rational decision- 
making may overlook more complex, 'satisficing' behaviour that may be more 
consistent with the commercial realities of long-term, strategic decision- 
making. 140 
2.5.2. Pro-Tax Incentives Arguments 
The debate over the use of tax incentives has generated conflicting views with 
the pro-incentive school contending that these measures increase aggregate 
investment and can positively influence the spatial distribution of capital 
accumulation. Many of the possible roles served by tax incentives considered 
above are used to justify such selective interventions. 
141 These arguments 
would not be repeated here. The next section examines various reasons 
canvassed by critics of tax incentives. 
2.5.3. Criticism of Tax Incentives 
2.5.3.1. Overview 
The case for the anti-tax incentives school may be summarised by two general 
arguments. Firstly, these measures have little, if any incentive value: they do 
138 Ibid, pp-190-191. 
139 Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments', op 
C1 . t, pp. 16-17. 
140 Brealey and Myers The Principles of Corporate Finance (51h International Edition), OP czt, 
pp. 992-993. 
141 See S2.4 above. 
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not affect the decisions of local or foreign investors and (in respect of tax 
incentives for FDI) are wasteful in that they effectively 'rob (local) taxpayers 
to pay the (international) investors'. Alternatively, tax incentives are not cost- 
effective in that the revenues forgone typically exceed direct and indirect 
benefits from related investment. 142These criticisms are considered below. 
2.5.3.2. Erosion of. Narrow Tax Bases 
Some commentators have criticised the use of tax holidays and other incentives 
in developing countries as these tend to erode tax bases. Aggressive tax 
avoidance or unscrupulous tax evasion schemes could be used to shift taxable 
income from tax-holiday firms to tax-paying firms within a single group. 
Administrative lapses could result in falsified or non-existent records 
hampering revenue collection and monitoring activities in post-tax holiday 
periods. Additional burdens may be imposed on tax-paying firms to make up 
the revenue forgone. 143 Developing countries tend to be more reliant on 
corporate and trade taxation than on personal income taxes. Consequently, tax 
incentives which affect these taxes tend to reduce the already narrow tax bases 
of such developing countries. 
144 
2.5-3.3. Cost-Benefits Analyses 
The cost implications associated with different types of tax incentives vary 
considerably. Accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits/ allowances 
may be preferable to investment subsidies and tax holidays given the quantum 
of revenues forgone. 145Where benefits in terms of incremental investment and 
positive externalities are elusive or difficult to measure, decisions granting tax 
incentives to certain industries or firms may be opaque and not lend 
themselves to either public scrutiny or administrative review. Wells and Allen 
estimate tax incentive costs by comparing the revenue lost by the provision of 
142 Wells et al, Using Tax Incentives to Compete for Foreign Investment: 
Are They IF'orth the 
Costs? Op Cit, p-vii. 
143 Wells and Allen 'Tax' Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons 
from Two Experiments', op 
cit, pp. 25-26. 
144 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing 
Countries' op cit, 
pp. 299-322. 
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incentives to firms which did not require them to invest, with the incremental 
investment made by firms that required incentives and invested as a result. By 
the use of subsidy equivalents and redundancy rates, these researchers suggest 
that the actual costs of providing incentives may sometimes exceed the net 
present value of incremental investment. 146 
Revenue authorities that lack adequate systems to identify and quantify the 
positive externalities desired from incremental investments may make flawed 
decisions based on the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the 
dividends of investment against which to compare the costs. Where 
administrative systems are necessary to supervise the operation of tax 
incentives, the costs of these systems when they work well (and indeed, when 
they are abused) must be borne in mind. 147 Tax incentives may also lead to 
unanticipated and undesirable side-effects. Some tax incentives may promote 
short-term, less enduring investment over longer term, more desirable types 
defeating the actual intentions of policyrnakers. 
2.5.3.4. Selecting Winners from Firms & Sectors 
Predicting which sectors woiýld be deserving of tax incentives and selecting 
winning firms is more an art than a science: an art which governments have 
often failed spectacularly at. Examples abound of 'ugly ducklings' overlooked 
by governments which turned out to be viable geese laying golden eggs. 148 
Conversely, governments have been known to bet on the wrong sectors and 
failing firms, supporting such investments with expensive incentive packages 
despite evidence indicating that initial investment decisions were flawed. 149 
145 Ibid, pp. 316-318. 
146 Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments' op 
cit, pp. 21-24. 
147 Morisset arid Pirnia 'How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Review', op cit, pp. 94-95. 
148 E. g. horticulture in Colombia and Kenya; textile manufacturing in Bangladesh; 
software development and services in India; and automobiles in Japan: World Bank, 
Vorld Development Report 2005, op cit, p. 160. 
149 E. g. the SOTEXKA (Senegal) and ALSCON (Nigeria): see Box 8.2 'Picking 
"winners" can be an expensive gamble - SOTEXKA in Senegal', ibid; B. Olowo (May 
2001) 'Nigeria Attempts a Fresh Start', Metal Bulletin Monthly IT ol. 365, pp. 52-54. 
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In today's competitive and dynamic global environment, firms leaving 
traditional areas of comparative economic advantage assume great risks which 
may pay off tremendously if the ventures are successful or lead to business 
failure if ill-advised. Firms which miscalculate merely stand to lose their 
shareholders' and creditors' funds. However, where failing firms or sectors are 
subsidised by tax incentives, they unduly benefit from the cushion of 
taxpayers' funds which would be better utilised supporting successful firms or 
directly improving the investment environment. Certain types of tax incentives 
reduce transparency in assessing these implicit costs to the public purse. 
Indeed, where incentives are provided to sectors whose outputs serve as 
substitutes for outputs produced by other sectors which do not enj JOY 
incentives, distortions may result leading to undesirable outcomes. 
2.5.3.5. Reducing Corruption & Undesirable Conduct 
Tax incentive policymakers typically include government authorities, executive 
ministries, legislative authorities and independent regulators who all 
policyrnakers should (ideally) be guided by the greater public good. However, 
as the literature on political economy indicates, the allocation of resources and 
economic opportunities by institutional processes may be subverted by 
powerful elites exerting pressure for policies which exclusively favour them. 150 
Corruption is fostered where public power held on trust for the many is abused 
for the private benefit of the few. 
Tanz, has identified- certain conditions which lend themselves to the 
proliferation of corrupt practices in tax and customs administrations. 
151 These 
include ambiguous laws; tax systems requiring regular contact 
between 
taxpayers and tax administrators; poor remuneration of tax officials; tolerant 
attitudes to corrupt behaviour in tax administration; opaque administrative 
150 Shah, Overview' in Fiscal Incentivesfor Investment and Innovation, o_p cl't, p. 
36; Tanzi and 
Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' o-P cit, p-6. 
151 ýTjto Tanzi Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of Economics 
(Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham: 2000), pp. 110-113. 
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procedures; administrative discretion over significant decisions; and poor 
administrative oversight. It is instructive to note that many of these conditions 
typically occur in developing countries and may impair the success of incentive 
schemes executed through such flawed administrative systems. Similarly, rent- 
seeking could pervert tax incentives and transfer gains from selective 
interventions such as tax incentives, high tariffs and import quotas from 
taxpayers and consumers to small cliques of elites. 152 
2.5.3.6. Agency Problems & Prisoners' Dilemma 
Wells and Allen have identified certain agency problems that may arise from 
the design and implementation of tax incentives. 153 These problems are 
aggravated where revenue costs associated with incentives are imputed to fiscal 
authorities and not the relevant investment promotion agency. Studies on 
Indonesian tax incentives suggested that agency problems in the struggle for 
bureaucratic power. Power dynamics involving foreign investors were found to 
hinder a more dispassionate assessment of the costs of incentives against 
actual and perceived benefits. 
Wells and Allen argue that investment promotion agencies and tax authorities 
need to be mindful of the hidden costs of incentives and ought not to be 
persuaded by the arguments of investors who bargain for incentives which they 
do not really require. Policymakers should also avoid pitfalls associated with 
competing with neighbouring countries to offer incentives. Wells and Allen 
warn of a prisoners' dilemma scenario whereby foreign investors obtain 
incentives in excess of what would have been conceded in the absence of cut- 
throat incentive competition. In these scenarios, the eventual outcome 
is to the 
detriment of all competing host (source) countries particularly the country that 
supposedly 'won' the contest. 
15' World Bank, Vorld Development Report 2005, oP cit, p. 161. 
153 Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract 
FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments', op 
pp. 27-31. 
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2.5.3.7. Pitfalls in Discretionary Triggering Mechanisms 
The effectiveness of tax incentives in achieving desirable economic outcomes 
may well depend on the mode of administration adopted. This is particularly 
true for discretionary or automatic incentives. The proper classification of 
incentives may be a question of degree, as most incentive schemes typically 
feature characteristics of both types. Incentives may be granted by the relevant 
authority on a discretionary basis after the evaluation of the firm of project 
based on subjective considerations. Here, the grant of incentives is entirely 
contingent on administrative flat with the relevant authority being empowered 
to interpret policies or approve incentives in an ad-boc manner. 154 
Conversely, under automatic administration regimes, once candidates meet a 
set of specific, objective and well-defined qualifying criteria, incentives are 
granted as a matter of course. The powers of the approving authorities are 
usually limited to verifying that the requisite criteria as regards quantum of 
investment in priority industrial sectors, transfer of technology, novelty of 
enterprise and use of local content or labour are met. Automatic incentives are 
preferred in the literature as there tends to be less uncertainty, shorter 
planning and processing periods, smaller administrative costs and less scope 
for graft. In special circumstances discretionary incentive approvals could 
improve the ability of the administrative body to select and approve the 
projects and firms most in line with the spirit of broader development policy. 
However, the practical disadvantages associated with such flexibility in terms 
of undesirable graft and rent-seeking lead most commentators encourage the 
use of automatic triggers wherever possible. 155 
In their study of Indonesia's re-introduction of tax incentives in 1996, Wells 
and Allen were highly critical of the ad-boc, discretionary manner of 
154 Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op cit, 
p. 318. 
151 Boadway and 
* 
Shah, 'Perspectives on the Role of Investment in Developing 
Countries', op cit, p. 36; Tanzi and Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing 
Countries' op cit, p. 318. 
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administration adopted. 156 The approving panel was ineffectual as most 
decisions were made by presidential fiat for favoured associates without clear 
underlying business justifications or economic rationales. Although the new 
incentives were intended to benefit electronics firms, grants were still made to 
other ineligible businesses. Incentives were awarded on a project-by-project 
basis and this reduced transparency. It also increased the costs of investors 
dealing with uncertainty, conducting feasibility studies and meeting 
information requirements. Consequently, Wells and Allen conclude that 
discretionary incentives are flawed as they are prone to corruption, cron ism y 
and political influence particularly in developing countries with weak 
governance controls. 
2.5-3.8. Diversion of Attention from Other Development Activities 
Investors choose the location of investments based on numerous factors. The 
existence of favourable,, stable political and economic policies, efficient 
utilities,, adequate physical and intangible infrastructure, liberal and open 
attitudes to investment, a well-educated work force, attractive geographic 
location and proximity to factor and output markets can make all the 
difference. 157 Where these fundamentals are lacking, policies seeking to 
compensate for any disincentives may be of little moment. Some commentators 
have criticised the use of 'quick fix' tax incentives where these divert the 
attention of policymakers away from harder, more fundamental efforts -to 
improve the local investment climate. 151 
2.5-3.9. International Tax Law Interactions Between Tax Systems 
Finally, the actual operation of tax incentives for FDI in developing countries 
may depend on the complicated interaction of source (home) country and 
156 Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments', op 
Cit. 
157 See Box 7.2 'Why Intel choose Costa Rica as the site of a multimillion dollar plant' 
World Bank, Vorld Development Report 2003, op cit, p. 139. 
158 E. g. liberalising markets, improving tangible and intangible infrastructure, reducing 
bureaucratic red-tape and other barriers to investment, industry and innovation: 
Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments', op 
cit, p. 26. 
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residence (host) country tax rules-159 Where capital- importing countries design 
and implement tax incentive schemes without due regard for these interactions, 
undesirable and unintended outcomes could result such as providing redundant 
or excessive incentives and reducing (or indeed, reversing) tax transfers from 
residence to source countries resulting in 'aid-in- reverse. 160 These issues are 
examined in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
159 Shah, 'Overview' in Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation, op cit, p. 36; Tanzi and 
Zee 'Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries' op cit, p. 15. 
160 Viherkenttý, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries 6- International Taxation, op cz . t, pp. 1- 
5; Wells and Allen 'Tax Holidays to Attract FDI: Lessons 
from Two Experiments', op 
cit, p . 8. 
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2 1 6. OUTCOMES 
This Chapter has considered the concept of tax incentives, described the 
various types utilised and evaluated contradictory views in the debate over 
their efficacy in promoting sustainable economic development. It would appear 
that there is no unequivocal answer to the query 'do tax incentives work? ' 
While tax incentives have the potential to trigger sustainable investment and 
economic growth, as with other kinds of selective interventions, the design and 
implementation of tax incentives usually determine their success or failure. 161 
Where prudently designed tax incentives are implemented with integrity and 
continuously reviewed, they stand a better chance, in conjunction with other 
more direct policies, to improve the investment climate. Although such 
improvements may be at the margin, marginal economic growth, if sustained, 
may well have the propensity to ignite development and propel developing 
economies out of a downward spiral of poverty and underdevelopment. 
Much of the literature on tax incentives considers their role in attracting FDI 
usually from Western, capital- exporting countries. This bias is understandable 
given the quantum of such FDI and the familiarity of many contributing 
authors with the tax systems of developed nations. This Thesis does not seek 
to replicate the general, FDI-oriented and econometric-based approaches 
adopted in many of these studies. Rather, by critically considering the actual 
and perceived role tax incentives play in fostering sustainable economic 
development in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, this Thesis seeks to offer a 
distinct and original insight to the operation of tax incentives in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The themes introduced above shall be expanded upon in detailed 
analyses of local laws, institutions and conditions. The next Chapter 
comprehensively examines the legal regime for tax incentives in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. 
161 World Bank, Forld Development Report 2003, op cit, pp. 162-16 
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3. AN EXPOSITION OF NIGERIAN TAX INCENTIVES 
"Tbe greatest tbreat to freedom is the absence of criticism. " 162 
3.0. INTRODUCTION 
3.0.1. Proem 
This Chapter reviews Nigerian fiscal policy within the context of its historical, 
political and legal setting. It provides an original exposition of the Nigerian 
legal regime for tax incentives. Taking a sectoral approach, it systematically 
catalogues existing tax incentives applicable under Nigerian law. This 
exposition is based on bibliographical research on Nigerian tax incentives as 
well as practical perceptions from numerous interviews of leading Nigerian 
public officials, lawyprs, accountants and professionals conducted during 
Nigerian Field Trips in November 2005 and January/February 2007. It forms 
the backdrop against which the South African and Kenyan tax incentive 
practices highlighted in the succeeding Chapters 4 and 5 may be compared. 
Chapter 3 also complements the critical analysis of contemporary Nigerian tax 
incentive policy using exemplars derived from the South African and Kenyan 
experiences in Chapter 7. 
162 Quote attributed to Professor Wole Soyinka, the 
Nigerian playwright, author, 
dissident and winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize for Literature. 
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3.0.2. Historical & Political Development of Nigeria's Legal System163 
Much of the origins of the Nigerian legal system lie in the early interaction and 
subsequent fusion of indigenous customary and religious (Islamic) legal 
systems with English law introduced by the British. Written Islamic law was in 
force in the northern regions of what was to become Nigeria whilst unwritten 
customary law was prevalent in the South. However, due to the profound 
impact of colonial rule on Nigeria' s evolution from numerous di istinct emi irates, 
chiefdoms and ethnic groups it is hardly surprising that the Nigerian legal 
system has English common law as its core. 
English common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in 
force in England on 24 July 1874 became applicable with the establishment and 
reorganisation of the Colony of Lagos between 1862 and 1876. A similar legal 
system existed in both the Protectorates of Southern Nigeria and Northern 
Nigeria, though the relevant statutes of general application were those in force 
in England as at 1 January 1900. The Colony and Protectorate of Lagos was 
first merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906 to form the 
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates were eventually united on 1 January 1914 to form the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria. 
Nigeria was reorganised as a federation in 1954 and attained independence on 1 
October 1960. With the adoption of the 1963 Constitution, the British regent 
(Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II) was replaced by the new President (Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe) as Head of State. Similarly, the judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council was replaced by the Federal Supreme Court as the highest court 
in the land. Legislative powers were shared between the federal Parliament and 
regional Legislatures, with the former being competent to make laws (or 'Acts') 
in respect of matters on the Exclusive Legislative List and the 
latter authorised 
to make laws (or 'Laws') on matters on the Concurrent Legislative 
List. 
163 See generally Prof. Akintunde Obilade's semInal work on the 
NIgerlan legal system: 
A. 0. Obilade The Nigerian Legal System (Sweet & Maxwell, London: 1979), Chapter 2; 
see also T. O. Elias, 
The Nigerian Legal System (Routledge & Paul, London: 1963). 
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Latent ethnic and religious tensions soon produced rends in the nation's fabric 
with both disturbances in the Western Region and the fallout of a controversial 
census leading to violent riots and widespread political unrest. An era of 
extended military rule began with the armed revolution of 15 January 1966 and 
the counter-revolution of 29 July 1966. The Constitution was suspended and 
the Regions were replaced first with a union of Provinces and later by a 
federation of 12 states. Legislative power was vested in the central Federal 
Military Government which could make laws (or 'Decrees') for the whole or 
any part of Nigeria. Military Governors were appointed for the various Regions 
(later, states) and made laws (or 'Edicts') Pis-d-vis matters on the Constitution's 
Concurrent List with the prior consent of the Head of State. Gen. Yakubu 
Gowon, as Head of State, was empowered to appoint the Chief justice of 
Nigeria and other judicial officers. Consequently, the principle of 
constitutional separation of powers was undermined. 
Unfortunately, the unstable political situation soon degenerated into a civil war 
between 1967 and 1970 in which ov. er a million souls were lost to the fighting 
and famine. The Biafran secession was eventually repressed and the 
secessionist Ibo people were reabsorbed into Nigeria upon the surrender of the 
Blafran army to Col. Olusegun Obasanjo on 15 January 1970. 
Gowon was 
overthrown on 29 July 1975 by a coup d'itat which 
brought Gen. Murtala 
Mohammed into power. Mohammed was assassinated in a subsequent coup 
attempt on 13 February 1976. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded 
him and 
implemented significant social and legal reforms. One of 
Obasanjo's legal 
reforms was the introduction of a new Presidential- style 
Constitution which 
concentrated power in the federal government. 
Obasanjo restored democratic 
rule by handing power to Alhaji Shehu Shagari after controversial elections 
in 
1979. The 1979 Constitution remained in force though frequently modified 
over the next 15 years by successive military 
juntas lead by the following 
generals: Muhammadu Buhari, 
Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha and 
Abdulsalami Abubakar. 
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Under Abubakar's regime a new constitution, the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 (hereafter: CFRN 1999) was introduced. CFRN 1999 
allocates legislative powers between the federal (central), state (regional) and 
local (municipal) Governments. Abubakar ruled for 9 months and organised 
democratic elections which were won by retired Gen. Obasanjo and the 
Peoples Democratic Party (or PDP). Obasanjo was sworn in as a civilian 
President on 29 May 1999 and ruled for 8 years, having being re-elected in 
2003. In May 2007, Obasanjo was succeeded by the current President Umaru 
Yar'Adua (also of the PDP) after controversial elections. 
This section (§3.0.2) has outlined some aspects of the historical evolution of 
the Nigerian legal and political system as a background to contemporary 
economic and fiscal policy. The next section sets out the key characteristics of 
the Nigerian tax system within which fiscal incentives operate. 
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THE NIGERIAN TAX SYSTEM 
3.1.1. Historical Development of Taxation in Nigeria 
Ayua 164 observes that the use of taxation to finance public expenditures in 
Nigeria predated British colonial rule. Ayua notes the use Of organised 
taxation165 in the ancient (Kanuri) Borno-Kanem kingdom and (Hausa-Fulani) 
Sokoto caliphate in the North and the monarchies of the southern Yoruba and 
Benin kingdoms. It appears that organised systems of taxation were largely 
absent among the ethnic groups of the Middle-belt and Eastern par ts of 
Nigeria which were politically organised around kinship clans and lacked 
traditional monarchs. 166Tax due was paid in 'coinage or kind (typically tributes 
and personal services) though the latter featured more prominently in the 
northern regions. 
Modern taxing systems were introduced by the British who consolidated 
traditional taxes in the Northern Protectorate of Nigeria under the Land 
Revenue Proclamation. 167Taxing statutes were gradually introduced in the Western 
and Eastern Regions in 1917168 and 1927169 respectively taking account of the 
financial costs of administrative burdens borne by the regional and local 
governments. In the Western Region, the challenge of ensuring sufficient funds 
for local governments led to the grant of new taxing powers to the local 
164 I. A. Ayua, Nigerian Tax Law (Spectrum Law Publishing, Ibadan: 1999), chapter 2. 
165 Including early taxes on agricultural commodities (kurdin kasa, sbuka-sbuka on crops 
exempt from Zakat and jangali on lifestock) and the charitable Zakat (a tax levied to 
fund educational or religious endeavours): ibid, p. 22. 
166 Consequently, there was little need to expropriate private resources to maintain an 
emirate or kingdom. Traditional social expenditures were funded by contributions 
solicited by clan leaders. 
161 A malor consideration behind the merger of the Protectorates was that the 
landlocked northern regions lacked sufficient tax capacity: Oluwole Akanle, The 
Power to Tax and Federalism in Nigeria: Legal and Constitutional Perspectives on the Sources 
of Government Revenue (Intec Printers Limited, Ibadan: 1988) pp. 11-1ý, particularly 
footnote 5; F. D. Lugard, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern 
Nigeria, and Administration 1912-1919, Cmd. 468. 
168 Under the Native Revenue Ordinance of 1917: C. S. 01a, Historical Development of Tax 
System in the Vestern State of Nigeria, 1957-58 to 1973-774 (Government 
Printer, 
Western State of Nigeria, Ibadan: 1974), p. l. 
169 Under the Native Revenue Ordinance of 1927. See also Caroline Ifeka-Moller, 'Female 
Militancy a nd Colonial Revolt: The Women's War of 1929, Eastern Nigeria' in 
Shirley Ardener (ed) Perceiving Vomen (London Malaby Press, London: 1975). 
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Councils. 170 In the Eastern Region, collections of taxation targeted at particular 
social purposes such as education appear to have met with more success and 
less resistance. 171 Personal and corporate172 income taxes were later introduced 
and the application of the relevant taxing statutes was extended to cover the 
entire nation. 173 
Problems with assessing income to tax based on residence174were eventually 
resolved by taxing incomes accrued in, derived from, received in or brought 
into Nigeria from whatever source at the regional level. This trend towards the 
devolution of unitary taxing powers away from the central government was 
borne out of various constitutional arrangcmentsl75which sought to deepen the 
foundations for a truly federal division of taxing powers. However, since 
Independence the federal autonomy of the states Pis-d-vis taxing powers have 
been greatly reduced due to the strong unitary tendencies re-introduced by the 
military's incursion into political rule and consolidated by the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions. 
The reduced fiscal autonomy of the states has been accentuated by the post- 
1970s dominance of revenues from the industrial and energy sectors in public 
finance. Consequently, the Nigerian economy tends to exhibit characteristics of 
a crentier state' which occur where the convenient taxation or economic 
exploitation of economic rents derived from a single, well-endowed and 
typically extractive economic sector generates sufficient revenues for the 
government to finance public expenditures without significant recourse to the 
taxation of other industries or incomes. Rentier theorists associate the ease 
"0 01a, Historical Development of Tax System in the Wlestern State o N' er'a, op cit, chapter 1. ýf ig 
"I Ibid, p. 5. 
172 Taxation on corporate profits was imposed by the Income Tax Ordinance No. 3 of 1940 
which taxed the income of expatriates (previously imposed under the Non-Native 
[Protectorate] Ordinances of 1931 and 1939) and indigenous persons resident in Lagos. 
173 Under the Direct Taxation Ordinance No. 4 of 1940. 
174 E. g., the Lagos source income of a person resident in the Western Region was 
exempt from tax and vice-versa: 01a, Historical Development of 
Tax System in the Vestern 
State of Nigeria, op cit, p. 2. 
175 Akanle, The Power to Tax and Federalism in Nigeria: Legal and Constitutional Perspectives 
on the Sources of Government 
Revenue, op cit, pp. 14-15. 
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with which such governments obtain financial resources to finance public 
expenditure with low political and democratic development due to the reduced 
accountability of such governments to their peoples. Where such governance 
flaws coincide with Dutch disease, a resource curse results: the country's 
currency becomes overvalued, real economic sectors become internationally 
uncompetitive and the balance of trade position becomes negative. 176 
Presently, the federal government dominates public entrepreneurial 
participation in the energy sector and the taxation of corporate profits from 
petroleum companies. While a percentage of revenues accruing to the federal 
government is redistributed to the states and local governments under the 
relevant 'constitutional provisions'177 responsibility for economic policy, public 
finance and taxing powers are concentrated in the federal government with the 
federating states and local authorities being in a weaker position. 178 
3.1.2. Taxing Powers, Tax Administration & Dispute Resolution 
The power to impose tax is shared between federal government, the 
federating states and the local governments in accordance with the CFRN 
1999. Matters under the Exclusive Legislative List 179 are within the sole 
preserve of the National Assembly. 180 This absolute federal legislative 
competence covers the following matters: customs and excise duties, 181 export 
duties,, 182 stamp duties, 183 the taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, 184 
176 Axel Harneit- Sievers, 'Reforming the Rentier State: Some Thoughts on NEEDS' in S. 
Amadi and F. Ogwo (eds) Contextualising NEEDS Economicl Politz*cal Reforms in 
Nigeria: 
A Report of Civil Society Policy Dialogue on the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS) (HURILAWS & CPPR, Lagos: 2004), pp. xi-xix; K. A. 
Chaudhry, The Price of Vealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca: 1997). 
177 §§80-82 of the CFRN 1999. 
178 Akanle The Power to Tax and Federalism in Nigeria: Legal and Constitutional Perspectives on 
the Sources of Government Revenue, op cit, chapter 4; B. O. Nwabueze, 
Federalism under the 
Presidential Constitution (Sweet & Maxwell, London: 1983), chapter 11. 
179 §4(l)-(5) and Part I of the Second Schedule, CFRN 1999. 
180 Composed by the Senate and Federal House of Representatives. 
181 Item 16, Part I, Second Schedule, CFRN 1999. 
182 Item 25, ibid. 
183 Item 58, ibid. 
114 Item 59, ibid. 
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matters of general trade and commerce, 185 the conduct of external affairs and 
implementation of certain treaties. 186The federating states' legislative powers 
are generally constrained to matters indicated on the Concurrent Legislative 
List 187 and matters not mentioned on either the Exclusive or Concurrent 
Legislative List. 188The state and local governments also have powers to collect 
and administer certain taxes. 189 
The Taxes and Levies (Approved Listjor Collection) Act of 1998 (hereafter: Taxes & 
Levies Act 1998) introduced some clarity into the regime of tax collection by 
the three tiers of government with the federal government being responsible 
for certain corporate taxes, value added tax, stamp duties, and certain taxes on 
capital gains and incomes. The main federal income taxes are corporation tax 
under the Companies Income Tax Act No. 28 of 1979 (hereafter: CITA 1979) and 
personal income tax under the Personal Income Tax Act No. 104 of 1993 
(hereafter: PITA 1993). State governments are empowered to collect taxes on 
certain individuals' incomes, certain entertainment taxes, road taxes, business 
registration fees and certain land use charges. 190 At the lowest level, local 
governments were given powers to collect an eclectic collection of minor levies 
ranging from marriage, birth and death registration fees to parking charges. 191 
However, as Sanni observes192CFRN 1999 remains the supreme law of the land 
185 Inclusive of both the import and export of commodities across Nigerian national 
borders and inter-state trade and commerce: see item 62, ibid. 
186 Namely those relating to matters on the Exclusive Legislative List: items 26 and 31, 
ibid. As such, the implementation of laws to give effect to international obligations 
under tax treaties concluded with other nation states is a matter of federal 
competency. 
187 To the extent that such state legislation is not inconsistent with any 
federal 
legislation on the same matter: ý4(6)-(7) and Part II of the Second Schedule, 
CFRN 
1999. 
181 Under the so-called 'Residual' Legislative List: 0. Akanle, The 
Government, the 
Constitution and the Taxpayer in M. A. Ajomo (ed) Tax Law and Tax Administration in I 
Nigeria, Vol. 1, NIALS Conference Series (Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, Lagos. 1991) p. 9; Nwabueze Federalism under the Presidential Constitution, Op 
cz . t, p. 39. See also Aberuagba's case (1985) 1 NWLR 395. 
189 See items D7-D1O, Part II of the Second Schedule, CFRN 
1999. 
"0 Part II of the Schedule to the Taxes & Levies Act IP98. 
19, See Part III, ibid. 
I Division of Taxing Powers' in M. T. Abdulrazaq (ed) 
C. I. T. N. N' erian 192 Ablola Sann 119 
Tax Guide and Statutes (1" ed., Chartered Institute of 
Taxation of Nigeria, Lagos: 
2002) p. 665. 
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and where the Taxes & Levies Act 1998 is inconsistent with CFRN 1999,193 it is 
void to the extent of such inconsistency. 194 
Tax administration similarly reflects the federal character of Nigeria with 
various federal and state bodies 195 sharing power over various facets. Local 
Government Revenue Committees 196 and State Boards of Inland Revenue, 197 
collect the taxes and penalties dues to these respective governments. Similarly, 
federal taxes198 are administered by the Federal Board of Inland acting through 
its operational arm, the Federal Inland Revenue Service (hereafter: FIRS). 
The Federal Board of Inland Revenue 199 and its Technical Committee 200 are 
composed of civil service functionaries from the Ministry of Finance, the 
National Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, the national 
oil company, the National Planning Commission, the Customs Service and the 
Corporate Affairs Commission. 201 The Board's broad remit extends to the 
implementation of tax incentives. Other bodies such as the National Council of 
Ministers, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission and the Nigerian 
Export Promotion Council also play notable roles in administering tax 
incentive laws. 
193 The Taxes & Levies Act 1998 appears to suggest that the legislative powers of the 
National Assembly and state Houses of Assembly are strictly limited to the matters 
set out in its Schedule. Under the present democratic 
dispensation, the Taxes 
Levies Act 1998 (originally a federal decree) assumes the status of an Act of the 
National Assembly and is thus inferior to the CFRN 1999: §315, CFRN 1999. 
194 51(l) CFRN 1999. 
195 586 PITA 1993. 
196 §590-93 PITA 1993. 
197 5§86-89 PITA 1993. 
19, V, Z., capital gains tax, companies income tax, education tax, petroleum profits 
tax 
and VAT. However, commissioners of stamp 
duties are usually responsible for stamp 
duties. 
199 51; Part I, CITA 1979. 
200 52 CITA 1979. 
201 §1 CITA 1979. 
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The resolution of disputes over tax imposition, assessment and collection are 
determined by various tribunals, 202 bodieS203 and courts. Here too, a federal- 
state dichotomy exists. Civil 204 and crirninaJ205 disputes in respect of federal 
revenue, corporate and business taxation, customs duties, excise and export 
duties, banking and finance, corporate bodies and the administration and 
management of federal agencies are determined at first instance by the Federal 
High Court 206 t0 the exclusion of all other courts. Under previous 
constitutions, the State High Courts had wider jurisdiction to determine 
matters; under CFRN 1999 this matter has been placed beyond CaVIJ. 207 State 
High CourtS208 (and the High Court of the FCT, Abuja)209may only consider 
civil and criminal matters subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. 
In practice, the State High Courts have jurisdiction over matters on which the 
state legislatures have legislative competence or which relate to the acts of 
state governments /agencies and which do not otherwise conflict with federal 
jurisdiction. Appeals from decisions of the FederaJ210 and State High Courts lie 
to the federal Court of Appeal2l' and from there, to the federal Supreme 
Court. 212 While the courts are crucial in the interpretation of tax and 
202 For instance, VAT disputes are heard by the Zonal VAT Tribunals from where 
appeals lie to the Federal High Court: see Value Added Tax Tribunals Rules, S. I. No. 
14 of 2003 especially Order 16-Appeals. 
203 Unresolved disputes over corporate tax assessments are decided at first instance by 
the Body of Appeal Commissioners from which appeals may be made to the Federal 
Court High Court: §§71-75, CITA 1979. 
204 §251(1) CFRN 1999. 
205 §251(3) ibid. 
206 Originally established as the Federal Revenue Court with limited jurisdiction over 
causes and matters including corporate taxation, customs and excise duties, banking, 
admiralty, companies and corporate bodies: see Federal Revenue Court Act No. 13 of 
1911-3. 
207 As with the division of taxing powers, extended military's rule led to the 
concentration of judicial power in the federal judicial bodies. As such, State High 
Courts' previous jurisdiction over federal laws and bodies has been severely curtailed 
even where state governments and their agencies are involved: I. E. Sagay, 'The 
judiciary in a Modern Democracy' in I. A. Ayua, D. A. Guobadia and A. 0. Adekunle 
(eds) Issues in The 19PP Constitution (NIALS, Lagos: 2000) pp-110-111. 
208 §270 CFRN 1999. 
209 §255 ibid. 
210 VI. Z., both the Federal High Court and the High Court of the FCT, Abula. 
211 §5237 & 240, CFRN 1999. 
212 §5230 & 232, CFRN 1999. 
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investment laws, the policies behind of these laws are determined by the 
executive and legislature. The next section surnmarises the political and policy 
framework which determines the content of investment and tax incentive laws. 
3.1.3. Political Framework for Tax Incentives & Economic Policy 
Tax incentive policy and administration are usually matters of federal 
legislative and executive competence as most trade and corporate taxes fall 
under the Exclusive Legislative List. 213 Special public bodies cooperate with the 
Federal and States' Boards of Inland Revenue to grant, administer and monitor 
the implementation of tax incentives. Certain federal bodies and key public 
officials are also involved in economic policy formulation as regards tax 
incentives and other selective interventions. Much of this policy-making is 
executed under the supervision of the President, Vice-President and certain 
Ministers (particularly the current Finance Minister, Dr. Shamsuddeen 
Usman). 
The National Economic Council (hereafter: NEC)214 is empowered to advise the 
President on economic matters particularly those involving coordination 
among the various tiers of government. NEC members include the Vice- 
President,, the 36 State Governors and the Governor of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (hereafter: CBN). 215 Budgeting, fiscal policy and the promotion of 
sustained economic growth and development have frequently featured on 
NEC's agenda. Similarly, the National Economic Intelligence Committee 
analyses, monitors and assesses fiscal measures. 216This Committee's remit also 
extends to tax evasion, auditing inappropriate returns and improving revenue 
collection. Other bodies, like the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
(hereafter: NIPC) deal directly with investment policy implementation. NIPC 
serves as a cone-stop-shop' for foreign and local investors 
by facilitating 
213 §4(l)-(5) and Part I of the Second Schedule,. CFRN 1999. 
214 5153 of, and ýT18 & 19 of the Third Schedule to, CFRN 1999. 
215 ý18 of the Third Schedule, CFRN 1999. 
216 54, National Economic Intelligence Committee Act, No. 17 of 1994. 
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business registration, licensing, permits and tax incentives. 217 NIPC also 
coordinates its activities with government agencies to improve the investment 
environment and serves as the secretariat for the Presidential Advisory Council 
oil Investment. 218 
While general principles of Nigerian investment policy may have remained 
largely consistent over the years, the particular policies and administrative 
arrangements adopted by any incumbent regime have changed with the 
frequent change of regimes. The resultant high turnover of ministers and 
policymakers has led to a bewildering matrix of abandoned and unimplemented 
policies. 219 Policy inconsistency is one of the many issues borne out of 
historical reasons that have significantly impacted the use of fiscal incentives 
and other investment promotion measures to improve the Nigerian investment 
climate. 
Various economic strategies have been adopted over the years ranging from the 
primary commodities export-oriented policies of the post-colonial era, import- 
substitution in the 1960s, to the proliferation of public enterprises 220 and 
indigenisation of industrieS221 in the 1970s. Some, like the 1986-1992 Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) were developed with the advice and support of 
the IMF and other multilateral agencies. 222 Under SAP, market-oriented reforms 
were introduced to deregulate prices and improve terms of trade. 223 Other 
policies have involved wide-spread consultation with the domestic private 
217 NIPC succeeded the Industrial Development Coordination Committee (IDCC) (as a 
result the repeal of the IDCC Act No. 36 of 1989-and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion 
Act No. 54 of 1989): see NIPC Act No. 16 of 1995. 
218 NIPC Annual Report 2004, p-49- 
219 E. I. Kachlkwu, Nigerian Foreý n Investment Lan) and Policy (Mlkzek Law Publications 9 
Ltd, Lagos: 1988) p. 365. 
220 Under the 2nd National Development Plan of 1970-1974. 
221 See Kachlkwu, Nigerian Foreign Investment Law and Policy, op elf, chapters 6 and 7; Tom 
Forrest, The Advance of African Capital, J. D. Y. Peel and David Parkin (eds) 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 1994), pp. 36-38. 
2-12 G. F. Moser, S. Rogers and R. van Til with R. Kibuka and I. Lukonga 'Nigeria: 
Experience with Structural Adjustment, ' IMF Occasional Paper (IMF, 
Washington 
D. C.: 1997). 
223 S. Thomas and S. Canagarajah 'Poverty in a Wealthy Economy: the 
Case of Nigeria, ' 
IMF Working Paper WP/02/114 (IMF, Washington D. C.: 2002) p. 8. 
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sector. In 1996, Abacha's administration embarked on the Vision 2010 project 
to develop an economic and political blueprint for Nigerian progress towards 
the year 2010.224The Vision 2010 Committee developed an elaborate public- 
private sector partnership to implement political and economic programmes 
intended to transform Nigeria into a leading and democratic African 
econoMy. 225 However, the lack of continuity and commitment in implementing 
proposed democratic and economic reforms rendered the project largely 
redundant226.227 
Recent economic policy under the Obasan)o administration has been largely 
spearheaded by NEEDS228which the Yar'Adua administration has adopted and 
is implementing within a strategic 7-Point Agenda framework. 229 NEEDS is a 
poverty reduction strategy paper (hereafter: PRSP) targeted at coordinating the 
efforts of the federal, state and local governmentS230with other stakeholderS231 
to realise Nigeria's economic potential by reorienting national values, reducing 
224 See the Vision 2010 website <http: //v7w-, v,. vision2OlO. olýg, /-> accessed 18 March 
2006. 
2-15 By: encouraging private sector-led development;. diversifying from energy and 
enhancing the real sector; encouraging microenterprises to reduce poverty; 
increasing indigenous participation in the energy sector; promoting a competitive, 
modern financial system; introducing reforms on investment law, privatisation, 
population control; and creating a macroeconomic environment that encourages 
private investment. Of note was the intention to use Export Processing Zones and 
other fiscal incentives to support microenterprises and to improve revenues by 
enhanced tax collection and reduced tax evasion. 
226 Ironically, the Vision 2010 Report's view that '... Nigeria must institute a stable and 
democratic system of governance that guarantees economic prosperity within a 
culture of the rule of law' was the Achilles' heel as its 
failure was ultimately 
precipitated by the insincerity of the Abacha's commitment to return 
Nigeria to 
civilian rule: Vision 2010 Report: Charting the Future Development of 
Nigeria, 
Political, Socio-Cultural and Economic Direction, Section I: Introduction. 
2`1 Some of the ideas of the Vision 2010 project have been adopted and refined in the 
NEEDS programme: see Meeting Everyone's Needs: National 
Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy, (2004: Nigerian National Planning Commission, Abula), 
(hereafter 'the NEEDS Report') Chapter 11: Implementation and Financing, p. viii. 
228 NEEDS is being executed by the National Planning 
Commission and National 
Council on Development Planning: see the National 
Planning Commission's website 
at <httl2:, /ý/ýwww. nigeri, -Lneconomy. com> accessed 
15-03.06. 
221 Nigerian Budget Speech 2008, by President U. M. 
Yar'Adua, pp. 2,3 
<htt 12: v7 ww. f-m- fý, =--a 9-LP-O-r taI/inde -x, ph P_ > accessed 
08.12.07. 
230 By the complementary SEEDS and LEEDS programmes: 
NEEDS Report, Chapter 11: 
Implementation and Financing, pp. 103-110. 
231 Notably the private sector, civil society, foreign investors and multilateral 
development agencies. 
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poverty, creating wealth and generating employment. Key strategies target the 
emergence of the private sector232 as the engine for economic growth in key 
economic sectors. 233 NEEDS proposes fiscal initiatives such as increasing 
revenue collection by expanding the tax base and reforming tax 
administration; -" 34 the reduction of multiple taxation; regional integration into 
the ECOWAS common tariff zone; and the selective235 use of tax incentives 
to promote private sector investment. 236 
Some of NEEDS' fiscal reforms are to be effected through FIRS' Tax Reform 
BillS237 some of which have been passed into law by the National Assembly. 
This legislative initiative is complemented on the executive front by a tax 
policy reform by the Budget Office of the Federation, the Federal Ministry of 
Finance and FIRS, as encapsulated in the draft National Tax Policy. The draft 
National Tax Policy sets out guiding principles which will inform future fiscal 
policy. The origins, scope and merits of this policy initiative are considered in 
Chapter 7. The next section will catalogue and examine Nigerian tax incentives 
in the context of existing tax law and regulations with a view to defining the 
role these fiscal interventions have played in promoting sustainable economic 
development. 
232 NEEDS Report, Chapter 2: The Development Challenges Facing Nigeria, p. 9. 
233 Vlý., agriculture, manufacturing, services, energy and solid minerals 
development. 
234 NEEDS Report, Chapter 5: Creating a Competitive Private Sector, pp. 55-58. 
' 235 Selective as the the number government has indicated the intention to 
'rationallse 
and scope of existing incentive schemes: 
NEEDS Report, Chapter 5: Creating a 
Competitive Private Sector, Box 5.1: Institutional and Administrative Reform to 
Reduce the Cost of Doing Business, p. 56. 
236 NEEDS Report, Overview, pp. xvii-xx. 
237 Nine Draft Bills on Tax Reforms (FIRS, Abula: 2005) . 
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3.2. SECTORAL TAX INCENTIVES 
3.2.0. INTRODUCTION 
3: An Evposilion of Nigerian Tax Inceniii-es 
Some of the earliest efforts in post-Independence Nigeria to use tax incentives 
to stimulate investment were made under the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance 
of 1952 which provided for 2-5year tax holidays. This was succeeded by further 
tax holidays, 238 accelerated tax write-downs and capital allowances, 239 import 
duty refundS, 240 protective tariff S 241 and assurances. The current cocktail of tax 
incentives has evolved from these early efforts to use using selective fiscal 
interventions. The following sections provide a sectoral exposition of these 
incentives as a prequel to the critique of their use in the Nigerian economy. 
3.2.1. AGRICULTURE& FOOD SECURITY 
Introduction 
Agriculture has traditionally been the backbone of the Nigerian economy,, 
employing the largest percentage of the workforce and contributing the 
greatest share of national GDP. 242 Forrest notes that the pre-Independence 
economy was dominated by small farmers and family production units linked 
by traditional communal, kinship and lineage ties. 
243 Traditional subsistence 
farming was pursued along with the cultivation of cash-crops such as ground- 
nut, cocoa, rubber and oil palm. Crop exports were promoted by the 
development of transportation linkages under British colonial rule. Large-scale 
mechanised farming became more prominent in the 1970s promoted by 
influential indigenous entrepreneurs. However, monetary devaluation and other 
economic policies pursued in the 1980s adversely affected agricultural 
competitiveness. 244 Increased public intervention in the economy 
during the 
238 See Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) A'Ct of 1958. 
239 See Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 1958 (later Companies Income Tax Act of 1961). 
240 See Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act of 1957 and 
Drawback (Customs) 
Regulations of 1959. 
241 See Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidised Goods) Ordinance of 1958. 
242 NEEDS Re-port, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p. 68. 
241 Forrest, The Advance o African Capital, op cit, pp. 1 8-20. 
24-4 Ibid, p. 243. 
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1970s created perverse incentives which contributed to the decline of 
agriculture in the 1980s/1990S. 245 
NEEDS seeks to reverse this decline. 246 Proposed strategies include 
encouraging private sector investment; reducing dependency on imports by 
enhancing food security; emphasising value-added, export-oriented activities; 
providing rural credit and financial assistance; improving transportation and 
distribution networks; and promoting relevant research activities. NEEDS 
proposes to generate N=3billion in annual revenues by focusing on the export of 
cassava247 and other cash-crops. Curiously, NEEDS is largely silent on the role 
(if any) of tax and non-tax incent" s for agriculture. However, Nigerian tax 
legislation feaLures various fiscal inc: --iitives specifically targeted at agriculture. 
3.2.1.2. Incentives for Research on Tropical Agriculture 
The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (hereafter: IITA) is an 
international research institution located in Ibadan, Oyo State and established 
under the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture Act No. 32 of 1967 
(hereafter: IITA Act). It is funded by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, 
international organisationS, 248 foreign donor countries 249 and the Nigerian 
government. 250 1tS objects include serving as a high-quality international 
research organisation; cooperating with research centres to increase food 
145 The decline of tradable sectors such as agriculture during this period has been 
attributed to the waste and inefficiency associated with an expanding public sector in 
manufacturing and services: X. Sala-i-Martin and A. Subramanian Addressing The 
Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration From Nigeria, IMF Working Paper WP/03/139 
(20.03: IMF, Washington D. C. ) pp-15-17. 
246 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 68-70. 
247 Cassava recently has attracted much attention from 
foreign (Chinese) investors and 
public functionaries given its untapped export potentials: see 
'Chinese Firms jostle 
for Nigerian Cassava', This Day [newspaper article by Etim Imisim], 7th March, 2006 
<htt[2: /ZwwNý7. thi-, dayonlitle. com/n-, Tiew. 12hp? id. =42549> accessed 09.03.06. 
248 Including the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research, the World 
Bank, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the 
UN and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 
249 Including the UK (via DFID), Denmark, Canada and the 
EU. 
250 IITA Annual Report 2003 
(Financial Information) 
<htrp: /'ý/ýýw-, iTw. iita.. or, o,, /an-nri2t/anni-12tO3. 
htm> accessed 25.04.06; IITA Annual Report 
2005 (Financial Information), pp. 59-61 < http: 
Z /vm7wIta 
-org, 
/cm,, Z article files /2 79- 
ar 005.12df> accessed 08.04.06. 
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production, quality and distribution; distributing improved plant materials to 
other research centres; providing resources for scholars and scientists; and 
organising local, regional and international forums to discuss and disseminate 
learning in tropical agriculture. 251 Recent projects include research into 
germplasm and agrobio diversity for tropical crops, and improving biological 
control options to promote food security, poverty alleviation and enhance lives 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
From inception, the IITA has been an autonomous,, non-profit and tax-free 
international organisation. IITA enjoys certain tax incentives which include 
customs duties exemptions for imported equipment, supplies, machinery, and 
furnishings. 252 IITA's income benefits from indefinite corporate income tax 
exemptions. A significant proportion of IITA's staff and management are 
expatriates reflecting its international character. The income of expatriate IITA 
staff, 253 and the scholarships, grants and in-service training allowances accruing 
to IITA researchers are equally exempt from personal income tax. 254Given 
the international, educational, charitable and donor-sponsored character of the 
IITA, it is unsurprising that these extensive customs and income tax incentives 
apply to encourage such important research. 
3.2.1.3. Pioneer Incentives for Agro-allied Industries 
A wide variety of agricultural activities enjoy 'pioneer status' under the 
Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act No. 22 of 1971 (hereafter: ID/ITR 
Act 1971) which confers tax holidays on eligible activities and entitieS. 255 The 
criteria for qualifying 'pioneer' industries are that: there is a dearth of 
investment in the particular industry; the scale of operation is not suitable for 
national economic requirements; there are favourable prospects 
for further 
development; or indeed, the promotion of the industry or its product is in the 
251 §2, and the Schedule to the IITA Act. 
252 §11 IITA Act. ' 
253 Provided derived from the IITA or from sources outside of Nigeria. 
254 ý12 IITA Act. 
255 As other sectors (e. g. manufacturing, mining and 
infrastructure) enjoy this 'Pioneer 
status', the discussions of the Act's provisions 
here are applicable to those sectors. 
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public interest. 256 Indigenous and foreign investors may apply for pioneer 
status for their companies or products. 257 The screening procedure is 
discretionary: the President 258 may grant pioneer status (with or without 
conditions) or reject the application. 259 In practice NIPC is responsible for the 
day-to-day administration of the pioneer incentives scheme. 
The statutory pioneer tax holiday lasts for 3 years initially, renewable for up 
to 2 additional years upon the satisfactory performance of the company. 
Performance is measured against certain criteria set out in the ID/ITR Act 
1971.2600ther criteria used in practice by NIPC include the levels of export 
potential, value added, local employment generated and amount of profits 
ploughed back into operationS. 261 Profits from approved pioneer activities are 
tax-exempt during the tax holiday although profits accruing from non-pioneer 
products and activities remain taxable. 262Capital allowances and losses may 
be carried forward to the post-pioneer period providing continuity into normal 
corporate tax rules. 263EIlgible agro-allied businesses include the cultivation and 
processing of crops, vegetables and fruits; the manufacturing of cocoa 
products; oilseeds processing; dairy production; cattle ranching; the 
manufacture of animal foodstuff; deep sea trawling; and coastal/inland lake 
fishing. 264 In 2004,4 agro-allied firms (engaged in dairy farming, crop 
cultivation, sorghum processing and fishing) were awarded pioneer tax 
256 ý1(1), ID/ITR Act 1971. 
257 According to the Act, the capital threshold is higher for foreign investors 4150,000 
as opposed to : -N, --50,000 
for indigenous investors: 51(2) ID/ITR Act 1971. However, 
in practice, a threshold of 410million is required by way of minimum paid-up share 
capital for both indigenous and foreign owned companies. 
258 Originally the Federal Executive Council/National Council of Ministers exercised 
this discretion: §1(1) ID/ITR Act 1971. 
259 §2(6) ID/ITR Act 1971. Failure to fulfil the conditions (e. g. as to qualifying 
expenditure or estimates of proposed products) may result 
in cancellation of the 
pioneer status: §§7 &8 ID/ITR Act 1971. 
260 E. g. the rate of expansion, standard of efficiency and 
development of the pioneer 
company; the utilisation of local raw materials, training and 
development of Nigerian 
personnel; and the location and relative importance of the industry: 
ý10, ID/ITR Act 
1971. 
261 Investors' Guide to Nigeria Brochure (Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission), 
Chapter 7: General Incentives, p. 55. 
262 §12, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
263 §§11 and 14, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
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incentiveS. 265 However, the pioneer tax holiday operates in exclusion to rural 
investment allowances on capital expenditure (hereafter: capex) expended in 
areas with poor infrastructural facilities. 266 
3.2.1.4. Direct and Indirect Tax Incentives for Agriculture 
Under CITA 1979, corporate taxes are payable on the trading or business 
profits of any company accruing in, derived from, brought into or received in 
Nigeria unless otherwise provided. 267 Companies income tax is charged on 
taxable profits, 268 with such chargeable profits being arrived at after the 
companies' accounting profits are adjusted for tax purposes by deducting 
interest and other allowable expenses. However, numerous corporate tax 
incentives promote investment in agriculture and agro-allied industries. 
Withholding tax exemptions on interest are granted to lenders providing 
long-term loans to companies engaged in agricultural trade or business. 
Qualifying agro-allied businesses include management of rubber, oil palm, 
cocoa., coffee and tea plantations; cultivation of cereals, fruits and cash-crops; 
animal husbandry and fishing. 269Normal rules restricting loss carry-forward 
periods to four years before their expiry are relaxed so the income tax shields 
from losses attributable to the first year of operations or trade operate 
indefinitely. 270Farms, plantations, fisheries and other facilities established in 
rural, underdeveloped and inaccessible locations enjoy rural investment 
allowances depending on the type of infrastructure required. The lack of 
telecommunication facilities attracts a 5% allowance while green-field 
investments in areas without any facilities at all are rewarded with a 100% tax 
264 Schedule to the ID/ITR Act 1971. 
265 Table 7.2.3.1: Pioneer Status granted to Companies in 2004, NIPC Annual Report 
2004, pp. 56-59. 
266 §19 ID/ITR Act 1971; §§34 and 40(12) CITA 1979. 
267 58(l)(a) CITA 1979. 
268 529 CITA 1979. 
269 Qualifying loans must provide for moratoriums of at least 18 months and low (base- 
rate) interest rates: 511(7) CITA 1979. 
270 §31 CITA 1979. 
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allowance. 271 Initial allowances permit the accelerated depreciation of 95% 
of capex incurred for plantation activities, agricultural plant and plantation 
equipment. 272 The generous capital allowances regime continues with the 
removal of the normal restriction273 on the quantum of capital allowances 
claimable in a particular year of assessment. 274VAT exemptions are provided 
under the Value Added Tax Act No. 102 of 1993 (hereafter: VATA 1993) for 
supplies of basic food items, fertilisers, locally produced agriculture and 
veterinary medicine, farming machinery and transportation equipment. 275 
While many of these agro-allied tax incentives have been in the statute books 
for decades,, recent developments have increased investment in agriculture. In 
2004, the Governor of Kwara State (Bukola Saraki) invited 15 displaced 
Zimbabwean farmers to establish large-scale farms for the cultivation of maize, 
soya beans and other cash crops. The initiative has proved extremely successful 
in a relatively short period of time, expanding beyond the pioneer farms in the 
Tsonga area and compelling other states and indeed, the federal government to 
mimic Kwara State's agricultural revolution. 276Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
agriculture will reclaim its former position as the foremost economic sector 
since the ascendency of the energy sector. 
271 Capital allowance rates include those for capex on tarred feeder roads (15%); water 
supplies (30%) and electricity (50%): §34 CITA 1979. 
272 The first year allowance rate is 95% and the residual 5% remains in the accounts to 
be used in computing balancing allowances or charges on disposal of the asset or 
entity: TT1&6 of; and Tables I& II to the Second Schedule, CITA 1979. 
273 Under normal income tax rules, companies may not claim allowances in excess of 66 
2/3% of assessable profits. 
274 T24(7) of the Second Schedule, CITA 1979. However, capital allowances appear to 
be 
capped at 95% of the associated capex in the first year claimed: 
ý6 of the Second 
Schedule, CITA 1979. 
275 Including tractors, ploughs and other agricultural implements: First 
Schedule, VATA 
1993. 
276 'Obasanjo, Governors Meet on Zimbabwe Farmers, This Day [newspaper report by 
Tunde Sanni], 1 5th December, 2005 
<http: / //Nvww. thisda)ýonline. corn 
/nview. php'ýid-3 -581 > and the 
Kwara Project 
website available at 
<httl2-, //ýwNi7-,, %-. k,, A7aral2roic-ct-cc)m/'index. 12hl2? ol2tiol-i=com 
frontpaVe&ItemJd=1> both 
accessed 16.12-05. 
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3.21.2. ENERGY 
3.2.2.0. Introduction 
3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incentives 
Energy remains Nigeria's dominant economic sector despite the efforts of 
successive Nigerian administrations to encourage diversification. 277 Most state 
participation in the sector has been through the national oil company, the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (hereafter: NNPC) 278 and its 
subsidiaries with the Department of Petroleum Resources (hereafter: DPR)279 
performing regulatory functions. 
Nigeria finds it relatively easy to impose and collect taxes on high value energy 
rents to meet much of its public expenditure requirements without recourse to 
the taxation of other economic sectors. Consequently, Nigeria is often 
classified as a rentier state as energy-related receipts (profits, taxes, rents and 
royalties) constitute the single largest source of public revenues. 280 
gures 3.1 & 3.2 below. )281 (See Fi 
277 The exploitation of crude oil dominates the energy sector, with Nigeria's enormous 
gas reserves (estimated at three times the crude oil reserves) being largely untapped 
for decades: Yinka Omorogbe 'The Legal Regime for Petroleum Production and 
y Issues in Nz, I Development in Nigeria', in C. O. Okonkwo (ed) Contemporar 'ger'an Law: 
Essays in Honour of Judge Bola Ajibola, (Toma Micro Publishers Ltd: Lagos: 1992), 
pp. 201-202. 
278 NNPC was established on April 1,1977 by the merger of the erstwhile 
Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation and the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power: 55 Nýgerian 
National Petroleum Corporation Act, No. 33 of 19 ý 7. 
279 DPR traditionally operates under the oversight of the Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources. Under the Obasanjo regime, this ministry was subsumed under the 
Presidency's bureaucracy. Further changes have been made by the Yar'Adua 
administration to the structure of the energy sector. 
211 Evan S. Lieberman, Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Bra. Zil and South 
Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 58; Axel Harneit- Sievers, 
'Reforming the Rentier State: Some Thoughts on NEEDS, ' op cit, pp. xi-xlx. 
281 Source: 2008-2010 Medium Term Fiscal Strategy Paper: Executive Brief to the 
Federal Executive Council, Federal Ministry of Finance/Budget 
Office of the 
Federation (Abuja FCT: August 2007), slides 25&18. 
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Figure 3.1: Sources of 2008 Federal Budget Revenue (: Nbillions) I 
Oil Revenue [78%] 
5! v VAT [2%] 
Companies Income Tax [8%] 
Customs [6%] 
independentRevenue[6%] 
Figure 3.2: 2008 FAAC oil Revenue at Benchmark Price (ftbillions) 
, 7i Crude Oil Sales (57%) 
N2,529b) 
'11,,,,, 'PPT(27%) [N1,208bj 
Royalties (9.8%) [ N429b] 
Gas (4.5%) f N197b] 
Other (1.7%) [N3b] 
H 
J 
Recent energy sector policy under NEEDS emphasises private sector 
participation through privatisation and liberalisation, improving key sub- 
sectors (e. g. petrochemicals and downstream activities), increasing indigenous 
participation through 'marginal fields' development and 'local content' 282 
regulations, and the promotion of forward and backward integration. A review 
and codification of the legal regime and specifically, energy sector tax 
182 Recent economic policies seek to achieve local content levels of 45% by 2006 and 
70% by 2010: see NNPC webs1te (webpage Nigerian Content Development in the Oil 
and Gas Sector) <bttp accessed 
18.04.06. 
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incentives is a key policy and may see the expansion or targeting of incentives 
to achieve some of these objectives in line with the ongoing tax reform 
projeC t. 283 
The legal regime for the exploitation of petroleum resources is hinged on two 
laws: the Petroleum Act,, Legal Notice 69 of 1969 (hereafter: Petroleum Act 1969) 
and the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969 (hereafter: 
Petroleum Regulations). Petroleum Act 1969 vests ownership of petroleum 
resources in the federal government and defines the legal regime for the 
exploitation of these resources through oil exploration licences, prospecting 
licences and mining leases. 284Application fees, rents and royalties are required 
to be paid for these licenses and leases. 285 All these taxes, fees, rents and 
charges are required to be paid by companies engaged in petroleum operations 
under the relevant statutory provisions. 
While Nigerian companies are normally liable to companies' income taxation, 
the profits of companies engaged petroleum operations are exempt. 286These 
revenues, however, are charged to tax by the provisions of the Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act, No. 15 of 1959 (hereafter: PPTA 1959) insofar as they accrue to 
companies engaged in petroleum operationS. 287Tax liability under PPTA 1959 
is charged on aggregate earnings under the following heads: the proceeds of all 
chargeable oil sold by the company in that period; the value of all chargeable 
283 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 76-77. 
214 Numerous contractual arrangements exist for the exploitation of petroleum 
resources, including concessions, joint ventures, production sharing contracts and 
service contracts: Yinka Omorogbe 'The Legal Regime for Petroleum 
Production and 
Development in Nigeria', op cit, pp. 190-199. 
285 §2 of and the First Schedule to the Petroleum Act 1969. 
The relevant rates are fixed 
pursuant to the Petroleum Regulations. 
211 Formerly, §19(l)(h) CITA 1979 provided , 
that: '... the profits of any company engaged 
in petroleum operations, within the meaning of section 
2 of the Petroleum Profits 
Tax Act, shall, in so far as those profits are derived from such operations and 
liable 
to tax imposed by that Act, be exempt from the tax 
imposed under this Act;... '. 
Under the codified version of CITA 1979 (Cap. 
C21, Vol. 3, LFN 2004) this 
provision has been deleted. However, this is unlikely to 
detract from the practice 
that excludes petroleum operations companies 
from the CITA 1979 tax regime. 
287 §2 (c) PPTA 1959 defines 'petroleum operations'; this definition 
has been 
significantly extended by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Sbell Petroleum Development 
Co. (Nig. ) Ltd. P. FBIR [1996] 8 NWLR (pt. 466) 256. 
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oil disposed of by the company in that period; the value of all chargeable 
natural gaS288 disposed in the relevant period; and all income of the company of 
that period incidental to and arising from any one or more of its petroleum 
operations. 289 However, income from the transportation by sea of chargeable 
oil is excluded from taxation. 290 
Companies engaged in petroleum operations pay tax at the unusually high 
nominal 292 rate assessed on their chargeable profits, 293 85% 291 derived after 
certain allowable deductions in respect of capital allowanceS294have been made 
against their assessable profits. These assessable profitS295 are derived after 
deductions for loss relief296 have been made as against the adjusted profits. The 
adjusted prof1tS297 of the companies are the profits for the relevant accounting 
period298 after certain allowable deductions 299 have been made and certain 
disallowable deductions have been corrected, by adding them back to the 
period's profits. 300 Petroleum companies pay royalties and are liable to tax 
under the Education Tax Act, No. 7 of 1993 (hereafter: ETA 1993) assessed at 
2% of the companies' assessable profit. 301 However, dividends derived from 
petroleum operations companies are exempt from withholding tax in the hands 
211 Basically, such quantities of natural gas delivered pursuant to the terms of any gas 
sales contract by the taxpayer company to the national oil company, the NNPC, 
exclusive of gas taken by the Federal Government under Article 34, of the First 
Schedule to Petroleum Act 1969: 52(c) PPTA 1959. 
289 §9(l) PPTA 1959. 
290 With a corresponding, symmetrical treatment for any losses: §14 PPTA 1959, 
291 ý21(1) PPTA 1959. 
292 However, where the relevant company has yet to commence commercial disposal of 
chargeable oil and accordingly, is yet to fully amortise certain un-recovered capital 
expenditure, the nominal rate is reduced to 67.75%: 521(2) PPTA 1959. In practice, 
the effective rate is lower due to generous rules for losses and capital allowances. 
291 Defined in §9(5) PPTA 1959. 
294 520 and the Second Schedule to PPTA 1959. 
295 Defined in 59(4) PPTA 1959. 
296 516 PPTA 1959. 
297 §9(3) PPTA 1959. 
298 Defined in §2 PPTA 1959 in relation to the period in that particular year, during 
which the concerned company was operating and engaged in petroleum operations. 
299 ý10 PPTA 1959. 
300 §13 PPTA 1959. 
301 §1 ETA 1993. 
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of recipients. 302The next section examines the relevant tax incentives available 
to relieve taxation in the energy sector. 
3.2.21 - 1. Energy Sector Tax Incentives 
3.2.2.1.1. Enhanced Deductions: Expenses, Capex & Loss Relief 
A wider variety of expenditures are tax deductible under PPTA 1959 than is 
the case under CITA 1979. These allowable deductions 303 comprise rents, 304 
royalties 305 and charges for customs and excise duties whether on specific 
capital expenditure or of a more general character; certain interest expenses; 
expenditure on repairs, renewals, and alterations of premises, plant, machinery, 
and other implements employed in petroleum operations; certain costs treated 
as expensed revenue items; and approved pension /provident fund 
contributions. 
Certain expenditures are disallowed. 306 The pro-indigenous enterprises 'local 
content' policy manifests itself with certain customs on imports being 
disallowed. 307 The provisions generally enshrine a clear distinction between 
revenue items (deductible) and capital items (no n- deductible). Consequently, 
any capital withdrawn from the undertakings of petroleum companies is 
disallowed as are capital improvements to facilities as opposed to mere repairs, 
renewals and alterations. Other disallowed expenditure include rent incurred 
for non-petroleum operations, local or foreign income tax charges, 308 
deductions for accounting depreciation and certain non-approved payments. 
302 §60 PPTA 1959. 
303 ý10 PPTA 1959. 
30, These rents are in consideration of the rights granted investors under oil prospecting 
licences and mining leases. Productive rents (associated with 
leases and licences) and 
non-productive rents are deductible. 
305 In respect of sales of natural gas, crude oil and casing-head petroleum spirit. 
306 §13(l) PPTA 1959. 
307 Particularly where locally-manufactured substitutes of equivalent quality and 
affordability are available. 
308 However, stamp duties and education tax charged under the 
ETA 1993 are deductible 
under 510(l) PPTA 1959. 
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PPTA 1959 provides certain incentives 309 to promote the utilisation of both 
associated gaS31(l and non-associated gas. 311 These include deductions for 
operational expenditure (hereafter: opex) which would otherwise be classified 
as capex. Outlays incurred to separate crude oil and gas into usable products 
are deductible as expenses against crude oil income. 312 Similar deductions are 
allowed against income from natural gas operations assessed to tax under CITA 
1979. 
Finally, tax deductions for losses under PPTA 1959 are significantly more 
generous than those under the general corporate tax regime. Generally, under 
CITA 1979, losses may be carried forward and relieved against taxable profits 
for up to 4 years of assessment before they expire. 313However, under PPTA 
1959 the carry forward loss relief period is indefinite: losses may relieved 
indefinitely in computing assessable profits, limited only by the availability of 
adjusted profits against which these can be set off. Companies may also exploit 
rules permitting them to elect to defer losses to be utilised in succeeding 
accounting periods. 314This produces a useful incentive for long-term capital 
intensive projects with the long gestation periods typical in petroleum 
operations. The next section reviews the PPTA 1959 regime for capital 
allowances. 315 
3.2.2.1.2. Investment Allowances: PPTA 1959 Capital Allowances 
Petroleum operations invariably requir'e vast amounts of capex usually payable 
in foreign currencies to obtain the technological, engineering and other inputs 
required to successfully exploit energy resources. Consequently, PPTA 1959 
provides generous capital allowances to reflect the economic depreciation of 
309 §ý11 & 12 PPTA 1959. 
310 Or casinghead gas: this is natural gas produced with crude oil 
from the same 
reservoir or oil well. 
311 Natural gas produced from a reservoir that does not contain significant quantities of 
crude oil. 
312 §11(1)(a); (2)(c) and (d), PPTA 1959. 
313 However, for agro-allied businesses, first-year losses (only) may 
be carried forward 
indefinitely and relieved against future profits: 
§31 CITA 1979. 
314 §16 PPTA 1959. 
315 §21 PPTA 1959. 
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such capex. 316 Outlays must fall under the following categories: qualifying 
plant, 317 pipelines and storage'318 and building and drilling319 expenditure. Two 
concurrent capital allowances are provided for. The first is accelerated 
depreciation provided by annual allowances at a rate of 20% per annum on 
qualifying capex, effectively writing off acquisition costs within 5 years. The 
second, the petroleum investment allowance, is an additional capital 
allowance granted on a graduated basis reflecting the location of capital 
equipment. As facilities located offshore are expensive to install and operate, 
the petroleum investment allowance provides additional allowances of up to 
20% of capex for facilities and operations located on the continental shelf and 
in territorial waters exceeding depths of 2200metres. 320 Where such equipment 
is 
acquired for utilisation in down-stream petroleum operations, it is also exempt 
from VAT. 321 
As is the case with any capital allowances, only profitable firms benefit from 
annual and petroleum investment allowances. This would ordinarily undermine 
the relevance of such incentives for the energy sector as capital-intensive 
petroleum operations typically have long investment horizons and may involve 
a series of incremental investment outlays with positive net present values only 
showing up years or even decades after final investment decisions are made. 
Happily, the law generously permits any unused capital allowances to be 
carried forward into subsequent years of assessment and set off against future 
assessable profits in computing chargeable income. 322 There is no 
discrimination against existing investors: all that is required is to establish that 
the new or incremental investment falls within the eligible categories of 
qualifying capital expenditure. There are additional incentives which permit 
316 §20 of and the Second Schedule to, PPTA 1959. 
I" Comprising capex on plant, machinery and fixtures facilities. 
318 Comprising buildings, structures and other housing facilities. 
'19 This category includes expenditure on the acquisition of mining and exploration 
rights, searching and winning 
deposits and other ancillary outlays. 
320 Lower allowances of 15%, 10% and 
5% (respectively) are provided on the capital 
1111 located in territorial waters of depths of expenditure costs for 
facilities/operations I 
up to 200metres, 100metres and those 
located onshore. 
321 First Schedule to VATA 1993. 
3 221 Rollover provisions are found in 520(5) 
PPTA 1959. 
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opex on equipment required to deliver associated gas, in usable forms or 
between pre-designated custody transfer point S 323 to be treated as capex 
entitled to annual and petroleum investment allowances. 324However, there are 
some limitations to the amount of capital allowances that may be claimed in a 
particular year. 325 
Capital allowances for gas projects are also provided for in other statutes. 
Sometimes capital allowances are coupled with some right of election being 
granted to eligible companies, as seen in the next section which examines 
energy incentives available under the CITA 1979. 
3.2.2.1.3. Mix & Match: CITA 1979 Accelerated Depreciation & Tax 
Holidays 
Special incentives are provided for gas utilisation projects, particularly in the 
downstream sector. 326 Eligible companies must choose between a tax holiday 
package and a capital allowance package as these options are mutually 
exclusive. The tax holiday option would benefit projects with short gestation 
periods which would be profitable in early years. It involves an initial 3-year 
tax-free period commencing on due ministerial certification of production and 
is renewable for 2 further years. 327 Upon the expiry of the tax holiday, the 
investor is entitled to a first-year accelerated capital allowance of 90% of 
investment in plant and machinery in addition to a 15% investment allowance 
321 Nigerian Accounting Standard Board: Statement of Accounting Standard 17 (SAS 17): 
Accounting in the Petroleum Industry: Downstream Activities. 
324 §11(1)(b) PPTA 1959. 
325 Eligible companies must claim the lower of -(a) the aggregate amount of annual and 
petroleum investment allowances computed in the ordinary way, and (b) a sum 
equivalent to 85% of the assessable profits (profits after loss relief and deductible 
expenses) less 170% of the sum of petroleum investment allowances for that year; 
subject, however, to the overriding stipulation that at least 15% of the tax payable 
were the annual and petroleum investment allowances not granted should be paid: 
ý20, PPTA 1959. 
326 Eligible projects include the commercial marketing and distribution of natural gas 
(through gas transmission and distribution pipelines subject to no royalties and 
petroleum profits tax), and gas utilisation in power plants, LNG and gas to 
liquid 
projects, petrochemicals and fertiliser plants: §39 CITA 1979. 
321 This is a discretionary extension contingent upon the 'satisfactory performance of 
the business'; however, the criteria for determining this is unclear. 
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which does not affect the assets' tax written value. 328 Finally, the relevant 
(post- holiday) rate of tax is the reduced tax rate of 30% under the CITA 1979 
and not PPTA 1959's 85%. 
The alternative capital allowance option is less generous and involves a one- 
off, first year 35% investment allowance which does not affect the 
computation of the relevant asset 's tax written down value. Whichever option 
is elected, eligible companies may enjoy further incentives of withholding tax 
exemptions on dividendS329 and interest 330 payments. Under the Deep Offsbore 
and Inland Basin Production Sbaring Contracts Act No. 9 of 1999 (hereafter: Deep 
Offshore/PSC Act 1999)331 an investment tax allowance of 50% on the costs 
of qualifying capital expenditure incurred under eligible Production Sharing 
Contracts is deductible from taxable income. 332The tax regime for Production 
Sharing Contracts also features reduced corporate tax rates as reviewed below. 
3.2.2.1.4. Reduced Corporate Income Tax Rates: Production Sharing 
Contracts' Incentives 
Production Sharing Contracts (hereafter: PSCs) are contractual arrangements 
for the exploitation of natural resources between a contractor and a host 
country whereby the contractor bears all of the exploration risk and incurs 
development costs in return for a significant portion of production revenues 
once commercial quantities of the resource are discovered. Ownership of the 
relevant acreage or oil field remains with the host country or its national oil 
company. The contractor assumes the risk of discovery and recoups its costs 
321 This stands at 10% of the cost at the end of the first year, being the residue of cost 
after the 90% annual allowance has been deducted. This amount is retained in the 
accounting records till the asset is disposed of or business discontinued and the sum 
used to calculate the relevant balancing charge or allowance. The investment 
allowance rate was 5% prior to 1998. 
329 Provided the initial investment was financed by foreign exchange or imported 
equipment was involved equivalent to at least 30% of the company's share capital. 
330 Provided due ministerial consent was obtained for the relevant loan. 
331 As amended by the Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharl*ng Contracts 
(Amendment) Act No. 26 of 19,9P. 
332 For Production Sharing Contracts entered into after the 1s' Of July, 1998. A similar 
investment tax credit is provided for PSCs concluded prior to this cut-off date: 54 
Deep Offshore/PSC Act 1999. 
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only when crude oil is discovered and commercially exploited. The contractor's 
development costs, operating expenses and any taxes or royalties are payable 
from actual production. The residue of production revenue is split between the 
host country and the contractor on a sliding scale basis, often with the former 
obtaining a larger share when production is low and vice-versa to reward 
successful, risk-seeklng contractors. 
Consequently, PSCs are suitable where the host country is unwilling or unable 
to bear the financial burden and operating risks of exploration and 
development, and can find a suitable contractor to bear these expenses and 
risks in return for a significant portion of ultimate revenues. Numerous 30- 
year term 333 PSCs have been granted in Nigeria to (foreign-owned) 334 
contractors since they were first introduced in 1972 with NNPC acting as the 
counterparty. A factor behind the growth in PSCs has been the inability of 
NNPC to consistently fund cash calls to defray shared expenditure under the 
terms of joint ventures with energy multinationals. Exploration, development 
and operating costs are typically recoverable from a percentage of crude oil 
production. Crude oil production is allocated to the parties on the basis of 
royalties, costs and corporate tax due by them. 335These production allocations 
are deducted before the residue of profit oil is shared. Royalties are charged on 
a graduated basis with rates ranging from nought to 17% depending on the 
location of the petroleum operationS. 336 
10 years for exploration under oil prospecting licences and 20 years under oil mining 
leases. 
E. g. Statoil, Ashland, Abacan, Esso, Agip, Shell, Elf, Mobil, Chevron, Conoco- 
Philips, and Allied Energy: see the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission's 
website [webpage: Oil and Gas: Main Industry Policies] <httj2: 
Z/wwW. n1j2c- 
nigeri-a. org/j2. ac. htm> accessed 18.04.06. 
115 §§8-12, Deep Offshore/PSC Act 1999. 
336 For instance, onshore operations (and those in waters within depths of 
200meters) 
may be charged at 16-67%; those in waters of depths exceeding 
1001 meters are 
exempt of taxation, reflecting the increased difficulty of recovery of petroleum at 
such depths: §5, Deep Offshore/PSC Act 1999. See also the 
Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission's 'Oil and Gas: Main Industry Policies' <htt. j2: //w-, i1V-. nij2c- 
nigeria. org/j2, sc.. htrn> accessed on 
18.04.06. 
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Tax incentives by way of reduced corporate tax rates have been awarded to 
numerous Nigerian PSCs. Profits from energy sector PSCs should be normally 
liable to tax at the PPTA 1959 rate of 85%. However, the terms of Nigerian 
PSCs have traditionally provided for a reduced tax rate of 50%. This 
contractual regime of reduced tax rates was granted statutory backing by the 
provisions of the Deep Offshore/PSC AC t. 337While this rate is significantly 
higher than the typical corporate tax rate of 30%, the 35% rate differential as 
against the 85% PPTA 1959 rate is -a substantial incentive, providing 
ammunition for critics who complain that some PSCs are unduly favourable to 
contractors. 338 Of particular concern is the manner in which a significant 
proportion of produced oil is allocated as 'tax oil' to defray private investors> 
petroleum profits tax liability, effectively meeting tax obligations out of shared 
gross production and not the net profits derived by the private investor. 339 
Another criticism is the contractual nature of the PSC reduced tax rate regime, 
which is quite typical of the manner in which Nigerian tax incentives in the 
energy are often implemented. While the use of informal agreements which 
effectively supersede statutory provisions has often been criticised 340 the 
practice persists. This is riot surprising given the ease at which fiscal 
agreements between the federal executive authorities and private firms may be 
concluded often circumventing the lengthy process of passing enabling 
enactments through the National Assembly. 
The next section considers generous tax incentives provided by the Memoranda 
of Understanding between the federal government and energy operators which 
337 §3 Deep Offshore/PSC Act 1999; Yinka Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, 
(Malthouse Press Ltd, Lagos: 2003), pp. 49-52. 
338 Specifically referring to the first PSC concluded with Ashland Oil Company in 1973: 
ibid, p. 49. 
339 Ibid, p. 50. Ostensibly, the high recovery ceilings of production oil against which tax 
and other expenses can be set off are to compensate the contractor concern 
for the 
large risks borne under the PSC: Yinka Omorogbe, 'Fiscal 
Regimes', (paper 
presented at the National Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative [NEITI] Civil 
Society Capacity Building Workshop at the Presidential Hotel, Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State on 28.07-05), p-8. 
340 Ibid, p. 10. 
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constitute a contractual and legally binding regime and also operate outside 
regular tax statutes. 
3.2.2.1.5. Incentive Cocktails: Memoranda of Understanding341 
The first Memorandum of Understanding (hereafter: MOU)342was the result of 
negotiations between public sector institutions (including the NNPC, and the 
Ministries of Petroleum and Finance) and NNPC's joint venture partners 
seeking to protect profit margins eroded by the oil glut and economic recession 
of the early 1980s. MOUs provide incentives to encourage exploration and 
production by energy operators. Private joint venture contractors are 
encouraged to lift crude oil allocations due to the NNPC which the latter is 
unable to appropriate. 
Various fiscal measures are utilised to achieve these ends. For instance, a 
capital investment relief stimulates increased investment in upstream 
exploration and development operations. A reserve additional bonus also 
operates as a tax credit to encourage efforts to increase proven reserves. Early 
contractual provisions guaranteed a profit margin of US$2 per barrel of crude 
oil produced. joint venture partners bear corresponding obligations to commit 
to specified levels of exploration, development and production with failure to 
meet these targets resulting in penalties and ultimately revocation of the 
special incentives regime. The basic MOU provisions have been frequently 
amended343 with recent versions providing a two-tier profit margin based on 
the energy companies' net investment per unit barrel of production. 344 Other 
fiscal incentives include a reduced tax rate of 35% to compensate for high 
operating costs, a tax credit against ultimate petroleum profits tax liability 
equivalent to the differential between the aggregate of royalties and petroleum 
341 Ibid, pp. 9-10; Omorogbe, Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, op cz . t, pp. 77-78; Omorogbe, 
'The Legal Regime for Petroleum Production and Development in Nigeria', op cit, 
pp. 193-194. 
342 The first MOU came into effect on 1 January 1986. 
343 In 1986, in 1991, January and July of 2000, and 2006. 
3" Essentially, a new pricing formula introduced a higher guaranteed profit margin of 
US$2.70 which applies only where the barrel unit costs exceed US$2; otherwise a 
lower profit margin of US$2.50 applies. 
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profits taxes, and a specially calculated revised government take. However, 
recent policy statements indicate the federal government's desire to eliminate 
the MOU arrangement which is perceived as excessively generous given the 
present high prices of petroleum commodities. 345 
The MOU arrangement illustrates how collective bargaining by foreign 
investors has guaranteed a favourable fiscal regime. Tax incentive measures 
often are negotiated in special 'packages' particularly where a significant 
investment is proposed by foreign investors who often possess a stronger 
bargaining position than the host country government. . 146 In Nigeria, 'packages' 
of financial, fiscal and other incentives to promote significant investments by 
private investors and multilateral aid agencies have often attracted their own 
enabling statute. Perhaps no other investment project has received as extensive 
incentives and guarantee support as the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas project 
considered next. 
3.2.2.1.6. Negotiated Incentive 'Packages': the Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas project 
Since 1908 when energy exploitation first commenced, the local environment 
has been degraded by the adverse effects of petroleum development including 
oil spills, deforestation, soil erosion, leaching and gas flaring. Gas flaring has 
had particularly malignant effects on the environment particularly in the 
resource-rich Niger Delta. The statistics underscore the extent of the 
pollution: in 1998,21 billion cubic meters of associated gaS347were flared in 
Nigeria contributing 38% of OPEC's flared output in that year. 348As Nigeria's 
345 Yakubu Lawal, 'Govt cancels incentives for oil firms, ' Nigerian Guardian (Lagos 
04.02.08) 
<h tt p: //wwýx. g,, uardia nnew. an; 4r. c om / news/ article 02 //in d exn 3 html-:, 12 date= 0402 () > 
accessed 04.02-08. 
341 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cif, pp. 98-99. 
341 Associated gas exists along side crude oil deposits. If the oil is extracted in the 
absence of adequate facilities (gas markets or infrastructure) to exploit this 
associated gas, such gas may be ignited and flared, or vented un-ignited, into the 
atmosphere. 
348 Recent estimates indicate that as much as 2.5 billion cubic feet of associated gas is 
flared daily (a rise to 32 billion cubic meters per annum), amounting to 80% of 
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gas reserves exceed her considerable crude oil endowments, this practice is not 
only harmful to the environment but also quite wasteful in terms of potential 
revenues forgone. 
Efforts to encourage gas utilisation by prohibiting gas flaring and imposing 
financial penalties have been largely unsuccessful due to the underlying 
economics. The utilisation of both associated and non-associated gas is 
extremely expensive in terms the level of infrastructure required. Rational 
energy operators would be inclined to opt for the less expensive alternative: 
flaring gas,, paying-fines and concentrating on exploiting more accessible and 
profitable crude oil reserves. 349The absence of vibrant domestic gas markets 
and the presence of significant barriers to entry to international ones impose 
additional constraints. 350 Global initiatives 351 to reduce gas flaring have been 
complemented in Nigeria by market 352 and fiscal interventions. A unique, 
negotiated tax incentives 'package' was also provided for the Nigeria Liquefied 
Natural Gas project. 
Nigeria LNG Ltd (hereafter: NLNG) 353 was incorporated in 1989 as a joint 
venture private company between NNPC, 354 Shell Gas B. V., Total LNG Nigeria 
Ltd., and ENI International (N. A. ) NV, -with the objects of exporting liquefied 
natural gas to exploit Nigeria's gas reserveS. 355Extensive environmental impact 
associated gas reserves utilised per annum: 
httl2: / /wwy.,. nigeria I ng. com//'NLNGnew/f,, iýi /defag It. h tM#W, 7 hen accessed 24.03.05. 
349 Omorogbe notes the ineffectiveness legal efforts to curb gas flaring: deadlines were 
shifted repeatedly (from 1 January 1984 to 2008); exemptions permitted; and 
penalties grossly inadequate: Yinka Omorogbe, 'Law and Investor Protection in the 
Nigerian Natural Gas Industry', Vol. 14, No. 2 journal of Energy and National 
Resources Law (JERL) pp. 181-182. 
350 Ibid, pp. 180-181. 
351 E. g. the World Bank's Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership of 2002. 
352 Notably the Oso I and II condensate projects undertaken by ExxonMobil. 
353 Omorogbe, 'Law and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural Gas Industry', o-P 
cit; see the NLNG website at < htt12: ning. com / NLN G new /default> accessed 
24.03.05. 
354 With a 49% equity stake; as such, the participation of foreign multinationals in 
NLNG is at 51%, effectively constituting a controlling stake. 
315 Essentially, the project involved the construction and operation of an LNG plant 
based in Finima, Bonny Island (located in the Nigerian Niger Delta). The Base 
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studies were concluded under local environmental protection legislation 356 
before the commencement of operations. Financing for the project has 
generated record-breaking inflows of FDI into Nigeria, with shareholders' 
equity investments of US$3.6billion necessary to finance the Base Project 357 
and the Expansion project. 358The, NLNGPlus Expansion ProjeCt359was partly 
financed by a record-setting syndicated loan of US$1.060billion. In addition, 
thousands 360 0f technical jobs were created during the construction of the 
various trains. Given the prospects of successive trains and the commitment of 
the company to increasing local content in its supply chains and operations, 
this trend is bound to continue. 
The Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act No. 3P of 19,90 
(hereafter: NLNG/FIGA AC t) 361 grants an inimitable form of pioneer status to 
NLNG, extending the typical corporate tax holiday period from the norm of 
5 years to a maximum of 10 years. 362Post-holiday tax liability is at the reduced 
corporate income tax rate of 30%363 and not the significantly higher PPTA 
1959 rate of 85%. 364 Finance-related tax incentives include interest tax 
deductions on any loans to NLNG, 365 and full exemption from withholding 
taxeS366 on interest,, 367 'ring-fenced'368 dividends and payments for serviceS369 
Project comprised of Trains 1 and 2 completed on August 12,1999 and February 27, 
2000 respectively. 
151 Environmental Impact Assessment Act No. 86 o 1992 and the Federal Environmental ýf 
Protection Agency (Amendment) Act No. 59 of 1992. 
357 Trains 1 and 2. 
351 Train 3. 
359 Comprised of Trains 4 and 5. 
360 Over 18,000 technical jobs were created in constructing the Base Project. 
161 As amended by the Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentives, Guarantees and Assurances) Act No. 
113 of 1993. 
362 Subject to certain sales thresholds, which if exceeded, limit the extent of the pioneer 
period: §2 NLNG/FIGA Act. 
363 §40 CITA 1979. 
364 §3 NLNG/FIGA Act. 
365 55 ibid. This is a significant incentive as normally, interest on loans to petroleum 
operators is only tax-deductible in limited circumstances (e. g. where the rate is 
closely linked to LIBOR): §§11&1, PPTA 1959). 
366 Normally charged at 10%: ý§78-82 CITA 1979; Company Income Tax (Rates, etc of Tax 
Deducted at Source [Vabbolding Tax]) Regulations of 1997. 
367 Again, a significant incentive given the magnitude the debt finance borne by the 
NLNG project. 
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provided to NLNG by foreign firms. Related parties' capital gains on the 
transfers of shares in NLNG are similarly tax exeMpt. 370 Income from BGT 
Ltd (NLNG's wholly-owned shipping subsidiary) is tax exempt. 371 Export 
duties on exported gas products are waived; import, customs and other tax 
exemptions exist for a wide range of necessary imports of plant, machinery, 
goods and construction materials. 372Normal benefits from capital allowances 
and loss relief are preserved beyond the end of the pioneer period373 and 
general limitations as to the quantum of capital allowances claimable within a 
year of assessment do not apply. 374 However, it is unclear if these tax 
exemptions extend to recently introduced taxes such as VAT. 375 
In addition to these generous fiscal incentives, the NLNG/FIGA Act includes 
extensive guarantees, undertakings and assurances granted by the federal 
government to NLNG and its shareholders on matters ranging from free 
repatriation of funds, provision of land and infrastructure, employment of 
expatriate staff to compensation for expropriati 0 n. 376 As important as the 
NLNG project may be in terms of attracting FDI and generating revenues, it 
utilises mostly non-associated gas. Consequently, its positive impact on gas 
flaring is limited. 377 However, Nigerian tax law provides incentives for the 
utilisation of associated gas as noted in §3.2.2.1.1 above. Further incentives 
361 Tax-exempt dividends are only paid out of pioneer period profits: §17 ID/ITR Act 
1971. 
369 For instances, supply and engineering services provided under extensive Engineering 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts. 
370 §6 NLNG/FIGA Act. 
371 §6 NLNG/F1GA Act and 514 CITA 1979. 
372 Provided that certain procedures are complied with: §7 NLNG/FIGA Act. 
373 51 NLNG/FIGA Act; ý14 ID/ITR Act 1971. 
374 Under normal corporate income tax rules, capital allowances are capped at 66 2/3% 
of assessable profits in any particular year of assessment: see 531 of and T24(7) of 
the Second Schedule to CITA 1979. 
375 VATA 1993 was introduced before the commencement of the fiscal regime under the 
Second Schedule to the NLNG/FIGA Act. 
376 Second Schedule of the NLNG/FIGA Act reads more like a boilerplate loan 
agreement than a typical Nigerian statute, prompting criticism from Omorogbe that 
the Federal Government is seeking to legislate for stability in the investment 
environment: Omorogbe, 'Law and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural Gas 
Industry', op cit, pp. 188-191. 
377 Omorogbe, 'Law and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural Gas Industry', op 
cit, p. 18 4. 
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are granted under the oil and gas export free zone legislation considered in the 
next section. 
3.2.2.1.7. Incentives for Gas: Oil & Gas Export Free Zone (OGEFZ) 
The Ol/ and Gas Export Free Zone Act, No. 8 of 1996 (hereafter: OGEFZ Act 
1996) establishes an Export Processing Zone (hereafter: EPZ) in the 
Onne/Ikpokirl area of Rivers State in the Nigerian Niger Delta. The provisions 
are almost in pari material to that of the -Nigerian Ex port Processing Zones Act, No. 
63 of 1992 (hereafter: NEPZ Act 1992). 378The few differences between the tax 
incentive regimes provided under the bespoke OGEFZ Act 1996 and the more 
general NEPZ Act 1992 include: the establishment of a separate and -distinct 
Authority to administer this Oil and Gas EPZ; 379 the prominence of 
representatives of the Rivers State Government and Department for Petroleum 
Resources on the Authority's governing board; 380 and the possible role of the 
Authority established under OGEFZ Act 1996 taking over the management of 
EPZs engaged in the export of oil and gas located elsewhere in Nigeria 
established under the NEPZ Act 1992.381 
Typical EPZ fiscal incentives relating to exemption from customs duties, 
excise levies, rates and VAT are granted. 382Capital and consumer goods, raw 
materials, components and other intermediate materials may be imported into 
the EPZ free from customs duties. Activities permitted within the EPZ 
include assembly, manufacturing, processing, repackaging, storage, export and 
consumption of imported materials. 383Retail trade of imported materials within 
the EPZ is prohibited unless special permission is obtained. 384 The EPZ is 
treated as separate from the Nigerian customs territory such that goods are 
118 Discussed in greater detail below at §3.2.5.2 of this Thesis. 
379 §52-7, OGEFZ Act 1996. 
Evidently to represent the views of the State in which the EPZ is sited and the 
supervising government department. 
381 ý5(2) OGEFZ Act 1996. 
382 Part I, First Schedule to VATA 1993. 
383 §512 & 18 OGEFZ Act 1996. 
384 Curiously, those limiting sales in the domestic customs territory to a minimum of 
25% of production. This seems to be a draftsman's error: 5§14 & 18 OGEFZ Act 
1996. 
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treated as imports from other countries and subject to the normal customs, 
licensing and VAT rules. 385 Import tariff rebates are also provided for 
products processed in the EPZ which are subsequently imported into the 
Nigerian customs territory. 386 These incentives are complemented by a total 
exemption from federal taxes (notably corporate income tax, petroleum 
profits tax, export duties, stamp duties, corporate capital gains taxes and 
withholding taxes), state taxes (including personal income taxes, business 
registration fees and individuals' capital gains taxes) and taxes imposed by 
local government authoritieS. 387 
Non-fiscal incentives include free remittance of capital, profits and dividends; 
a simplified import, export and licensing regime; rent-free land; the prohibition 
of strikes and industrial action; no restrictions on foreign ownership of firms; 
reduced restrictions on the employment of expatriates; and provisions to 
facilitate trade finance and securitisation. 388While these incentives appear to be 
specifically targeted at attracting FDI, 389 other incentives are clearly directed at 
encouraging investments by indigenous entrepreneurs. This is illustrated by the 
fiscal incentive regime for marginal field operators. 
3.2.2.1.8. Reduced Tax Rates: Marginal Fields Incentives fo r 
Indigenous Operators 
Given the risky, capital-intensive nature of petroleum exploration, production 
and development, it is unsurprising that the sector is dominated by energy 
multinationals. Omorogbe commends the rise of indigenous companies despite 
the difficulties these entrepreneurs face in raising finance, arguing for financial 
incentives and assistance to promote their presence in this vital sector. 390 She 
argues for the use of policy interventions to create a supportive environment 
385 517 OGEFZ Act 1996. 
386 T1 Oil and Gas Export Free Zone (Special Import Provisions) Order 2003, S. I. No. 2 of 2003. 
387 58 OGEFZ Act 1996. 
388 5518 & 512(3)(b) OGEFZ Act 1996. 
381 U. J. Osimiri, 'Stimulation of Investment in energy through Nigerian tax exemption 
laws' 2002 OPEC Review, March 2002 pp. 46-60. 
chapter 310 Yinka Omorogbe, Indigenous Oil Companies and the Nigerian Petroleum Industr 
9, p. 112-113. 
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within which indigenous companies could flourish. 391 One such policy has been 
the Marginal Fields Development Programme which is specifically targeted at 
developing indigenous exploration and production capacity in the upstream 
sector. 
The 1996 amendments to the Petroleum Act 1969392 set the stage, empowering 
the Head-of-State to compel energy multinationals which held oil mining leases 
to farm out marginal fields which had not been developed for over ten years 
due to: marginal economics, low ranking in the lessors' reserve portfolios, high 
gas and low oil reserves or the lack of proximity to existing projects and 
facilities. 393 In 1999,119 fields were classified as marginal and efforts to 
develop these culminated in September 2001 with the successful award of 
concessions to 24 marginal fieldS394 out of 200 available fields to 32 indigenous 
companies. 395While some of the awardees have commenced some level of 
operations, commercial production of these fields has been delayed largely due 
to difficulties in raising necessary finance, obtaining appropriate technical 
support and security concerns in the Niger Delta. 
Indigenous marginal fields' operators can take comfort from tax incentives. 
These mainly consist of a reduced tax rate of 65.75% of chargeable profitS396 
for the first five years of operations, increasing to the normal PPTA 1959 rate 
of 85% in subsequent years. 397However, discussions between this Researcher 
and marginal field operators indicate that Presidential approval has been 
obtained to reduce the prevailing rate to 55% throughout the life of the field's 
391 Ibid, p. 120. 
392 By the Petroleum (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 1996. 
393 Guidelines for Farmout and Operations of Marginal Fields, [August 2001] (Abula; 
Office of the Presidential Adviser on Petroleum and Energy, 2001) pp. 7-8. 
394 With estimated reserves at 300million barrels of crude. 
395 NNPC website (webpage Nigerian Content Development in the Oil and Gas Sector) 
<http: / /v7ww. nnl2cgrout)-com/--ý2otentlal. httn> accessed 24.04.06 
396 521 PPTA 1959. 
... Marginal Fields: Technical and Commercial Field Specific Bid Tender Submission 
Requirements Uune 2002] (Lagos: Department of Petroleum Resources, 2002) p. 8 
<httl2: //vT-, -,?, w. dprniý,, eria. com/margifldisumrqt. 
htm> accessed 02.05.06. 
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operations. 398 Investment tax credits vary from 10% to 15%, depending on 
the location of qualifying assets. 399 Graduated royalties are still paid to the 
FIRS and the original lease holder. 
The energy sector is one o many sectors in which the ability to effectively 
harness financial and technical resources may determine success or failure. The 
foregoing discussion has reviewed tax incentives applicable to particular energy 
sub-sectors that are used to improve the investment environment. Energy 
sector fiscal incentives serve a variety of purposes including countering the 
unusually high tax rate applied on oil rents, compensating for the lack of 
physical infrastructure in most - oil producing areas and recognising the 
immense financial resources required to exploit energy resources. The next 
section considers tax incentives granted to providers of credit and other 
financial services. 
3.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
3.2.3.0. Introduction 
Private-sector led economic growth is a central theme under NEEDS. Financial 
institutions fund such growth and serve as intermediaries between investors 
and enterprises requiring finance. Financial sector regulation is based on the 
Central Bank Acts of 1991 & 2007, the Banks and Otber Financial Institutions Act 
No. 25 of 1991 (hereafter: BOFIA 1991) the Insurance Act No. 1 of 2003 and the 
Investment and Securities Act No. 45 of 1999. The Central Bank (hereafter: CBN) 
is vested with wide supervisory powers to regulate financial institutions in 
398 Marginal fields' operators may apply directly to the Department of Petroleum 
Resources to benefit from the reduced 55% tax rate while the new regime queues for 
legislative approval to pass it formally into law. (This, of course, is yet another 
example of how often the regulatory reality is far removed from the law prescribed 
in statute books): Statement by Johnson Salako, CEO: Goland Petroleum 
Development Company, Lagos, Nigeria (personal communication 26-28 April, 2006). 
399 VI. Z., 10% for onshore investment; 15% for investment in water depths up to 
100metres; 20% in waters 100metres deep and beyond: see Marginal Fields: Technical 
and Commercial Field Specific Bid Tender Submission Requirements [June 2002], op 
cifý p. 8. 
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conjunction with the Nigerian Insurance Commission (hereafter: NAICO M) 400 
and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation. 40'Financial institutions are 
usually required to be incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act 
No. 1 of 1990 (hereafter: CAMA 1990) and as such, are subject to normal 
corporate tax 402 on their taxable profitS. 403 
Regrettably, Nigeria's capital markets have remained shallow relative to the 
size of the economy due to problems of under- cap italis ation, mismanagement 
and poor corporate governance precipitating successive Nigerian banking crises 
between the 1950S404 and the 1990S. 405 Banks were notorious both for their 
p ursuit of short-term profits from arbitrage opportunities on currency markets 
and reluctance to lend to long-term, real sector projects. A World Bank/IMF 
survey of the private sector in Nigeria (hereafter: Nigeria PSA Report) 406 ranks 
access to finance as the second most-quoted challenge for private sector 
manufacturing firms owing to the unavailability of long-term finance, 
inadequate collateral or guarantees and prohibitively high interests rates. These 
high rates may incorporate a risk premium associated with business 
uncertainty, a weak contract enforcement/judicial system, unreliable financial 
data and the lack of a lengthy trading history. 
411 Established under Act No. 1 of 1997 (hereafter: NAICOM Act 1997). 
401 §33-35, BOFIA 1991. 
402 At 30%. However, there is an additional 'excess profits' tax imposed at 15% on the 
excess of normal profits over 'standard profits' (calculated by reference to the 
capital employed by the company) with a threshold of N6million. While this excess 
profits tax is -applicable to all companies, it usually only affects banks and insurance 
companies that are required to maintain high capital levels (N25billion and 
N10billion respectively): §40 CITA 1979. 
403 Special accounting and taxation rules apply vis-d-vis the calculation of accounting and 
taxable profits for banks and insurance companies: see generally Nigerian 
Accounting Standard Board: Statements of Accounting Standard 10 & 15, Accounting 
for Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions I& II. 
404 Forrest, The Advance of African Capital, op cit, pp. 35-36. 
405 J. U. ' Ebhodaghe, 'Distress Management and Prevention Strategies for the Nigerian 
Banking System', in Peter N. Umoh (ed) Safe and Sound Banking Practices in Nigeria: 
Selected Essays by jobn U. Ebhodagbe (Page Publishers Services, Lagos: 1997), pp. 27-30. 
411 Nigeria Private Sector Assessment: Tecbnzcal Papers, Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development, Africa Region, September 2002 (World Bank, Washington D. C.: 2002), 
pp. 20-21; 78-82 & Part 3. 
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CBN is currently implementing certain reforms of the financial sector in line 
with NEEDS and the Financial Systems Strategy (FSS) 2020.407Banks are being 
encouraged to provide microfinance facilities for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (hereafter: SMEs). As such, NEEDS seeks to remedy financial 
sector deficiencies by adopting a quartet of policy thrusts: deepening asset 
volumes and instrument diversity in the financial sector; reducing financial 
sector-funded public deficits; providing incentives for financial institutions to 
invest in the real sector; and, most controversially, reviewing the capitalisation 
of financial institutions. 408 The tax incentives that accompanied the 
capitalisation exercise are considered in the next section. 
3.2.3.1. Tax Incentives for Banking & Insurance Consolidation 
Shortly after Prof. Charles Solud0409was appointed as the Governor of the 
CBN in May 2004, the CBN introduced a policy of consolidation in the 
Nigerian banking sector 410 with far-reaching implications. 411 The principal 
policy thrust was mandatory increase in minimum capitalisation by way of 
shareholders' funds 412 for banks to 425billion 413 within an 18-months 
implementation horizon. The policy precipitated a wave of bank mergers 
reducing the number of banks from 89 to the eventual 25 banks compliant by 
407 Under FSS 2020, the CBN intends to reform the Nigerian financial system to become 
a leading global financial hub by 2020: Prof. Charles Soludo, 'Nigeria's Financial 
System Strategy 2020 Plan: "Our Dream"' Presentation at the FSS 2020 International 
Conference, Abula, Nigerian on 18-06.07 
<httl2: /,, 'wv7-, i7. ceni-)ank. org/fss/ýfsshome. asl. 2> accessed 04.10-07. 
408 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 75-76. 
409 Soludo had previously served as the Chief Economic Adviser to the President and 
led the team that developed NEEDS. 
410 At the Nigerian Bankers' Committee meeting held on the 6t h of July 2004 in Abula, 
Nigeria. 
41 1 This Researcher has considered the conflicting views on the consolidation policy 
elsewhere. This section draws heavily from that article: see further Oyebode 
Oyetunde, 'Consolidation Reform of the Nigerian Banking Sector: The Perspectives 
of Angels and Trolls, ' [2005] J. I. B. L. R. pp. 280-285. 
412 Essentially accumulated reserves, equity and preference share capital unimpaired by 
losses and excluding accretions from asset revaluation. 
413 Approximately US$194.5million or ý112.8milllon as at 30 December 1995 (see Rates 
Archive on CBN website: <http: / /wwxN,. cenb ank. org/Rares /Exchano,, -Af chive s. aap > 
accessed 03.03.08. Previously, under the CBN's Monetary, Credit, Foreign Trade and 
Exchange Policy Guidelines existing banks were required to have shareholders funds 
of N-lbillion with new entrants into the banking sector required to achieve a 
-ýý2blllion threshold under the Central 
Bank Guidelines. 
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December 2005 who now may hold public sector funds and access foreign 
exchange allocation through official channels. 414 
A key element in the Central Bank's incentive packet for merging banks was 
the commitment to work with the relevant tax authorities to provide tax 
incentiveS. 415 Various tax incentives may be considered under applicable tax 
codes,, including the companies' income tax5 capital gains tax (under the Capital 
Gains Tax Act No. 44 of 1967, hereafter: CGTA 1967), value added tax, 416 and 
stamp duties regimes (under the Stamp Duties Act No. 5 of 1939, hereafter: SDA 
1939). Nigerian tax law does not currently provide for group and consortium 
relief available in other jurisdictions to merging and reorganising related 
corporate entities in respect of trading losses, excess charges, or management 
expenses. 417 However, a limited tax advantage may be gained by way of 
reconstruction and merger relief. 
Corporate tax rules allow companies to elect to which accounting reference 
dates to make up their accounts. In circumstances where tax able companies 
make up accounts to different dates, various rules apply granting the taxman, 
or the taxpayer, as the case may be, rights of election. Where an existing 
company changes its accounting reference date to coincide with its parent 
company'418 the taxman has a right of election to charge tax on the higher of 
chargeable profits based on the old accounting date, and such profits based on 
the new accounting date. 419 In relation to prospective bank mergers, a target 
414 CBN Governor's Speech, 'Consolidating the Nigerian Banking Industry to Meet the 
Development Challenges of the 21st Century, delivered on the 6 th of July, 2004 at the 
Central Bank of Nigeria offices in Abula, Nigeria 
<httli: //Nvv, w. cenbal-ik. or, (ý,, /documefits/ýýýsi2eeches. asl2> accessed 01.02.05. 
415 Particularly as regards capital allowances, companies income tax and stamp duties: 
see ý4.4 of the CBN's Guidelines and Incentives (published on 5 of August 2004 
<httj. 2: / /www. cenbank. org /out /12ublications / bs d/ 2004 /consolidation. 1.2df > accessed 
01-02.05. 
416 Under VATA 1993. 
41 , For a UK perspective see: David Southern & PricewaterhouseCoopers' Treasury Tax 
Team, Taxation of Loan Relationships & Derivative Contracts (8th edition, Tottel 
Publishing: 2007) pp. 275-280. 
418 §336(2) CAMA 1990. 
419 §29(2) CITA 1979. 
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bank that is ceasing to operate420would suffer a similar tax disadvantage of 
being subject to the taxman's right of election as regards tax basis periods. 421 
Should several banks form a consortium and consequently merge, the new 
bank, conversely, would enjoy the tax relief of exercising a right of election. 422 
Consequently, the merging or target entities face the prospects of a large tax 
bill particularly if their recent profits have been high. However, by proper 
structuring of the transaction to met relevant conditions,, the merging entities 
may be able to benefit from merger and reconstruction relief. In the main, 
the relevant provisions 423 disapply the right of election rules highlighted 
above424 and preclude the incidence of balancing charges on the disposal of 
assets of the merging or target companieS. 425 
Capital gains from disposals of taxable assets are liable to tax 426 on the 
realised or market value of the disposal427 of chargeable assets. The relevant 
assets classes are quite wide and include both tangible assets like branch 
premises and intangibles like goodwill. 428 In related-party transactions, market 
values are substituted for the contract purchase consideration in computing tax 
liability. 429 Similarly, transactions deemed artificial or fictitious are 
disregarded. 430 The merging banks could face a significant tax charge given the 
large values of the consolidating undertakings. Here too, the taxman could give 
merger relief in respect of shares acquired as purchase consideration by 
shareholders of the target or merging banks in the acquiring or new bank. 431 
420 Being liquidated and whose undertakings are being transferred to the acquiring bank. 
421 529(4) CITA 1979. As such, the taxman exercises a right of election to select the 
higher of assessable profits thrown up by computing to on the preceding year basis 
and actual year basis. 
422 529(3) CITA 1979. 
423 529(9) ibid. 
424 However, the taxpayer's right of election due to a change in accounting date remains: 
§29(9)(a) ibid. 
421 However, no initial allowance relief may be enjoyed by the acquiring or new entity 
post-merger. 
426 At 10%: §2 CGTA 1967. 
427 §6-7; 523 ibid. 
428 53 ibid. 
429 57,23-24 ibid. 
430 ý21 ibid. 
431 Such shares being consideration for the disposal of shares and interests previously 
held by the target company's shareholders: 5§32A & 31(l), ibid. 
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This relief is peculiar to share-for-share acquisitions and it is instructive to 
note that this was the Central Bank approved mode of consideration, except 
where payments to minority shareholders are involved. 432 
Value added tax is imposed, charged and payable on specified taxable goods 
and services. A taxable person433 is required to pay input tax to a supplier, on 
purchases of taxable goods and services and is obliged, when supplying taxable 
goods and services to distributors, agents, clients or consumers to collect 
output tax on these supplies. 434 Input VAT on service and administration 
expenses, and expenses incurred in connection with capital assets are generally 
required to be expensed or capitalised, respectively, in the taxpayer's financial 
statements. 435 Consequently, VAT on the professional fees of legal advisers, 
financial consultants, reporting accountants and auditors, stockbrokers and 
other professionals would be expensed in the profit and loss account of the 
merging institutions. 436 In some jurisdictions, it may be possible to recover 
input VAT attributable to professional fees relating to such essential services 
as financial and legal advice, due diligence exercises, contract negotiation and 
transaction structuring and coordination activities, particularly in share for 
share takeovers. Regrettably, Nigerian VAT law is not as sophisticated. 
However, in line with the CBN's declared intention to facilitate the 
consolidation activities and provide necessary professional services and 
technical assistance, it would have been worth the while of banking 
stakeholders to press for similar relief to be provided by legislation for this 
purpose. It is unclear if similar relief was sought and obtained in any of the 
merger transactions. 
432 T7.10 of the CBN's Guidelines and Incentives. 
433 §42, VATA 1993. 
434 §§10 & 11 ibid. 
435 513A ibid. 
436 Such fees would qualify as charges arising from the consumption of services 
rendered and thus liable to VAT: Taofeeq Abdulrazaq, 'Consolidation Brings Tax 
Changes to Banking Industry, ' reprinted from Tax Notes International Dec. 19, 
2005, p. 1039. 
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Stamp duties are charged at flat or ad valorem rates on relevant instruments, 
which are executed in Nigeria or relate to property or things to be done in 
Nigeria. 437 The consequences of not stamping such instruments go to the 
admissibility of such documents in civil proceedings and for other purposes. 438 
Stamp duties are vital costs in mergers, given the numerous documents 
required to be executed in respect of the transferred properties and 
undertakings of consolidating banks. In any case, merger relief is available by 
amalgamating companies where transactions are structured as business 
acquisitions or the acquisition of shares, under certain provisionS. 439 
On the whole, the consolidation exercise proved to be relatively successful440 
increasing the sector's share of the Nigerian Stock Exchange's total market 
capitalisation by 26% to 50%, attracting US$500million in FDI, and improving 
liquidity, credit and depositor confidence. 441 25 successful banks emerged 
although only 76 banks of the original 89 banks were actually involved in 
mergers. 442These 25 surviving banks have since been rewarded by the CBN 
with greater investment opportunities including the privilege of being global 
custodians of the nation's considerable foreign reserves. 
However, despite the CBN's declared intention to work with the relevant 
authorities to provide special tax incentives for merging banks'443 it appears in 
practice that the CBN relied only on the limited tax incentives currently 
437 §3 SDA 1939. 
438 522(4) SDA 1939. However, the documents may be admissible in criminal 
proceedings and in other limited circumstances. 
439 5104 ibid. 
440 Despite valid criticism from certain commentators: Tunde I. Ogowewo and Chibulke 
Uche, '(Mis)Using Bank Share Capital as a Regulatory Tool to Force Bank 
Consolidations in Nigeria', journal of African Law, 50 (2006) pp. 161-186. 
441 CBN Press Release of 12.01.06 'Soludo to Receive Global, African Banker of the 
Year Award' available at 
<httl. 2: / Zwww-cenbank. orV. 1 OUT /PUBLI CA TI ONS /PRESS RELE.. -\ SE / GOV /2006 /P 
R%2012A-1-06. PDF>. 
442 The successful 25 banks accounted for 93.5% of the industry's deposit share; the 
unsuccessful 13 banks representing 6.5% faced subsequent liquidation: see CBN 
Press Release of 03.01.06 '2 5 Banks Meet December 31s, Deadline' 
< httl2: / /yww. cenbank. org / OUT /PUBLIC. A TI ONS /PRESS RELEZýSE / GO N7 /20()6 /P 
DF'ý' 203-1-061/'ý20PR. PI)F> accessed 01.03-06. 
443 ý4.4 of the CBN's Guidelines and Incentives. 
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provided by Nigerian law. 444 Consequently, many merging banks utilised tax 
planning strategies similar to those outlined above. 445 The apparent lack of 
coordination between the CBN and the 'relevant authorities' was underscored 
by a Public Notice in which the FIRS reminded merging entities of their need 
to seek its prior approval before any merger, takeover, transfer or restructuring 
of any business could be fully consummated. 446 Oddly enough, FIRS' Public 
Notice was issued on 6 February 2006, well after the CBN had concluded the 
consolidation exercise and published the list of the 25 successful banks on 3 
January 2006. Even more curious was the concluding statement to the effect 
that the FIRS would not entertain requests for approval of mergers unless it 
was informed before the commencement of the exercise. 
Unsurprisingly, the FIRS Public No, tice has attracted the censure of leading tax 
practitioners who criticise FIRS for creating further uncertainty in relation to 
the concluded consolidation exercise. 447 These developments raise concerns 
about the FIRS' administrative and technical capacity to implement complex 
policies and coordinate effectively with other key public agencies. However, 
FIRS' Tax Audit Department and Large Taxpayers Unit evidently has previous 
experience with merging corporations and has conducted routine post-merger 
audits on successfully merged banks. 
Insurance companies have also been required to increase their capital base. 448 
The new policy applies from September 1,2005 for existing firms and February 
444 It is unclear if this policy was due to a conscious policy not to extend the scope of 
available tax incentives further. 
441 Recent discussions with leading legal advisers to merging banks in Lagos revealed 
that while tax planning often was approved on a transactional basis, options that this 
Researcher had previously identified were adopted: Oyebode Oyetunde, 
'Consolidation Reform of the Nigerian Banking Sector: The Perspectives of Angels 
and Trolls', op cit, pp. 283-284. 
446 FIRS required merging banks to give it notice of their intended mergers and to 
attach merger plans, three-years audited accounts and letters of guarantee by 
successor entities to discharge the tax liabilities of their merging predecessors. FIRS 
alluded to an understanding with the CBN that mergers would be approved in 
principle, pending the satisfactory completion of tax audits by the FIRS. 
447 Taofeeq Abdulrazaq, 'New tax notice on bank consolidation in Nigeria creates 
uncertainty', (Deloitte Touche Tornatsu, Lagos: 2006). 
448 Essentially paid-up equity capital and any reserves unimpaired by losses. 
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28) 2007 for new firms. Life insurance companies are required to increase their 
capital base from 4150million to ýý; 2billion; for general insurance firms and 
reinsurers, the capital base has increased to 43billion and ; ý; 10billion from 
4120million and 4350million respectively. 449 The insurance regulator - 
NAICOM - (in conjunction with the FIRS) proposed to provide tax incentives 
to facilitate the consolidation of firms in the insurance industry. It is unclear 
what the exact incentives comprise and whether these were identical to those 
provided to merging banks. The views expressed above in relation to merging 
banks are applicable to consolidating insurance companies as well and 
consequently will not be repeated. 
Finally, certain pension reforms have been implemented under the Pension 
Reform Act No. 2 of 2004 (hereafter: PRA 2004). PRA 2004 exempts retirement 
benefits from tax 450 and provides tax deductibility for employee contributions 
toward eligible contributory pension schemes. 451 The banking, insurance and 
pensions reforms are som e of the key economic policies the current 
administration has implemented to improve the performance of the financial 
sector and capital markets. The next section examines reform proposals for 
using tax incentives to improve the bond market which has been relatively 
shallow, illiquid and undeveloped. 
3.2.3.2. . Bond Market Reform & Tax Incentives 
Recent economic policy has favoured. bond market reform with several 
committees set up in recent years to propose progressive strategies. In 2000, a 
Securities and Exchange Commission Committee Report452 suggested numerous 
449 ý9 Insurance Act, No. I of 2003; 'Guidelines for the Insurance Sector: Reform and 
Consolidation', issued on September 30,2005 by the Nigerian Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM), Abula, Nigeria; 
<http: / /www. naicom online. org/currenta ffairs /Issues. htm > accessed 14.06.06. 
450 §7 PRA 2004. 
451 §10 ibid. 
452 The Committee was set up on June 15 2000 by the Director- General of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to examine constraints to capital market growth 
and suggest solutions for reform: Bond Market Committee Report (hereafter: SEC 
Committee Report) <w-, -, 7w. secngr. org / 12 df files /B ol-idiNItrketOut-l-incofRer)ort. pdf > 
accessed 14.06.06. 
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reforms targeted at reforming perceived deficiencies with the Nigerian bond 
market. 453 Suggested tax incentive reforms included providing tax relief for 
bond issues; 454 exempting bond yields from withholding tax; 455 making 
debentures eligible for capital gains exemptions, 456 tax roll-over relief and 
providing withholding tax exemptions for interest on local loanS; 457 reducing 
stamp duties 458 and generally providing tax incentives to promote long-term 
capital formation and wider participation in the capital markets. 459 
As noted above, one of the key policy objectives under NEEDS is to deepen 
asset volumes and instrument diversity in the financial sector. Some changes 
have been made such as reintroducing government development stocks, settling 
debts due to local contractors by the issue of government bonds, improving 
capital market infrastructure and permitting investments in 3-year bonds by 
financial institutions to meet regulatory reserves and liquidity requirements. 460 
In February 2006, a Bond Market Steering Committee was established to help 
design, harmonise and implement strategies to promote capital and bond 
451 The Committee noted the following problems: high illiquidity due to the absence of 
a viable secondary market; relatively few government issues leading a negative yield 
curve and the lack of a benchmark rate to help price private issues; and the effect of 
military rule and the absence of rule of law on the markets: SEC Committee Report 
at pp. 13-15. 
454 It is unclear from the SEC Committee Report if this relates to tax deductibility of 
issue costs: op cit, at p. 7. 
455 It was argued that this measure was necessary to eliminate tax arbitrage between 
bonds (whose yields were subjected to withholding tax) and money market 
instruments (bankers acceptances, treasury bills, letter of credit etc on which no 
withholding tax was payable): ibid, p-20. 
451 This measure was to be targeted at bond issues with long-term tenors: ibid, p. 21. 
457 Roll-over relief applies under CGTA 1967 and postpones tax on the proceeds of 
disposals of eligible capital assets provided these proceeds are 'rolled-over' or used 
to acquire similar capital assets. Tax reliefs for foreign sources loans are examined 
below; the proposals were to replicate these incentives for locally sourced loans: 
ibid, p. 7. 
411 By replacing ad valorem rates with capped flat rates: ibid, p. 20. 
459 Ibid, p. 7. 
460 Charles Soludo 'Special Remarks by the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, ' at 
the 2005 Nigerian Bond Market Technical Roundtable held at Le Meridien Hotel, 
Abuja on Tuesday, June 28,2005 at 
<httl2: //vTww. cenl)alik. c)r, ciý,, /dc)cuments/si2eeches. asp> accessed 14.06.06. 
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markets. 461 Unfortunately, NEEDS is silent on the use of tax incentives to 
achieve these ends. There are certain instances where interest income 
accruing to holders of federal government bonds is exempt from withholding 
taxes. 462 Similarly, capital gains derived from government securities, treasury 
bonds, saving certificates and premium bonds are exempt from tax. 463 
However, it remains to be seen If any tax incentives (such as those 
recommended by the SEC Committee Report) are deemed sufficiently desirable 
enough to be adopted as suitable reform strategies. 
Another area in which greater clarity as to the role (if any) of fiscal incentives 
is in developing the leasing sector (considered next). 
3.2.3.3. Leasing, Hire Purchase & Tax Incentives 
Nigeria's hire purchase and leasing sectors are relatively underdeveloped, 
dominated by commercial and merchant banks, and service mainly the energy 
and manufacturing sectors. However, finance leases are often provided for 
communication, administration and transportation equipment. 464 The Nigeria 
PSA Report argues that - with improved leasing laws, more professionals, 
greater access to pension funds and enhanced fiscal advantages from tax law 
reforms - leasing can become a viable alternative means of finance, particularly 
for SMEs unable to secure medium and long term facilities from commercial 
lenders. 465 
461 Linda Elueme and Eromosele Abiodun 'Bond Market Steering Committee 
Inaugurated', This D ay article (27th February, 2006) 
<httl2: //wwv, -. thisd-, tý,: oriline-cc)m/nview. 12hl2-ýid=41868> accessed 03.03.06. 
462 E. g., see T7 Local Loans (First Federal Government of Nigeria Bonds 2003) (Amendment) 
Directions 2004, Statutory Instrument No. 3 of 2004 cf. Companies Income Tax [Rates, Etc., 
of Tax Deducted at Source (Wlithbolding Tax)] Regulations Statutory Instrument No. 10 of 
19,97. 
463 530 CGTA 1967. 
464 Operating leases are usually provided for smaller, less expensive equipment. 
465 Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 89-91. 
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Unfortunately, the precise tax treatment of hire-purchase, finance and 
operating lease arrangements under Nigerian law is not parti 40)6 'cularly clear. 
Relevant Nigerian accounting standards require finance leases to be so 
classified if the lease term covers 80% or more of the asset's useful life; the 
net present value of the lease at inception is equivalent to or greater than its 
fair value; or the purchase option at the end of the lease is likely to be 
exercised by the lessee. All other leases are classified as operating leaseS. 467 
The distinction is crucial as it affects the lessee's decision whether to borrow 
(for finance leases) or buy (for operating leases) instead of taking out a lease. 
Certain accounting consequences also follow the classification. Fiscal benefits 
seem to be restricted to the use of capital allowances and tax-deductible 
interest to shield business profits. 
A finance lease is economically equivalent to a debt-financed asset 
acquisition. 468However, Nigerian tax law follows the legal form and treats the 
arrangement as the hiring of goods for profit. The lease rentals are tax- 
deductible for the lessee and resultant tax shields reduce the after-tax leasing 
costs. As the lessee does not 'own' the asset, the lessee loses both (a) the 
depreciation tax shields from capital allowances and possibly (b) interest tax 
shields from tax-deductible interest payments. 469These demerits are mitigated 
if the lessee's taxable income is insufficient to absorb available capital 
allowances or deduct all interest charges. If the lessor is in a superior financial 
position and enjoys both allowances and tax-deductible interest,, some benefit 
could be passed on to the lessee in lower lease rentals. Brealey and Myers note 
that value to both the lessor and lessee would be optimal when the lessor's tax 
bracket is significantly higher than that of the lessee; 470 accelerated capital 
allowances are ývailable to realise depreciation tax shields early in the asset's 
466 The principle income tax statutes (CITA 1979 and PPTA 1959) lack specific rules on 
these issues. What is clear is that an entity may claim capital allowances on assets 
'owned' by it and tax deductions for interest charges it incurs. 
467 Nigerian Accounting Standard Board: Statement of Accounting Standard 11 (SAS 11): 
Accounting for Leases. 
461 The lessee invariably acquires the asset and the fixed rental obligations are only 
cancellable upon payment of compensation for the lessor's finance costs. 
161 Le. if the lessee had borrowed to acquire the asset. 
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life; lease rentals are concentrated at the end of an extended lease period; and 
interest rates are relatively high to maxi 1 the present value of the tax 
deferral. 471 
In operating leases, the lessor bears the acquisition risks and adds a premium 
to rentals to compensate for this. The tax advantages of capital allowances and 
tax-deductible interest are enjoyed by the lessor. However, as the lessor may be 
able to manage the pool of assets more efficiently, it may pass on some 
financial savings through lower lease rentals. Lessees also benefit from the 
option to cancel the lease and acquire immediate use of assets in return for a 
deferred financial liability. 472 Conversely, the hirer in hire purchase 
agreements is treated for tax purposes as the owner of the asset and is 
allowed to claim associated capital allowances. However, the quantum of such 
capital allowances is limited to the sum of the initial deposit plus instalments 
paid during a fiscal year. Capitalised instalments must exclude the imbedded 
interest element (which is tax deductible). 
A perusal of Nigerian tax statutes does not indicate any additional tax 
advantages beyond those highlighted above. However, greater clarity in the tax 
treatment of these alternative arrangements may increase their accessibility to 
taxpayers. The next section examines tax incentives to encourage financial 
institutions' investment in the real sector. 
3.2.3.4. Incentives for Foreign Financed Projects 
Nigeria operates a classical system of taxation473 and applies a combination of 
source-basis rules (for corporate tax) and residence-basis rules (for income 
tax under PITA 1993 to the incomes of foreign non-resident individuals and 
E. g. where the lessee benefits from reduced tax rates or other incentives. 
R. A. Brealey and S. C. Myers The Principles of Corporate Finance (7th International 
Edition, McGraw-Hill, New York: 2003), chapter 26. 
472 This may be attractive to small lessees who lack sufficient financial resources to buy 
assets outright. 
473 Although some relief against economic double taxation is provided by provisions 
governing franked investment income and set-off rules for withholding taxes on 
dividend income. 
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corporate entities. Generally, indigenous individuals and Nigerian-based 
entities are taxed on their worldwide income while foreign individuals and 
firms are liable to tax on income derivable from commercial activities in 
Nigeria. However, where certain income is deemed to have been derived from 
Nigeria (in the case of non-resident corporate entItip S) 474 or to have accrued to 
individuals deemed to be resident in Nigeria (in the case of foreign 
individualS)475 then such income is taxable. 
For individuals, taxable income comprises income derived from sources within 
Nigeria or offshore'476 and extends not only to dividends, interest or discount477 
but also to any other profit, gain or payment. 478 For foreign corporate 
investors, income from direct and portfolio investment typically takes the form 
of- profit or capital repatriations, interest, rents, dividends or royalties. 
Similarly, the local subsidiaries of foreign concerns may be required to pay 
management fees, intellectual property royalties, technical service charges, 
management fees and patent fees for services and assistance provided by 
parent or associated companies. All these payments are subject to local 
withholding taxes at rates ranging from 5% to 10%. 479 However, for foreign 
recipients of these payments, the withholding tax charged is the final taX. 480 
474 Certain deeming provisions provide a quartet of tests to determine derivation; these 
tests establish tax liability where circumstances indicate that a 'fixed base, 
authorised agency, single contracts for certain services or associated/ subsidiary 
company relationship scenarios exist: 513(2) CITA 1979. 
475 Rules for residence for tax purposes under 11, Schedule, PITA 1993 determine where 
in Nigeria the individual is resident or deemed to be resident in a year of assessment 
for the purpose of determining the relevant tax authority. Generally, a non-national 
must be resident for 183 days in a 12-month period or otherwise fall within the tax 
rules and have income liable to tax under the PITA . 
1993 before being resident for 
income tax purposes: §52&108, PITA 1993; Ayua, Nigerian Tax Law, op cit, p. 63; 
Ipaye, 'Overview of the Tax Environment: Issues and Challen. ges', in CITATATZgerzan 
Tax Guide & Statutes, op cit, p. 5. 
476 ý3(1) PITA 1993. 
477 ý3(3)(d) ibid. 
478 §3(3)(f) ibid. 
479 5§78-82, CITA 1979; Companies Income Tax [Rates Etc. o Tax Deducted at Source 
(Wl'ltbholdZn, g Tax)] Regulations S. I. No. 10 of IP97. 
480 §ý78-80, CITA 1979. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
2ueen Mary, University of London 
Pa 
, ge 
110 of 418 
The- Role of Tax Incentires in A Trio of Sub-Saharan African Economies: 3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incenlit, es A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African and Kenyan Tax Law 
Nigerian tax law provides certain incentives to encourage foreign direct and 
portfolio investment. There are exemptions from withholding tax for dividends 
from unit trusts; interest on deposit accounts of foreign non-resident companies 
and interest on foreign domiciliary accounts 481 accruing after 1 January, 1990.482 
Profits, dividends,, interest, rent and royalties received in or routed through 
Nigeria through government approved channelS483 from operations of associated 
foreign companies or business operations would equally be tax exempt unless 
deemed to be derived from Nigeria. 484 
CITA 1979 provides graduated485 interest rate withholding tax exemptions to 
foreign lenders who provide long-term loans to local businesses (see Table 3.1 
be lo w) . 486The relevant proviSionS487 grant withholding tax exemptions ranging from 
40% through to 100% depending on the term of the loan, with tenors of 7 years 
and above attracting total exclusion of tax on interest payments. 488 Qualifying 
foreign loans arise where a foreign company grants the loan out of offshore, non- 
domestic funds (whether in Nalra or not) brought into Nigeria from a foreign 
territory or country; where a foreign company grants a loan offshore in a territory 
or country other than Nigeria, and grants the funds in a foreign currency; 489 or 
possibly where the credit obligation is repayable in a foreign currenC y. 490 
481 Under the liberalised foreign exchange laws, private persons are permitted to hold 
and trade in foreign exchange; one of such liberties is the operation of local 
domiciliary accounts denominated in foreign currencies. 
482 523(l)(f), (l) & (m) CITA 1979. 
483 Essentially funds remitted through the official foreign exchange markets operated by 
the Central Bank and authorised dealers in foreign currency under the relevant 
foreign exchange regulations. 
484 §23(l)(1) and (k) CITA 1979. 
485 § 11 (10) ibid. 
481 There is no restriction placed on the form of business organisation or the type of 
commercial activity engaged by the borrower. 
481 The pre-April 1,1968 regime [§11(1) CITA 1979] seems to have expired giving way 
to the post-April 1,1968 regime and §11(6), CITA 1979. The post-1968 regime more 
generous than the pre-1968 regime in that it reduced the length of the tenor required 
before the loan may qualify for exemptions. 
488 §11 CITA 1979. 
489 § 11 (8) ibid. 
411 Nigerian Accounting Standard Board: Statement of Accounting Standard 7 (SAS 7): 
Accounting for the Effects of Changes in Foreign Currency Rates, T6. 
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TABLE 3.1 
TABLE I, THIRD SCHEDULE, CITA 1979 
TABLE OF TAX EXEMPTION ON INTEREST ON FOREIGN LOANS 
Rcpaymcnt Period 
including Moratorium 
Grace Period Tax Exemption 
Allowed 
(1) Above 7 years 
(down from 10 jears pre- 196S. ) 
(11) 5-7 years 
(111) 2-4 years 
(1v) Below 2 years 
Not less than 2 years 
Not less than 18 months 
Not less than 122 months 
Nil 
10 Oll/o 
70% (upfrom 15%) 
40'/o (itpjl-om, 150110) 
Nil 
3.2.3.5. Capital Gains Tax Incentives 
Some of the tax incentives noted in the preceding section (§3.2.3.4) apply with 
equal force to local investors. For instance, an indigenous corporate investor 
could claim tax exemptions for withholding taxes on dividends from unit 
trusts. 491 However,, tax incentives for indigenous investors appear to be 
targeted more at 'active' direct investment in specific sectorS492 than at merely 
rewarding the bare act of investing in commercial activities. An exception to 
this trend is the targeting of incentives to local investors retaining foreign 
exchange earnings in local domiciliary accounts. This retention improves the 
external position of the economy, controls the appetite for foreign exchange 
and curbs demand in the parallel or 'black' market for foreign currency. 
EarningS493 repatriated from foreign operations and interests earned on foreign 
491 523(l)(f) CITA 1979. 
492 Particularly those restricted to indigenous investors (e. g. tax incentives for marginal 
fields' operators). 
493 Vi7, dividends, interest, rents and royalties. 
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currency domiciliary accounts held in Nigeria enjoy withholding tax 
exemptionS. 494 
As noted above, capital gains are taxable under CGTA 1967. The relevant 
concept of 'disposal' is rather wide one. 495 Indeed, for disposals of assets 
situated outside Nigeria, both resident and non-resident alienating 
individualS496may be liable to tax on any amounts received in or brought into 
Nigeria. 497 Similarly, an alienating non-resident company 498 would be 
nonetheless liable to tax to the extent that any gains from such disposition are 
received in or brought into Nigeria. 499 CGTA 1967 provides certain tax 
exemptions. Local companies and individuals can claim exemptions in respect 
of non-capital incomes which would be chargeable under the income tax 
statutes. 500 Also, gains derived from the disposal of stocks and shares are fully 
exempt from capital gains tax. 501 Similar treatment is accorded gains from the 
disposal of interests in unit trusts. However, in respect of gains accruing to 
holders of unit trusts, the tax-exempt treatment is conditional on any proceeds 
of disposal being subsequently reinvested ('rolled-over') into new securitieS. 502 
Finally, there is the possibility of institutions providing banking, stock 
exchange, insurance, reinsurance and other financial services qualifying for the 
494 523(l)(k) and (m) CITA 1979. 
491 Encompassing the sale, transfer, or other disposition of assets such that where any 
capital sum is received in return for the surrender of rights, or the refraining from 
exercising such rights, the recipient of value may be liable to capital gains tax: 
§6(l)(d) CGTA 1967. 
496 Even though resident in Nigeria for a temporary purpose without intending to 
establish any permanent abode. 
491 However, liability for a non-resid. ent individual would arise only if, in any 12-month 
period, he is present in Nigeria for more than 182 days. However, even where an 
alienating individual qualifies as a taxable person under this 182-days residence rule, 
tax would only be chargeable to the extent that any gains are received in or brought 
into Nigeria: ý4 CGTA 1967. 
491 Not being a company incorporated, managed and controlled in Nigeria under CAMA 
1990. 
499 ý4 CGTA 1967. 
"0 Notably the PITA 1993, PPTA 1969 and CITA 1979: §12 CGTA 1967. 
'01 ý31(1) CGTA 1967. 
502 532B CGTA 1967. 
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extensive tax exemptions provided by NEPZ Act 1992.503 This regime is 
considered in detail below but appears to encourage the development of 
financial services centres targeted at multinational groups and international 
financial institutions. However,, in the absence of basic infrastructure, 
uninterrupted power supply, increased security and higher levels of ICT skills 
in the local workforce, it remains to be seen how tax incentives, without more, 
can serve as an effective catalyst for the development and growth of finance 
and other centres based in these EPZs. 
This section has considered the scope of tax incentives applicable in the 
financial sector for institutions (e. g. banks and insurance firms) and 
instruments (e. g. bonds and equities). Financial sector reform has been a key 
theme under NEEDS and tax incentives policy has featured in a number of 
strategies to improve financial infrastructure. The next section reviews fiscal 
incentives targeted at activities that directly address physical infrastructure. 
3.2.4. INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES 
3.2.4.0. Introduction 
The lack of adequate infrastructure and services has been a major obstacle to 
economic development. Public provision of basic services such as electric 
power supply, telecommunications, postal services, transportation networks,, 
sewage and refuse disposal, portable water, healthcare and education has 
deteriorated. Indeed, the Nigeria PSA Report observes that infrastructure 
constraints were cited as the most common deterrent to investment by 
manufacturing firms surveyed, ahead of access to finance and business 
uncertainty. 504 Similarly, NEEDS notes the adverse impact that poor roads, 
epileptic power supplies and inadequate water resources have had on economic 
development. Key strategies under NEEDS have been privatisation and 
5'3 These include indefinite exemptions from all federal, state and (local) government 
taxes, levies, rates and customs duties: §§8,12 & 18 of, and Third Schedule to NEPZ 
Act 1992. 
5'4 Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 20; 31. 
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liberalisation to promote the provision of some infrastructure and public 
goods/services by a competitive, well regulated private sector. 505 The next 
section considers how tax incentives have been (and are proposed to be) used 
to improve the provision of infrastructure and basic services by encouraging 
private sector participation. 
3.2.4.1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Overview 
The lack of effective and affordable telecommunications has been a major 
disincentive to investment and economic growth, ranking behind the poor 
electrical power supply as one of the key infrastructural shortcomings cited by 
manufacturing firms in the Nigeria PSA Report. 506 In 1998, waiting times for 
fixed phone lines provided by the telecommunications utility (Nitel) were on 
average 31/2 years. Nitel's services were also unreliable and expensive. Fixed 
and mobile phone line teledensity was 0.40 per 100 persons and 1 per 10,000 
persons respectively, ranking among the lowest in Africa. 5070nly 400,000 fixed 
lines were operational out of an installed public network capacity of 700,000 
lines. 
Significant changes have occurred since the introduction of the National 
Telecommunications Policy in September 2000 by the Ministry of 
Communications and the Nigerian Communications Commission (hereafter: 
NCC). 508 A crucial reform was the successful auctioning of ten-year digital 
mobile licences in January 2001 to 2 private operators and Nitel's mobile 
subsidiary, Mobile Telecommunications Ltd (M-Tel). The private operators, 
10, Other strategies proposed include public-private finance initiatives, build-operate- 
and-transfer, build- operate-own-and-tran sf er, rehabilitate -operate-and-trans fer and 
concessioning: NEEDS Report, Chapter 5: Creating a Competitive Private Sector, 
p. 5 9. 
116 Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 107-110. 
117 Africa had on an average 2.24 fixed lines per 100 persons and 45 mobile lines per 
10,000 persons. (Statistics are from the NITEL 1998 Annual Report, cited in the 
Nigeria PSA Report, p-99). 
508 Established under the NCC Act No. 75 of 1992. The legal basis for recent reform has 
been the Nigerian Communications Act of 2003. 
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MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd (MTN)509 and Celtel Nigeria (Zain) 510 paid 
US$285million each for the licenses and have invested significantly in'building 
mobile networks spanning the entire country. 511 In 2003, a second national 
operator, Globacom Networks, commenced operations by competing with 
MTN and Celtel in the provision of mobile telephony services. 512 25 fixed 
wireless access operators and 21 fixed line operators have also been licensed 
adding 520,000 fixed telephone lines to the national grid between 1999 and 
2004. The aggregate number of phone lines has grown from 450,000 fixed and 
25,000 analogue mobile lines in May 2005 to 1.2million fixed and 12.8million 
digital mobile lines in May 2005.513 By August 2007, the telecommunications 
market subscriber base was estimated at 45.5million mobile, fixed and other 
lines. 514The telecommunication revolution has resulted in more competition, 
better quality of service, increased teledensity, reduced waiting times (from 
years to minutes) all driving down the prices of tariffs and products. 515 The 
The Nigerian subsidiary of the South African based, MTN Group which is a leading 
telecommunications multinational with operations in Cameroon, SA, Swaziland, 
Uganda, as well as Nigeria. 
110 Celtel Nigeria originally was Econet Wireless Nigeria Ltd (and later Vmobile) and 
after initial shareholder action currently is owned by indigenous public and private 
investors. Celtel originally invested US$650million in Nigeria and recently concluded 
a US$1.1billion pro)ect financing to further expand its mobile network 
<http: / /www. vmobile-nio-, eria. com /about. htm >, and <htti2: //www. vmobile- 
nigeria. com/showne, "7s. 12hl2-ý. nev;, sld--59> accessed 20.06.06. 
511 MTN has spent US$1.8billion building the largest GSM telecommunications network 
and infrastructure in Nigeria. MTN estimates that US$3billion would be required in 
capex and opex investment to overcome infrastructural deficiencies 
<htrp: / /www,. mtnonlin e. com / corl2ora te /a bout. a sp > and 
<htti2: //www. mr. iionline. com/corT.? or,. ite/ I j2ress. a-sp? NewsID--'2> accessed 20.06.06. 
512 Globacom Networks is an indigenous firm owned by the Nigerian industrialist Mike 
Adenuga. As the second national carrier, Globacom is also licensed to provide fixed 
line, wireless and internet gateway services: 
<http: / /www, gloworld. com /Gloi\, Iobile /About /GloI\4obile. htm'INavItemlD= GI. o,, \4ob 
ile&Cn=GloI\Ic )bile> accessed 20.06.06. 
513 E. Ndukwe, Telecommunications in Nigeria: the Next Frontier (a paper presented by 
E. Ndukwe, CEO, NCC at the New Age/NCC Seminar in Lago, s on 31.05.05) 
accessed on 20.06.06 at 
<hrr. p: //wv, -w. ncc. gov. ng/speeche-, 12resentati-ons/Eý'C's. '/, ý2OPresentation/Telecomm 
unications%20inl/'(ý2ONiL, eri,, i. 12df>- 
514 'Telecoms Subscriber Base Hits 45.5m, ' This Daj) [newspaper report by Shina 
Badaru], 29th October, 2007 <hrtl2: //, ýý,, sý, w. thisdaýonlii-ie. com/nview. php? ld=93648> 
accessed 29.10.07. 
515 For instance, the price of mobile starter packs dropped from 44=20,000 (US$145) on 
2001 to N1 (less than 1 US cent) in 2004: see generally, Trends in 
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improved investment climate has resulted in communications -FD I increasing 
from US$5million (1999) to US$7.5billion (2005). 516 
3.2.4-1.2. Tax Incentives 
Multiple taxation has been a major disincentive to investment and few sectors 
feel the burden of the taxes, charges and levies imposed by the three tiers of 
government as much as the telecommunications industry. Mobile telephony 
operators have consistently complained of double taxation, arbitrary local 
charges on communications masts and high duties on imports of essential 
equipment. 517 However, there has been some relief for private 
telecommunications firms from tax incentives provided under the ID/ITR Act 
1971-518 MTN and Vmobile were granted pioneer status in 2001 and enjoyed 5- 
year tax holidayS519 despite criticism that the holidays were too generous given 
the level of financial success achieved by the firms within their initial years. 520 
M-TeI5 Globacom and 2 other communications firms were also granted pioneer 
tax holidays in 2004.521 Pioneer period capital allowances and tax losses may 
be carried forward by these firms into the post-pioneer period presenting 
Telecommunications Markets in Nigeria 2003-2004 (Abula, Nigerian Communications 
Commission, 2005). 
51, OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Nigeria) p. 443. 
517 Goodluck, Wale Multiple Taxes and Levies-The Need for Harmonisation (The 
Telecoms Experience), a presentation by W. Goodluck, General Manager, 
Commercial/Legal, MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd at the Nigerian Bar 
Conference, Abuja, 30.08.05. 
518 Item 33 of the Industrial Development (List of Pioneer Industries) S. I. No. 9 of 1982 
provides for the 'manufacture of telecommunications equipment, cables, etc'. It is 
assumed that this includes the provision of telecommunication services though, as 
further examined in Chapter 7, tax incentive legislation tends to be rather subjective 
and may differ in application from the strict wording of the statute books. 
5" In this Researcher's opinion, the 5-year tax holidays were improperly granted by 
NIPC: see below at §7.4.3.3. 
520 MTN Nigeria attracted media censure over its 5-year tax holiday despite significant 
earnings, generating gross revenues of N119billion (R5.87billion) in the 6months to 
30.09.05: see 'GSM: Five-Year Tax Holiday Still in Force, Says MTN CEO', This Day 
[newspaper report by Kletus Akwaya], 5th June, 2006 
<htt. 12: / /www. this dayonlin e. com / nviev7. j2hp? id = 19240 > accessed 07.02.07; 'MTN 
Nigeria Earns 4119bn in 6months', This Daji [newspaper report by Tayo Ajakaye], 
24, h November, 2005 <httl2: L`ww, yu. this d,, -i ý, onlin e. c. om /nv, iew. p_ hj. 2? id - 3419 8> 
accessed 06.02.07. 
521 Table 7.2.3.1: Pioneer Status granted to Companies in 2004, NIPC Annual Report 
2004, pp. 56-59 cf. Item #69, List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment 
Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, op cit, Chapter 1: General Incentives, pp. 2-6. 
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desirable opportunities for large tax savings given the vast sums expended on 
capex and opex in establishing telephone networks. 522 
Telecommunication incentives are consistent with NEEDS economic policy 
which seeks to use both financial and fiscal incentives to promote private 
sector investment in the information and communications sectors. 523While the 
generosity or otherwise of these tax holidays is debatable, it is only fair to note 
that at the time the mobile telephony operators were licensed, few foreign 
investors were willing to enter the Nigerian telecommunications market given 
the perceived high risk levels and the prevailing global investor apathy due to 
the failure of investments in third-generation mobile networks in Europe. 
Nevertheless, telecommunications has remained a profitable economic sector 
recently attracting the second-largest share of FDI 524 with some operators 
recording bumper revenues. 525 Telecoms firms still operate in a challenging 
investment environment. Nitel's inadequate transmission facilities, poor 
infrastructure and transport networks, a lack of physical security for 
installations, concerns over currency exchange rates and the multiplicity of 
government taxes are often cited as key disincentives. 526Large sums of capital 
are required compensate for these infrastructural shortcomings, particularly to 
overcome inefficiencies from poor electricity Supply. 527 The next section 
considers the role of tax incentives in improving electricity supply and 
transportation networks. 
522 §11 and 14, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
521 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 72-73. 
524 Aggregate FDI in telecommunications has risen from US$50million in 2000 to 
US$10billion in 2006. Only the energy sector attracted more FDI in 2006. 
525 MTN recently announced revenues of 4ý177.8billion (US$1.4billion) in 9 mo nths: see 
'MTN Nigeria Earns 4ý178billiori in 9 months', This Day newspaper article by Taye 
Ajakaye and Frances Ovia], 9th March, 2006 
<httl2: / /www. this davonline. c om /1-iview. j2hp? id =426 03> accessed 09.03.06. 
526 Wale Goodluck, 'Multiple Taxes and Levies-The Need for Harmonisati on: The 
Telecoms Experience', Q cit. 
527 In 2003, US$140million (NGN18billion) committed to provide generator sets for 
base stations and other telecommunications facilities in Nigeria: see PR 25.02.03 
http: // ww-, a?. mtn online. com /c orp orate/ press. a s 12? N ews ID = 22 and 
httj2:., //wv7w. mtnonlirle. com /cori2orate/12ress-asl2? Newsll: )=16. 
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3.2.4.2. POWER & TRANSPORTATION 
Electric Power 
3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incenlives 
The lack of reliable, cheap and efficient power supply is the investment 
challenge most commonly cited by investors. The sector has been dominated 
by the power utility company, the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (or 
PHCN; formerly known as NEPA) which operates as a vertically integrated 
monopoly. PHCN/NEPA is notoriously inefficient with frequent power 
outages, tension fluctuations (causing damage to equipment, property and 
goods), poor administration (particularly billings and debt collection) and 
corruption being the norm. 528 The manufacturing and service sectors are 
particularly affected by the power deficiency. The Nigeria PSA Report notes 
that the vast majority of manufacturing firms surveyed resorted to more 
expensive private power generation 67% of the time on average. Indeed, 
investment in power generation equipment accounted for 22% of capex on 
average tying up scarce financial resources. Other responses observed included 
factor and product substitUtion529 and reduced oUtpUt. 530 
The decline of the power sector peeked in 1999 when the lowest capacity of 
under 2, OOOMW/day was recorded. Current reforms focus on increasing the 
national grid's capacity from the present 4, OOOMW/day to 10, OOOMW/day by 
the end of 2007 and reaching at least 60% of the population with uninterrupted 
power SUpply. 531 NEEDS places emphasis on liberalisation, privatisation and 
more public-private collaboration to improve power generation, distribution, 
transmission, marketing and tariff collection. Legal and regulatory reform 
revolve around a new power sector policy and the Electric Power Sector Reform 
Act of 2005. The PHCN is to be unbundled into 18 distinct entities 532with 
public holdings of thermal generation, distribution and hydropower facilities 
528 It is commonly joked that the acronym NEPA stands not for the National Electric 
Power Authority but rather 'Never Expect Power Always' and PHCN stands for 'the 
Problem Has Changed Names. ' 
521 That is substituting less power-intensive inputs, outputs and processes often at the 
cost of reduced productivity and value. 
5" Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 33-37. 
511 NIPC Annual Report 2004, p-22. 
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replaced by private operators or rehab ilitate-op era te- an d-trans f er-b ack 
concessions. Sector policy and regulatory powers are to be vested in the 
National Electricity Regulatory Commission. 
17 private independent power providers have been licensed and some of these 
have commenced operations in Lagos and Abuja. 533Geometric Power Limited 
pioneered emergency power plants in Abula and was granted pioneer status tax 
incentives. Geometric has concluded plans to operate a 140MW Independent 
Power Plant to be located in Aba (the centre of trade in Eastern Nigeria). 534 
Active indigenous firms in the power sector include Kotco Power Ltd535 and 
Gaslink Nigeria Ltd536which both were awarded pioneer status tax incentives 
in 2004.537However, it is unclear how beneficial 5-year pioneer tax holidays 
would be to greenfield independent power projects as these ventures typically 
take 4-6years to develop and even longer to generate taxable profits. 538 Besides 
the associated tax holidays, these firms would be entitled to post-pioneer 
period capital allowances and tax losses on the expenditures required to 
establish and operate their facilities. 539 
The next section considers the use of tax incentives to promote development 
by improving local and international transportation linkages. 
532 Le. 6 (private) generation companies, 1 (state-owned) distribution company and 11 
(private) transmission companies are proposed. 
533 The Enron/AES Barge Nigeria Ltd has operated a 1270MW capacity barge in the 
Egbin area of Lagos. Likewise Geometric Power Inc and Aggreko International 
Projects Ltd now operate in Abula. 
534 'World Bank, Geometric Partner in N16bn Power Project', This Day [newspaper 
report by Kunle Aderinokun], 171h July, 2006 
<httl2: //vTww. thisdavonline-com/nvie-ýý7.12hl2-ýid---)335-t> accessed 17.07.06. 
535 Kotco Power Ltd specialises -in electricity transformers and operates a joint venture 
company with Asian/Indian investors. 
536 Gaslink Nigeria Ltd is a subsidiary of the indigenous energy firm, Oando plc and 
speciallses in the supply of commercial and industrial gas. 
537 Table 7.2.3.1: Pioneer Status granted to Companies in 2004, NIPC Annual Report 
2004, pp. 56-59. 
538 'Nnaji: Why Independent Power Projects Are Delayed, ' This Day [newspaper report 
by Chika Amanze-Nwachukwu], 23rd January, 2008 
<httl2: //wv, w. thisd,, iN, otiline-com//nvie-, ý7.1? hl2? id=9364, ý> accessed 23.01.08. 
539 §§11 & 14, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
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3.2.4.2.2. Transportation 
Compared to neighbouring West African countries, Nigeria's transportation 
network is relatively well developed with the vast majority of goods and 
passengers being transported by road. 540 In 'the past, Nigeria's network of 
federal and state owned roads suffered from low investment, poor 
maintenance and neglect reducing the accessibility of produce from rural areas 
to local markets and major ports. The federal road network is currently being 
refurbished under the Operation 500 Roads project. The outmoded 3,505km 
rail system is being rehabilitated and upgraded with assistance from Chinese 
engineers prior to the privatisation or concessioning of Nigerian Railways. 541 
There are several international airports (including the Lagos, Abu)a and Kano 
airports), half-a-dozen local airports : and numerous private and military 
aerodromes. Unfortunately, the dearth of adequate facilities and equipment in 
the aviation sector has been the cause of several tragic air disasters in recent 
years. 542Nigeria's main seaports are located in the southern cities of Lagos, 
Port-Harcourt, Warri and Calabar and were previously operated by the 
Nigerian Ports Authorities. Current reforms have seen concessions for 21-odd 
seaport terminals granted to private local and international operators 
generating substantial fee income for the government. Similarly, the 
government-owned shipyard and fabrication corporation, Nigerdock, was 
privatised by the sale of controlling interest to private investors in 2001. 
NEEDS appreciates the numerous deficiencies in the transportation sector and 
seeks to implement a raft of strategies designed to coordinate public and 
541 Linda van Buren 'Nigeria: Economy', Africa South of the Sahara 2005 34" Edition, 
(Europa Publications /Taylor & Francis Group, London/New York: 2005) pp. 858- 
859. 
541 'Mining Needs $5bn to Rehabilitate Railway Sector', This Day [newspaper report by 
Onyebuchi Ezigbo], 12th September, 2005 
<httj2: //wvrv7 this dayon line. com /n-, rie-\-, T. 12hl2? id =2 806 0> accessed 13.09.05. 
542 2005 ended with two air crash disasters involving a Bellview Airlines Boeing 737 (on 
22.10.05) and a Sosoliso Airlines DC-9 (on 10.12.05) resulting in the loss of 117 and 
100 lives respectively. Critics have attributed the poor safety record to inadequate 
facilities and the lax regulation of operators. NEEDS proposes greater radar 
coverage, new equipment and better facilities to address these concerns. 
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private initiatives to resolve these shortcomings. 543A key aspect of NEEDS' 
strategies is the use of private-public partnerships to finance and manage the 
enhancement of local infrastructure. The necessary legal environment to 
facilitate such private participation is to be supported by the Infrastructure 
Concession Regulatorj Commission (Establishment, etc) Bill of 2004 and the Build- 
Operate- Transfer (Regulatog) Commission Bill of 2005. Both Bills will establish 
regulatory commissions to supervise the grant of concessions to private 
concerns investing in transportation, power, telecommunications, 
transportation, water supplies, sewage disposal and other basic services. 
3.2.4.2.3. Tax Incentives for Power and Transportation 
Traditionally, the main tax initiatives for infrastructural development were the 
rural investment allowances for capex incurred on the provision of tarred 
roads, electricity supply and portable water for the purpose of a trade or 
business in remote geographical areas. Such areas must be located at least 
20km away from public infrastructural facilities. Rural investment allowances 
give investors enhanced or multiple deductions ranging from 5% 
(telecommunications), 15% (roads), and 50% (electricity) to 100% on qualifying 
cap ex. 544 Modest capital allowances are granted for capital investments for 
infrastructural facilities including those associated with shipping, railways and 
portable water, regardless of geographical location. 545 Tax incentives are not 
restricted to investments in long-term fixed assets. CITA 1979 provides 
incentives for investments in shorter term assets by transportation firms. 546 
Firms engaged in public transportation may claim initial allowances as 
accelerated depreciation of 95% of capex incurred in procuring vehicles. 547 
543 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 59-60. 
544 §34 CITA 1979. 
545 Comprised by 15% first year initial allowances followed by 10% annual allowances 
for docks, wharfs, piers, jetties and ancillary facilities; public railways; and facilities 
for the supply of portable water: see ý5 of, and Tables I& II to the Second Schedule 
to CITA 1979. 
546 Most transportation firms would be liable to corporate tax under normal rules. 
However, special rules apply for firms engaged in shipping and air transportation: 
§14 CITA 1979. 
547 T6 of and Table I to the Second Schedule, CITA 1979. 
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In the 1970s/1980s, power generation, transportation and telecommunication 
projects were not treated as preferred activities deserving of pioneer industry 
tax holidays. 548 However, it appears that the dearth of these aspects of 
infrastructure and the adverse effect their absence has had on investment and 
growth influenced the change in fiscal policy. Under NEEDS, the strategy is to 
encourage private sector solutions to these infrastructural challenges. 
Currently, under an extended list of pioneer industries provided by NIPC 
investments in the following sectors are eligible for 3 to 5-year tax 
holidays: 549 gas manufacture and distribution; manufacture of solar-powered 
equipment; bitumen mining and production; manufacture of lubricants; and the 
provision of utility services including independent power generation projects 
utilising gas, coal and renewable energy sources, all aspects of transportation 
including rail, road and waterways, and indigenous telecommunications 
companies other than GSM mobile telephony operators. 550 This appears to be 
consistent with the Ministry of Finance's policy under the draft National Tax 
Policy to target tax holidays precisely to ensure that vital private sector 
investments in the power, railways, roads, aviation, gas and other key sectors 
are encouraged. 551 
This section has highlighted tax incentives that are available for vital 
investment in local infrastructure which is necessary to improve the investment 
climate for manufacturers and other businesses. The next sections examine tax 
incentives directly targeted at these manufacturers, focussing first at macro- 
enterprises and then at micro-enterprises. 
548 As underscored by the absence of these activities on the original list of pioneer 
industries (Schedule to ID/ITR Act 1971). These utilities had not been privatised 
and public monopolies were statutorily protected. 
541 NIPC has in the past advertised and awarded 7-year tax holidays for pioneer 
industries sited in economically disadvantaged rural areas. However, the legislative 
authority for these incentives is obscure and it would appear that any such incentives 
were awarded in error: Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, o-P c1l, Chapter 1: 
General Incentives, pp. 2-6. 
5" Items #44,45,47,53 and 69, List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment 
Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, op cz . t, Chapter 1: General Incentives, p. 8. 
'IMF Comments on FGN Tax Strategy: FGN Strategy and Position on Issues Raised, ' 
Power Point Presentation of January 24,2007 (Budget Office of the Federation, 
Abuja: 2007), slide 3. 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre. /or Commercial Law Studies 
Queety Mary, Universit) of London 
Page 123 qf418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharav African Economies 
A Comparalit, e Sludy of Nigerian. Soutb African and Kenyan Taýv Lan, 
3.2.5. MANUFACTURING& INDUSTRY 
3.2.5.0. Overview 
3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incenfires 
Reliable data and statistics on the recent performance of Nigeria's industrial 
and manufacturing sector are hard to access. However, NEEDS observes that 
results have been well below the sector's potential to create wealth and 
increase employment. 552 Firms vary from state-owned parastatals and heavy 
industry, 553 small and medium-scale indigenous manufacturing enterprises, 
medium-sized Lebanese and Asian owned companies 554 to large Western 
multinationals. The import substitution policies of the 1970s provided the 
initial impetus for large-scale industrialisation supported further by protective 
tariffs. Due to the 1980s structural adjustment policies, many manufacturers 
who relied heavily on imported inputs were adversely affected by the 
devaluation of the Naira. This resulted in a decline in manufacturing by a third 
between 1982 and 1985 severely affecting the vehicles' assembly, chemicals, 
metals, textiles,, sugar, plastics and paper sectors. In 1986 firms reliant on local 
inputs recorded high levels of capacity utilisation but in 2003 manufacturing 
comprised only 4% of GDP due to levels of low capacity utilisation. 555 
However, due to an improving investment environment, manufacturing GDP 
grew by over 9% in both 2005 and 2006.556 
The Nigeria PSA Report gives an overview of some key issues regarding 
industrial. In particular, the relatively low level of value-added per worker is a 
significant factor, attributable to the ownership of firms, 557 the relevant 
552 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p. 70. 
553 Such as the Delta Steel Co., the Ajaokuta Steel Co. and the Aluminium Smelter Co. 
of Nigeria. However, the government is seeking to divest its interest in these 
concerns under the current privatisation policy. 
554 Forrest, The Advance of African Ca_pltal, o_p cit, p. 242. 
555 Van Buren 'Nigeria: Economy', op cif, p. 857. 
556 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2001: Countrj, Notes (Nigeria) p. 443. 
557 The Report notes that foreign-owned firms (i. e. firms with European, Asian and 
Middle Eastern entrepreneurs) had significantly higher levels of value-added per 
worker (due in part to the lower levels of workers employed): Nigeria PSA Report, 
pp-9-10. 
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industrial sector, 558 local labour market dynamic S, 559 the overvalued Naira and 
the high proportion of non-productive, 'white-collar' workers in industry. 560A 
significant proportion of large manufacturing concerns focus on import- 
substitution and the relatively high levels of tariff protection tend to shield 
these firms from international competition, often reducing efficienCy. 561 Other 
impediments to industry include the infrastructural inadequacies noted in the 
preceding section, onerous business regulations, rule of law challenges, 
inconsistent and unpredictable economic policies, security concerns and a 
prevailing environment of low business ethics/trust. The tax system has also 
been criticised by industry as being unduly complicated, with a multiplicity of 
local, state and federal levies which are often arbitrarily administered. 562 
NEEDS notes that the key challenge to increased industrial productivity lies in 
increasing the levels of local value-added in goods and services to move 
beyond the supply of primary products to the manufacture and processing of 
internationally competitive intermediate and finished goods. Local 
manufacturers have been harmed by unfair competition from dumped, 
substandard and smuggled goods. 563 Similarly, prevailing legal, financial and 
infrastructural deficiencies have undermined the nation's industrial base. 
NEEDS proposes the following solutions: increasing the levels of local value- 
added by emphasising knowledge and skill-based industries; increasing the local 
Food processing exhibited higher levels of value-added per worker than other 
sectors (including chemicals, paper, textiles and wood processing): Nigeria PSA 
Report, p. 8. 
15, The Report compares local labour market conditions with those of Asian economies 
at comparable stages of development. It suggests that Nigeria exhibits relatively 
lower productivity and higher wage levels, attributable to lower man: land ratios and 
greater unionisation of the workforce: Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 15-16. 
560 Ibid. 
561 The Report, however, notes that the decline in employment in larger manufacturers 
during the 1980s/1990s period of structural adjustment may reflect increasing 
efficiency: ibid, pp. 8-9; 15-16. 
562 Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 42-51. See also 'Multiple Taxation Prevents Industrial 
Revolution', This Day [newspaper report by Cfusoe Osagle], 6 th March, 2006 
<htti2: //-, ý. ýw, A,. thisda\, onliiie. com/nview. 12hýýid=42408> accessed 02.05.06. 
563 See 'Dunlop Records a ýý36.9m Loss', This Day [newspaper report by Jerome 
Ushakang], 23r d August, 2005 
I <httl2: //v7wv, 7, thisdavonline-com/nvie. w. 12hl2? id=260'ý74> accessed 19.01.06. 
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science and engineering capacity; and increasing private sector investment to 
replace the government's dominance in industry. 564 
3.2.5.1. Tax Incentives for Manufacturing 
The corporate tax code is replete with numerous tax incentives to encourage 
manufacturing and industry. Existing tax incentives for capital investment 
range from modest industrial building investment allowances 565 to very 
generous capital allowances by way of initial allowances allowing the 
immediate write off of industrial research and development expenses. 566 
Other incentives include the removal of the normal restriction567 on the 
quantum of capital allowances claimable in a particular year of assessment. 568 
Indigenous manufacturers of spare parts, tools and equipment for the domestic 
or export markets are eligible for a 25% investment tax credit calculated on 
qualifying capex against taxable profits provided they engage in no other 
business. Similarly industries that patronise such locally manufactured plant, 
machinery or equipment are allowed a 15% investment tax credit on the 
acquisition costs of such assets. 569 The replacement of obsolete plant and 
machinery with more modern equipment is rewarded with a 15% investment 
tax credit. 570 
A central policy in the industrialisation strategies of the 1970s/1980s was the 
promotion of both imp ort- substitution and capital-intensive heavy industry. 
This policy's imprint is still discernable in the pioneer industry tax holiday 
564 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 70-72. 
165 15% first year initial allowances and subsequent 10% annual allowances are granted 
for industrial structures including mills, factories, mechanical workshops and 
ancillary facilities: TT5 &8 of and Tables I& II to the Second Schedule, CITA 1979. 
566 Industrialists may immediately deduct 95% of qualifying expenditure incurred on 
equipment and facilities, patents, licences, secret formulas or processes, industrial, 
commercial or scientific information, technical feasibility studies and other R&D 
costs in computing taxable profits: see ý(1)(1)(f) of; and Tables I& II to the Second 
Schedule, CITA 1979. 
... Under normal corporate income tax rules, companies may not claim allowances in 
excess of 66 2/3% of assessable profits in any year of assessment. 
568 124(7) of the Second Schedule, CITA 1979. This incentive is exclusive to the 
manufacturing and agro-allied sectors. 
569 §38 (1)&(2), CITA 1979 respectively. 
570 §41 CITA 1979. 
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provisions in the ID/ITR Act 1971. Crucially, out of the 37 categories of 
eligible activities enumerated in Schedule to the Act3 26 relate to 
manufacturing and industry. Eligible activities include salt processing; smelting 
and refining of iron, steel and alloys; manufacturing industrial inputs for the 
energy sector; manufacturing infrastructural inputs such as cement, glass, 
marble, ceramic products, telecommunication equipment, building materials 
and stationery; solid minerals processing; processing industrial chemicals; 
processing yeast, alcohol, animal feedstuff, cocoa and other plantation crops; 
manufacturing science, educational, medical, dental and pharmaceutical 
supplies or equipment; 571 processing paper, metals,, textiles, leather and rubber; 
and the local fabrication of industrial machinery and automobile parts. 572 
However, NIPC has furnished an extended list of 69 pioneer industries 
eligible for fiscal incentives. 573The legislative authority for this extended list is 
unclear as the additional industries listed are not provided for anywhere in the 
ID/ITR Act 1971. However, under §1 of the ID/ITR Act 1971, the President 
may by publication in the government's Gazette, increase or otherwise amend 
the list of pioneer industries and products. It is possible that the list has been 
extended by Gazette but the Schedule to the Act has not been amended 
accordingly to reflect this. 574 
NIPC's extended list expands the scope of manufacturing and allied industries 
qualifying for pioneer status. 575Notably, the list now includes the manufacture 
Medical and pharmaceutical products are also VAT-exempt: see the First Schedule to 
VATA 1994. 
572 Schedule to the ID/ITR Act 1971. 
573 List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, op 
cit, Chapter 1: General Incentives, pp. 2-6. 
571 This Researcher was unable to establish the exact Gazette or other authority for 
NIPC's extended list, despite numerous enquiries at NIPC and FIRS made during 
field trips to Nigeria. This reoccurring theme of obscure, inadequate and inaccessible 
legislative or regulatory authority for various aspects of Nigeria's tax incentive 
policy, and the adverse effect this has on transparency and accountability is further 
explored in Chapter 7. 
575 Curiously, the manufacture of medical and dental equipment; office and school 
stationery; and building and home furnishing materials all seem to 
have been deleted 
in NIPC's extended list: cf. items #35,36 and 37 of the Schedule to the 
ID/ITR Act 
1971. 
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of nets, gas cylinders, fertilizers, gypsum, flat sheets, welding electrodes, nails 
and brewing hops; and the processing of wheat, gum Arabic, waste oil, 
enzymes and concentrates. In addition, eligible engineering activities include 
the manufacture of electrical appliances and components, marine equipment 
and vessels, computers, cameras, underwater diving equipment,, aircraft 
facilities, agriculture equipment, heavy-duty lifting equipment and foundries; 
and the installation of aircraft facilities, scientific instruments and 
communication equipment. 576 
Under the ID/ITR Act 1971, the initial 3-year tax holiday may be extended 
by 2 additional years yielding a maximum cumulative holiday of 5 years 
subject to satisfactory performance based on criteria including the rate of 
industrial expansion, the level of efficiency and development, the firm's 
effectiveness in implementing any schemes relating to raw material utilisation 
or training of indigenous staff and the general importance of the industrial 
activity to the economy. 577However, in practice it appears that NIPC has in 
the past irregularly. awarded 7-year tax holidays comprising a 5-year initial 
period followed by a 2-year extension in contravention of the express 
provisions of the ID/ITR Act 1971.578The source of the co-nfusion which led 
to this development is not clear. However, NIPC presently accepts that tax 
holidays under the Act should not be awarded for more than a cumulative 
period of 5 years. 579 
116 List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, Op 
cit, Chapter 1: General Incentives, pp. 2-6. 
577 510 ID/ITR Act 1971. 
578 t7 NIPC states in its advisory brochure tha 1-year tax bolidays may be granted to 
investments in 'economically disadvantaged local government areas', cassava 
projects, manufacture or installation of telecommunication equipment, electrical 
power supply and transportation: see Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, op 
rit, pp. 1,8,10,16. These statements are clearly contrary to §10, ID/ITR Act 1971 
which limits tax holidays to a maximum of 5years. Indeed, the relevant provision of 
the CITA (§34) dealing with investments in disadvantaged local government areas 
provides for capital allowances by way of a rural investment allowance and not tax 
holidays. 
57' This was established in personal conversations between this Researcher and NIPC 
officials in January 2007. 
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Net business losses and capital allowances relating to eligible capex may be 
accumulated during the tax-free pioneer period and carried forward into the 
post-pioneer period to reduce taxable profits. 580 As such, the benefit of these 
rules under the normal corporation tax rules is preserved. Shareholders benefit 
from withholding tax exemptions on dividends paid from tax-free pioneer 
period profits, provided such profits are credited into a special aCCOUnt. 581 
These provisions are targeted at firms that prove to be profitable within the 
initial 3 or 5 years. 582 However, companies are prohibited from making 
(reverse) loans during the pioneer period without due approval under an anti- 
abuse measure. 583 
The rationales behind the ID/ITR Act 1971 are as noble as the pioneer period 
incentives are generous. However, the reality may be that these incentives have 
had limited impact on the expansion of Nigeria's industrial base due to 
conceptual defects in the imp ort- substitution/ economic growth-by- 
industrialisation paradigm and practical problems with targeting incentives. 
The outcomes have been high redundancy rates and excessive revenue losses. 
NEEDS proposes to review and codify the existing tax incentive system, 
design incentives to promote export-oriented production and 
manufacturing and introduce more sophisticated tax incentives specifically 
targeted at science,, technology and R&D including enhanced and accelerated 
deductions for related expenditures. 584 This trend towards export-oriented 
incentives is highlighted in the next section. 
3.2.5.2. Tax Incentives for Exports: Tax-Free Zones 
A key aspect of the draft National Tax Policy on the use of fiscal incentives is 
the intention to target tax holidays to encourage investments in specific 
580 §14, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
5" It is unclear whether an accounting contra-entry would be sufficient compliance with 
this provision or whether a designated bank account must be set-up 
for this purpose. 
582 5§16&17, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
5" §18 ID/ITR Act 1971. 
51 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p. 72. 
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economic sectors including the promotion of exports. 585 This is consistent 
with the preference under NEEDS for export processing zones or enclaves 
as opposed to the reliance in the past on imp ort- substitution manufacturing. 
This economic policy is clearly translated into legislative reality under the 
export processing zones provisions. 
As noted above, 586 NEPZ Act 1992 provides a general regime for the 
establishment, operation and management of EPZs. NEPZ Act 1992 vests the 
President with the power to designate as EPZs such geographically delineated 
areas as may be recommended by the Authority established under NEPZ Act 
1992 (hereafter: NEPZ Authority). NEPZ Authority may amend, vary, add to 
the limits or rename any EPZ587 and is constituted by a managing director and 
representatives of various Ministries, 588 the Nigerian Customs Service, the 
Nigerian Ports Authority, the private sector and the CBN. 589 
Provisions similar590 to those under OGEFZ Act 1996 provide that approved 
enterprisCS591 are exempt from customs duties, 592 import duties, 593 and all 
other Federal, State and (local) 594 government taxes, levies and rates 
including VAT. 595 Approved enterprises may engage in trading, exhibition, 
assembly, manufacturing, processing, repackaging, storage, export and 
consumption of imported materials. 596 Retail trade must be with the express 
'IMF Comments on FGN Tax Strategy: FGN Strategy and Position on Issues Raised, ' 
Power Point Presentation of January 24,2007, op cit, slide 3. 
586 See §3.2.2.1.7. above. 
587 51 NEPZ Act 1992. 
588 Vi. Z., of Commerce and Industry, Culture and Tourism, and Science and Technology. 
589 51 NEPZ Act 1992. 
590 V17, §§8,12 & 18 NEPZ Act 1992. 
, 9, The NEPZ Authority is empowered to licence such enterprises and such licensing Is 
deemed to constitute company registration under CAMA 1990; however, in practice 
the filing of returns with the Corporate Affairs Commission is required: §10 NEPZ 
Act 1992. 
592 Ordinarily payable on the import of capital and consumer goods, raw materials and 
other intermediate components: §12 NEPZ Act 1992. 
593 T1 Customs Tariff (Exemption) Order2001, S. I. No. 18 of 2001. 
594 ý8 OGEFZ Act 1996. It would appear that the omission of the word 'local' from this 
provision was a draftsman's error. 
595 Part I, First Schedule to VATA 1993. 
596 512 NEPZ Act 1992. 
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permission of 'NEPZ Authority. 597 EPZs are treated as distinct zones outside 
the Nigerian customs territory and exports from EPZs to the rest of Nigeria 
must comply with local customs and licensing regulations applicable to normal 
imports. 598 
Ancillary non-fiscal incentives include free remittance of capital, profits and 
dividends targeted at foreign investors; a simplified import, export and 
licensing regime; re nt-free land for facilities during the construc tion period; 
the prohibition of strikes and industrial action; no restrictions on foreign 
ownership of firms; reduced restrictions on the employment of expatriate staff; 
and provisions to fa cilitate trade finance and securitisation. 599 
These EPZ incentives are complemented by certain provisions of CITA 1979 
providing withholding tax exemptions for dividends derived from wholly- 
export oriented businesses; companies' income tax exemptions on 
repatriated profits derived from exports of goods provided the proceeds are 
utilised for the purchase of raw materials, equipment and other inputs, or from 
supplies of inputs exclusively for export production; 600 and 100% annual 
capital allowances on qualifying building and plant expenditure. 601 CITA also 
provides 3-year tax holidays for wholly export-oriented undertakings sited 
within or outside EPZs. 602 However, it is improbable that any profit- 
maximising concern located within an EPZ would elect these time-bound tax 
waivers instead of the more generous indefinite tax holidays provided under 
NEPZ Act 1992. 
597 517 ibid. 
Sales of imports in the domestic customs territory are limited to 25% of production: 
§§14 & 18(l)(e), ibid. 
`9 §ý18 & 12(4)(b), ibid. 
110 §23(l)(p)-(o), CITA 1979. 
'01 These operate to exclude eligibility for normal investment allowances. 535(1)&(2), 
CITA 1979. 
602 §35(3) CITA 1979. 
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The most successful tax-free zone has been the pioneering Calabar Free Trade 
Zone which was approved in 1989 603 but only became operational in 2000. 
Calabar Free Trade Zone is located in Cross River State and occupies 152- 
hectares of enclosed property adjacent to the Calabar Free Port. 60 companies 
have been registered in the Zone operating in textiles, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, steel rolling, paints manufacturing and computer assembly. 
These enterprises are supported by power, postage, telecommunication and 
banking facilities in addition to customs, immigration, cargo handling and 
warehousing services. 604 Calabar Free Trade Zone will also serve as the 
investment platform for the establishment of Tinapa Busi ive Resort. 605 Fi 
other tax-free zones have been approved and are to be located in Northern 
Nigeria, 606Lagos State607 and Ondo State. 608 
The foregoing paragraphs have underscored the fiscal incentive regime for 
industrial activity focussing on manufacturing both for domestic and export 
markets. However, the organised manufacturing and industrial sectors, though 
vital for economic development and competitiveness, employ less people than 
the burgeoning informal sector. The next section considers tax incentives 
targeted at small and medium sized enterprises (or SMEs). 
603 Investors' Guide to Nigeria Brochure, op cit, Chapter 13: Free Trade/Expoft 
Processing Zone Scheme, p. 87. 
604 Broll Retail Projects and Tinapa Business Resort Limited; 'Tinapa Business Resort 
Limited: Africa's Most Exciting Leasing Opportunity' Brochure, Slide 5, 
<httii: //ww, A7. tinai2a. com/htmlý/downloads/ýdownlaod. ht. ml> accessed 30.03.2007. 
605 See below at 53.2.8.2 of this Thesis. 
606 Vi. Z., the Kano, Maigatari and Banki Free Trade Zones to be located in the northern 
states of Kano, Jigawa and Borno respectively: Investors' Guide to Nigeria Brochure, 
op cit, Chapter 13: Free Trade/Export Processing Zone Sch'eme, p. 89. 
611 The proposed Lekki Export Processing Zone is a private Joint venture initiative 
between the Lagos State government and a consortium of Chinese businessmen, to 
occupy 1000hectares of property located at the Lekki peninsular. The project is to 
cost N2billion (or US$26.7million) and has the potential to generate 300,000 local 
jobs: 'Lekki Free Trade Zone to Create 300,000 jobs-Tinubu', This Day, 12 th May, 
2006 <htt. 12: / /www. this davonline. com /nvicA. -,. ph12? id =47941> accessed 13.05.06. 
08 Niyi Bello, 'Govt to relocate Naval base to free trade zone in Ondo, ' Nigerian 
Guardian (Lagos 19.09.07) <httl2: / /v7ww. guardiannewsngr. com /new-, /article06 > 
accessed 19.09.07. 
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3.2.6. MICRO-ENTERPRISES & SMES 
3.2.6.0. Overview 
The informal trading sector has always been a dynamic one engaging large 
numbers of people particularly in densely populated cities such as Lagos, 
Kano, Kaduna, Enugu, Ibadan and Port Harcourt. Some indigenous small-scale 
traders started from humble beginnings in formal apprenticeships and evolved 
into medium and large-scale manufacturing conglomeratcs. 109 Forrest notes that 
the expansion of some indigenous enterprises has been due to diversification 
and risk-reduction strategies to address high levels of risk in the commercial 
environment. Other responses to policy and macroeconomic risks include 
overinvestment in property holdings, the pursuit of short-term opportunities 
and reduced of long-term investment in fixed assets. 610 
The OECD and African Development Bank Nigeria note that while SMEs 
constitute 95% of Nigeria's organised manufacturing sector and provide 70% 
of the employment, they contribute less than 15% of industrial oUtpUt. 611 SMEs 
suffer significant shortcomings compared to larger enterprises. 612 The 
challenges posed by infrastructural deficiencies fall disproportionately on small 
firms which are unable to utilise economie s of scale to subsidise large 
investments in private power, transport and communication infrastructure. 
Similarly, the low levels of business trust, reduced influence with the 
government and public officials, and difficulties in enforcing contracts through 
often protracted judicial and arbitration procedures all place SMEs at a distinct 
disadvantage compared to larger firMS. 613 It is no surprise that the cumulative 
effect of these difficulties is to reduce productivity. Indeed, the Nigeria PSA 
601 Forrest profiles numerous indigenous entrepreneurs (between the 1920s to the 
1980s) who started out as traders and subsequently proved to be extremely 
successful industrialists, traders and transporters: Forrest, The Advance of African 
Capital, op rit, pp. 233-234. 
610 Ibid. 
"' OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2004105 - Country Studies: Nigeria, p. 373. 
612 Particularly in coping with poor electricity supplies: OECD/AfDB, African Economic 
Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Nigeria) p. 443. 
113 Value-added per worker was found to vary from US$3,859 for small firms (less than 
100 employees), US$5,020 for medium sized firms (less than 200 employees), 
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Report observes that value-added is directly related to firm size with smaller 
and medium sized firms exhibiting significantly lower levels of value-added per 
worker than large and very large firms. 614 
NEEDS notes the economic significance of the informal sector and seeks to 
implement strategies to enhance its economic contribution. Policies are 
proposed to address low productivity and value-added, poor linkages with 
organised industry and research institutes, poor access to finance and 
infrastructural deficiencies that particularly affect SMEs. Strategies include 
developing clusters and industrial parks to promote linkages, improving access 
to finance through public financial institutions 615 and private financial 
initiatives, 616 introducing favourable pro-'local content' public procurement 
policies and encouraging joint ventures, partnerships and collaborations 
between local micro- enterprises and foreign InVeStorS. 617 
3.2.6.1. Tax Incentives for Micro-enterprises 
A special agency known as SMIDA. was established under the Small and Medium 
Scale Industries Develo mentA P gency (Establisbment) Act No. 16 of 2003618 (hereafter: 
SMIDA Act 2003) to promote pro-SME policies,, rural industrialisation, 
poverty alleviation, support services, networks and related technology. SMIDA 
is responsible for developing 'cottage' industries and the SMEs sub-sector, and 
promoting sub-contracting, clustering, networks and linkages with other 
economic sectors. 619 SMIDA is empowered to recommend to the federal 
government applicable tax and tariff regimes and other financial incentives 
US$4,198 for large firms (less than 500 employees) to US$11,094 for very large firms 
(over 500 employees): Nigeria PSA Report, p. 6. 
614 Nigeria PSA Report, pp. 15-16. 
615 E. g. from the Bank of Industry. Other initiatives such as the Family Economic 
Advancement Programme were less successful. - 616 E. g. the Small and Medium Enterprise Investment Equity Scheme organised by the 
Bankers' Committee whereby banks are required to set aside 10% of their profit after 
tax for investment in SMEs. 
61 , NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 70-72. 
618 The Act establishes SMIDA with representatives from the 6 geo-political zones, with 
ex-officio members drawn from the public service (i. e. the Federal Ministries of 
Industry and Science & Technology; the National Planning Commission; and the 
Bank of Industry) and private sector: §51&2, SMIDA Act 2003. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Stmdies 
2ueen Marj, University of London 
Page 134 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 3: An Exposilion of Nigerian Tax Incentives A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African and Kenyan Tax Lav, 
for promoting the development of small and medium scale industries. 620 
Existing tax incentives targeted at SMEs include rural investment allowances 
for capex expended for providing infrastructural facilities in less developed 
regions. 62'Dividends from SMEs active in the manufacturing sector are 
exempt from withholding tax in the first five years of operation. 622 SMEs 
active in agriculture, mining and small-scale manufacturing are eligible for 
pioneer industry tax holidays and other tax incentives. However, companies 
granted the pioneer industry tax incentives under the ID/ITR Act 1971 are 
ineligible for the rural investment allowances. 623 
Special incentives apply under the Venture Capital (Incentives) Act No. 89 of 1993 
(hereafter: VC Act 1993) to encourage indigenous technologies and promote 
the growth of SMEs which involve the development and utilisation of local raw 
materials. VC Act 1993 provides unusual capital allowances permitting the 
deduction of the cost of an equity investment in eligible venture capital 
companies from the investor company"s taxable income as assessed under 
CITA 1979. The applicable schedule is 30: 30: 20: 10: 10 effectively writing off 
the investor company's risky equity investment in venture capital company 
over 5 years of assessment. 624 Investments funded by the National Risk Fund 
attract similar incentives. Withholding tax on dividends paid by the Risk Fund 
is reduced by 50% from 10% under CITA 1979 to 5%. 625 Curiously, certain 
capital gains from the disposal by the investor company of its equity interest in 
the venture capital company are exempt from capital gains tax depending on 
the length of time the equity interest is held. 626VC Act 1993 extends both 
619 58 SMIDA Act 2003. 
620 58(t) SMIDA Act 2003. 
621 Applicable to infrastructural capex to provide electricity, water, roads and 
telecommunications located in rural, underdeveloped areas. The allowances range 
from 5% to 100% on qualifying capex depending on the type of infrastructure 
provided: §34 CITA 1979. 
6 22) §25(0) CITA 1979. 
623 519 ID/ITR Act 1971; 540(12) CITA 1979. 
624 §4(a) VC Act 1993. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Gains realised within 5 years of the initial investment are completely exempt from 
capital gains tax; those realised between 6 and 10 years are suffer tax at 2.5% while 
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pioneer industry incentives under the ID/ITR Act 1971 and export- 
promotion incentives under the Export (Incentives and Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act No. 18 of 1986 to venture project companies. 627 
NEEDS proposes to introduce special incentives to promote linkages between 
the formal and informal sectors and streamline available tax incentives for 
SMEs. 628However, the existing tax law is inconsistent, simultaneously featuring 
tax incentives and provisions which contain certain tax disincentives which 
may discourage SMEs from formalising their businesses and registering for tax. 
On the one hand is the reduced corporate income tax rate of 20% applicable 
to small companies engaged in manu acturing, agriculture, solid minerals 
mining and export trade with total gross sales/turnover of less than 
41million. 629 On the other are the much vilified minimum tax provisions 
which levy tax on corporate profits based on various (arguably inappropriate) 
criteria including gross profit, net assets and paid-up share Capital. 630 The 
minimum tax provisions are particularly bizarre as they may be applicable 
where a company is inactive or marginally profitable and the tax base criteria 
are wholly unrelated to net profits. However, agricultural, foreign and new 
companies that have not been operational for more than 4-years are exempt 
from the minimum tax. Companies can also exploit capital allowances and loss 
relief rules. 631 
Tax incentives are one of many strategies ut, lised to promote micro- 
enterprises. The Central Bank has increasingly made the provision of 
microfinance facilities a key policy point. A voluntary initiative by the Bankers' 
those reallsed between 11 and 15 years are taxed at 7.5%: 54(c) VC Act. The normal 
rate of capital gains tax under CGTA 1967 is 10%. 
627 §4(e) & (f) VC Act 1993. 
628 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p. 72. 
621 The normal rate of corporation tax is 30%. Companies enjoy the reduced rate for an 
initial period of four years after commencement of business. The period may be 
extended by 2 additional years depending on evidence of good management and 
records: §40(7), (8) & (10) CITA 1979. 
630 533 CITA 1979. The minimum tax provisions override the small companies' tax 
provisions. 
631 ý33(3) & (4) CITA 1979. 
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Committee since 1999/2000 under the Small Medium Industries Equity 
Investment Scheme (SMEIES) urges banks to set aside 10% of their profits 
after taxation for equity investment in SMEs, either routed directly by the 
banks or through conduit venture capital companies. 
Other sectoral initiatives support SMEs. Under the Nigerian Minerals and Mining 
Act, 2007 (hereafter: NMMA 2007), small scale and artisan miners may be 
provided with certain extension services financed by the Solid Minerals 
Development Fund to support their operations. 632Mining is a unique sector 
where much of the commercial exploitation of solid minerals has been 
conducted by the unregulated informal sector. The next section considers 
recent legal reform of this sector and highlights the tax incentives provided to 
promote private sector participation. 
3.2.7. MINING& SOLID MINERALS 
3.2.7.0. Overview 
Mining in Nigeria has a distinguished pedigree, with historical records tracing 
this activity back to the 340 B. C. Nok culture and other ancient artisan 
civilisationS. 633 Mineral resources including tin, columbite and coal were 
commercially exploited for export during the Second World War. The 
1950s/1960s saw the major decline of the mining sector largely due to the rise 
of the petroleum industry and the Biafran War. 634 
However, under the Oba_sanjo and Yar'Adua administrations, the mining sector 
has assumed new prominence in efforts to diversify the economy. Current 
policies under NEEDS seek to address numerous constraints in developing and 
632 §534 & 91, NMMA 2007. 
633 Such as the Igbo Ukwu civilisation, the Hausa kingdom and the ancient City States 
of Benin and Oyo. 
634 Federal Ministry of Solid Minerals Development's Mining journal special 
publication, 'Nigeria: An Exciting New Mining Destination' (London, Mining 
Publications, 2006), p. 5; <httl2: //www. msmd. gov. ng/Publications/ . publications. asp> 
accessed 27.04-06. 
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exploiting mineral resources 635 by encouraging formal, private-sector 
investment in environmentally- sustal exploitation; 11 data 
management of mining rights, licences and leases by a cadastral register; 
improving poor working conditions, access to credit and health services for 
industry participants; and codifying a competitive range of fiscal incentives for 
investors. 636World Bank funding was obtained for a Sustainable Management 
of Mining Resources Pro)ect involving significant reform of the mining sector. 
3.2.7.1. Tax Incentives for Mining 
The new NMMA 2007 replaces the previous Minerals and Mining Act No. 34 of 
1999 effective from 16 March 2007.637 As with energy resources, ownership 
rights to minerals are vested in the federal government on behalf of the 
Nigerian people. 638The sector is regulated by the Minister for Mines and Steel 
Development whose duties place a strong emphasis on sustainable 
development. 639Authorised persons may obtain numerous types of exploiting 
rights including reconnaissance permits, exploration licenses, mining leases, 
quarry leases, water use permits and small scale mining leaseS. 640 
Tax incentives are provided for license holders and other operators. Capital 
allowances by way of 95% first year allowances may be accumulated and 
utilised for up to 4-years before they expire641 on certain qualifying capex. 642 
Modest capital allowances may also be granted for industrial buildings utilised 
635 Notably, the informal nature of current mining activities; a dearth of local know-how 
and capacity to exploit resources; poor data and surveys of proven mineral deposits 
and an uncompetitive fiscal and regulatory regime. 
636 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 77-79. 
637 ý161 NMMA 2007. 
638 §1 NMMA 2007. 
639 See ý4 NMMA 2007. 
640 Part IV, NMMA 2007. 
641 §24 NMMA 2007. 
642 Essentially certified exploration, development and processing expenditure including 
feasibility studies and sample assaying costs, and all infrastructural costs regardless 
of ownership or replacement. 
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in mining operations under CITA 1979.643 Loss relief carry forwards may 
apply for certain 
losseS. 644 
License holders are eligible for 3-year tax holidays commencing from the 
certified date of mining operation which may be extended for an additional 2- 
year period if the Minister for Mines and Steel Development is satisfied as to 
the rate of expansion, standard of efficiency, level of development of mining 
operations, and the implementation of any conditions including the training 
and development of Nigerian personnel. 645AIl operators may enjoy exemption 
from customs and import duties for approved plant, machinery, equipment 
and accessories specifically and exclusively imported for mining operations. 
Income tax incentives targeted at FDI include a quota for tax-free personal 
remittances for expatriate personnel coupled with foreign exchange rules 
permitting the transfer of external currency out of Nigeria. 646As Most prime 
mining locations are found in underdeveloped and often inaccessible regions, 
investors may be able to claim additional rural investment allowances 647 
resulting in enhanced or multiple deductions for qualifying capex. 
The Ministry of Mines and Steel Development has marketed investment 
opportunities at international mining events. Mining interests hitherto held by 
the Nigerian Mining Corporation w ere to be privatised to local and 
international investors in an on-going bidding process. Recent privatisation 
exercises have involved bids for bitumen and coal fields from 60 local and 
foreign investors. 648Emerging economies like China have indicated interest in 
643 15%, first year initial allowances followed by 10% annual allowances: T5 of and 
Tables I& 11 to the Second Schedule to CITA 1 979. 
644 Eligible losses are capped at values equivalent to the capital allowances claimed in 
the year of assessment from which the losses were brought forward. 
645 §28 NMMA 2007. 
646 ý25 NMMA 2007. 
647 This applies for capex for electricity, water, roads, telecommunications located in 
rural, underdeveloped areas and ranges from 5% to 100% on capex depending on the 
infrastructure provided: ý34 CITA 1979. However, these rural investment allowances 
operate in exclusion to pioneer period tax holidays: §40(12) CITA 1979. 
648 See 'FG Pre-qualifies 60 Firms on Mining Assets Bidding', This Day newspaper 
report by Onyebuchi Ezigbo], 5th February, 2006 
<httl2: //-, ý?, v,, w,. thisdavonline-com/n-, 7-iev,. 12hl2? id=4-/(), -, !> accessed 02.05.06. 
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investing substantially in , the sector. 649 However, investors have been 
discouraged by the recent 'revalidation exercise-' by the new Minister of Mines 
and Steel Development (Chief Sarafa Ishola) of existing mining licenses 
awarded by the mining cadastral office. 650 
The majority of mining activities are carried out illegally by the largely 
unregulated informal sector. A notable feature of the present regulatory regime 
is the emphasis on technical support for small-scale miners and micro- 
entrepreneurs. 651 §3.2.8 examines the scope of tax incentives specifically 
targeted at promoting sustainable economic development in the services sector 
in which the large informal sector is also very active. 
3.2.8. OTHER SERVICES 
3.2-8-0. Overview 
Globally, the service sector is increasing its significance with the composition 
of world-wide FDI leaning towards services. The migration of export-oriented 
services offshore has lead to numerous challenges and opportunities for both 
developed and developing nationS. 652 On a domestic level, NEEDS expects the 
growth in services to boost the economic performance of the real sector. 653 
3.2.8.1. Information & Technology 
Current economic policy considers the development of the information and 
technology sector as crucial to national development and competitiveness. 
NEEDS seeks to address the challenges posed by the dearth of local software 
development capacity, the poor telecommunications and postal service and 
inadequate investment in human capital, technological know-how and science- 
649 'China Rationalises $15bn Investment in Nigeria', This Day newspaper report by 
Onyebuchi Ezigbol, 5t h January, 2006 accessed at 
<httl2: / /www,. thisdaý, online. c om/ nview. j2h 12 -rid -- 469 91 > on 02.05.06. 
650 Yet another example of Nigerian policy uncertainty: 'Govt okays mining policy, 
Nige, -ýian Guardian Newspapers article, 21 February 2008 accessed at 
<httj_2: //w-, v,, x. guar iannewsn, (Ir. com/ne-, ý7s,, articleO3> on 21.02.08. 
611 ý§34 & 91, NMMA 2007. 
652 UNCTAD, Vorld Investment Report 2004, chapters III and IV. 
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based skills. Key policy points focus on promoting telecommunications by 
establishing a national multimedia super-corridor, establishing specialised 
science and technology parks and technology incubation centres in various 
parts of the country, enhancing intellectual property rights and upgrading local 
capacity to produce hardware and software InpUtS. 654 
NEEDS proposes to provide both financial and fiscal incentives to facilitate 
the development of a multimedia super-corridor and also to provide incentives 
to promote the development of industrial parks and telecommunications 
technology. 655 Existing fiscal incentives include the deductibility of R&D 
expenses from taxable profits subject to a ceiling of 10% of the relevant 
company's total assessable profits. Companies and organisations which 
specialise in the commercial application of R&D may claim a 20% investment 
tax credit on relevant R&D expenditures. 656 Alternatively, generous initial 
allowances may be claimed to write off R&D expenses. 657 
The special incentives provided by VC Act 1993 are also relevant. Eligible 
projects include those facilitating industrialisation by the use of innovative 
ideas, projects and techniques; those utilising commercial applications of 
research findings; and those encouraging indigenous processes and 
technologies. Applicable tax incentives include: capital allowances for the 
cost of equity investments in eligible venture capital companies applied on a 
30: 30: 20: 10: 10 basis to write off the investments against the investor's taxable 
income over 5 years; 658 capital gains tax exemptions on disposals of equity 
and withholding tax reductions on dividends paid. 659 In addition, there are 
653 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p-72. 
654 Ibid, pp. 57,73. 
655 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, p. 73. 
656 526 CITA 1979. 
657 An initial allowance of 95% on qualifying expenditure on a wide range of R&D 
outlays (equipment and facilities, patents, licences, secret formulas or processes, 
industrial, commercial or scientific information, technical feasibility studies) may be 
deducted in computing taxable profits: T(1)(1)(f) of; and Tables I& II to the Second 
Schedule, CITA 1979. 
... 54 VC Act 1993. 
659 54(c) & (d) VC Act 1993. 
Bode Oyetmnde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, UniversiýD, of London 
Pqge 141 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan African Eonomies: 3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incentii, es 
A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African and Kenyan Tax Lan, 
pioneer tax holidays and other incentives under the ID/ITR Act 1971 for 
the manufacture of computers, installation of scientific instruments and 
communication equipment, and production of ICT equipment including 
hardware and software; 660 and export-pro motion incentives under the Export 
(Incentives and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 18 of 1986.661 
3.2.8.22. Tourism, Real Estate Development, Film & Entertainment 
Despite the potential for large revenues, tourism in Nigeria is an untapped, 
underdeveloped sector. The infrastructure of game reserves, natural springs, 
tourist resorts and other facilities have declined over the years. For instance, 
the 800miles2 Yankari National Park is the largest of seven-odd game reserves 
but has lost many of its 50 endangered wildlife species to poachers and 
deforestation. The Jos Plateau - which was once the centre of local tourism 
due to its temperate weather, rare crater lakes, scenic Shere Hills and 
picturesque Aesop Falls - has been adversely affected by violent ethnic and 
religious conflicts, poor security and corruption; NEEDS proposes to promote 
private sector and foreign investment in tourism by concessioning existing 
tourism attractions and implementing polices which favour tourists, investors 
and the environment. 662 
A recent development which may change the fortunes of this sector is the 
Cross River State Government's Tinapa Business Resort located at Ad, abo 
on the, Calabar River near the Calabar Free Trade Zone. The N45billion 
(US$350million) Tinapa Business Resort is to be a world-class holiday and 
shopping resort comprising: warehousing facilities; wholesale and retail trading 
emporiums and shopping outlets; budget and luxury hotels; cinemas, casinos 
and restaurants; water-world parks and other leisure facilities. The Cross River 
State government hopes to build on the significant success of its other tourism 
... Items #37,43 and 66 on the List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment 
Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, op cit, Chapter 1: General Incentives, pp-2-6. 
661 §4(e) & (f) VC Act 1993. 
662 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp. 73-74. 
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project, Obudu Ranch Resort, which is the leading tourism resort in 
Nigeria. 663 
Promotional material indicates that Tinapa Business Resort possesses a free 
trade status; incentives identical to those available in EPZs are to be extended 
to investors in the Resort. 664Although the precise enabling legal regime for 
these incentives is opaque, 665 this Researcher was able to determine that Tinapa 
Business Resort was granted EPZ status under ý1(1) NEPZ Act 1992 by 
Presidential approval. 666 Tinapa Business Resort Free Zone Enterprise was 
established as a subsidiary entity to manage the zone in accordance with ý1(2) 
NEPZ Act 1992. As such,, Tinapa free trade zone is legally as well as 
geographically distinct from the contiguous Calabar free trade zone. Investors 
in Tinapa would consequently enjoy income tax exemptions and other EPZ 
incentives. 
These EPZ incentives would be in addition to existing but more modest tax 
incentives for investors in hotels and other resorts. CITA 1979 provides that 
25% of tourism revenues received in foreign exchange is tax exempt 
provided kept in a special reserve fund and utillsed within 5 years in the 
expansion of new tourism facilities. 667 Similarly, NIPC's extended list of 
pioneer industries (and the related 5-year tax holidays and other incentives) 
includes tourism by way of the development of holiday resorts, hotels, sporting 
and recreational faClIltieS. 668 
Broll Retail Projects and Tinapa Business Resort Limited; 'Tinapa Business Resort 
Limited: Africa's Most Excl'ting Leasing Opportunity' Brochure 
<httl2: //www,. tinapa. com/htmlý/downloads/downlaod. html> and 
<http: //www. tinal2a. com> both accessed 30.03.07. 
664 Tinapa Press Release 1-'Free Trade Zone' issued by the Gendel Group for Tinapa 
Business Resort (2004) <http: / /ywy,. tinapa. com /images Zmedia/12resS 01-12df> 
accessed 30.03.07. 
661 This Researcher frequently encountered instances whereby the underlying legislative 
authority for certain incentives was either opaque or obscure. See §7.4.2 below. 
666 Statements by Eyo Ekpo, (former) Attorney-General Cross Rivers State, Nigeria and 
Orok B. Okon, Personal Assistant to the Attorney- General (personal communication 
5 April, 2007). 
667 §37 CITA 1979. 
668 Item . #67, List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment Incentives in Nigeria 
Brochure, op cit, Chapter 1: General Incentives, pp. 2-6. 
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Another sub-sector which features on NIPC's extended list is real estate 
development. This category includes projects earning rental income from 
residential and commercial premises and capital gains from interests in real 
estate disposed within a specified period. 669As noted earlier, the legal position 
of NIPCs extended list is unclear. However, the promotion of real property 
development is consistent with the policies outlined by NEEDS to promote 
infrastructural development. 
NEEDS also seeks to promote the indigenous entertainment industry, 
focusing on the burgeoning film industry located in Eastern Nigeria. Key 
issues include improving the technical inputs and quality of films, developing 
the export market and providing access to finance to investors. Incentives are 
to be provided to increase private sector participation in the sector but it is 
unclear if these include tax incentives. 670 
3.2.8.3. Education, Government Services & Public Corporations 
Certain profits of non-for profit, statutory or public owned corporations are 
exempt from corporation income tax under CITA 1979. The provisions 
cover income accruing to statutory or registered friendly societies; 
ecclesiastical, charitable or educational companies; corporations to promote 
sporting activities; commodity purchasing authorities; and state development 
corporations. 671 Local government councils, purchasing authorities and state 
development corporations are exempt from capital gains tax. 672 Financing by 
various public bodies and governments may attract tax incentives such as the 
withholding tax exemption for interest accruing to investors in Lagos State 
161 Item #68, ibid. 
670 NEEDS Report, Chapter 6: Sectoral Strategies, pp-74-75. 
671 523 CITA 1979. Public corporations such as the Odu'a group of companies and the 
New Nigeria Corporation rose to prominence during the 1970s and 1980s. However, 
under NEEDS the private sector is the preferred engine for economic growth and 
development and it is probable that there will be a decline in tax and other 
incentives provided to support public corporations. 
67' E. g. for local governments: §27 CGTA 1967. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
, 
Queen Mary, Universiýq, of London 
Page 144 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Suh-Saharan African Economies: 3: An Exposition of Nigerian Tax Incentives 
A Comparafire Study of Nigerian, South African and Ken-Yan Tax Lan, 
Government's Redeemable Bond Issue 2005/2009.673 Charitable donations 
made to benefit approved public funds, statutory corporations and 
ecclesiastical, benevolent, educational and scientific institutions are also 
treated as tax deductible expenses. 674 Nigerian tax law goes further in the 
promotion of education by imposing a special education tax levy which is 
charged on all companies at 2% of their assessable profits. The education tax is 
collected by FIRS and paid into an Education Fund which disburses the funds 
to federal, state and local government educational institutions. 675 However, 
under proposed legislation this levy is to be eliminated and replaced with an 
appropriation charge from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. 676 
673 Under the Companies Income Tax (Second Lagos Government Redeemable Bond) (Exemption 
Order) S. I. No. 16 of 2003. 
674 §25 CGTA 1967. 
675 §53-5 ETA 1993. 
676 A Bill for an Act to amend the Education Tax Act, Nine 
Draft Bills on Tax Reforms, 
op cit, pp. 91-94. 
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3.3. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter traces the historical and political evolution of the Nigerian legal 
system as the background to the development of the current system of 
taxation. It summarises key characteristics of the Nigerian tax system noting 
the division of taxing powers between the federal, state and local governments, 
and highlighting salient aspects of tax administration and dispute resolution. It 
sets out the political framework for tax incentives, selective interventions and 
other aspects of economic policy underscoring the central role of NEEDS in 
current policy initiatives. However, its main purpose has been to present a 
detailed exposition of existing tax incentives for selected economic sectors 
including: agriculture, energy, financial services, infrastructure, basic services, 
the formal industrial sector, SMEs, mining and other sectors like technology, 
tourism, real estate development, entertainment and education. 
Diverse kinds of tax incentives have been used to encourage economic growth 
and development and the precise mix of tax incentives has varied over the 
years with changing economic policies. Blunt import- substitution and 
indus trial- oriented incentives have slowly given way to more selective export- 
oriented incentives. While the legal bases for most of these measures have 
been identified in this Chapter, some provisions remain obscure. The 
influences of international tax, trade and finance have been deliberately been 
excluded. These issues shall be examined in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 completes 
the mosaic with a critical analysis of the role of tax incentive policy in 
promoting sustainable economic development in Nigeria using exemplars from 
the other study countries. Chapters 4 and 5 will review South African and 
Kenyan tax incentive practices adopting the sectoral approach used in this 
Chapter. 
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4. A REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN TAX INCENTIVES 
'After climbing agreat bill, 
one onlyfinds that there are may more bills to climb 
I can restjor only a moment, for vitb freedom comes responsibilities, 
and I dare not linger, for my long 2valk is notyet ended. "677 
4.0. INTRODUCTION 
4.0.1. Proem 
This Chapter reviews the Republic of South Africa's tax and investment 
incentives policy set against the historical, political, economic and legal 
background. It adopts the sectoral approach used in Chapter 3 to highlight 
South African tax incentives utilised to promote employment, economic growth 
and development. Information obtained by bibliographical research is 
complemented by perceptions gleaned from interviews of leading South 
African tax academics, accountants, lawyers and professionals conducted 
during a South African Field Trip in May 2007. Views were also obtained from 
the Chief Director of Tax Policy/Head of the Tax Unit of the South African 
National Treasury and a South African Revenue Service official. Exemplars 
based on the tax and investment incentives considered here are critically 
considered in Chapter 7 providing some useful lessons for the reform of tax 
incentive policy in Nigeria. 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Nelson Mandela, The Long Wlalk to Freedom: Autobiography 
of Nelson Mandela, p. 554 (Brown & Co, Little: 1994). 
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4.0.2. Historical Development of the South African Legal System 678 
4.0.2.1. Early Legal Development 
South Africa was originally inhabited by the indigenous Khoikhoi (the 
Hottentots) and San (the Bushmen) people, with the influx of the majority 
Bantu-speaking groups and the Nguni (forebears of the Zulu and Xhosa 
peoples) occurring by 100 A. D. and 500 A. D. respectively. The rise of the Zulu 
kingdom under Shaka in the 1820s brought numerous smaller groups under the 
control of a centralised nation-state. The cultural practices of these indigenous 
peoples are preserved in contemporary customary law, which recognised as a 
distinct source of law under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter: CRSA 1996). 679 
However, the formal origins of what has become the South African legal 
system may be traced to the founding in 1652 of the Dutch East India 
Company's settlement at the Cape of Good Hope. Roman-Dutch law was 
transplanted from Holland and applied by the Dutch East India Company 
(hereafter: VOC), initially only to Dutch citizens then eventually to all 
residents of the territories under VOC's control. However, it was not until the 
Dutch680 and (subsequently) the British681 governments took over the direct 
administration of the colony that there was a clear separation of judicial and 
administrative/ executive functions. British jurists and legal practitioners 
introduced new legislation and English common law concepts and procedure 
into the matrix of Roman-Dutch law. The commercial undertones of received 
English law also gave impetus to wider social, political and commercial reforms 
coinciding with the reduction of VOC's powers and liberalisation of 
international trade. 
678 See generally Prof. Franýois du Bois' account of the historical development of the 
South African legal system: Franýois du Bois, Chapter 1: 'Introduction: History, 
System and Sources, ' in C. G. Van de Merwe and Jacques E. du Pleiss (eds) 
Introduction to the Law of South Africa, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 2004), 
pp. 1-53. 
171 5211 CRSA 1996. 
681 In 1803. 
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4.0.2.2. Anglo-Boer Conflict & the Union of South Africa 
Roman-Dutch law was allowed to flourish in independent Boer republics 
established by Boer Voortrekkers migrating inland into Zulu territory to avoid 
British colonial rule. Unlike the Republic of Natalia, the South African 
Republic (Transvaal) and the Orange Free State were permitted some autonomy 
and adopted a Presidential system of governance that preferred the separation 
of powers and constitutional supremacy to parliamentary supremacy under the 
Westminster model. 682 
The 1871 discovery of diamonds in Kimberley and post-1886 conflicts over 
rights to exploitation of gold deposits in Transvaal's Witwatersrand region led 
to the Anglo-Boer (or South African) Wars waged between 1899 and 1902. The 
Boers were ultimately defeated by the British. The two Boer republics were 
subsequently united on 31 May 1910 with the British colonies of Natal and the 
Cape to form the Union of South Africa under the Treaty of Vereeniging. 
Parliamentary sovereignty was restored under the Union Constitution with a 
Parliament comprising Lower and Upper Houses. 
4.0.2.3. The Republic of South Africa & Apartheid683 
Non-Whites were denied franchise under the new political dispensation with 
the few Black, Indian and Coloured voters being systematically removed from 
the common voters' roll. Racial segregation continued with land reform, new 
pass laws and influx controls, and limited opportunities for education, 
employment and public services for non-Whites. 684A section of the Afrikaner 
National Party came to power in 1948 and introduced the apartheid system 
which ultimately culminated in political separation of 'Independent' States for 
British control of the Cape colony acquired by military conquest in 1806 became 
permanent in 1815. 
611 Johan de Waal, Chapter 2: 'Constitutional Law, ' in Introduction to the Law of South 
Africa, op cit, p. 56. 
611 See generally 'South Africa: Recent History' by Christopher Saunders, in Africa South 
of the Sahara (34th Edition, Europa Publications /Taylor & Francis Group, London: 
2005) pp. 1044-1053. 
684 Johan de Waal, Chapter 2: 'Constitutional Law, ' in Introduction to the Law of South 
Africa, op cit, p. 58. 
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Black Africans from the Republic. 615 Resistance to apartbeid led to political 
opposition, mass civil disobedience and armed resistance by the South African 
Communist Party (SACP), the African National Party (ANC), the South African 
Indian Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress particularly in response to 
the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. African leaders were arrested and convicted of 
treason; apartbeid was consolidated; and political repression became more 
brutal despite widespread -international indignation and sanctions. 686 
South Africa became a Republic in 1960 and left the Commonwealth. Minor 
reforms were implemented by the ruling National Party's leader P. W. Botha in 
response to the deteriorating political situation and growing international 
opposition to apartbeid. However, it was only under leadership of F. W. de 
Klerk did the growing disillusion among Afrikaner intellectuals, professionals 
and the business community with apartbeid crystallise into political and social 
reform. 
4.0.2.4. The Post-Apartheid Democratic Era 
De Klerk released Mandela from in 1990 and removed bans on previously 
proscribed political parties. Desegregation occurred in all facets of society and 
international sanctions were lifted. A series of constitutional negotiations lead 
to the adoption of a new 'interim' Constitution in 1993.687The 'independent' 
native homelands were absorbed into the Republic and the existing provinces 
were reorganised into 9 regions. 688 
The ANC won the first democratic elections held on the 24 April 1994 and 
formed a government of national unity with the Inkatha Freedom Party. 
Mandela was elected as President with Thabo Mbeki and de Klerk serving as 
685 The 'independent' States were Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei, Lebowa, 
Gazankulu, Qwaqwa and KwaZulu. 
686 International sanctions imposed from 1967 continued till 1994. 
687 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1P. 93. 
681 Namely the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Orange Free State (or Free 
State), North-West, Natal (or KwaZulu/Natal), Eastern Transvaal (or Mpumalanga), 
Northern Transvaal (or Limpopo) and Gauteng (Pretoria, Witwatersrand and 
Vereeniging) Provinces. 
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Deputy Presidents. A Constitutional Assembly concluded negotiations in 1996 
which led to the adoption of a new 'final' Constitution (hereafter: CRSA 1996) 
on 4 February 1997. President Mandela resigned in December 1997 and was 
replaced by Thabo Mbeki with Jacob Zuma acting as Deputy President. MbekI 
and Zuma led the ANC to electoral victory in the general elections of June 
1999 and April 2004. Despite corruption charges and other political scandals, 
Zuma seems likely to succeed Mbeki in the 2009 general elections. 689 
4.0.2.5. The Constitution & Economic Rights 
Certain socio-economic rights are guaranteed under CRSA 1996. These include 
the right to housing, health care, food and wa ter, and social security. South 
African jurisprudence 690 indicates that these rights may be judicially 
enforceable by negative 691 and possibly positive means 692 although this 
interpretation is not without controverS y. 693 CRSA 1996 also provides for 
freedom of choice in the pursuit of a trade, occupation and profession, and 
permits these economic activities to be regulated by the State. 694 
189 'Zuma victory leaves ANC divided, ' BBC website report by Peter Greste, BBC 
Polokwane, 18th December 2007 <httl2: //news. bl)c. co. uý-/2/hi/,, tfrica/7151108. stm-> 
accessed 04.02.08. 
"0 Johan de Waal, Chapter 2: 'Constitutional Law, ' in Introduction to the Law of Soutb 
Africa, op cz . t, pp. 99-100. 
691 That is, by. preventing the S-tate from effecting policies which deny citizens access to 
adequate housing and social amenities: Government of the Republic of Soutb Africa v. 
Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at ý88- 
692 Requiring the State to proactively implement measures which enforce the social 
rights of citizens: see Minister of Healtb v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC) compelling the State to make available a certain drug at no cost to HINT-positive 
mothers and their children. 
693 Cf. Soobramoney v. Minister of Healtb, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (SA) 765 (CC). 
694 522 CRSA 1996. 
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4.1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TAX SYSTEM 
4.1.0. Historical Development of Taxation in South Africa 
Prior to the creation of the Union of South Africa,, the provinces (Cape 
Colony, Natal, Orange River Colony and Transvaal) exercised fiscal 
autonoMy. 695 Revenues accrued mainly from railway receipts and custom duties. 
Significant taxes were the (successful) direct tax of 5% (later 10%) on gold 
mining profits 696 and the (unsuccessful) general income taxes imposed by the 
Cape Colony and Natal governments in 1904 and 1908 respectively. 697 Income 
tax was successfully reintroduced in the Income Tax Act of 1914 and, fuelled by 
political pressures to increase distribution of wealth by tax transfers, 
progressive taxes,, surtaxes and excess profits taxes on top income earners were 
introduced. 698The introduction of new investment tax allowances for corporate 
investors reduced the tax base between 1975 and 1990 but a new general sales 
tax was used to broaden the tax base. 699With the abolition of apartheid and the 
introduction of democratic rule, the attraction of vital investment lost during 
the apartheid period became a significant economic objective. 
4.1.1. Investing In South Africa 
Local and foreign investment is actively encouraged by numerous policies 
including both tax and non-tax incentives. The Department of Trade and 
Industry (hereafter: DTI) lies at the heart of these initiatives, providing a 
variety of services to intending and existing investors. Liberal exchange control 
policies have removed most restrictions on FDI other than restrictions on the 
amount of debt financing foreign investors may raise on local money 
markets. 700 Foreign investors may freely raise equity from local capital markets 
Lieberman, Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa, op 
cit, pp. 108-109. 
696 Introduced first by Transvaal in 1898 and used to finance the Boers' war 
expenditures. 
691 Lieberman, Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa, op 
cit, P. 111. 
698 Ibid, pp. 125-127; 128-129. 
699 Ibid, p. 16 8. 
710 Foreign (non-resident) investors are precluded from procuring local financial 
assistance in the form of loans and credit facilities. The regulations cover various 
forms of credit facilities subject to certain exceptions 
but also permit greater access 
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and stock exchanges but require approval by the South African Reserve Bank's 
Exchange Control Department to make offshore loans to resident entities. 7.01 
Foreign investors may repatriate - profits, dividends, interest, ren. tal s, 
royalties'702management and administration fees, and other receipts subject to 
certain restrictions. Certain transactions require Exchange Control approval 
while others may be approved by authorised dealers in foreign exchange. 
South Africa belongs to both the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). SACU includes 
neighbouring Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland and permits the free- 
flow of goods and services between member countries. SADC is a wider 
community of 14 Southern African countrieS703 forging greater economic ties 
within an increasingly expanding free trade zone. 
Numerous forms of business organisation are available to local and foreign 
investors. Investors may transact business individually as sole traders, combine 
through partnerships, 704 Joint ventures and syndicates or operate through 
trusts. However, corporate forms of organisation (companies and close 
corporations) are most commonly utilised. 705 Where foreign corporations 
establish a 'place of business' within South Africa, they are required to 
incorporate their undertakings as an external company under the Companies Act 
61 of 1973.706Normal companies may have the liability of members limited by 
shares, 707 or by guarantee, although most companies formed to pursue 
commercial activity for profit invariably have share capital. Companies formed 
to local credit facilities where there is increased participation by local investors in 
the subsidiary: Mark Badenhorst and Elizabeth de Brauw, Jude Amos and Angela 
Seyfang (eds. ) Taxation & Investment in South Africa (IBFD, Amsterdam: 2003), T4.4.4. 
Ibid, T4.4-5. 
702 Royalties are subject to withholding taxes at 12% subject to the availability of treaty 
relief: ibid T4.5.3. 
711 Including Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, the Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
701 These are regulated by common law and may consist of no more than 20 partners: 
ý30(1) Companies Act 61 of 1,973. 
715 Philip Sutherland, Chapter 10: 'Companies and Other Business Entities, ' in 
Introduction to the Lax of South Africa, op cit, pp. 365-398. 
706 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, chapter 6. 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Page 153 qf418 
The Role of Tax Incenlives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan A' frican Economies. -1: A Review of South African Tax Inceniives A Comparative Sludy of Nigerian, Soutb African & Kenyan Tax Law 
by certain professionals 708may have unlimited liability to ensure compliance 
with the nature of their professionS. 709 
Companies may be public or private, with the main distinction being the 
number of shareholders permissible. 71OClose corporations are special corporate 
entities formed in terms of the Close Cor I its porat ons Act 69 of 1984 which permi 
the incorporation of smaller businesses. The main advantages associated with 
close corporations are the fewer formalities and expenses involved in 
incorporation, management and compliance with accounting 711 and other 
regulatory requirements. 712 
4.1.2. Taxing Powers, Tax Administration & Dispute'Resolution 
Taxing powers are shared between the central, provincial and local 
governments. The central government levies, collects and administers the main 
types of taxes and remits a portion of collected revenues to the provinces. 
Under the CRSA 1996, the provinces are empowered to levy certain taxes, 
levies, user and service charges.. 713 Provinces are allocated an equitable share of 
centrally collected income taxes on individuals, national fuel levies and VAT 
based on the recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission. 714 
Provinces benefit from transfer tax revenues 715 and grants from the central 
government. Provinces, in turn, allocate funds to local governments based on 
707 Shares may have a certain par value or indeed may have no par value. 
701 E. g. attorneys, auditors and medical practitioners. 
709 §53(b) Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
710 Private companies may have a single member but must have no more than 50 
members (as they are required to restrict the right to transfer shares and the public 
offer of securities). Conversely, public companies are under no such restrictions and 
must have at least 7 members. 
711 §56 Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 cf. 561 Companies Act of 1973. 
712 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, ý5.3; Philip Sutherland, 
Chapter 10: 'Companies and Other Business Entities', in Introduction to the Lax of 
South Africa, op cit, pp. 390-392. 
713 Such as taxes on casinos, gambling and lotteries. However, provinces may not levy 
income tax, VAT or sales tax. 
711 The Financial and Fiscal Commission advises Parliament on financial and fiscal 
policies and the allocation of financial/ fiscal resources among the various levels of 
government. 
115 A province's share of transfer tax revenues is that relating to property situate in that 
province. 
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criteria determined by the Financial and Fiscal Commission. The local 
governments have limited taxing power and they may levy only certain property 
taxes and user charges. However, local governments are assuming competence 
to impose regional establishment levies and regional service levies. 716 
Taxes administered by the central government include the income or normal 
tax in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter: ITA 1962), value 
added tax under the Value Added Tax Act, 1991 (hereafter: VAT Act 1991), 
transfer duty on the alienation of real estate'717 stamp duties tax, 718 taxes on 
marketable and dernaterialised securities, 719 fuel levies and certain other 
taxes. 720 However, recent fiscal proposals replace stamp duties and 
uncertificated securities tax on secondary trades with a single securities tax 721 
and abolish tax on retirement funds. 722Central taxes are generally administered 
by the South African Revenue Service (hereafter: SARS) which was formed by 
the merger of the Inland Revenue and the Customs and Excise units of the 
Department of Finance. 723 SARS is headed by a Chief Executive Officer but the 
Commissioner for SARS724 has general responsibility for tax administration. 
The Commissioner operates out of SARS's Pretoria headquarters. 
The primary sources of tax revenues are the income tax and VAT. 725 Income or 
normal tax is administered under the ITA 1962 and is levied726 0n taxable 
income727 attributable to individuals, corporate entities (companies and close 
Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, chapter 20. 
Under the Transfer Duty Act. 
118 Under the Stamp Duties Act. 
719 Under the Marketable Securities Act and the Uncertificated Securities Tax Act 
respectively. 
720 See for instance, taxes imposed under the Tax on Retirement Funds Act. 
721 SARS, Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, p. 17. 
722 Ibid, p. 24. 
723 On 18 October 1995 with operations commencing on 1 April 1996. 
724 §2(l) ITA 1962. 
725 VAT is levied at the rate of 14% on the supply of goods and services by a vendor, 
the importation of goods into South Africa and the supply of imported services by a 
non-resident to a resident person: VAT Act 1991; Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment 
I. n South Africa, op cit, Chapter 21. 
726 By ý5 of ITA 1962. 
727 Generally, taxable income is calculated by adding certain sources of income 
(inclusive of 'deemed income') to 'gross income' and deducting certain exempt 
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corporations) and other taxable entities (trusts and estates). Taxable income is 
a wholly artificial concept that does not purport to correspond to accou nting 
or economic income,, 728 but is the residue of 'income' as defined in terms of §1, 
ITA 1962 after the application of rules on permissible deductions. Two main 
deduction rules apply under the general deduction formula: the 'positive' test 
for deductible expenditure under 511(a) ITA 1962; and the 'negative' test for 
of disallowed expenditure under §23(g). 729 
De Koker concisely posits that these dual provisions combine to stipulate the 
following rule: '... expenditure and losses must be actually incurred during the 
year of assessment in the production of income: they must not constitute 
expenditure or losses of a capital nature, and if they are claimed as a deduction 
against income derived from the trade, they must, either in part or in full, 
constitute moneys that are laid out or expended for the purposes of trade. '730 
While some tax incentives are provided by this general deduction formula, 
many of the incentives considered later in this Chapter come within special 
provisions. 
The rates at which normal tax applies vary. CompanieS731 are generally taxed at 
29% on taxable income (28% with effect from the 2008 fiscal year)732 and an 
additional 12.5% secondary tax on companies (hereafter: STC) applied on the 
income to arrive at 'income'; such 'income' is adjusted for deductions and allowances 
and aggregated with taxable capital gains to arrive at 'taxable income'. Notably, in 
computing gross income, the value of opening stock/inventory is added to other 
sources of income and that of closing stock/inventory is deducted: Badenhorst, 
Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T19.4.1 and 10.5.4. 
728 Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 1948 (4) SA 580 (A), 15 SATC 381 at 389; Pjott v CIR 1945 AD 
128,13 SATC 121 T 126-7. See further, Alwyn de Koker, Silke on South African Income 
Tax, (1995 Memorial edition, 2005 Service 31, LexisNexis Butterworth, Durban, 
2005), §7.1. 
729 §§11-19, and §23 ITA 1962 respectively for corresponding positive and negative lists 
of deductible expenditure. 
730 Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §13.2 at p. 7-9. 
731 The term 'company' is defined by 55 ITA 1962 and includes associations, 
corporations and companies incorporated under South African law or the laws of 
other jurisdictions as well as South African close corporations: Silke on South African 
Income Tax, op cit, §13.2. 
732 Budget Review 2008, pp. 56,61. 
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net amount of dividends declared and distributed. 733However, STC is will soon 
be replaced with a lower rate (10%), broader-based dividend withholding tax. 734 
Generally, trusts are charged on taxable income in similar fashion to other 
taxable person S. 735 For persons other than companies and trusts (i. e. natural 
persons), tax is levied based on graduated progressive rates with the highest 
tax bracket of R490,000+ being taxed at a marginal rate of 40%. 736 Shares of 
profit remitted to non-resident partners are not subject to withholding taxes. 
However, normal tax of between 30% and 35% may apply on partnership 
profits (and certain foreign investment income) prior to distribution. 737 
Remittances to foreign investors with interests in syndicates are also exempt 
from withholding taxes. Royalties of external companies deemed to be derived 
from a South African source are taxed at 30% while royalties and other 
payments attributable to the use of intellectual property accruing to non- 
residents are subject to withholding taxes at 12%. 738Donations tax is levied at 
20% on certain disposals of property. 739 However, donations by public 
corporations are exempt resulting in a major difference in tax treatment 
between public and private companieS. 740 
South Africa has replaced the traditional source basis of tax with a residence 
basis. 741 Consequently, while South African residents are currently taxed on 
their worldwide income, non-residents are liable to tax only on income derived 
from a South African source. 742 Certain rules determine residence for 
733 STC is applied on the net surplus of dividends declared over dividends received 
during the relevant dividend cycle: §64B and §64C, ITA 1962; Silke on South African 
Income Tax, op cit, §13.10. 
734 SARS, Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, p. 24; Budget Review 2008, pp. 56,61. 
735 According to progressive rates in special tables; although there are some differences 
between the tax treatment of special and other trusts: see further Silke on South 
African Income Tax, op cit, §12.14. , 736 For fiscal year 2007/08: Table 4.7, Budget Review 2008, p. 65. 
737 The higher band applies where the non-resident partner is a corporate entity 
managed outside South Africa: Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, o'P 
cit, ý7.3. 
738 Subject, however, to the terms of any applicable double taxation agreements. 
739 §64 and Part V, ITA 1962. 
740 556(l)(n) and §38, ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, 523.2. 
741 Announced in the SA Budget Speech 2000/2001 with effect from 1 January 2001. 
742 See generally Lynette Olivier and Michael Honiball, International Tax: a South African 
pective (3 ed., Cape Town, Siber Ink: 2005) chapter 3. Pers rd 
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individuals and corporations. 743Non-resident recipients of interest income pay 
no withholding tax on such receipts although income tax liability may arise if 
paid from South African sources. 744Worldwide capital receipts accruing to 
residents from the actual or deemed disposal of capital assets are liable to tax 
at 25% for individuals and at 50% for legal entities. 745Non-residents may be 
liable to capital gains tax only where a capital gains tax event occurs re lating 
to rights to or interests in immovable property situate in South Africa or assets 
owned by the South African permanent establishment of the non-resident. 746 
External companies established by foreign corporations to incorporate local 
places of business are liable to normal tax at the rate of 30% on taxable 
income in addition to STC at 12.5% on distributed profits. Unincorporated 
branches of foreign corporations are not legally distinct entities but are treated 
as such for tax purposes. The taxable incomes of these branches are taxed at 
34% -a higher rate than external companies as neither withholding taxes nor 
STC are levied oil remitted branch profits. 747 
Double taxation relief may be provided unilaterally under the ITA 1962, 
under the terms of double taxation agreements or indeed, by general deduction 
of foreign taxes imposed on incomes liable to South African tax. 748 South 
743 For individuals, the rule implies the most fixed and settled residence to which an 
individual normally returns from his travels. For companies, the concepts of place of 
management and control or place of effective management are used: Badenhorst, 
Taxation & Investment in Soutb Africa, op cit, T12.3 
744 Such liability may be limited by any relevant double taxation agreements. Generally, 
these limit the rate of tax to 10% of the gross amount of interest paid to a resident 
of the other contracting state though more recent treaties grant the right to tax to 
the country of residence (unless paid by a permanent establishment in South Africa): 
ibid, T1 8.3.5. 
`5 ý26A and the Eighth Schedule to ITA 1962; Silke on Soutb African Income Tax, op cz . t' 
chapter 24. 
746 Capital gains tax was first introduced with effect from 1 October 2001: Badenhorst, 
Taxation & Investment in Soutb Africa, op cit, chapter 27. 
747 Conversely, a South African resident would be liable to tax on income remittances 
from foreign branches though a credit may be given for any foreign tax suffered. 
However, where such remittances are sourced from ce. rtain designated countries 
(namely countries with tax systems similar to that of South Africa and tax rates of at 
least 27%), such remittances would be treated as exempt income: ibid, chapter 6. 
748 Olivier and Honiball, International Tax: a Soutb African Perspecti . ve, op cit, chapter 6. 
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Africa has an extensive network of double taxation agreements 749 including 
some which were recently ratified, 75(l are yet to be ratified, 751 are unsigned and 
are under negotiation. 752 Generally, income attributable to permanent 
establishments of enterprisýs resident in contracting states are liable to South 
African tax on profits attributable to such permanent establishments. Similar 
provisions are contained in recent double taxation treaties as regards 
dividends, interest and royalties. 753 
Certain procedures and institutions expedite dispute resolution for tax 
matters. These procedures and institutions give effect to constitutional 
provisions 754 guaranteeing the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. 7550n notification of the obligation to file tax 
returns, taxable persons and entities submit their returns within the relevant 
time prescribed. The Commissioner and Receivers of Revenue assess taxpayers 
to tax by the issue of notice of assessments, additional assessments or 
estimated assessments. Such assessments are subject to taxpayers' rights of 
objection and appeal. 756Appeals against tax assessments generally lie to Special 
Courts for Income Tax Appeals. These Special Courts are superior courts 
established under the ITA 1962757 and are constituted by a presiding High 
Court judge, an experienced accountant and a representative of the commercial 
or business world. The Special Courts are of subordinate jurisdiction to 
divisions of the High Court, 758High Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court of 
749 With major trading partners like the USA (1"), Germany (2nd), UK (3rd), Japan (4th) 
and the Netherlands (5th): Pocket Guide to SA, Government Communications (GCIS) 
(STE Publishers, Pretoria: 2004), pp. 56-58. 
711 With the UK and Greece. 
751 That with Nigeria has been ratified by South Africa but (as at 28.07.03) is yet to be 
ratified by Nigeria. 
752 E. g. the DTA with Brazil. 
751 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, chapter 18. 
754 ý33 CRSA 1996. 
755 Cara Hoexter, Chapter 3: 'Administrative Law, ' in Introduction to the Law of South 
Africa, op cit, pp. 107-134. 
756 §581-88/Part III of Chapter III, ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, 
5518.23-18.28. 
711 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T9.2.2. 
758 High courts are superior courts of co-ordinate, geographically prescribed 
jurisdiction and are divided into 13-odd 
divisions. High Courts possess both original 
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AppeaJ751 and the Constitutional Court. 760 Decisions of the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal are absolutely or fully binding on all other 
761 High Court decisions are either absolutely binding 762.0 r, 1 courts. other High 
Courts and all inferior courts or of persuasive influence on other High Courts 
depending on the composition of the Bench determining the matter. 763 Special 
Courts for Income Tax Appeals a re bound by decisions of the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts but the Special Courts' 
decisions are of persuasive influence only on other courts. 764 
4.1.3. Political Framework for Economic and Tax Policy 
Much of the responsibility for economic, monetary and tax policy rests on the 
shoulders of the current Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel. Besides cabinet 
ministers and legislative committees, certain parastatals and public departments 
are involved in economic policy making. These include the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, the South African Reserve Bank, the National Treasury and 
SARS. Private sector participation and input is also actively engaged. Current 
economic policy is based on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (hereafter: GEAR) introduced by Trevor Manuel in June 1996. Key 
aspects of GEAR are focussed on achieving annual economic growth of 6%, 
jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the Special Courts for 
Income Tax Appeals, Magistrate Courts and other inferior courts: ý168 CRSA 1996. 
711 The Supreme Court of Appeal as the successor to the former Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court is the highest court in South Africa as regards non-constitutional 
matters with unlimited appellate jurisdictions except where this specifically excluded: 
5168 CRSA 1996. 
161 The Constitutional Court is the highest court in South Africa vis-d-vis constitutional 
matters being vested with appellate and judicial review powers (including the power 
to render null and void Acts of Parliament or provincial legislatures as being 
unconstitutional): 5167 CRSA 1996. 
161 Decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on itself (until overruled) and 
absolutely binding on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is presumptively 
bound by its own decisions but may depart from them if subsequently held to be 
clearly wrong: see National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA); Amod v. 
Multilateral Motor Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA); Franqois du Bois, Chapter 
1: 'Introduction: History, System and Sources, ' in Introduction to the Law of South 
Africa, op cit, pp-43-47. 
762 When the decision is that of a full Bench, this is fully binding on single Bench High 
Court judges and all Magistrates. 
763 Franqols du Bois, Chapter 1: 'Introduction: History, System and Sources, ' in 
Introduction to the Law of South Africa, op cit. 
764 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, ý9.2.2. 
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annually increasing job creation by providing 400,000 new jobs, promoting the 
redistribution of income to reduce income disparities and. ensuring the 
provision of basic services for all South Africans. 765 GEAR provides tariff 
reduction to control input prices and tax incentives to encourage new 
investment. GEAR is complemented by a Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) and the Public. Finance Management Act to promote better 
accountability. 
the fiscal Fiscal policy has focussed on inflation targeting, reduci deficit and 
maintaining a stable government debt to GDP ratio. Tax compliance is 
exemplary and rising disposable incomes have given the government greater 
latitude in financing infrastructural projects, maintaining social spending (on 
health, education and transportation) and income redistribution under 
proposals for the MTEF highlighted in the 2008 Budget. 766Recent fiscal policy 
has targeted the broadening the tax base by improving tax administration and 
taxpayer compliance; providing tax incentives for small business 
development, 767R&D, 768 skills development and home ownership; and reducing 
the general tax burden by raising thresholds for specific types of taxation. 769 
The level of tax incentive support is controlled by prudent tax expenditure 
budgeting and other measures. Certain general rules apply to limit the quantum 
of capital allowances and other incentives enjoyed in any particular tax year to 
total taxable income or to taxable income from a particular source. The rest of 
this Chapter outlines sectoral tax incentives within the context of the 
economic realities of particular sectors. 
765 Ibid, ý1.6. 
766 Budget Review 2008, p-63- 
767 See §4.2.6 below. 
768 See §4.2.5.4 below. 
769 Notably capital gains tax, estate duty, 
donations tax, transfer duty and stamp duties. 
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4.2. SECTORAL TAX INCENTIVES 
4.2.0. Introduction 
4: A Repiew of Soulb African Tax Incenlit)es 
Early tax incentive policies were implemented under the import substitution 
industrialisation of the 1920s/1930s involving the use of high tariffs to protect 
and nurture indigenous 'infant' industrieS. 770 In the 1960s, incentives were used 
to implement apartbeid influx control laws by reducing the movement of native 
Africans to the heavily industrialised 'white' cities. Tax and other771 incentives 
were granted to industrialists relocating to less intensive industrial areas. 
However, not only were these incentives relatively expensive 772 but their 
rationales were questionable as the primary impact of these policies was the 
relocation and not creation of jobS. 773 
The use of grants, subsidies and other explicit forms of state assistance has 
increased in tandem with greater scrutiny of the costs of tax incentives. Blunt 
tax incentives such as tax holidays are being replaced with more targeted and 
cost-effective schemes. More recent tax incentives policies are considered 
below treated on a sectoral basis within the relevant economic and general 
taxation setting. 
"0 Lieberman, Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Bra. Zil and South Africa, Q 
cit, pp. 112- 113. 
E. g. credit facilities, lower railway charges and reduced wage regulation. 
772 C osting as much as R18,000 per job (at 1990 prices) with an aggregate cost of 
R18,000mil lion between 1982 and 1990. 
773 Linda van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', in Africa South of the Sahara, op cit, 
pp. 1053. 
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AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY 
Overview 
4: A Revien, If -ýlmlb African 
Tax Incentives 
The importance of agriculture as a key economic sector is underscored by the 
fact that although it contributes a mere 4% to GDP, 774 it accounts for up to 
10% of domestic employment. 775 Major crops include maize, sorghum and 
exported cash crops such as fruits, vegetables, cane sugar and wool. Livestock 
cultivation, forestry, fishing and wine production are also important sub- 
sectors. Agriculture possesses value-adding linkages with other economic 
sectors which has increased agro-industrial contribution to GDP to 15%. 776 
Recent crop production and exports 777 have been adversely affected by 
recurrent drought conditions and challenges with transportation 
infrastructure. 778 Although commercial agriculture is highly developed and 
productive, the large subsistence sub-sector is marked by underdevelopment 
and low productivity. Under the Integrated Food Security and Nutrition 
Programme targets were set to significantly improve national food security by 
2015 and eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Further, the Strategic Plan for 
South African Agriculture seeks to increase production, competitiveness and 
African participation in the sector. 779Tax incentive policy has also-been used to 
promote agricultural production and out . Put. 
4.2.1.2. Agricultural Tax IncentiveS780 
Agriculture has traditionally benefited from favourable tax policies featuring 
numerous tax incentives. Income from pastoral, agricultural or other farming 
operations is taxable subject to certain special provisions. 781 Special tax 
averaging provisions apply to income from farming and plantation activities, 
774 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: South Africa, p. 462. 
771 3% of GDP and 9% of employment as at 2004: Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, p. 132. 
116 Pocket Guide to SA, op cZt, p-111. 
777 Particularly to neighbouring Southern African nations. 
778 OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cit, 
p. 462; van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p-1057. 
779 Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, pp. 115-116. 
780 See Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, chapter 15; Badenhorst, Taxation 
Investment in South Africa, op cit, ý15.4. 
781 §26(l) and First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
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and may result in a lower tax liability for individual farmers where tax liability 
based on average tax rates of the current and 4 preceding years of assessment 
is lower than the rate applicable to farming income from the current year. 782 
These provisions protect agricultural taxpayers from distorted tax liability 
based on widely fluctuating revenues typical to the agricultural sector. 783 
Some incentives relate to the valuation of items used in the computation of 
taxable income. For instance, livestock and produce are generally included in 
computing taxable income liable to normal tax. However, the valuation, of 
these items favours farmers. Livestock are brought to account at low 
predetermined standard values and not at higher market value thus reducing 
the ultimate tax liability. Similarly, produce-at-hand is valued at the lower of 
cost and market value. 784 Acquisition costs of procuring livestock are fully 
deductible regardless of whether acquired on capital and revenue aCCOUnt. 785 
Outlays expended on the establishment and maintenance of plantations are 
fully deductible subject to certain restrictions in respect of acquisition CoStS. 786 
Other incentives affect capex outlays. Generous capital allowances permit the 
full deduction of farming development expenditure in the year incurred. 
Deductible expenses include outlays to control weeds and soil erosion; 
expenses for the construction of dipping tanks, roads, bridges, dams, irrigation 
and electrification facilities; and the cost of the erection of fences. 787 Other 
incentives provide for the tax deductibility of losses arising from drought, fire, 
plague and government-organised livestock reduction schemes. 788 However, 
these deductions are only permissible subject to ring-fencing restrictions 
limiting possible deductions to income derived from farming acti vities. 
Indefinite carry forward provisions permit unredeemed capital allowances for 
782 119(2) First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
"' Similar provisions apply to sugar cane and other plantation businesses. 
784 Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §§15-11-15.14. 
711 18, First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
716 Unrelieved deductible acquisition costs . may be carried forward but all such 
deductions are restricted by ring-fencing provisions to gross income attributable to 
the particular plantation: T15, First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
787 112(l), First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
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farming capital development expenditure to be set off against future farming 
income. 789 Special capital allowances applied at rates of 50: 30: 20 percent 
permit the expensing of capex on machinery, implements, utensils and other 
items acquired for farming use over 3 years. 790 These general and special capital 
allowances operate irrespective of any resultant assessed JOSS. 791 
Agricultural (and other) cooperatives benefit from a range of tax incentives 
providing special deductions by way of depreciation capital allowances for 
certain items of machinery and plant; 792 storage or packing machinery and 
plant; 793 other processing facilities; 794 and certain bonuses., transfers to price 
stabilisation funds and provisions for JOSSeS. 795Donations tax exemptions are 
also applicable to the transfer of certain farming rights. 796 
The numerous tax incentives available for farming and plantation activities 
could be either explained by past historical reasons or current economic 
rationales given the relatively low level of rainfall and irrigation systems and 
the sensitivity of agriculture to recurrent drought conditions. Power- 
generation, like agriculture, is highly dependarit on the level of annual 
precipitation. The next section considers incentives for the energy, power- 
generation and mining sectors. 
788 ýý13 and 17, First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
789 T12(3), First Schedule, ITA 1962. 
790 512B ITA 1962. 
791 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T15.4.5. 
792 ViýZ., 5% straight-line depreciation allowances. 
791 At 50: 30: 20 rates: 512B ITA 1962. Less generous allowances may be available under 
512C ITA 1962. 
794 Viý., 20% straight-line depreciation allowances. 
795 §27(2)(a), (g) and (h), ITA 1962. 
791 As between donor and child: §56(l)(m), ITA 1962. 
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4.2.2. ENERGY& MINING 
4.2.2.1. Energy & Power 
South Africa has modest oil and gas reserves 797 relying on abundant coal 
reserves 191 to meet much of the domestic energy demand. 799 Local coal is 
relatively cheap and serves as feedstock for three oil-from-coal plants operated 
by South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (hereafter: SASOL). These 
plants have the combined capacity to produce enough synthetic liquid-fuels to 
meet 41% of the local fuel demand800 and also provide hydrocarbon inputs for 
the petrochemicals industry. 801 Similarly, PetroSA operates gas-to-liquid 
facilities using natural gas feedstock from offshore gas fields to meet 7% of 
the local liquid-fuel demand. 802 Despite the contribution of coal and natural 
gas, South Africa remains dependent on imported petroleum and refines crude 
oil imports to meet 64% of domestic demand. 803 However, the recent strength 
of the rand804 has helped to reduce the effects of rising global oil prices on the 
balance of trade position. 
South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) is a world-class utility 
and operates an effective monopoly supplying 95% of the nation's electric 
power. 805 Eskom ranks among the top ten globally in respect of sales and 
797 Proven oil reserves currently stand to 29.4m barrels. Recent discoveries of gas 
deposits at Mossel Bay (Cape Province) have yielded significant natural gas deposits 
of 30,000m cubic meters: van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1058. 
798 In 2001 South African coal reserves ranked globally at 5th as regards size, 4th as 
regards exports and 6th as regards production capacity: ibid, p. 1058. 
799 Local coal provided 73% of domestic energy demand in 2001: C1ECD/AfDB African 
Economic Outlook 2003104 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cz . t, p. 288. 
`0 SASOL 1 was commissioned in 1955; SASOL 2 and 3 were commissioned in the 
1970s in response to the threats of international sanctions, petroleum embargos and 
high petroleum prices. The plants are the largest of such installations in the world. 
801 SASOL's interests in the petrochemical industry include its acetic plant, chemical 
plants and a new Sasol Petroleum Temane (SPT) gas-processing plant: van Buren 
'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p-1058. 
802 Pocket Guide to SA, o_P cz t, p-132. 
103 Ibid, p. 131. 
814 The strong rand has been fuelled by high global prices for exported commodities 
(diamond and platinum), improved international credit ratings and net capital 
inflows: OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2003106 - Country Studies: South 
Africa, op cit, p. 467. 
`5 Eskorn produces two-thirds of Africa's electricity and supplies power to several 
Southern African countries: van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1058. 
However, recent reforms will see new independent power producers being 
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generation capaCjty806 although increasirig demand and lagging investment in 
capacity has recently affected the normally uninterrupted power Supply. 807 
Eskom relies mainly on coal-fired generators to generate its 39,154MW 
capacity, though nuclear, 808 petroleum-fired and hydro-elec tric plants 
complement the coal-fired generators. Although South Africa lacks sufficient 
energy-fuel resources to guarantee self-sufficiency, its substantial solid mineral 
endowments more than compensate for this shortcoming. 
4.2.2.2. Mining 
South Africa possesses immense mineral wealth ranking first in global gold, 
platinum-group metals, chrome, ferro-chromium, alumino- silicates, manganese 
and vanadium reserves. Its diamond, 809 ferro-manganese, iron ore and coal 
reserves are also significant. Historically, mining has been the most dominant 
sector, contributing 20% of aggregate GDP in 1980. Post-World War II gold 
discoveries in the Free State, Far West Rand, Klerksdorp and Evander regions 
have exceeded aggregate output from the original Witwatersrand mines. Gold 
output has gradually declined after a record 1,000 metric tonnes were mined in 
1970. In 2006, gold production contracted 13% to 297.3tonnes (the lowest 
level since 1923) 810 and in 2008, China replaced South Africa as the world's 
largest producer of gold. 81'Factors contributing to the reduced gold mining 
earnings include rising productions costs, depressed prices due to large sales 
introduced to compete with Eskom: OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 
- Country Studies: South Africa, op cz . t, p. 469. 
106 OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2003104 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cit, 
p. 288. 
807 C)ECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (South Africa) p. 499. 
118 Eskom's 1,800 MW Koeberg Nuclear Power station was commissioned in 1976 and 
its twin reactors have the capacity to meet 6% of local electricity demand. 
... Diamond production has declined reducing South Africa's ranking to 5th Vis-d-ViS 
global production behind Australia, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Russia. However, De Beers (a South African company) leads in global diamond 
markets accounting for 60% of worldwide trade. SA 2005-2006 South Africa at a 
Glance (Editors Inc., Greenside, South Africa: 2005) p. 154. 
`0 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (South Africa) p. 488. 
Charlotte Mathews, 'Booming China is the world's new Egoli', Business Day 
(Johannesburg, South Africa 18.01.08) 
<httl2: //www. busine. -, sdav. co-za/--krticles/'I'-ark--ýrticle, asi2x? ID=31'-'3814> accessed 
on 05.02-08. 
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of gold reserves, 812 the exhaustion of easily accessible ore and the recent 
strength of the rand. 813The industry has reacted by consolidating interests with 
the reduction of 48 gold-mining companies into )ust 11 firms over the decade 
to 2004. 
Policy on energy and mining activities are implemented by the Department of 
Minerals and Energy under the direction of the relevant Minister. As the tax 
treatment for mining for natural fuels and solid minerals is broadly similar 
under South African law, tax incentives for both these sectors are considered 
together in the next section to avoid undue repetition. 
4.2.2.3. Tax Incentives for Energy & Mining814 
Mining and mining operations generally connote any method or process by 
which any mineral (inclusive of natural 011815) is won from the soil or any 
substance or constituent thereof. 816Mining operations may be divided into 
mining for gold, 817mining for natural oil and mining for other minerals. 818Tax 
rates vary depending on the nature of the taxpayer and the mining acti , vity. 
Mining income accruing to non-corporate taxpayers is taxed based on ordinary, 
progressive graduated tax rates. For companies, the type of mining activity is 
crucial. Natural oil and gas mining companies suffer tax at an effective rate of 
58%819 sub)ect to ministerial approval of applications for rate deductions. Gold 
812 Sales of gold reserves by IMF and the British Bank of England in 1999 depressed 
global gold prices to US$252.90/troy ounce, well below the production costs of 
many gold producers. However, global gold prices have recovered since 2004: van 
Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1057. 
813 Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, p. 127. 
See Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, chapter 16; see also Badenhorst, Taxation 
6- Investment in South Africa, op cit, 115.1. 
815 Natural oil is defined as any liquid or solid hydrocarbon or combustible gas but 
excludes coal, bituminous shales, certain stratified deposits and marsh or other 
surface gases. 
116 ý1 ITA 1962. 
117 For tax purposes, this includes mining for uranium, silver, osmiridiurn and pyrites: 
SlIke on South African Income Tax, op cit, 516.11. 
Other minerals include silver, coal, copper, tin, manganese, tungsten, marble, 
limestone, salt and certain types of fireclay: ibid, §16.2. 
811 As a result of the 30% normal tax and an additional 40% on the residual post-normal 
tax income: ý5(2A)(a), ITA 1962. 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
. 
Queen Mary, University of London 
RýTe 168 of418 
The Role of Tax Inceniii, es in A Trio q'f Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 4: A Revien, of Soulb African Tax Incentives A Comparalive Sludy of Nigerian, Soutb African & Kenyan Tax Lan, 
. 
mining companies are exempt from donations taX820 but are liable to normal tax 
according to various formulae821which are applied to each individual mine and 
ensure that the more profitable mines suffer tax at a higher rate. 822 The normal 
tax rate of 30% applies for all other mining companies including diamond 
mining companies. 823 
Normal depreciation tax allowanceS824 are replaced by special deductibility rules 
for capex incurred in mining operations. As with capex on farming 
development, capital outlays for mining operationS825 are usually deductible 
in full in the year incurred 826 subject to ring-fencing restrictions limiting 
possible deductions to taxable mining income derived (usually from the 
particular mine) 827 as reduced by cumulative mining assessed losses brought 
forward. 828 These cumulative assessed losses are reduced by any returns or 
rebates which remain after being setoff first against current capex and then 
unredeemed capeX. 829 Any excess of such returns and rebates over redeemable 
capex is taxed at the higher of 30% or a determined average rate of tax. 830 
Prospecting expenses (including outlays on boreholes, survey work, trenches 
and pits) incurred on revenue account are eligible for special allowances only 
821 Gold and diamond mining companies are treated as public companies: 538(2)(g) and 
556(l)(n) ITA 1962. 
821 The formula applicable depends on whether the company concerned elects to pay 
STC (here the rate is [y=35 - (175-x)%]) or opts out (and pays tax at a higher rate 
based on another formula: [y=45 - (225-x)%]): SARS Tax Rates for 2005/2006. 
8 22 See 'Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1990' WP 2-'90 at 4, cited in 
SlIke on South African Income Tax, op cit, ý16.11. 
823 12(a) of Schedule 1 to Taxation Laws Amendment Act 16 of 2004. Diamond mining 
companies are treated as public companies and exempt from donations tax: §38(2)(g) 
and 556(l)(n) ITA 1962. However, mining taxpayers may also be liable to other taxes 
including transfer duty, VAT, establishment and services levies. 
824 Including the §11(e) wear-and-tear allowance; 511(f) lease-premium allowance; 
§11(gA) intellectual property allowance; and §11(o) asset alienation allowance. 
825 Including capex (on shaft sinking, mining equipment, plant, facilities and buildings), 
certain items of pre-productiOn opex, private motor vehicles (amortised over 5 
years) and amenities (including housing, schools, health and other facilities for 
employers and their families - amortised over 10 years): §36(11) ITA 1962. 
826 An exception is made for new mines, in that capex is accumulated and deducted, 
with current year expenditure, in the year the production commences and income 
liable to tax is generated (subject to a further 25% cap): §36(7G) ITA 1962. 
127 Unless ministerial waiver of this restriction is obtained: 536(7F) ITA 1962. 
828 536(7E) ITA 1962. 
821 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T15.1.3. 
830 ý2(a) of Schedule 1 to Taxation Laws Amendment Act 16 of 2004. 
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where mining income is generated. 831 Gold and natural oil mines are eligible for 
10%832 or 12%833 capital allowances on the aggregate amount of certain capex 
associated with their acquisition and development. 834A special allowance, is 
applied at 10% or 5% on the cost, respectively, of pipelines or electrical 
lines and cables utilised in the transportation of natural oil or the 
transmission of electricity. 835 Rehabilitation costs also attract special tax 
treatment and promote environmentally- friendly mining operations. 836 Recent 
fiscal proposals indicate the possibility for special measures targeted at taxing 
(and relieving) windfall gains (and losses) from synthetic fuels and bio-fuel 
products. 837 
The tax regime for oil and gas exploration is established in terms of the 1965 
Prospecting Lease OP26 which provides incentives by way of a stabilisation 
regime. Essentially, oil and gas operators may elect to be taxed under the 1977 
regime or the current fiscal regime. The OP26 regime was slated to expire in 
June 2007 and its provisions were incorporated into the Tenth Schedule to ITA 
1962 effective from 2 November 2006.838 The Tenth Schedule provides 
numerous incentives for oil and gas operators. Maximum tax rates of 29% and 
32% are set for domestic and foreign oil companies. A maximum STC rate of 
5% applies although pre-existing holders of OP26 leases enjoy exemption from 
STC. There are generous immediate capital allowances providing multiple 
deductions of 200% and 150% respectively for exploration and production 
capex. These allowances are complemented by provisions for loss relief. 
Assessed losses from exploration and production activities may be set-off 
against related income without restriction and 10% of these losses may be 
831 515(b) ITA 1962. Where no income is produced, deductions may be made under a 
general deductions formula. Badenhorst, Taxation 6- Intesiment in South Africa, op cit, 
$15.1.4. 
832 For post-1973 gold mines and other deep level gold mines. 
833 For post-1990 gold mines and natural oil mines. 
834 536(11)(c) ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §5-16.14 and 16.15. 
835 Applied at 10% (pipelines) and 5% (lines and cables): 512D ITA 1962. 
836 Essentially, provisions allow bespoke tax-exempt companies financed by tax- 
deductible contributions to execute such rehabilitation works: 510(l)(cH) ITA 1962. 
837 SARS Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, p-26. 
838 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2006 (Pretoria: 25 October 2006), p. 49. 
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seto against unrelated investment income. Finally, any unrelieved losses may 
be carried forward indefinitely. 839 
While these tax incentives appear to be quite generous, they are generally 
constrained by the ring-fencing provisions which limit their scope by closely 
linking the income earning process with tax deductibility. Similarly, the 
important capital-revenue distinction disallows outlays for the acquisition of 
land and mining prospecting rights from being deductible except in special 
circumstances where these outlays are directly linked to the production of 
income. 840 The use of ring-fencing restrictions to control the scope of tax 
incentives is not unique to the energy, power-generation and mining sectors. It 
also features prominently in tax incentives for financial leases. 
The next section outlines taxation imposed on financial services activities and 
highlights available tax incentives. 
4.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
4.2.3.1. Overview841 
The South African financial services sector is the most advanced in Sub- 
Saharan African and is relatively well-developed compared to middle income 
emerging economies elsewhere. International confidence in the government's 
prudent and disciplined macroeconomic policies has been reflected in the 
enhanced country ratings given by Moody's 842 and Fitch843 in August 2005844 
aligning South Africa with similarly-ranked Chile, Mexico, Poland and 
Thailand. Prior to 1995, South Africa operated a dual exchange system whereby 
non-residents could acquire ' financial' rands at a discount to fund inward 
839 Tenth Schedule to ITA 1962. 
141 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T15.1.2; Silke on South African 
Income Tax, op cit, §3.36. 
811 SA 2005-2006 South Africa at a Glance, op cit, p. 154. 
842 Moody's South African country debt ratings were upgraded from Baa2 to Baal. 
813 Fitch: From BBB to BBB+. 
81 Standard & Poor's: BBB+: OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country 
Notes (South Africa) p-490- 
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FDI. 845The dual exchange rate system and financial rand were abolished on 13 
March 1995 in favour of a single floating exchange rate with the South African 
Reserve Bank (hereafter: SARB) intervening indirectly846 t omanage the rand's 
volatility. However, despite these ex I change control reforms, Rendani 
Neluvhalani (Director, International Tax: Ernst & Young South Africa) 
observed that restrictive procedures remained requiring pre-approvals with the 
Reserve Bank before investment transactions could be consummated. 847 
The banking sector is regulated by the SARB 848 while non-bank financial 
institutions are regulated by the Financial Services Board. Banks are regulated 
under the Banks Act 94 of 1990. The banking sector is dominated by four849 
South African banks - Absa, First Rand, Nedbank and Standard - following 
banking consolidation between 2002 and 2003. However, many foreign banks 
have investment banking operations, branches and authorised representative 
offices. 850 Other institutions are active in the insurance, pensions, asset 
management and collective savings (stokvels) sub-sectors. Insurance companies 
are regulated by a Registrar of Insurance under the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 
of 1998 and the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 o 1998 depending on the type of 
business transacted. The Registrar exercis I es powers of over the registration, 
returns, financial resources and organisation of insurance companies in the 
interests of policy holders. 851 
845 Residents however, could only trade in the 'commercial rand' - which varied widely 
due to the large capital outflows precipitated by the political crises of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
846 The SARB influences exchange rates by acquiring rand and foreign exchange on spot 
and forward markets. The SARB's Exchange Control Department is responsible for 
regulation in terms of the Currency and Exchanges Act IP61. 
847 Interview with Rendani Neluvhalani: Director, International Tax; Ernst & Young 
Advisory Services Ltd, Ernst & Young RSA National Office (Johannesburg, Thurs 24 
May 2007). 
The SARB acts in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance but enjoys significant 
autonomy from the latter in matters of. banking regulation and monetary policy. 
Interest rates are influenced by setting the 'repo' rate at which commercial banks 
borrow from the SARB. 
A fifth group (Investec) also has significant presence in banking services. 
850 Stuart Theobald 'Banking's immigrants settle in', Pbambili SA Edition 2, June/July 
2004, WriteStuff Publishing cc (Sandton, South Africa, February 2004) pp. 5-7. 
151 Charl Hugo and Richard Stevens, Chapter 9: 'Commercial Law, ' in Introduction to the 
Law of South Africa, op cit, p. 342. 
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The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (hereafter: JSE) was established in 1887 and 
is the largest stock exchange in Africa with a domestic market capitalisation of 
over US$711billion (2006). 852 JSE operates trading in equities, financial 
instruments and agricultural derivatives through its Main Board, Development 
Capital Market, Venture Capital Market, AltX (for SMEs) and YieldX (for 
interest rate spreads) exchanges. The well-developed bond market provides 
debt financing for companies, governments and other institutions. The Bond 
Exchange of South Africa (BESA) regulates bond issues. A variety of money 
market instruments are utilised ranging from traditional securities 853 to 
innovative financial derivatives. 854 Securities law and regulation is provided for 
mainly by the Stock Excbange Control Act 1 of 1985, the Financial Markets Control 
Act 55 of 1985 and the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998. 
Recent fiscal policy has sought to reverse the negative capital flows prevalent 
towards the end of the apartbeid era. Foreign exchange tax amnesties were 
granted to residents who repatriated funds illegally routed out of jurisdiction 
by circumventing the strict foreign exchange controls of that time. 855 By 
February 2006,42,672 tax amnesty applications had been processed yielding 
R68.6billion in disclosed foreign funds and R2.9billion in tax revenues from 
tax amnesty levies. 856 Other tax incentives to promote activities of local and 
international investors, financial intermediaries and other market participants 
are considered in the succeeding section. 
4.2.3.2. Tax Incentives for Finance 
Providers of financial services are subject to several taxes in addition to 
normal tax which is charged at 30% on taxable income. Investment income 
852 Up by 29.5% from 2005: World Federation of Exchanges Annual Report and 
Statistics 2006, Equity 1.1 'Domestic Market CapitaLZation' <httj2: //www. worl& 
exchanp,, es. org /WFE / home. as r) ý menu -- 11 &document= 42 33 >, p. 66. 
Vzý., treasury bills, certificates of deposits arid other negotiable instruments. 
854 Including options, swaps, futures, forwards, and deeply discounted instruments. 
855 Peter Surtees 'South African Budget Offers Broad Range of Tax Breaks, Incentives' 
March 10, TNI 2003 at p. 931- 
856 SA Budget Speech 2006, op cit, p-10. 
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from interest and option premiums are accrued evenly over the life of the 
relevant instrument and included in taxable income. 857 Issuers of debentures, 
discounted and other financial instruments are allowed to deduct the associated 
interest, discount or premium on an accrual basis provided incurred in the 
production of taxable income. 858 Foreign exchange gains and losses 859 are 
treated symmetrically with gains being included in arriving at taxable income 
and losses being tax deductible. 860 
Taxpayers operating in the financial sector may be liable to other taxes 
including transfer duty, VAT'861establishment and services levies. Liability for 
regional establishment levies is contingent on the concerned financial 
institution being classified as a financial enterprise, carrying on business as an 
investor of money. While more active investment activities (e. g. management 
of shares in subsidiaries by an investment holding company) result in 
classification as a financial enterprise, 862more passive investment activity863 
would not attract such tax classification or liability. 864 
Special provisions apply to insurance business where short-term and long- 
term insurers receive different tax treatments. 865 Short-term insurers 866 are 
taxed at the 30% normal tax rate. 867 Long-term insurers868 MUSt comply with 
certain regulations and segregate their funds under a four-fund approach into: 
857 524J ITA 1962. 
858 5§24j, 24K and 24L, ITA 1962. 
851 These exchange differences may result from transaction, realisation or translation 
events, and their quantum is determined by prescribed prevailing exchange rates. 
860 §241 ITA 1962. 
161 VAT has essentially replaced the former levy on financial services given its 
widespread application to supplies of financial services: Badenhorst, Taxation 
Investment in South Africa, op cit, TT21&22. 
162 Classification as a financial enterprise attracts liability for regional establishment 
levies. 
163 Such as the receipt of investment income from the occasional investment of cash 
surpluses by a conduit company of a non-financial trading/ operating company. 
864 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, chapter 20. 
165 Sýlke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §17.13. 
866 S hort term insurance covers indemnity insurance business (the insurance of fire, 
marine and motor vehicle risks). 
867 528(2) ITA 1962. 
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an untaxed policyholder fun-d'869 an individual policyholder fund, a corporate 
policyholder fund870 and a corporate fund871.872Taxable income accruing to the 
last three funds is taxed at the 30% normal rate while that accruing to the first 
fund (untaxed policyholder fund) is taxed at 25%. 873 Other legislation 874 
provides for the taxation of gross income and net rental of on otherwise 
exempt pension, provident and retirement annuity (retirement) funds. 875 
The South African tax treatment for leases is quite sophisticated compared to 
that of the other study countries. Generally, a symmetrical treatment is applied 
to lease payments. Lessors. are liable to tax on lease premiums and the value of 
certain improvements to leased property by the lessee (all included in the 
computation of gross income). Conversely, lessees may deduct the cost of 
these premiums and improvements (if taxable in the hands of the lessor). 
Numerous tax incentives apply for various types of financial sector aCt, Vlty. 876 
For instance, special tax incentives apply to leases. 877 The leasehold 
improvement allowance permits lessees to write off certain costs over the 
shorter of the unexpired term of the lease or 25 years. 878 As noted above, 
lessors are liable to tax on the value of leasehold improvements. In recognition 
of the fact that the benefits inherent in such enhancement to the lease property 
will only be enjoyed by the lessor at the end of the lease, special and 
innovative allowances permit the lessor to reduce the taxable amounts to the 
861 Long term insurance includes life, assurance, industrial property and non-cancellable 
medical/ disability insurance. 
To hold funds relating the accounts of certain policyholders who are either tax- 
exempt or liable to tax at lower rates. 
"0 For individual and corporate policyholders respectively. 
The residual funds not attributable to policyholders are allocated to the corporate 
fund on the insurer's account. 
ý29 and §29A, ITA 1962. 
Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, T15.2. 
... Tax on Retirement Funds Act 38 of 1996. 
... Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §§17.14B-17.14W; )3adenhorst, Taxation & 
Investment in South Africa, op cit, chapter 26. 
876 However, some generally applicable incentives (notably machinery and plant capital 
allowances) are specifically excluded for banks, insurers and other providers of 
financial services: Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, o-P cit, p. 126. 
877 §23A and §11(g), (h), ITA 1962. 
871 Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, ý110.5.6 & 15.8. 
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net present value of the improvements. This is particularly valuable for lessors 
with long term and finance leases. 879 However, ring-fencing provisions 
restrict the benefit of capital allowances enjoyed by finance leases of plant and 
machinery in the manufacturing, hotel, farming and aircraft sectors. These 
provisions limit these capital allowances to the amount of taxable income 
derivable from the leasing business. 880 
Operating leaseS881 are exempt from ring-fencing restrictions permitting tax 
allowances to be utilised against leasing as well as non-leasing income. Special 
provisions apply to sale and lease-back transactions for a variety of assets 
and industries. These limit capital allowances to the lower of cost to the lessee 
or market value at the time acquired. 882Short-term insurers may benefit from 
deferral allowances for unexpired risks, notified but unpaid claims and un- 
notified and unpaid claims. These deferral allowances are re-calculated and 
added back in each year of assessment. Tax deductions for transfers to 
contingency or catastrophe funds are also permitted883 
Some incentives apply to financial transactions involving shares and other 
securities. Various provisions 884 grant corporate rollover relief to reduce 
capital gains tax, income tax, donations tax,, STC and other transaction taxeS885 
otherwise payable as a result business reorganisations and other corporate 
Silke on South African Income Tax, op cz . t, 58.75; Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in 
South Africa, op cit, ý 15.8. 
181 However, un-utilised capital allowances may be carried forward indefinitely and set- 
off against future leasing income. 
881 An operating lease is one concluded by the lessor in the ordinary course of business 
of letting property (other than of banking or financing) if the property can be hired 
by members of the general public for periods less than 1 month, and 
maintenance /repair costs and the risk of loss /destruction remain with the lessor: 
523(l), ITA 1962. 
882 Where the lessee is a tax-exempt body, the transaction is treated as a loan: the lessor 
is not taxed on the gross rentals or allowed to en)oy capital allowances: 523G, ITA 
1962. 
... Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, 115.2.3. 
881 5541-47, ITA 1962. 
'8' Viý., stamp duties, marketable securities tax, uncertified securities tax and transfer 
duty. 
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group transactions. 886'These provisions apply to relieve taxation on company 
formations, 887 certain share-for-share transactions, 888 business combinations 
(including mergers, conversions and amalgamations), 889 intra-groUp890 and un- 
bundling activities'891 liquidation, winding up and deregistration transactionS. 892 
These incentives prevent tax and duty considerations from discouraging or 
impeding legitimate corporate actions involving incorporation, share swaps and 
exchanges, mergers, acquisitions and amalgamations, unbundling and 
divestitures of shares to shareholders, and corporate dissolutions. However, 
there are limitations on the availability of corporate rollover/group relief to 
financial institutions and non-resident entities. 893AIso, special anti-avoidance 
rules ring-fence capital gains and taxable income894 for 18 months and preclude 
the disposal of built-in gain assets through transfers to loss-endowed 
companies. 895 
Recent fiscal policies propose various changes providing modýrate tax relief to 
combat wage inflation and fiscal drag. 896The sale of shares held for more than 
3 years is to attract capital gains tax. 897However, various tax thresholds are to 
be increased for estates duty, donations to public benefit organisations, 
exemption from capital gains tax payable at death and tax-free savings. 898 
New, innovative venture capital tax incentives are proposed under the 2008 
Budget to improve the access of high-growth, high-technology firms to critical 
... This relief applies to the disposals of capital and depreciable assets, inventory, 
trading stock, and donations of chargeable assets as a result of the asset transfers 
inherent in business reorganisations. 
887 542 ITA 1962. 
888 543 ibid. 
889 §44 ibid. 
890 §45 ibid. 
891 546 ibid. 
892 §47 ibid. 
893 §42 ibid. 
894 Derivable from disposals of trading stock, capital and allowance assets. 
195 See 5§42(6), 43(6), 44(5), ITA 1962. See also the Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Bill, 2002 [WP2-'02] at 17, cited in Silke on South African 
Income Tax, o_P c1t, chapter 24. 
896 
. ýBudget Review 2008, pp. 
64,66. 
897 SARS Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, pp. 2,3. 
89' From R2.5million (2006) and R3.5million (2007): ibid, p. 10. 
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finance. Non-mining companies with annual turnovers (or gross assets) of up 
to R14million (R7m'lllon) will be entitl*ed to a general, up-front deduction of 
30% (subject to certain annual caps). For junior mining exploration companies 
a 50% deduction applies. 899 Finally, as Robyn Nathan (Partner, International 
Tax: KPMG South Africa) observed South African tax law provides a full 
exemption for interest accruing to foreign-sourced debt finance as there is no 
withholding tax levied on interest paid to non-residents in terms of ý10(1)(H) 
ITA 1962.900 
This section has outlined certain aspects of the tax system and associated fiscal 
incentives for the financial sector.. The next section focuses on physical 
infrastructure and social services and highlights the role of tax incentives in 
facilitating the provision of these services. 
4.2.4. INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES 
4.2-4.0. Introduction 
South Africa has some of the best developed infrastructural facilities in Africa 
in terms of telecommunications, transportation and basic social services. 
However, it faces significant challenges in ensuring that a wider section of the 
population benefits from these facilities. This section provides an overview of 
the challenges facing the provision of adequate infrastructure and so. cial 
services to citizens and the role of tax incentives within the context of the 
related tax system. 
4.2-4.1. Information & Communications Technology/ Electronics 
South Africa has extensive and well-developed telecommunications 
infrastructure. Telkom901 was privatised in 1997902 and listed oil the JSE and 
899 Budget Review 2008, p. 64; SA 2008 Budget, p. 21. 
900 Interview with Ferdi Vorster: Director, Corporate Tax and Robyn Nathan: Partner, 
International Tax; KPMG Services (Proprietary) Ltd, KPMG RSA National Office 
(Johannesburg, Thurs 17 May 2007). See also 510(l)(H) ITA 1962. 
901 The state telecommunications company. 
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New York Stock Exchange. 903 Vodacorn (Telkom's subsidiary) dominates the 
mobile telephony market with a 61% market share (2004). 904The sector has 
grown since the late 1990s to become the world's 4th fastest growing cellular 
market-905 Private operators include the MTN group906 and Cell C. 907 Current 
reforms include the licensing of a Second National Carrier to compete with 
Telkom-908 
Information and communications technology/ electronics (hereafter: ICT- 
E) is a significant sector controlled mainly by listed companies, the local 
operations of IT multinationals and a small number of local unlisted 
companies. Key sub-sectors include the provision of integrated systems, 
storage systems, software solutions, computer hardware, semiconductors, 
telecommunications equipment and security systems. Other potential growth 
areas are the supply of electro- technical systems909 and offshore or captive call 
centres. 910 Black Economic Empowerment initiatives have been implemented 
902 With Malaysian interests (Thintana Communications LLC) investing R5,600 million to 
acquire a 30% stake, reducing the government's stake to less than 39.3% (2004): van 
Buren 'South Africa: Economy', p. 1059. 
903 Raising a record R3.9billion on the first day of listing alone: Pocket Guide to SA, op 
cit, p. 13 3. 
904 Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, p. 96. 
105 The cellular phone market dwarfs the fixed-line market (18million cell phone users 
as against 4.8million land-lines): OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2003106 - 
Country Studies: South Africa, op cit, p-469. 
916 As observed in Chapter 3, MTN is a leading telecommunications operator in Africa. 
MTN's South African operations secured a 38% market share in 2005 growing 28% 
from 6.270million to 8.001million subscribers in that financial year. In the same 
period, revenues and profits after tax increased 21% and 47% to R29billion and 
R7.3billion respectively: see MTN Group Ltd Annual Presentation for year ended 31 
March 2005 (presented to analysts on 20 June 2005). 
907 C Cell commenced operations in 2001 and has grown its subscriber base to 
1.5million by year end 2002: Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, p-96. 
908 In December 2005, the Independent Communications Authority licensed a coalition 
of business interests to provide fixed-line telephony services as a Second National 
Carrier: OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2003106 - Country Studies: South 
Africa, op cit, p. 469. 
'09 For integrated defence systems, fire and security detection systems, electricity 
infrastructure, fine calibration and other instrumentation. systems. 
`0 The majority of call centres are clustered in the Greater Johannesburg locality with a 
strong leaning towards the financial services sector. However, the growth of call 
centres may be constrained by skills shortages and the relatively high costs of calls 
and voice -over-int ern et services 
(due to the legacy of Telkom's monopoly and the 
strong rand): Annie Gaithwaite, 'The Destination: South Africa Call centres in South 
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under an empowerment charter and by cooperation between industry and the 
Departments of Trade & Industry and Communications. Much of the sub- 
sector is concentrated in the Gauteng Prov'nce-s high-tech information 
technology corridor in Midrand. 
Physical connectivity through transportation systems, hubs and services is 
considered in the next section. 
4.2.4.2. Transportation 
Despite lacking navigable inland waters, South Africa has one of Africa's most 
developed transportation infrastructure with extensive rail 911 and road 912 
networks. There are 9 international airports (including Cape Town, Durban 
and Johannesburg) owned and managed by the Airports Company of South 
Africa (ACSA). The ports 913 are operated by the National Ports Authority 
(hereafter: NPA). The shipping sector is dominated by the private sector914 and 
recent economic policy has favoured privatisation and commercialisation. 
supervised by certain public bodies. 915 Nevertheless, the transportation sector 
remains dominated by the state parastatal Transnet Ltd and its subsidiaries. 
These subsidiaries include Spoornet and Metrorail (railways, passenger 
coaches), National Ports Authority (sea ports), South African Airways (or SAA: 
airlines), Freight Dynamics (roads) and Petronet (petroleum pipelines). 
Transportation is a significant employer though the restructuring of Transnet 
since 1990 has reduced its workforce significantly. However, Transnet intends 
Africa' Soutb Africa Vol. 3 Issue 1 2005 International Marketing Council of South 
Africa (Johannesburg, 2005) pp. 46-47. 
The 31,400km rail network comprises a third of all railway tracks in Africa. 
912 Similarly, the road network is the longest of any African nation and features 
500,000km of classified roads although only 20% of this was paved in 2001: van 
Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1058. 
913 Durban is the largest port handling over 55million metric tonnes of cargo annually. 
Other key ports include Richards Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, Mossel Bay, 
Cape Town and Saldanha. 
914 Indeed, recent proposals should see an increase in private sector participation in the 
management of ports: van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p-1058. 
91, Including the South African National Roads Agency Ltd, the South African Maritime 
Safety Authority, the Cross-Border Road Transport Agency and the Civil Aviation 
Authority: Pocket Guide to SA, op cIt, pp. 105-110. 
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to invest R78billion in upgrading rail infrastructure and rolling stock ahead of 
the FIFA 2010 World Cup under recent budgetary propoSalS. 916 
The next sections highlight current realities in the provision of water, housing 
and basic services. 
4.2.4.3. Water & Housing 
Securing adequate water supplies for industrial and domestic use has become 
increasingly challenging despite planned enhancements to the capacity of the 
Vaal River from drainage systems passing through the Tugela Basin. A 
US$3.770billion Highlands Water Pro)ect has been proposed by the South 
African and Lesotho governments to meet projected requirements. Other 
initiatives include the construction of a second dam at Klipriviersberg (to serve 
Johannesburg and the Gauteng Province) and water supply projects for the 
provision of drinking water in poorer communities. 917 
Providing adequate housing facilities has been a significant challenge. 918The 
post-apartbeid ANC-led government has expended huge sums on housing 
initiatives to provide decent- and secure homes for the large, economically- 
deprived section of the population. Housing assets worth R48billion were 
transferred by the state between 1994 and 2003 benefiting 6million citizens. 919 
Numerous public and public-private partnerships are being implemented to 
ensure urban renewal of inner city and other slums, improve service delivery by 
combating housing fraud and balance rural/urban development. 920 Other 
initiatives aim to deliver more affordable housing; improve access and terms of 
"I SA 2008 Budget, pp. 13-14. 
917 Reaching 85% of all households in 2001: van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, 
p. 1059. 
111. Given the demographical distribution of land between the segments of the 
population as a legacy of apartheid laws under which most non-Whites were denied 
ownership of and access to real property under influx control and pass laws (such as 
the Group, Areas Act 41 of 1950, Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, 
Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act 67 of 1952 and Possession 
of Illegal Squatting Art 52 of 195 1): Johan de Waal, Chapter 2: 'Constitutional Law, ' in 
Introduction to the Law of South Africa, op cit, p. 57. 
Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, p. 151. 
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housing; provide mortgages and finance to savers, disabled persons, women, 
and rural communities; 921 and ensure sustainable rental housing. 922 Initiatives 
range from the provision of financial facilities, 923 the management of non- 
performing loans and properties-in-possession 924 to 
' capacity 
building for 
housing insti tU ti 0nS 925.926Despite these efforts and the recent property boom in 
middle market and upmarket housing, there is still a significant backlog in 
housing provision particularly for rural communities and the very poor. Similar 
challenges exist in the provision of education and other socials services. 
4.2.4.4. Education & Other Social Services 
Education is mainly the responsibility of the central government's Department 
of Education which acts in conjunction with the nine provincial departments 
of education. Statistics show progress in the performance of learners at all 
levels particularly in public schools, universities and technikons. However, 
there are concerns over quality, particularly in the low number of learners in 
science/ technology, mathematics, business /commerce and engineering. 927 
Recent initiatives focus on encouraging education in these sectors as well as 
providing facilities for flexible/ lifelong higher education and training to equip 
the country with suitably qualified manpower in the academia, professions, 
technical vocations and industry. 928 
920 Under the national Housing Programme. 
921 Under the Human Settlement Redevelopment Programme. 
922 Under the Public Sector Hostel Redevelopment Programme. 
921 By institutions such as the National Housing Finance Corporation and the Rural 
Housing Loan Fund. 
921 The Department of Housing operates a Joint venture with the Councils of South 
African Banks and Servcon Housing Solutions to provide debt and property 
management, recovery and disposal services. 
925 Non-for-profit organisations like the Social Housing Foundation provide such 
capacity development services. 
9" Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, pp. 151-156. 
921 The dearth of skilled artisans, technicians and engineers has prompted suggestions 
for closer links between education and industry through the joint Initiative for 
Priority Skills Acquisition (JIFPSA): C)ECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: 
Country Notes (South Africa) p. 496- 
928 Respectively under Strategic ' 
Plan for Higher Education and the Further Education 
and Training programme: Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, pp. 137-142. 
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The agenda for health and social welfare services has also been driven by the 
need to address post-apartbeid realities. Despite the existence of excellent 
private medical services and the availability of free primary healthcare services 
at public clinics, significant segments of the society have inadequate access to 
healthcare. There are significant shortages of trained physicians and specialists 
due to the emigration of health professionals to seek better paying jobs abroad. 
Inadequate initial public policy responses to HIV/AIDS 929 and other 
communicable diseases have adversely affected the working population and 
reduce economic productivity. 930 The South African Social Services Agency has 
increased spending on cash transfers to deal with social welfare needs. The 
Agency aims at providing income support to the most vulnerable groups, while 
simultaneously seeking to preserve incentives to work. Recent emphasis has 
been focused on better social support delivery and reducing benefits fraud. 931 
However, expenditure on social services and infrastructure will likely remain 
within controlled public deficit limits till 2008/09.932 
Fiscal measures complement these non-fiscal initiatives targeted at providing 
access to adequate to basic infrastructure and services for all South Africans. 
Tax incentives to promote these ends are considered in the next section. 
4.2-4.5. Tax Incentives for Infrastructure & Services 
Most individuals and enterprises engaged in the infrastructure and social 
services sectors are subject to normal income tax. However, there are certain 
exceptions. For instance, telecommunication enterprises are subject to certain 
special provisions which provide for a deemed taxable income9331n the absence 
of proper accounts which satisfactorily reflect the income generated during the 
relevant tax year. 934However, special allowances are available at 5% on the 
929 Statistics indicate that South Africa has the largest number of people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Africa. 
930 OECD/AfDB African 
-Economic 
Outlook 2003104 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cit, 
p. 474. 
9" Ibid, p. 473. 
932 Ibid, p. 466. 
933 Equivalent to R10 of taxable income on every R200 of revenue generated.. 
934 §32 ITA 1962. 
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cost of capital outlays for telephone lines or cables utilised in the 
transmission of telecommunications. 115 These special allowances also apply to 
expenditure incurred to erect, construct or install railways lines and other 
affected assets used for the transportation of passengers and goods. 936 Tax 
incentives for other modes of transportation are also available. 
Ship and aircraft owners may claim general capital allowances applied on a 
straight-line basis at 20% per annum over 5 years'937 or 33.3% par annum over 
3 years, 938 or indeed, 40: 20: 20: 20 over 4 years939 to write off capex. 940 Special 
provisions allow the treatment of parent and subsidiary shipping companies as 
a single entity for granting capital allowances and the tax treatment of income 
and expenses. 941 Other allowances permit ship owners to claim the cost of 
estimated repairs projected to be incurred up to 5 years in advance. 942Certain 
proViSlonS943 provide tax deductibility for expenditure on the acquisition or 
construction of aircraft hangars, runways, taxiways at approved airports. 944 
Others apply to taxpayers that erect permanent shipbuilding facilities. 945 A 
special tonnage tax was introduced to stimulate the South African shipping 
industry. Accordingly, shipping companies would be liable to tax according to 
the size of their ships and not according to business results, reducing the 
relevant effective rate of tax. 946 Fiscal policy proposals will permit the tax 
935 512D ibid. 
936 §12D ibid. 
91, For new or used qualifying assets acquired on or after 21 June 1993. 
938 For new/unused machinery and plant acquired between 1 July 1996 and 30 
September 1999. 
939 For new/unused machinery and plant acquired on or after 1 March 2002. 
940 ý12C ITA 1962. These allowances apply with effect from 1 April 1995 and replace a 
system of capital allowances permitting either (a) a generous 40% first-year initial 
allowance followed by lower annual allowances or (b) general annual wear-and-tear 
allowances of 10% per annum for ships and 25% per annum for aircrafts: 514(l) ITA 
1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §§8.3-8.8. 
941 §14 ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §8.11. 
942 §14(l)(c) ITA 1962. 
943 ý12F ibid (with effect from 1 April 2001). 
9, Silke on South African Income Tax, op cil, §8.39E; Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in 
South Africa, op cit, pp. 183-185. 
945 §13(8) ITA 1962. 
946 Budget Review 2005, op ^it, p. 84. 
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depreciation of rail locomotives and wagons over 5-years instead of the 
previous 14-year period. 947 
Scrapping allowances are provided for ships, ship- building facilities, aircraft, 
aircraft facilities (hangars and taxiways), railway lines and other related 
facilities that are withdrawn from use for reasons other than cessation of trade 
(i. e. alienation, loss or destruction of the asset). 948 In addition to these 
scrapping allowances, toll road operators are provided special deductions949 for 
certain types of toll road expenditure including expenses on permanent road 
works and major rehabilitations to road pavements, routine repairs and 
maintenance of toll roads, associated finance costs and ancillary services. 950 In 
line with the trend towards non-fiscal incentives, a taxi recapitalisation 
project has been approved under which a cash allowance of R50,000 is paid 
for each taxi scrapped. The scrapping allowances do not trigger capital gains 
tax liabilities and, where used for the acquisition of a new taxi vehicle, the 
owner would be entitled to the full cost for tax pUrpoSeS. 951 
In the past, income tax exemptions applied to qualifying companies formed to 
provide housing utilities for low-income communities. 952 These have been 
replaced by income exemptions for similar public benefit companies. 953 The 
regeneration of decrepit urban and business districts is encouraged by 
incentives promoting development in certain urban development zones. 954 
The scheme promotes public-private partnerships between entrepreneurs and 
local municipalities in 16 designated inner cities. 955 Incentives include 
initial/first year allowances of 20% followed by either (a) annual 5% 
"' SARS Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, p. 4. 
948 §11(o) ITA 1962. 
949 Subject to ring-fencing restrictions and limitations on the timing of the deductions: 
ý24G(5) ibid. 
9" §24G(2) ibid. 
9" Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2006, op cit, p. 45. 
952 §10(1)(H) ITA 1962. 
9" 530 ibid; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, 56.24. 
954 §13qual ibid; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §8.115. 
95, Local municipalities play a significant role, particularly in designating eligible 
demarcated areas to benefit from the scheme. 
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allowances in the 16 succeeding years, 956 or (b) 20% annual allowances in the 
four succeeding years, 957 depending on the nature of the urban development. 
These incentives are to be extended for another 5 years till 2014 under Budget 
2008 proposals. 958 
Other housing and township development incentives are available for the 
conversion of undeveloped land into saleable housing units and associated 
amenities. Certain capital development expenditure 959 iS permitted to be 
apportioned among the number of housing units and deducted as trading stock 
in the tax year in which these units are disposed. Opex may be deducted in the 
current tax year. Developers may claim allowances for expenditure they are 
obliged to incur on future, post-sale development. 960 Developers may also claim 
suspensive sale961 debtor allowances which relieve from tax the gross profit 
element of revenue earned but unpaid or outstanding at the end of the tax 
year-962 
Employers providing housing by way of the erection of dwellings 963 or 
residential units964 for their employees are eligible for additional allowances 
on the cost of ýhe housings facilities965 or residential units. 966 Employers are 
In respect of the erection of new buildings or additions and extensions to these. 
In respect of improvements to existing buildings which do not alter the exterior 
framework of such buildings. 
958 Budget Review 2008, p. 6 2. 
959 Namely expenditure on real property acquisition costs, road construction, water, 
services and common areas. 
960 §24 ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §17.30 et seq; Badenhorst, 
Taxation &Investment in South Africa, op cit, T15.3. 
961 In suspensive sales, the title in the goods or movable property (or to immovable 
property) only passes upon the receipt of the whole or a certain part of the purchase 
consideration. The vendor retains title to the property prior to such payment: Silke 
on South African Income Tax, op cit, §17.26. 
962 §24 ITA 1962. 
963 In terms of 511(t) ITA 1962. 
964 Self-contained residential accommodation consisting of more than one room 
(excluding any hotel, hostel or similar accommodation commenced on or after 1 
April 1982, and erected under a taxpayer's housing project to provide 
accommodation for profit or let to a full-time employee): 513ter(l) ITA 1962. 
965 At 50% of the expenditure donated or advanced: 511(t) ITA 1962. 
966 10% initial first year allowances in addition to concurrent 2% annual allowances 
provided at least 5 units have been let to employees (or in the case of leasehold 
properties, the lease's term is at least 10 years): 513ter ITA 1962. 
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also eligible for incentives for expenditure on the education and training of 
employees under learnership agreements registered with a Sector Education 
Training Authority (SETA) or the Department of Trade and Industry. The 
allowances here are equivalent to the lesser of the annual equivalent of the 
employee's remuneration (for new employees) or 70% of the annual equivalent 
of the remuneration (for existing employees) subject, respectively, to a cap of 
R25,000 and R17,500.967 
These incentives are some of the numerous incentives provided to employers 
to increase output, productivity and employment. 968The next section considers 
other tax incentives available. to emplc)yers and other investors in the vital 
manufacturing sector. 
4.2.5. MANUFACTURING& INDUSTRY 
4.2.5.1. Overview 
The well-developed industrial sector leads other productive sectors in 
contributing 19% to GDP969 and providing employment for 14% of the nation's 
workforce in 2005.910 Industrial activities tend to be clustered around four key 
industrial areas 971 particularly in the Gauteng Province. 972 Manufacturing and 
heavy industry are closely interconnected with other sectors such as the 
services and ICT-E sectors. The services sector in particular provides essential 
supplies of professional, managerial, technical and executive skilled labour for 
manufacturing and industry. As such, any consideration of tax incentives for 
967 The benefit of these allowances may be clawed-back by the Commissioner where the 
learnership agreement is prematurely terminated for reason other than for death or 
dismissal due to physical incapacity: §12H ITA 1962. See Silke on South African Income 
Tax, op cit, §8.70A. 
961 South African labour law tends to apply the concept of 'fairness' as a constitutional 
overlay to basic common law employment contract principles: see Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995, Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and Employment Equity 
Act 55 of 1998; Christoph Garbers, Chapter 11: 'Labour Law, ' in Introduction to the 
Law of South Africa, op cit, pp. 399-430. 
In 2005/06: OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 200510.6 - Country Studies: South 
Africa, op cz . t, p. 462. 
9" Van Buren, 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1055. 
9" Namely Gauteng, Western Cape, Durban-Pinewood and Port Elizabeth-Ultenhage. 
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manufacturing and industry should be understood with the interplay with these 
sectors in mind. Metals and engineering lead other manufacturing sub-sectors, 
with steel and aluminium contributing considerably to output and 
employment. 973Vehicle manufacturing contributed 6.4% to GDP and employed 
32,000 people in 2004.974Textiles however have faced declining fortunes due to 
a number of factors 975 despite high tariff protections and access to the US 
markets under the US African, Grovtb and Opportuniýy Act. 
Over the years, tax incentive policy has featured prominently in promoting 
manufacturing and industry. Commentators observe that investments in ferro- 
chome procesSlng, 976 ceramics, 977 aluminium smelters and fibre-optics occurred 
as a result of attractive investment incentives. 978 The following sections 
consider the use of various tax incentive schemes targeted at promoting 
growth, productivity and employment the manufacturing sector. 
4.2.5.2. Tax Holidays for Decentralisation & Industrial Development 
Zones 
Industrial development incentives had an important role in the decentralisation. 
of industry during the apartbeid years. Black observes that in 1982 the industrial 
decentralisation. policy involved various incentives ranging from tax holidays 
to income tax exemptions subject to a 15% withholding tax on certain 
972 Though the smallest province, Gauteng contributes more than a third of total GDP. 
973 Industrial efficiency is high resulting in relatively low and internationally 
competitive steel and aluminium prices: van Buren 'South Africa: Economy', op cit, 
p-1055. 
974 OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cz . t, 
p. 463. However, declines in exports, rising labour costs and poor domestic demand 
due to income disparities have adversely affected the sector: van Buren 'South 
Africa: Economy', op cit, p. 1056. 
"5 These include the expiry of the Multi-Fibre Agreement, increasing Asian 
competition, the strong rand affecting the price competitiveness of exports: 
OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cz . t, 
p-462. 
976 Tata Steel of India invested R600million having been lured away from Australia. 
977 Pegasus was investing R208million in a ceramic tile plant in Vereeniging. 
978 Peter Surtees 'South African Tax Update: The Bitter and the Sweet of Incentives' 
TNI Nov 11,2002 [1-002 WTD 209-5]. 
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remittances. 979 These incentives were provided to encourage local and foreign 
investors to relocate industrial activity away from the 4 major metropolitan 
regions of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, Durban, Cape Town and Port 
Elizabeth-Uitenhage. Investment was decentralised to the semi-autonomous 
Bantustans (homelands) and other border areas in line with the apartbeid policy 
of separate development. 
However, these industrial relocations were almost entirely motivated by 
political considerations and not sound economics. As such, little new 
investment was created, existing investment was relocated to inefficient and 
unviable locations and the costs in revenues forgone escalated from 
R107million for fiscal year 1982-1983 to R618million for fiscal year 1985- 
1986.980 These significant inefficiencies were reflected in the costs-per-Job in 
decentralised areas ranging from R60,000 to R100,000: three or four times the 
comparative values for metropolitan jobs. Ultimately, the rate of investment 
declined due to economic recession, political instability and the unsustainable 
nature of the incentives leading to their gradual withdrawal. 981 The industrial 
decentralisation policy was succeeded by the industrial development zones tax 
holiday scheme operative between 1996 and 1999.982 
Tax holidays were previously available between 1996 and 1999 for eligible new 
companies and close corporations commencing single-apProved manufacturing 
projects with capital investments in the secondary sector. 983 The scheme was 
administered by the Board of Manufacturing Development under the oversight 
of the Department of Trade and Industry. $ince its inception on 1 October 
1996, the scheme generated R3.7billion in investment in 133 projects 
979 A. H. Black, 'Decentralization incentives and investment in the South African 
periphery' in Alan W. Whiteside (ed) Industriali. Zation and Investment Incentives in 
Southern Africa, (University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg: 1989) pp. 121-141. 
980 Ibid, p. 131. 
981 Ibid, pp. 136-140. 
982 §37H ITA 1962; Marius van Blerck 'South Africa Introduces Tax Holiday Program' 
TNI May 12,1997 [97 TNI 91-17]. 
983 The tax holiday scheme commenced from 1 October 1996 and was available to 
projects approved by the Board for Regional Industrial Development by 30 
September 1999: Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South Africa, op cit, §10.12. 
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potentially creating 11,000 jobs. 984 Cumulative 2-year tax holiday periods 
were awarded based on projects meeting 3 separate sets of criteria based on 
geographical, industry and workforce components. Projects could en)OY a 
maximum consecutive tax holiday period of 6 years. The capital outlays had 
to be in excess of R3million and expended on land, buildings, plant and 
machinery to be utilised in manufacturing processes. The scheme emphasised 
innovative and viable projects which enhanced the local skills-base and utilised 
competitive technology. However, these tax holidays were phased out from 
September 1999 and replaced by other more targeted incentive schemes. 
4.2.5.3. General Tax Incentives 
South African tax law features several fiscal incentives of a general nature, as 
well as more sp e cific ally- targeted incentives. General incentives include the tax 
deductibility provided by the general deduction formula's 'positive' and 
cnegative' tests 985 which effectively allow the tax deductibility of only such 
expenditure and losses which are actually incurred, on revenue account, during 
relevant tax year in the production of income, having been expended for the 
purposes of the trade. 986 
Another set of broadly targeted incentives are the wear-and-tear and 
depreciation allowances available for items of industrial plant and 
machinery. 987 These allowances are applied on a straight- line 
basis 988 and 
granted at the discretion of the Commissioner at rates that fairly reflect the 
amounts by which relevant assets have been diminished by reason of wear and 
tear. In determining the applicable deemed or base costs, direct costs of 
acquisition, installation, erection, shipping, delivery and repairs are relevant. 
However, finance costs, pre-production interest, and other indirect or artificial 
984 Business Day article 'Replacing Tax Holidays', 22 September 1999, cited in R Stretch 
and J Silke, Taxgram Database, accessed at University of Johannesburg's Law 
Library. 
985 In terms of §§11-19 and §23, respectively, ITA 1962. 
916 Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §13.2. 
987 §11(e) ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, Q cil, §8.117. 
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costs are d' 989 iscountenanced. These are restricted to certain assets 
which do not enjoy other incentives. 99() However, there are special provisions 
providing exceptions, for instance, in respect of qualifying foundation or 
supporting structures. 991 
Further general capital allowances apply for items of movable machinery, 
plant, implements and other utensils used in manufacturing or similar 
processes. These apply on a straight-line basis at 20% per annum over 5 
years992 or 33.3% par annum over 3 years'993 or indeed, at 40: 20: 20: 20 rates over 
4 years994 (depending on when the asset was acquired). 995 
Industrial buildings acquired for use wholly or mainly996 in manufacturing and 
similar processes would be eligible for annual building allowances of 2%, 997 
5%998 or 10%999 on the cost of acquisition and enhancements of the industrial 
capacity of such facilities (depending on the timing of the building or 
improvement works). 1000 These allowances enure to the benefit of a taxpayer 
988 Although formerly, this was on a reducing/ diminishing-b alance basis: see Practice 
Notes 19 (GN 707 GG 14756 of 30 April 1993) and 39(GN 375 GG 16415 of 19 May 
1995). 
981 Special anti-avoidance rules apply for transactions between connected persons: 
§11(e)(vii) ITA 1962. 
990 As such, buildings, structures, works of a permanent nature, ships and aircraft are 
excluded: §11(e)(ii), (iii) ibid. 
991 § 11 (e) (11A) ibid. 
992 For new or used qualifying assets acquired on or after 21 June 1993. 
993 For new/unused machinery and plant acquired between 1 July 1996 and 30 
September 1999. 
994 For new/unused machinery and plant acquired on or after 1 March 2002. 
995 §12C ITA 1962. Other provisions are applicable at rates of 50: 30: 20 over 3 years to 
assets acquired on or after 1 January 1989 (but presumably before 1 March 2002): 
Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §§8.38A, 8.39-8.39BA. 
996 Essentially, SARS requires that at least 50% of the floor space or the volume of the 
building should be used for qualifying manufacturing purposes: see further Silke on 
South African Income Tax, op cit, §8.17A; Badenhorst, Taxation & Investment in South 
Africa, op cit, p. 128. 
997 For building or improvement works commenced on or after 31 December 1988. 
9,8 For building or improvement works. commenced on or after 1 January 1989 but 
before 1 July 1996; or on or after 1 October 1999. 
999 For building of improvement works commenced between 1 July 1996 but before 1 
October 1999, provided the completed works were brought into use by 31 March 
2000. 
10" §13 ITA 1962. 
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provided a manufacturing or similar use dominates and any qualifying non- 
manufacturing buildings are constructed simultaneously. 1001 
4.2.5.4. Incentives for Innovation 
Prior to 2 November 2006, the quest for new and innovative processes, 
products and designs was encouraged by tax incentives for research and 
development (R&D), 1002 particularly for 'R&D' 1003 aimed at the creation of 
'intangible assets'. 1004 South African tax law departs from the accounting 
treatment (which distinguishes between 'research' and 'development' 
expenses) '1005permitting the full deduction1006 of all revenue R&D expenditure 
while expenses of a capital nature may be entitled to special depreciation by 
way of tax allowances. R&D expenditure on revenue account was tax 
deductible in the year actually incurred if undertaken by or on behalf of 
taxpayers for devising, developing, creating or (in some cases) registering 
rights to inventions and patents, 1007 designs 1008 and copyrights (other than 
trademarks) 1009 . 1010 Conversely, certified 1011 capital expenditure could be 
deducted by writing off such Costs 1012 over 4 years at rates of 40: 20: 20: 20. 
Assets had to be exclusively used for R&D activities to be eligible. However, 
100, However, while facilities used for only part of a tax year benefit from full annual 
allowances, interest and finance charges are excluded in calculating the base cost: 
Silke on South African Income Tax, o_p cit, §8.18. 
1002 Ihid, 58.89A. 
1003 'R&D' is defined as R&D actually or potentially resulting in intangible assets as 
contemplated under South African GAAP (but exclusive of R&D for social sciences, 
humanities, management and marketing): 511B ITA 1962. 
1004 The Accounting Practices Board's AC129 defines (1) 'assets' as resources controlled 
by enterprises as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are 
expected to flow and (2) 'Intangthle assets' as identifiable non-monetary assets without 
physical substance held for use in the production or supply of goods and services, 
for rental to others, or for administrative purposes. 
`5 Under AC129, 'research' expenditure should be expensed in the accounts while 
'development' expenditure should be capitalised provided the intangible assets to 
which they relate to may be used or sold. 
'00, Proposals are for 150% enhanced deductions: SA Budget Speech 2006, op cit, p. 18. 
1007 Defined by the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
10" Defined by the Designs Act 195 of 1993. 
1009 Defined by the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
1010 511B(2) ITA 1962. 
"" By the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. 
1012 Being the lesser of (x) actual cost, (y) equivalent costs if acquired on an arms-length 
basis and (z) cost to connected persons from which the assets were acquired. 
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for buildings, apportionment provisions permit partial deductions where some 
of the facilities are used for non-R&D purposes. The dates on which assets 
were put to use are immaterial provided that some use was made during the 
relevant tax year. Similarly, there are no claw-back provisions for tax 
deductions enjoyed in previous years where the R&D activities are 
discontinued. 1013 
Since 2 November 2006, taxpayers may access new R&D incentives in terms of 
511D, ITA 1962 which introduced an incentive regime similar to that operative 
under ý11B. 1014 In the main, the new provisions permit the immediate 
deduction of operating expenses at 150%. Accelerated deductions for 
capital expenditure may be made over a shorter period of 3 years at rates of 
50: 30: 20.1015To qualify for the new R&D deductions, the R&D activities must 
be undertaken within the Republic and directed towards the advancement of 
novel, practical and non-obvious information regarding inventions, designs, 
computer programmes and other scientific or technical knowledge. Buildings 
and facilities must be regularly utilised and specifically equipped for research 
purposes to qualify for the deductions. 1016 Expendiýture for certain related 
activities which do not qualify under the definition of R&D are disallowed. 
These include prospecting for minerals, oil and gas; the management or 
enhancement of internal business processes; trademark creation; social science 
or humanities research; and marketing, sales and market research. 1017However, 
as seen below in §7.3.2.5, some aspects of the new provisions are fraught with 
difficulty impairing the ability of investors to access the incentives. 
1013 §11B(3) ITA 1962. 
1014 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2006, op ct, p-50- 
101, § 11 D (1) & (2) ibid. 
1016 511D(4) ibid. 
1017 511D(5) ibid. 
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4.2.5.5. Incentives for Qualifying Strategic Industrial Projects1018 
A key aspect of South African tax incentive policy are special incentives 
targeted at high value strategic industrial projects utilising certain industrial 
assets which have potential to increase economic growth or employment and 
positively impact the South African economy. This industrial investment 
allowance is a remarkably well-targeted tax incentive, with clear objectives, 
prudent administrative procedures and explicit tax expenditure limits. 1019 
Eligible projects enjoy two levels of preferential tax treatment. For normal 
qualifying projects, incentives permit the deduction of 50% of the CoSt1020 Of 
qualifying industrial assets by way of investment tax allowances, capped at 
the lower of the amount of approved investment and R300million. For p'rojects 
qualifying with preferred status, the investment tax allowances permit full 
(100%) deductibility capped at the lower the amount of approved investment 
and R600million. 102'Further restrictions ring-fence the allowances to income 
derived from such industrial projects; however, any unused investment tax 
allowances may be carried forward indefinitely to succeeding years. 1022Eligible 
assets include new or unused industrial machinery and plant, and buildings (or 
any improvements thereto) provided such machinery/plant or buildings are 
commissioned within four or three years, 1023 respectively, from the date of 
approval as a qualifying strategic industrial project. 1024 Special recoupment 
provisions claw-back some allowances enjoyed on early disposal of relevant 
assets. 1025 
1018 §12G ibid; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §8.39F; Peter Surtees 'New 
Incentives Encourages Investment in South African Industrial Pro)ects' TNI Jan 10, 
2002 [2002 WTD 7-8]. 
, 0,9 Set at an aggregate of R10billion worth of allowances by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry: 512G(6) ITA 1962; Budget Review 2001 at 216. 
1021 Relevant costs relate to acquisition, erection, construction and other direct costs and 
include finance charges, related party premiums and government subsidies: 512G(l) 
ITA 1962. 
1021 §12G(2) and (3)(b) ibid. 
1022 §12G(3)(a) ibid. 
1023 However, where industrial assets costing more than Rlbillion are involved, the four 
year period may be extended by another year at the discretion of the Minister of Trade 
andIndustry: 512G(16)(a) ibid. 
1024 512G(l) and (2) ibid. 
1025 §8(4)(n) ibid. 
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Sponsoring companies (and any connected persons) must be registered 
taxpayers in good standing as evidenced by certain documents to this effect. 1026 
To be eligible, projects must first (x) qualify as strategic industrial pro)ects, 
then (y) meet certain basic minimum criteria, and finally (z) be so highly-rated 
based on a points-scoring system as to satisfy the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (as advised by a special adjudication committee)1027 as to the project's 
potential to increase growth or employment within the Republic. To qualify as 
4strategic' and 'industrial', projects must be associated with key manufacturing, 
computer- related or R&D activities. The types of projects falling within the 
latter two categories are determined in accordance to certain regulationS. 1028 
For instance, eligible manufacturing activities must be classified as 'Major 
Division 3: Manufacturing'. 1029Eligible manufacturing activities cover a host of 
industries including manufacturing and processing of food and beverages; 1030 
manufacturing and processing of clothing and textiles; 1031manufacturing wood 
and paper products; publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media; 
manufacturing, processing and refining coke, petroleum products, nuclear fuel, 
basic chemicals and other chemical products; manufacturing certain man-made 
products; 1032manufacturing basic metals,, iron, steel, precious and non-ferrous 
metals; manufacturing and casting metals products; manufacturing general and 
special purpose machinery1033 and electric apparatus; 1034manufacturing radio, 
1026 The documents required are a declaration and certificate from the Commissioner for 
Taxes stating, respectively, that (a) the persons are taxpayers of good standing and 
(b) they are registered for tax purposes and their tax affairs are up to date. The 
Commissioner must inform the Minister of Trade and Industry if a company's 
request for such documents is refused: 512(10)(c) ibid. 
1021 The committee is composed by three special representatives each of the Department 
of Trade and Industry and the SARS/National Treasury reflecting both investment 
promotion and revenue interests: ý12G(14) ibid. 
1028 Such regulations are made by the Minister of Trade and Industry on consultation 
with the Minister of Finance. 
1029 In Statistics South Africa's most recent standard Industrial Classification. 
Including meats, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils and fats, dairy products, grains, 
starches and animal feeds. 
1... Including leather, fabrics, furs, footwear and other articles of apparel. 
1112 Including man-made fibres, rubber products, plastic products, non-metallic mineral 
products, glass and glass products. 
1033 Including household appliances, office, accounting and computer machinery. 
1034 Including electric motors, generators and transformers, electrical control and 
distribution apparatus, insulated wire and cable, accumulators, primary cells and 
batteries, electric lamps and lighting equipment. 
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television, telecommunication and other equipment; 1035manufacturing transport 
vehicles, equipment and spares; 1036 and the manufacture of jewellery, toys, 
games and recycled waste/scrap materials. 
The basic, minimum criteria target long term and viable industrial projects by 
taxpayers in good standing which: involve the introduction of assets in excess 
of R50million within a4 or 3-year post-approval horizon; if new, increase 
production and employment in the relevant sector: 1037 if not novel, significantly 
increase the capacity of existing projects; and do not qualify for certain other 
benefits or concurrent investment incentives. 1038The second stage approval 
by the Minister of Trade and Industry 1039 evaluates the extent to which 
proposed projects would upgrade the relevant industry, 1040 provide general 
business linkages, 1041 and create direct or indirect employment. 1042 Finally, the 
achievement of preferred status with additional incentives is dependent on 
the project's total points score (see Table 4.1). 
101, Including medical, optical/photographic and precision equipment. 
1031 Inclusive of motor vehicle, railway, aircraft /spacecraft, and marine equipment. 
.... After due allowance has been made for displacement in that sector. 
10" Such as the tax holiday scheme or benefits available to value-added processes: 
§37(H), (E) ITA 1962. 
1039 As advised by the adjudication committee. 
By applying new processes or supplying new products; serving as key component to 
increase the competitiveness of existing industrial sectors; or engaging in value- 
added processes. 
With small, medium and micro-enterprises supplying the projects with goods and 
services; or by providing publicly available infrastructure. 
1042 §12G(5) ITA 1962. 
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TABLE 4.1 
SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL PROJECT POINT SYSTEM 
Factor I Points 
A. Upgrading industry 
i. New product or process point 
ii. Key component of a point 
cluster point 
ni. Value-added process 
B. Business linkages 
1. SMME purchases 10% of total purchases -1 point 
ii . Infrastructure (5% of the 20% of total purchases -1 point 
cost of the investment) 
C. Direct and indirect 
nployment creation 
Job creation 3 full time jobs per Rlmillion of qualifyi ing 
assets point 
4 full tji-nc jobs per RImillion of qualifying 
,a" ; sets 2 points =- 
5 full time Jobs per Rimillion "Ing of cluallf)i 
assets =3 points 
6 full time jobs per RImIllion of qualifying 
assets =4 points 
Qualifying strategic industrial projects which score 4 points are eligible for the 
special investment tax allowances and those scoring 6 points enjoy preferred 
status. The creation of direct and indirect employment ranks high in the 
scheme of things as may be deduced from the relevant weights attached to 
criteria. There are detailed procedures specifying annual reporting 
requirements which benefiting companies and relevant functionaries must 
adhere to. These regulations ensure that only deserving projects that produce 
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tangible results continue to benefit from the incentives. 1043 Administrative 
personnel must strictly observe confidentiality rules given the detailed private 
and technical information that must be disclosed by applying companies 
regarding their projects. 1044 The incentives may be withdrawn under certain 
claw-back rules where obtained using fraudulent, incomplete or inaccurate 
information. Depending on the level of culpability involved, companies may be 
liable, on the withdrawal of incentives to additional assessments and 
penalties. 1045 
These special incentives for strategic industrial projects are one way in which 
tax policy seeks to promote industrial innovation, growth and development. 
While the programme attracted billions of rands in investment it appears that 
the primary objective of generating significant employment opportunities was 
not achieved. Consequently the programme was phased out in July 2005.1046The 
next section considers similar incentives targeted at value-added processes. 
4.2.5.6. Incentives for Value-added Processes1047 
Special provisions provided tax incentives targeted at approved beneficiation 
or 'value-added processes' by which raw materials or intermediate products are 
processed to yield intermediate or final products. Such processes would qualify 
as sufficiently value-adding if they: add at least 35% of value-added to raw 
materials or intermediate products, based on a specific value-added formula; 1048 
are being carried on an internationally competitive scale; and utilise foreign 
term credits for the importation of any, imported capital goods. 1049 The 
incentive extended tax deductibility rules in respect of pre-production 
interest/ finance charges, 1050 qualifying industrial buildings, 1051 machinery and 
1043 §12G(8), (16) and (17) ITA 1962. 
1044 ý12G(18), (19) ibid. 
1041 ý12G(9), (10), (11) and (20) ibid. 
1046 Budget Review 2005, op cit, p-83- 
1047 537E ITA 1962; Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, §8.115B. 
1041 The formula is (A - (B + C)) -Ax 100 - 1: where A is the ex-factory price of the 
intermediate or final product; B is the input cost of raw materials /intermediate 
products; and C is the cost of electricity consumed in the production. 
1049 §37E(l) ITA 1962. 
10" 511(bA) ibid. 
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plant 1052 to expenditures related to such value-added processes by relaxing the 
rules normally relating to these tax deductIons. 1053 
Eligible processes had to be approved by a special value-added committee 
which is appointed by the Minister of Finance 1054 and carried out certain 
regulatory duties. 1055The committee's terms of reference were quite wide and 
include the evaluation of the scheme's effect of the scheme on the Exchequer 
as well as a consideration of the degree to which (x) production of an 
intermediate product will promote further processing of that 1 late 
product by other industries in the SACU; (y) preference will be given to local 
SACU products; and (z) SACU SMEs would be affected by the process. 1056 
The scheme was a rather controversial attempt at promoting intermediate 
processing of goods and attracted De Koker's criticism that its provisions are 
merely an attempt at handing out concessions 'to a favoured few at the expense 
of the fiscally disenfranchised many'. 1057 One particularly unusual provision 
permits any excess of cumulative allowances over, taxable income resulting in 
new or increased assessable tax losses to be converted into unique 'negotiable 
tax credit certificates', which may be then disposed of to other taxpayers and 
used by them in meeting their normal tax, secondary tax and provisional tax 
liabilities at the expense of the National Revenue Fund. 1058 1t is not clear how 
these provisions could directly promote the proliferation of these value-added 
processes but it would appear to lend credence to the views of commentators 
like De Koker's. However, these tax incentives have been since phased-out and 
"51 ý13(1) ibid. 
1052 ý12C ibid. 
1053 The key modification is that eligible assets may qualify before their acquisition or 
construction, provided they are commissioned within certain time periods: §35E(5) 
and (6) ITA 1962. 
1054 In concurrence with the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
1155 §37E(2) ITA 1962. The committee is also charged with excluding benefiting 
processes from enjoying other forms of state assistance. 
1056 §37E(3) ibid. 
1057 Silke on Soutb African Income Tax, op cZ1, p. 8-314-5. 
1058 §37E(9)-(12) ibid. 
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taxpayers have until 29 February 2008 to use any outstanding negotiable tax 
credit certificates. 1059 
The next section considers somewhat less controversial incentives targeted at 
Small, Medium and Micro-Enterprises (hereafter: SMMEs). 
4.2.6. MICRO-ENTERPRISES & BLACK ECONomic EmPOWERMENT 
4.2.6.1. Overview 
An abiding legacy of apartheid is the . 
large income - inequity existing 
predominantly across racial lines due to the restricted access of historically 
disadvantaged groups to wealth, skills, jobs, educational opportunities and the 
economy in general. These problems manifest in current high unemployment 
rates 1060 fuelling poverty, conflict and crime. Post-apartheid policies seek to 
redress the injustices inflicted on these groups. 1061 In the main, such policies 
coalesce around the Black Economic Empowerment (hereafter: BEE) 
Strategy1062 as an ongoing part of the 1994 Reconstruction and Development 
Programme. BEE promotes wider economic participation by encouraging 
black-owned and controlled businesses, more blacks in executive and senior 
management positions, more women in business, industry and public 
institutions, and the growth of SMMEs and entrepreneurship. BEE adopts 
various strategies 1063 t0 achieve these ends. Specific tools include balanced 
'059 SARS Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, pp. 24-25. 
101, Estimates for unemployment vary from 26% to 41% despite the increasing role of 
social-grants and the Expanded Public Works Programme to alleviate poverty: 
y Studies: South Africa, op cit, OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Countr 
p. 476. 
1161 Blacks, women, youths and disabled persons. 
1062 BEE is described as 'an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly 
contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about 
significant increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control 
the country's economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities': 
Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa's Economic Transformation: A Strategy 
for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (DTI) March 2003, p. 12. 
1063 Vi. Z. , legislation, regulation, restructuring of state-owned enterprises, preferential 
public procurement, partnerships with the private sector, sectoral and enterprise- 
based charters and institutional support (from BEE Commission and Advisory 
Council, Industrial Development Corporation, and National Economic Development 
and Labour Council). 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, Universiy of London 
Pape 200 of418 0 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 4: A Review of Som1b African Tax Incentives 
A Comparative Slu4y of Nigerian, Soulb African & Kenyan Tax Lan, 
score-cards, 1064 financial initiatives (state-facilitated finance, venture 
capital/project financing, grants) and fiscal incentives. While some of these 
non-tax incentives shall be considered anon, the next section briefly highlights 
some tax incentives targeted at SMMEs. 
4.2.6.2. Tax Incentives for SMMEs 
Direct fiscal support by way of incentives for BEE transactions never 
materiallsed due to concerns over the potential for undesirable economic 
distortions. 1065Robyn Nathan pointed out that one possible exception to this 
rule is the relaxation of the 75% share ownership threshold required to qualify 
for group recognition and relief. 1066As Rendani Neluvhalani ex plained, if a 
parent company's share holding in a related subsidiary fell below 75%, it would 
lose the benefit of group relief rules. Most BEE deals however, required a 30% 
stake to be sold to the BEE investors. To promote BEE deals and prevent 
companies engaging in these deals from losing the group relief benefits, this 
threshold was reduced from 75% to 70% to satisfy both BEE and group relief 
thresholds. 1067 Recent fiscal policies propose measures to prevent tax 
implications for artificial gains and losses arising out of BEE transactions 
involving cross-issue of shares and forced share buy-backs. However, under- 
utilised provisions permitting the tax-free acquisition of shares under (BEE) 
employee share ownership schemes are to be revised. 1068Microenterprises are 
to continue to benefit from lower thresholds for income tax, capital gains tax, 
bespoke depreciation regimes and measures to reduce tax compliance costs. A 
turnover tax is to be introduced in fiscal year 2008 which microenterprises may 
1064 These measure the performance of sectors and enterprises against certain criteria 
(namely, direct empowerment; human resource development/employment equity; and 
indirect empowerment targets) and - are used 
by government bodies to grant 
licenses/ concessions, sell assets and engage in public-private partnerships. 
1165 South Africa: Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report 
No 05/346, September 2005 (IMF, Washington D. C.: 2005), p. 24. 
1066 Interview with Ferdi Vorster and Robyn Nathan, op cit; see also §541-49, ITA 1962. 
1061 Budget Review 2005, op cit, p. 84. 
1068 SARS Budget Tax Proposals 2007/8, pp. 4-6. 
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opt into to avoid the complexities of normal tax and VAT. 1069The threshold for 
VAT registration is also to be increased to Rlmillion from R300,000.1070 
However, certain indirect tax incentives are used to promote the growth of 
SMMEs. As a significant proportion of these SMMEs are managed by 
previously disadvantaged persons, tax concessions for SMMEs indirectly foster 
black indigenous participation in the economy. Small business corporations1071 
are liable for normal tax at a reduced rate of 10% on the first R300,000 of 
taxable income and the normal 29% (28%: FY 2008) rate on revenues in excess 
of this 1072 . 1073 Small business corporations are also entitled to multiple 
deductions on certain capital expenditure. Eligible small business corporations 
are entitled to full (100%) deductions of the cost of capital manufacturing 
assets during the tax year such assets were first brought into use1074 and double 
(200%) deductions of certain start up costs subject to a ceiling of R20,000.1075 
Indirect tax incentives noted above include fiscal incentives for the value- 
added processes scheme and the qualifying strategic industrial projects. Both 
schemes feature elements which promote, respectively, SMMEs in the SACU 
region1076 and the increased business linkages between larger enterprises and 
SMMEs supplying them with goods, services and 111pUtS. 1077 Grants, subsidies 
and other state assistance provided under rion-tax incentive schemes including 
1061 Budget Review 2008, p. 63; SA 2008 Budget, p. 21. 
"I, Budget Review 2008, p. 67- 
107 1 Defined as companies or close corporations, other than employment companies, 
wholly owned by individual shareholders (none of whom hold shares of interests in 
any other private company or close corporation during the relevant tax year), whose 
gross income do not exceed R14million p. a. (increased from R6million) and does not 
comprise of 20% or more of income from investments or personal services: §12E(4) 
ITA 1962. 
1072 SA Budget Speech 2006, op cil, p-18- 
1073 T2(b) of Schedule 1 of Taxation Laws Amendment Act 16 of 2004 (for years of 
assessment ending within 12months of 31 March 2005 the rate was 15% on the first 
R150,000 of taxable income and 30% on the excess. 
1071 For periods on or after 1 April 2001: §12E(l) ITA 1962. 
1075 §12E(3A) ibid. 
1076 537E(3)ibid. 
1077 §12G(5) ibid. 
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the Small/Medium Manufacturing Development Programme, 1078 the Small, 
Medium Enterprise Development Programme, 1079 the Export Credit Finance 
Guarantee Scheme for SMEs and the Small Business Development Corporation 
Limited are tax exempt. 1080 
The 2006 Budget proposed a tax amnesty programme to help SMME and other 
tax-evaders (such as taxi drivers and informal traders) regularise their tax 
positions upon the payment of a flat 10% tax on taxable incomes earned in the 
2005 year of assessment'081 operative between 1 August 2006 and 31 May 2007. 
The definition of small corporations was also relaxed for income tax 
purposes. 1082Finally, financial transaction taxes (stamp duties) on debit entries 
were eliminated effective from 1 March 2005 to relieve the burden on small 
businesses and low income individuals at a cost of R350million to the fiscus-1083 
Numerous informal businesses and SMMEs are active in tourism; the next 
section examines tax incentive policy other sectors. 
4.2.7. OTHER SERVICES 
4.2.7.1. Tourism 
Tourism plays a significant role in the economy, contributing 8% to GDP. 
Visitors increased from 640,000 in 1994 to a record 6.7million in 2004.1084 
Tourists range from 'shopping safari' visitors from neighbouring African 
countries to European and American visitors on luxury cruises, golf packages 
and water sport tours. South Africa attracts millions of eco-tourists each year 
This scheme provides cash incentives for investment in manufacturing, agro-allIed, 
biotechnology, tourism and ICT business for eligible companies, close corporations, 
proprietorships and partnerships engaged in new'or expanding investments in South 
Africa. 
'0" Effective from 1 September 2000. 
ý10(1)(zE) and (zH) ITA 1962. 
"81 SA Budget Speech 2006, op cit, p-17- 
1082 The income tax exemption threshold was increased from R35,000 to R40,000: 
Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2006, op cit, p. 45. 
1083 Budget Review 2005, op rit, p. 85. 
1084 OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: South Africa, op cit, 
p.. 463. However, declines in exports, rising labour costs and poor domestic demand 
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to visit its game parks, nature reserves and national parks including the famous 
Kruger and KwaZulu-Natal national parks. Tourism is promoted by individual 
cities and provinces under the supervision of South African Tourism. Work on 
transportation and other facilities are ongoing to enhance the local 
infrastructure ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. 1085 R9billion is to be 
allocated to upgrading transportation infrastructure ahead of the World CUp. 1086 
Recent proposals for tax incentives for the 2010 FIFA World Cup include: 
import tax exemptions for imported media equipment and pharmaceutical 
goods; VAT and income tax exemption for profits from souvenir items; and 
income tax exemptions for FIFA subsidiaries, non-resident FIFA officials and 
the Local Organising Committee. 1087 
Hotel keepers 1088may benefit from capital allowances on the costs of hotel 
buildings and improvements thereto. Applicable rates vary from 2%1089 and 
5%1090 to 20% on development costs, depending on certain criteria. Essentially, 
the former 2% rate was increased to a 5% rate which applies on the cost of 
developments commencing on or after 4 June 1988. The 5% rate was increased 
to 20% on relevant expenditure for improvements commenced on or after 17 
March 1993 which do not extend the existing exterior framework of the 
building. 1091 However, the building expenditure must have been incurred by the 
hotel proprietor (or indeed, his lessee) and eligible buildings and 
due to income disparities have adversely affected the sector: van Buren 'South 
Africa: Economy', op ca, p. 1056. 
1085 The World Cup is expected to generate R16.9billion of direct investment, create 
122,800 jobs, attract 400,000 visitors arid increase tax collections by R5.6billion: see 
Colin Bryden 'South A fri c a's Winning Bid', Pbambili SA Edition 3, 
October/ November 2004, -WriteStuff Publishing cc (Sandton, South Africa, October 
2004) 6. 
1116 SA 2007 Budget, p. 19. 
1187 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2006, op cit, p. 54. 
1188 Defined as persons carrying the business of hotel keeper or boarding or lodging 
house keeper where meals and sleeping accommodation are supplied to others for 
money: ý1 ITA 1962. Lessors whose lessees are hotel keepers may benefit from the 
same incentives. 
Prior to 4 June 1988. 
... With effect from 4 June 1988. 
"" 513bis ITA 1962. 
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improvements exclude acquired facilities. 1092 Some other capital allowances 
have been replaced under recent amendments. 1093 However, wear-and- 
tear/ depreci atio n allowancesl094 are still applicable as are allowances for the 
acquisition'095 and alienation, loss or destructionl096 of hotel equipment. 1097 
4.2.7.2. Film and Entertainment 
The entertainment industry in South Africa is varied and profitable, ranging 
from celebrated theatre, orchestral and dance troupes, to cultural festivals, 
music, fine arts and cultural crafts. Public investment in cultural tourism has 
been significant, with R35million (2001) and R12million (2003) committed to 
support orchestras and film development. 1098 Film development is a particularly 
lucrative sub-sector, with world-class facilities available to local and foreign 
producers alike. Public support for the film sector features in the use of tax 
incentives to encourage film production, development, marketing and 
exporting. 1099 Special tax provisions are made in respect of films and film 
owners. 1100 The general deduction formula may be utilised to deduct outlays for 
film acquisition, development and marketing provided these are incurred in the 
production of taxable income. 1101 State subsidies provided to producers of 
films are treated as exempt income for normal tax purposes. 1102 
Film producers /marketers may benefit from special tax incentives permitting 
tax deductibility of production or acquisition costs and post-production 
1092 Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit, 58.62; Badenhorst, Taxation 6- Investment in 
South Africa, op cit, p-128- 
See for instance the grading allowance for hotel buildings and improvements (under 
513bis) and the 50: 30: 20 allowances (under ý12B). 
`91 ý11(e) ITA 1962. 
1,95 §12C ibid. 
1096 The equivalent of the 'scrapping allowance': §11(o) ibid. 
1197 Hotel equipment, for the purposes of §12C, excludes any vehicle or equipment for 
offices or mangers' or servants' rooms: ý12C(e) ibid. 
Pocket Guide to SA, op cit, pp. 185-188. 
1,99 Silke on South African Income Tax, op cif, ý§8.51 and 8.52; Badenhorst, 
Taxation 
Investment in South Africa, T15.6 op cit, p-183. 
1,10 The definition of 'film' extends beyond cinernatograph films, video tapes and 
discs 
to include copies of and rights in films: 524F(l) ITA 1962. 
1101 5 11 ibid. 
1102 §24F and §10(1)(. ZG) ibid. 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, Universlýy of London 
Pqe 205 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 4: A Rei, iep, of Sow1b African Tax Incenlit, es 
A Comparative Study of Nigerian, Soutb African & Kenyan Tax Lan, 
expenditure. 
1103 The timing of the film allowance depends on when the 
relevant expenses were incurred in relation to the film's completion date. 
Production CoStS 1104 for uncompleted films may be carried forward and 
deducted in the year in which the completion date falls. If any post- 
production CoStS 1105 are incurred in this year, these too may be claimed. 
Subsequent post-production costs (and any unclaimed allowances carried 
forward) may only be claimed as incurred in subsequent years. 1106 There are 
separate provisions for allowances in respect of print CoStS1107 and marketing 
expenditure. 1108 'At risk' rules limit the scope of these allowances to sums 
expended by film owners out of their own financial resources and credits 
raised to meet such expenditure, provided that such obligations remain 
outstanding on the last day of the year of assessment. The essence of these 'at 
risk' rules is to limit incentives to economic risks that the film owners are 
actually exposed to should no income accrue to them from the subsequent 
exploitation of the film. 1109 In addition to the 'at risk' rules, tax allowances are 
generally restricted to actual production and other costs incurred. 
1103 ý24F ibid. 
1104 The scope of such production costs Is very wide and covers, inter alia, expenditure 
on the erection, construction or acquisition of buildings and other permanent 
structures; acquisition costs for story rights, script, screenplay, copyrights, other 
rights and music/sound effects; insurance premiums for policies relating to life, 
injury, accidental damage and cost over-runs insurance; finance costs and wear-and- 
tear depreciation. 
"0, Production costs (except print costs for making copies) incurred after a film's 
completion date. 
"0' 524F(3)(a) ITA 1962. 
"" Essentially costs incurred by film owners associated with making copies of films. 
1108 This phrase includes research, advertising, publicity, and export-oriented expenses 
(provided export is to non-SACU countries). 
11,9 See 'Explanatory Memorandum on the Income Tax Bill, 1987' [WP3-'87] cited in 
Silke on South African Income Tax, op cit. 
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4.3. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter highlights the historical and political development of the South 
African legal system, notes constitutional provisions for economic rights and 
summarises salient aspects of the South African fiscal system. It summarises 
the key characteristics of the Republic's tax incentives for various economic 
sectors, focussing on agriculture and food security, energy, power-generation 
and mining, financial services, physical infrastructure and basic services, 
manufacturing and industry, micro - enterprises and black economic 
empowerment initiatives, and other services like tourism and entertainment. 
Numerous tax incentives are used to promote employment, productivity, 
economic growth and the provision of basic infrastructure and services to all 
South African citizens in line with GEAR's overarching policies. Due to the 
nature of the South African tax system, tax credits rarely feature and the most 
common tax incentives are tax deductions by way of investment tax allowances. 
Deductions may be applied in terms of the general deduction formula or more 
specific capital allowances for particular capex outlays. Certain incomes are tax 
exempt and are ignored or deducted in arriving at taxable income. 
Less sophisticated incentives like tax holidays are being phased out and 
replaced by more carefully targeted schemes like the special deductions for 
qualifying strategic industrial projects. The revenue cost and redundancy rates 
of these incentives are limited by ring-fencing restrictions, claw-back 
provisions and anti-avoidance rules. Tax administration is quite sophisticated 
compared to what obtains elsewhere on the continent. Taxpayer compliance is 
high and the resultant rising tax revenues give the National Treasury and 
Minister of Finance greater latitude in reducing tax burdens and providing 
more tax breaks for vulnerable groups and special sectors. Tax incentives have 
also given way to non-tax financial incentives utilising explicit subsidies and 
grants to achieve similar objectives in, perhaps, more transparent and effective 
ways. Early forms of these financial incentives were the Regional Industrial 
Development incentives and grants introduced in 1991 to lure companies and 
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close corporations away from the denser industrial centres and promote news 
industrial areas. Modern forms of non-tax and tariff-based incentives 
increasingly feature in the fiscal environment. This Chapter continues the 
review of tax incentive systems in the study countries. Chapter 5 concludes 
this review, focussing on the Kenyan experiences with fiscal incentives for 
sustainable economic development. 
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5. A REVIEW OF KENYAN TAX INCENTIVES 
portant to nurture any new I "It is im Weas and initiatives wbicb can make 
a diffe re n ce fo r Africa. "' 110 
5.0. INTRODUCTION 
5.0.1. Proem 
This Chapter reviews tax and investment incentive policy in the Republic of 
Kenya. Although this Chapter is largely based on bibliographical research, 
practical insights into the role of tax incentives within contemporary Kenyan 
fiscal policy were obtained from numerous discussions with Kenyan tax 
practitioners. Using the sectoral approach adopted in preceding Chapters 3 and 
4, this. Chapter highlights fiscal incentives utilised to promote investment, 
employment and economic growth in Kenya and so concludes the review of 
investment tax incentives in the three study countries. 
1110 Quote attributed to Wangari Maathal, 
2004 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and founder 
of the Green Belt Movement which 
has mobillsed poor women to plant 30million 
trees for over 30 years. 
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5.0.2. Historical Development of the Kenyan Legal System 
Historical and Political Development"" 
Kenya has historically been the trading and commercial centre of East Africa. 
Indeed, archeological evidence lends credence to the view that Kenya might be 
the cradle of ancient human ci vilisation. 1112More modern inhabitants of Kenya 
trace their origins to the continuous influx of agrarian Bantu people from 
central Africa, migrant settlers from northern and western Africa, and coastal 
descendents of racial intercourse between Bantus and Omani Arabs. 
The arrival of European traders and settlers 1113 threatened and eventually 
displaced Arabian control of Kenya's trading coast. The founding of the 
British East African Protectorate in 18951114 led to the arrival of British settlers 
in the late 1800s. The completion of the Uganda Railway in 1901 by indentured 
Asian labour was a key development linking the coastal port of Mombasa 
through the Kenyan hinterland to Kisumu on Lake Victoria. The railway was 
crucial in bringing the indigenous Kikuyu and Maasai into closer contact with 
the British colonialists, and introducing thousands of Indian labourers, traders 
and artisans whose descendants now constitute the Asian minority. 1115 
British colonial rule generally restricted indigenous African communities to 
native reserves while extending private European ownership of scarce arable 
lands particularly in the 'white highlands'. 1116 A racially stratified economy 
emerged with the Europeans dominating agriculture, administration and the 
economy; Asians serving as clerks, artisans and traders; and indigenous 
See generally 'Kenya: Recent History' by Alan Rake and 'Kenya: Economy' by Linda 
van Buren in Africa South of the Sahara 2005, op cit, pp-573-583. 
1112 Richard E. Leakey and Roger Lewin People of The Lake: Mankind and Its Beginnings 
(Avon Books, New York: 1979). 
. 
1113 The Portuguese in the 16, h century and the British in the 191h century. 
1114 Pursuant to the spheres of influence agreed among the European imperial powers at 
the Conference of Berlin, in 1885. The Protectorate covered the regions of 
contemporary Kenya and Uganda. 
1115 Norman Miller and Rodger Yeager Kenya: the Quest for Prosperity (Westview Press, 
Colorado: 1994), pp. 10-15; Paul Collier and Deepak Lal Labour and Poverýy in Kenya: 
1900-1980 (Oxford University Press, New York: 1986), p. 38. 
Under the East African (Land) Ordinance and the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915: see 
Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questjor Prosperity, op cit, p. 15. 
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Africans engaged in agricultural labour and petty trade. The economic 
relegation of Africans into the informa% subsistence economy became a source 
of tension) further exacerbated by the post-World War I recession- 
unemployment and overcrowding of native reserves. Conflicts grew between 
the colonial administration's trusteeship duties to natives and the European 
settlers' interests in maintaining access to cheap African labour. The 1932 
Carter Commission went some way in returning parcels of land to African 
communities. However, it was only after decades of increasingly violent 
political agitation1117 that greater racial equity1118 and ultimately independence"19 
were attained under majority African rule. 
Of the various indigenous parties formed in the years preceding independence, 
the Kenya Africa National Union (hereafter: KANU) led by a Kikuyu, Jomo 
Kenyatta, 1120 eventually won early elections paving the way for subsequent one- 
party rule under Kenyatta's successor, Daniel arap Moi (a minority Kalenjin). 
Under Moi's 24 year rule, Kenya enjoyed a period of relative though uneasy 
political stability. 1121 During this period Africans were gradually integrated into 
the formal, European-style economy. 
The traditional dominance of the majority Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo ethnic 
groups has been mitigated by the emergence smaller groups (notably the 
Kalenjin, Meru, Kamba and Gusli) in politics and the economy. However, 
despite accounting for a small fraction of the population, the minority Asian, 
Notably the Kikuyu-led Mau Mau revolt 'of the 1950s involving the destruction of 
European and loyalist African property and farms, civil unrest and murders. The 
British responded with force and eventually suppressed the movement through 
arresting African leaders, a state of emergency, mi I itary action and the repatriations 
of whole communities: ibid, pp. 24-26. 
.... The 1955 Swynnerton Plan addressed inequities of land use by providing Africans 
with opportunities for individual freehold ownership, farming credit, agricultural 
technical assistance and other inputs: ibid, p. 26. 
9 On the 12, h of December 1963. 
1120 Kenyatta was an early pro-independence activist who was arrested in 1953 for being 
connected with the Mau Mau. He was later released from detention by the British 
colonial authorities in 1959 ahead of independence in 1963. 
1121 However, Moi's rule was marred by a quashed coup (in 1982), political 
assassinations, the introduction of a constitutional one-Party state system, repression 
of political opposition, civil rights abuses and public corruption. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Laiv Studies 
. 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Pqe 211 of418 
The Role of Ta--v Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan African Economies: 5: A Review of Kenyan Tax Incenlites A ComParafit, e Sludy ýf Nigerian, South African & Kenyan Tax Law 
Arab and European communities continue to control significant private sector 
interests. Local political agitation and international pressure (from donor 
agencies and creditors) led to the return to a multi-party system in the early 
1990s. Ultimately, four decades of continuous single-party KANU rule was 
terminated in 2002 when the National Rainbow Coalition (hereafter: NARC) 
won the general elections and its leader, Mwai Kibaki, 1122 assumed power as 
President. However, the recent disputed Presidential elections of 27 December 
2007 which returned Kibaki for another 5-year term has sparked an outbreak of 
violence and ethnic tension which has threatened Kenya's relatively stable 
democracy. 
5.0.2.2. The Constitution & Economic Rights1123 
The Kenyan legal system applies received English common law, doctrines of 
equity and statutes of general application in force in the UK on 12 August 
1897. English common law governs commercial transactions, agency, contract, 
tortuous liability and the op eration of trusts. Customary and Islamic law 
. principles apply to a limited extent in respect of individuals. However, the 
Constitution of Kenya (hereafter: 1963 Constitution) remains the supreme law 
of the land. The parliamentary system inherited at independence eventually 
gave way to republican constitutional rule. The 1963 Constitution currently 
provides a republican framework composed of a dominant executive, 1124 the 
Parliament, 1125 and the judiciary. 1126 Kenya is divided administratively into 7 
provinces and an area. 1127 
1122 Kibaki served as finance minister under Kenyatta and vice-president under Moi. He 
left the ruling KANU party to join the opposition. 
1123 See Van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, pp. 573-583. 
1124 The Utawala, headed by the President, whose numerous powers in cludes that of 
appointment of the Vice-President and Ministers, which together constitute the 
Cabinet: §17; Chapter 2,1963 Constitution. 
1125 The Bunge, constituted by the President and the unicameral National Assembly, the 
latter composed of elected members and 12 persons nominated by the President: 
§531-32; Chapter 3,1963 Constitution. 
1126 The Mabakawa, which includes the Court of Appeal, High Courts, and Kadhis courts: 
Chapter 5,1963 Constitution. 
1127 Viý, the Central, Coast, Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley provinces and 
the Nairobi Area. 
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The 1963 Constitution enshrines the underlying pro- capitalistic, free-enterprise 
principles on which the economy is based by guaranteeing rights to private 
property and specifically guarding against compulsory acquisition. 1128 Further 
investment protection assurances and guarantees against expropriation are 
contained in the Investment Promotion Act of 2004. A process of constitutional 
reform would have lead to a new draft constitution under which the enormous 
powers w, ielded by the President were to be devolved to a powerful Prime 
Minister. While there are hopes that a new political framework would provide a 
better foundation for good governance and political accountability than that 
under previous constitutional arrangements, it is unclear when these changes 
are to be adopted, given the present political crises and deep divisions over 
specific reforms. 
1121 Except in certain instances, in the public 
interest and subject to judicial review and 
the payment of adequate compensation: 
§75,1963 Constitution. 
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5.1. THE KENYAN TAX SYSTEM 
5.1.0. Historical Development of Taxation in Kenya 
The early incidence of taxation featured in the imposition of monetary hut and 
poll taxes on indigenous communities. Africans were compelled to shift from 
the subsistence, informal economy to wage-based, formal employment to 
obtain money to discharge these obligations. 1129Hut and other taxes provided 
financial resources necessarv to fund colonial administrative costs and 
redirected cheap human resources to sustain settlers' agriculture. 1130 
Taxes were originally administered by the colonial authorities of British East 
Africa -a region which included Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar and Tanganyika 
(presently Tanzania). Upon the independence of these territories, tax 
administration was undertaken by the Income Tax Department of the East 
African Community. 1131 Concerns that Kenya benefited disproportionately from 
the common external tariff and absence of internal tariffs contributed to the 
eventual demise of the East African Community in 1973.1132 The Kenyan 
government eventually assumed responsibility for the taxation of capital and 
incomes of taxable persons under the Income Tax Act Cap 470 of 1973 
(hereafter: ITA 1973). Until 1995, separate revenue departments administered 
income tax, customs and excise duties, and value added tax. Presently taxes are 
administered by the Kenya Revenue Authority. 
1133 
5.1.1. Investing in Kenya 
Successive Kenyan governments have consistently promoted private 
investment by both foreign and local investors though variou Is policies. The 
Ministry of Trade and Industry implements investment promotion policy 
through its numerous departments. The erstwhile Investment Promotion 
1129 Collier and Lal, Labour and Poverty in Kenya: 1900-1980, op cit, pp. 28-30. 
I'll Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questfor Prosperity, op cit, pp. 18-20. 
1131 For Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Safdar All Butt and Amirall Sokwala An 
Introduction to Taxation in Kenya (Cassell, London: 1978), p. 4. 
1132 John F. Due Taxation and Economic Development in Tropical Africa (MIT Press, 
Cambridge-Massachusetts: 1963), pp-5,10,160. 
1133 Samuel G. Kikira Principles of Taxation Law in Kenya (15t edition, Connectour 
Publishers, Nairobi: 1996) p-1. 
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Centre was re-constituted under the Investment Promotion Act of 1994 as the 
Kenya Investment Authority possessing a wider remit to promote and facilitate 
domestic and foreign investment. Eligible investors are entitled to a special 
investment certificate which provides numerous benefits including the deemed 
grant of essential business licenses circumventing Kenya's extensive licensing 
regime. 1134 To be eligible, investors must demonstrate a potential positive 
impact on the economy in terms of increasing employment, upgrading skills, 
transferring technology or generating income. Foreign investors must meet a 
minimum investment threshold of US$500,, 000 (US$65,000 or KSh. 5million is 
required for local investors) to be eligible for the certificate. 
Exchange control laws and regulations were liberalised in 1994 resulting in 
the repeal of the Excbange ControlAct in 1995. The Minister for Finance and 
the Central Bank regulate currency control and the activities of authorised 
dealers -who trade in foreign exchange. Residents and non-residents may 
maintain foreign- currency denominated accounts with local banks. However, 
few regulations still exist and govern the application for forex allocations for 
imports. 1135 
Kenya is the leading economy in the resuscitated East African Community 
(hereafter: EAC). The Protocol establishing the EAC Customs Union 
(hereafter: EAC CU) took effect from 1 January 2005 and establishes a three 
band external tariff while abolishing internal tariffs on goods and services. 
EAC is one of numerous initiatives by which greater economic, political, social 
and cultural integration of the peoples of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is being 
secured. 1136 
1134 71 different licences may be required by investors: Schedule to the Investment Promotion 
Act, 2004; UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya (UN, New York/Geneva: 
2005) [UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2005/2], p-51. 
IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya (IBFD, Amsterdam: 2005), p. xi. 
UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to East Africa (UN, New York/Geneva: 2005) 
[UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2005/4]. 
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Kenya also belongs to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(hereafter: COMESA) which is the successor association to the pre-1994 
Preferential Trade Area. Among its 20-odd member nations, 1137 COMESA 
features a market of 374million consumers worth over US$92billion in annual 
trade, permits the free-flow of goods and services between member countries, 
and benefits from duty-free trade and economic cooperation between the EU 
and the wider association of African, Caribbean and Pacific States. Kenya is 
also a member of. the World Trade Organisation. 
Various forms of business organisation are normally utilised as investment 
vehicles. Typical business forms include unincorporated sole traders and 
partnerships, and incorpo rated cooperatives, building societies and companies. 
However, public and private registered companies are typically utilised by local 
and foreign investors. The incorporation, operation and dissolution of 
companies are governed by the CompaniesAct. 1138 Certain requirements must be 
met before the Registrar of Companies may issue a certificate of incorporation 
to the local or foreign promoters. For instance, every company must have a 
share capital of at least KSh20, OOO. However, companies may also have the 
liability of their members limited by guarantee or be unlimited. Private 
companies may have no less than 2 and no more than 50 members. Public 
companies must have at least 7 members. 
Foreign investors may transact business through branch offices, subsidiaries or 
other places of business. Unincorporated bran'ches of non-resident companies 
are exempt from the requirement to file audited accounts. However, these 
branches must be registered within 30 days of commencement of business with 
the Registrar of Companies. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign companies 
are permitted although the government encourages )oint ventures with 
Besides Kenya, these include Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Cap 486 of 1959. 
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indigenous businesses. Previous restrictions on the accessibility to local 
finance of wholly foreign owned subsidiaries have been phasedoUt. 1139 
5.1.2. Taxing Powers, Tax Administration & Dispute Resolution 
Taxing powers are generally concentrated in the central government with local 
governments deriving resources from property rates, grants and transfers from 
the central government. Local governments also levy services charges on 
employers and employees. 1140 
The main categories of tax are collected and administered by the central 
government through the Kenya Revenue Authority (hereafter: KRA). KRA was 
establis hed in 1995 and is based in Nairobi. KRA is responsible for tax 
administration, revenue collection and enforcement of fiscal laws. Its roles 
also include combating tax evasion,, reducing budget deficits by improving 
revenue collection and 'ensuring the protection of local industries and 
facilitating economic growth through the effective administration of tax laws 
relating to trade. '1141 KRA is supervised by the Minister of Finance and headed 
by a Commissioner General who is himself assisted by Commissioners of Tax 
for Customs Services,, Domestic Taxes, Road Transportation and Support 
Services. 
Principal taxes include direct (mainly income) taxes and indirect taxes. Taxes 
on capital gains were suspended in June 1985 and estate duty was abolished in 
1982. Proposals to reintroduce capital gains taxes on property other than 
road vehicles and marketable sec urities1142were postponed in 2007.1143 Income 
tax is levied on individuals and companies at varying rates depending on 
residence. Taxable profits of resident companies are taxed at the prevailing 
1139 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. v. 
1141 The rates depend on the collecting city, municipality or council: ibid, P. 
22. 
1141 Kenya Revenue Authority Act CaP. 46,9 of 1P95. 
1142 Amos Kimunya: 'Speech Delivered to National Assembly on the 15th June, 2006 by 
Hon. Amos Kimunya, EGH, M. P., Minister for Finance, Republic of Kenya when 
presenting the Budget for Fiscal Year 2006/2007' (hereafter: 
K Budget Speech 2006), 
T129/p. 30. 
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corporation tax rates (30%), 1144while those of non-resident companies with 
permanent establishments 1145 are subject to income tax at higher rates 
(37.5%). 1146 Resident individuals are taxed at progressive rates1147 on taxable 
income comprising gross income net of deductions for allowable expenses, 
personal relief and other allowances. Taxable income for this purpose includes 
business income from any trade, profession, vocation and employment income. 
Taxable income from certain other specified sources are computed 
sep ar at ely. 1148Resident individuals are those possessing a permanent home in 
Kenya 1149 while resident companies are those incorporated or managed and 
controlled in Kenya. 1150 However, non-resident taxpayers are only taxable on a 
source basis applied to employment and other income derived from or accruing 
in Kenya. 1151Withholding taxes apply on dividends, interest,, rents, royalties 
and fees at varying rates (e. g. for dividends, a lower rate [5%] applies for 
Kenyan and EAC CU residents while a higher rate [10%] applies to non-EAC 
CU residents. 1152 For non-resident recipients, withholding tax may comprise the 
final tax on such receipts. 1153 
1143 Richard Harnley, 'Financial Markets: Regulation- Recent developments in banking and 
financial markets', [2007] J. I. B. L. R. N. 39. 
1144 §34 ITA 1973. 
1145 Permanent establishments must constitute fixed places of business and are linked to 
a 6-months test of permanency: §2(l) ITA 1973. 
1146 See Income Tax Chart: IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit. 
1141 These rates range from 10% to 30% for the highest band of income: ibid, p. 12. 
1141 These specified sources include rents from immovable property, income 
from self- 
employment and from agricultural activities: ibid, PA. 
1149 Or in the absence of such permanent home, are resident within Kenya 
for at least 
183 days in any tax year or an average of 122 days in three consecutive tax years 
including the current tax year: §2(l) ITA 1973. 
1`0 Or deemed resident by an appropriate ministerial declaration. 
" Based on the rates set by the relevant year's Budget: see 
534 ITA 1973. 
1152 Amos Kimunya: Budget Speech for the Fiscal Year 2007/2008 (1s' July-301h June) by 
Hon. Amos Kimunya, EGH, M. P., Minister for Finance, Republic of Kenya on 141h 
June 2007 (hereafter: K Budget Speech 2007/2008), pp. 28-29. 
1113 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 14. 
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The main indirect taxes include VAT, customs levies and excise duties. VAT 
is levied at a rate of 16% on taxable supplies of goods and services. 1154The 
VAT net was extended in fiscal year 2007/2008 to include rentals from non- 
residential property. 1155 Excise duties are payable on manufactured goods 
including tobacco products, non-alcoholic drinks, alcoholic beverages, 
cosmetics and jewellery, motor vehicles, petroleum products and Some services 
(mobile phone airtime). 1151 Rates of excise vary considerably from 10% for 
cosmetics to 145% for manufactured tobacco products. 1157 Similarly, tariffs for 
imported items vary depending on their nature. However, due to the EAC CU 
Protocol, a three-band common external tariff applies in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. Rates range from a maximum of 25% for finished goods through 10% 
(intermediate goods) and 0% (raw materials). 1158 Stamp duties apply on the 
execution of instruments relating to property or transactions performed in 
Kenya. 1159 Land taxes (property rates) are imposed by local government 
authorities at different rates depending on the relevant property's location. 
International double taxation may be alleviated by the grant of treat relief in 
the terms of any applicable double tax treaties or possibly, by unilateral relief 
through the deduction of foreign taxes from the tax liability assessed in Kenya, 
but only to the extent that such foreign taxes hav e actually been paid and are 
related to income derived in Kenya. 1160 Kenya has a relatively extensive network 
of double taxation treaties with its major trading partners including Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands and the UK. 1161Where such 
1154 The standard rate was reduced from 18% to 16% by the 2003/04 Budget. Certain 
goods and services are also exempt: see Value Added Tax Act Cap. 476 of 2004 
(hereafter: Kenyan VAT Act). 
1155 K Budget Speech 2007/2008, p. 3 1. 
1156 Under the Customs & Excise Act Cap. 476 of 1990. 
1157 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 20. 
"" UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to East Africa, op cit, p. 29. 
1`9 See Stamp Duty Act 1958. 
1161 §§41 & 42, ITA 1973. 
1161 Table IVA 'Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs), with Signing Dates': UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 51; 
IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 29. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Queen Mary, Universiýy of London 
Page 219 of418 
The Role of Tax Incenlives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran A, frican Economies: 5: A Ret, iem, of Kenyan Tax Incentives A Comparative Study of Nigerian, Soutb African & Kenyan Tax Law 
treaties are in force their terms determine the applicable withholding taxes on 
dividends interest royalties and other receipts paid to eligible entities. 
Kenya's dispute resolution system follows the adversarial tradition of the 
common law with a hierarchy of courts bound by judicial precedent and stare 
decisis. Dissatisfied taxpayers may object to decisions of the Commissioner of 
Tax, subject to the latýer's right to amend or refuse to amend an assessment. If 
still dissatisfied, taxpayers may appeal against assessments to certain Tribunals 
or Local Committees. 1162Appeals against decisions of Tribunals or Committees 
to the High Courts 1163must be on point of law (or mixed law and fact). 1164 
Appeals from the High Court on point of law or error of procedure lie to the 
Court of Appeal which is Kenya's apex court. 1165Decision's of the Court of 
Appeal are final and binding on litigants. 
5.1.3. Political Framework for Economic & Tax Policy 
Since independence in 1963, Kenya has pursued a state-managed, free- 
enterprise economy. Despite high economic growth in the 1960s/1970s, 
outstanding public debt obligations increased from US$319million to 
US$4.8billion between 1970 and 1990 without corresponding increases in 
productivity, export earnings or private investment. To cope with these 
challenges, Kenya cultivated a structured dependence on high levels of debt 
and donor aid to meet budget deficits. 1166 It is unsurprising that in the face of 
public corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement, donor countries and 
multilateral lending institutions exert considerable influence on Kenyan 
monetary, financial and economic policies. Recent economic policy is best 
understood with an appreciation of this reality. 
1162 5§82 & 89, ITA 1973. 
1163 Established by §60,1963 Constitution: these are headed by a Chief justice appointed 
by. the President as advised by the judicial Service Commission. 
1161 586 ITA 1973. 
1161 591A ibid. See also 564,1963 Constitution which establishes the 
Court of Appeal. 
1166 Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questjor 
Prosperity, op cit, pp. 152-157. 
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Donor intolerance with corruption and the Moi government's slow pace of 
reform came to a head with the suspension of multilateral aid from the IMF in 
1997 and again in 2001. Aid resumed in November 2003 with the NARC 
government securing a US$252.75million Poverty Reduction Growth Facility 
(hereafter: PRGF) from the IMF to finance reforms proposed under the 2003- 
2007 Economic Recovery Strategy (hereafter: ERS) 1167 . 1168 ERS revised and 
refined the 2001 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the NARC 
government's Manifesto and Post-Election Action Plan. ERS was financed by 
donor aid, domestic and external borrowing, and growth in private 
investment. 1169 Recent macro-economic policy has been based on ERS with a 
2004/0ý-2006/07 Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) being used 
to link ERS objectives with outcomes under a Ministerial Public Expenditure 
Review (MPER) process. MPER was led by a National Steering Committee co- 
chaired by a Kenyan Permanent Secretary and the World Bank's Kenya Country 
Director. The Steering Committee's work was assisted by certain working 
groups and committees, and coordinated by the Ministries for Finance and 
Planning/ N ational Development. 1170 
With the conclusion of the ERS in December 2007, economic development is 
to be sustained under the Vision 2030 programme which seeks to ensure Kenya 
is a more globally competitive and prosperous nation by 2030 by building on 
key economic, social and political principles. 1171 The rest of this Chapter 
considers existing and proposed fiscal incentives for Kenyan economic sectors. 
1167 ERS was the outcome of a consultative process facilitated by a National Investment 
Conference in November 2003 and a Donor Consultative Group meeting in January 
2004: see International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 05/11 January 2005 
Kenya: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper /Investment Programme for the Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007 (rev'd March 12, 
2004) (hereafter: IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007). 
Van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p-581. 
1161 US$4.1billion in donor aid was pledged at the January 2004 Donor Consultative 
Group meeting towards the ERS. Deficit financing is to be met by maximising 
external concessional borrowing while maintaining a declining external debt to GDP 
ratio of 36% and a domestic debt to GDP ratio reducing from 24.3% (2002/03) to 
20.8% (2006/07): IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp. 1-3,25-26. 
1171 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp. 5-7. 
1171 K Budget Speech 2007/2008. 
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5.2. SECTORAL TAX INCENTIVES 
5.2.0. Introduction 
5: A Review of Kenyan Tax Incentit, es 
This section reviews recent Kenyan tax incentive policy for various economic 
sectors. Key fiscal policy thrusts outlined by the Minister for Finance, Amos 
Kimunya, in his 2006 Budget Speech included directing financial resources to 
priority areas such as infrastructure development, health and education, 
agriculture and rural development; improving the environment for private 
investment; and creating employment. 1172 In Kimunya's 2007/2008 Budget 
Speech, greater emphasis was placed on promoting economic growth in 6 key 
sectors, namely: tourism, manufacturing, trade, business processing and 
financial services. 1173 He also outlined a raft of tax incentives and other 
measures to promote economic development in line with the broad objectives 
ERS/Vislon 2030. These measures will be considered in the context of other 
fiscal incentives provided by Kenyan tax law for particular economic sectors. 
Although Kenya's industrial and tourism sectors have contributed significantly 
to economic development in recent years, formal and subsistence agriculture 
has traditionally played the leading role, providing income and employment for 
the vast majority of Kenyans. The next section considers the use of tax 
incentives to promote economic development in the agricultural sector. 
5.2.1. AGRICULTURE& FOOD SECURITY 
Overview 
While agriculture traditionally was the dominant economic sector contributing 
25% of GDP in 20051, it has since been superseded by the services (tourism) 
sector which contributed 50% of GDP (2005). 1174Recent growth in GDP has 
been erratic ranging from 2.7% (2003) to 1.4% (2004). The recent variability 
has been due to drought and depressed global prices for some agricultural 
commodities. 1175 However, growth improved to 5.5% (2005) and 5.4% (2006) 
1172 K Budget Speech 2006, pp. 5-8. 
"" K Budget Speech 2007/2008, p. 14. 
1174 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), pp. 300,302. 
1175 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Count; y Studies: Kenya, p. 298. 
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largely due to improved rainfall. 1176Ken ya's mixed agrarian economy is broadly 
constituted by formal, export-oriented agriculture and informal, subsistence 
agriculture. 
Export horticulture has been the leading sub-sector, recently utilising over 
250,000 hectares of both plantations and smallholder farms, earning over 
US$600million annually from fruits, vegetables and cut flowers, and attracting 
substantial foreign investment. The UK and other European countries are 
major markets for horticultural produce including fruits, vegetables and 
floricultural products. The US market, however, remains largely untapped due 
to the dearth of direct flights from Kenya. 1177 
Coffee, tea and pyrethrum 1178 are also major cash crops, ranking after 
horticulture in recent years in contribution to employment, foreign exchange 
earnings and contributions to GDP. Although, coffee has historically been a 
key crop, recent output and proceeds have declined due-to depressed 
international prices and smallholder producers switching to more profitable 
commodities. Since its introduction in 19031,1179 tea has rapidly overtaken 
coffee in terms of production and exports. 1180 Tea production declined by 16% 
in 2005 but this was compensated by price increases of 11.2% despite a 
weakening US dollar. 1181 Tea production employs 10million Kenyans (or 10% of 
the population) and is divided between smallholder growers (with 60% of the 
market) and larger multinational plantations. In 2007, Pakistan, Egypt, the UK, 
OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), p. 301. 
Studies indicate that great potential exists for expansion of the EU-15 and US 
markets in edible fruits and vegetables: UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, 
op cit, p. 3 6. 
1118 An aromatic plant which yields pyrethrin (a natural insecticide). 
1171 By G. W. L. Caine, a European settler. 
Tea export values were US$440million (2003) contributing 24% of export earnings. 
Conversely, coffee exports declined from 11% to 5% between 1998 and 2003. 
Although deliveries increased by 87.7% in [the year to March 2003], low prices 
resulted in a mere 6% increase in export earnings to yield US$90million: UNCTAD- 
ICC, An Investmeni Guide to Kenya, op cit, p-37; see also van Buren 'Kenya: Economy,, 
op cit, p. 575. 
118, OECD/AfDB, African, Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya). 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
. 
Queen Mary, Universqy of London 
Page 223 of 418 
The Role o, f Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan A, frican Economies: 5: A Reviem., of Kenyan Tax Incentit)et A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African &' Kenyan Tax Lan, 
Afghanistan and the Sudan (respectively) ranked as the most popular 
destinations for Kenyan tea exports. 1182 
Kenya is the leading supplier of pyrethrum (a plant used to manufacture 
insecticide) supplying 70% of global demand and generating over US$25million 
per annum. The flower is cultivated by 200,000 smallholder families, and 
marketed by the Kenyan Pyrethrum Board, providing income for over 1million 
Kenyans. 11830ther keys sub-sectors include the production of sisal, cashew and 
macadamia nuts, livestock, 1184 dairy products, cane sugar, honey and fish. A 
recent UNCTAD study highlights significant investment opportunities in 
agriculture, particularly the upstream (processing), downstr eam (agricultural 
by-products) and services sectors. 1185 
Recent data indicates improving fortunes in agriculture. Despite a decline in 
tea production of 5.5% in 2006, increases in horticulture and coffee exports 
(2.2% and 6% respectively) contributed to a growth in real GDP of 6% in 
2006.1186However,, increased productivity is constrained by low precipitation 
during the short and long rains resulting in an acute shortage of arable, high- 
grade land. 1187As such, agriculture is concentrated in the coastal, western and 
highland regions. Development of the larger expanses of arid and semi-arid 
lands in the north-east (hereafter: ASALs) has only recently become a priority. 
In the past, a preference for (large-scale) prodtiction of export-oriented cash 
crops over (smallholder) cultivation for domestic consumption warped 
cultivation decisions resulting in structured dependency on food aid and 
1182 Exports to these 5 countries accounted for 75% of total tea exports: 'Tea Industry 
Performance Highlights for 2007' by Sicily K. Kariuki, Managing Director, Kenya 
Tea Board. 
See generally the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya's website at <httj2: //www. kenvaý 
12vrethrum. com /index. html>. 
1184 Including the processing of hides and leather. 
1`5 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, o_P cit, pp. 35-39. 
As opposed to 5.8% in 2005: see Central Bank of Kenya, Monthly Economic Review, 
February 2007, pp. 15-17, available at 
<httl2: //wwv, -. centr-, jbank-go-ke /downloads /publications /mm/feb07. Vdf>. 
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imports, particularly for key staples like maize and wheat. 1188 Structural and 
marketing problems emanate from inefficiencies of the marketing and 
auctioning boards responsible for sales of coffee, grains, sugar and cotton. 
Recent policies under ERS focus on promoting productivity to attain average 
annual growth of 5%. 1189 Fiscal initiatives to promote productivity and large- 
scale, mechanised activities in the sector are considered next. 
5.2.1.2. Tax Incentives 
Farmers1190 are taxed on farming gains and profits inclusive of the difference 
between opening and closing stock values for livestock, produce and harvested 
crop. 1191 Special capital allowances apply at rates of 33.3: 33.3: 33.3 over 3 
years, 1192 or indeed 50% over 2 years 1193 to deduct expenditure incurred on 
specified farm works from gross income. 'Farm works' include farmhouses, 
other immovable buildings, fences, drains, dips, water and electricity supply 
works but excludes machinery. 1194 
Agriculturists may also benefit from the immediate, accelerated depreciation 
of capex for clearing or planting permanent or semi-permanent crops 1195 and 
for preventing soil erosion, if incurred by the owner or tenant of agricultural 
land. 1196 In addition,, there are other special capital allowances for items of 
agricultural equipment. Tractors, combine harvesters, heavy earth-moving 
equipment and other self-propelling machines weighing in excess of 7tonnes 
benefit from accelerated depreciation permitting associated capex to be 
1187 Only 20% of Kenya's irrigation potential has been tapped and a mere 7% of the land 
constitutes premium arable land: van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p. 574. 
I... Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questjor Prosperity, op cit, pp. 131-136. 
1189 See IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp-55-58. 
1190 Defined as persons carrying on pastoral, agricultural or other similar activities: 52(l) 
ITA 1973. 
ý17,1hid. 
1192 Or 20% p. a. over 5 years, if incurred prior to 1 January 1985. 
119, With effect from FY2006: K Budget Speech 2006, ý135/p. 31. 
119, TT22 & 23, Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1195 Traditionally, these categories have been restricted to cashew nuts, citrus, cloves, 
coffee, essential oils and New Zealand flax: Thirteenth Schedule, ITA 1973. 
However, the cultivation of avocadoes and mangos are to benefit from these 
provisions: K Budget Speech 2006, T135/p. 31. 
1196 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 8. 
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expensed by 37.5% deductions applied to the written-down value of the 
a SSetS. 1197 
Further tax incentives apply to indirect taxes. Numerous agricultural products, 
supplies'and inputs are wholly-exempted1198 or zero-rated"99 for V AT. Many 
of these items are further exempt from customs duties. 1200 Import duties on 
sugar are suspended and other measures promote the importation of 
unprocessed oilseeds - to promote the local processing industry. 1201 This 
proliferation of incentives. is not surprising given the relatively greater 
importance of agriculture to Kenya than to the other countries examined in 
this Study. Although Kenya lacks the petroleum and mineral resource 
endowments of Nigeria and South Africa, some initiatives exist to promote the 
development of the Kenyan energy and mining sectors as noted the next 
section. 
5.2.2. ENERGY & MINING 
5.2.2.1. Energy, Power & Solid Minerals 
Kenya has no significant energy reserves. However, prospecting for oil and gas 
reserves has been ongoing since the mid-1980s with the National Oil Company 
of Kenya and private concessionaires undertaking exploratory work in the 
Anza, Mandera, Tertiary Rift and Lamu sedimentary basins. The enabling 
legislation 1202 adopts the use of Production Sharing Contracts to provide 
incentives for developers. Despite these initiatives, no energy deposits of 
commercially viable quantities have been discovered underscoring Kenya's 
dependence on imported petroleum fuels. The refining of crude oil into 
1197 Provisions are made for any resultant balancing charges or allowances: 57 ITA 1973. 
119, Including numerous live animals and foodstuffs; frozen foods; bulbs, plants and 
seeds; and agricultural, animal husbandry and horticultural services: Second 
Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act. 
1199 Including vegetable seeds, pesticides, greenhouses, certain animal feeds, fertilizers 
and tea purchased at tea auction centres and insecticides: Fifth Schedule, Kenyan 
VAT Act. 
1200 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op rit, pp. 18,20. 
1201 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op ci . t, p. 4 0. 
1202 Oil Exploration Act 19841Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act IP86. 
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petroleum derivatives for the domestic market and the East African region 
occurs mainly at Kenya Petroleum Refinery Limited's Mombasa refinery. 
Electrical power is generated locally from petroleum -fired plants, Olkaria 
geothermal stations and hydroelectric plants located in the Tana River Basin. 
and Turkwel Gorge. However, as these local sources are unable to meet 
domestic power demands, Kenya imports 30MW from Uganda under a bulk 
supply contract and has concluded arrangements to connect its national grid to 
the South African Power Pool via Tanzania and Zambia. Recent energy 
projects funded by donor countries and multilateral lending agencies seek to 
complement local resources. 1203 
Recent policies promote increased private sector investment in geothermal, 
hydropower and oil-based thermal energy generation. These policies have 
resulted in the operation of four independent power producers (IPPs) which 
account for a fifth of local generative capacity. In the late 1990s, the state- 
owned power Utility 1204 was reorganised and unbundled into a regulator, 1205 a 
generation company (KenGen)1206 and a transmission and distribution company 
(KPLC). 1207 Despite these reforms, KPLC remains rather inefficient with high 
transmission and distribution losses, frequent blackouts and recurring financial 
losses. Its poor performance has adversely affected industrial productivity. 1208 
However., recent data indicates an increase in electric power supply of 5.5% in 
2006 (up to 5.823billion KWH) matching a 5.3% increase in electricity 
consumption (up to 4.743bilion KWH). 1209 
1103 E. g. the Japanese-sponsored Sondu-Miriu 60MW project and the World Bank's 
US$125million rural electrification project. 
1201 Kenya Power Co. 
1201 Electricity Regulatory Board. 
1216 Kenya Electricity Generating Co. Ltd. 
1207 Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd. 
1208 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 41; van Buren 'Kenya: 
Economy, ' op cit, p-578. 
1209 CBK Monthly Economic Review, February 2007, p. 18. 
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Although significant mining opportunities exist, much the potential of 
Kenya's four mining belts 1210 remains untapped. Soda ash is mined from the 
large, self-regenerative deposits of Lake Magadi. Soda ash is Kenya's principal 
export mineral with industrial applications in the manufacture of glass and 
paper products. Other mining sub-sectors have attracted foreign investment. 
For instance, the mineral sands project by a Canadian company (Tiomin 
Resources) at Kwale in the Coastal Belt should generate initial pre-tax cash- 
flows of US$40millon over the first 6years of an 11-year project lifespan. 
Tiomin forecasts substantial annual yields of zirconium and titanium. 1211 Other 
opportunities exist for the exploitation of gold, salt, vermiculite, limestone, 
rubies, apatite, graphite, kaolin, kyanite, topazes, and coal deposits. 1212 
The NARC government proposes certain policies designed to promote the 
energy and mining sectors. For energy, ERS proposes to: strengthen the 
regulatory role of the Electricity Regulatory Board particularly over tariff 
control, reduce the government's interest in KPCL from 51% to 39%, 
restructure KenGen as a public-private partnership and create a new Rural 
Electrification Authority. 1213 ERS appears not to specifically address mining 
activities. However, the NARC government has proposed changes to the 
Mining Act to generate revenue from coal and gold mining activities. 1214 
Tax incentives for the energy and mining sectors are reviewed next. 
5.2.2.2. Tax Incentives 
Power and mining companies are assessed to tax on the same basis as other 
businesses. However, petroleum companies operating under the Petroleum 
1210 Vi. Z., the Greenstone, Mozambique, Rift and Coastal Belts. 
1211 See generally Tiomin Resources' website at <http: //w-, N7w. tiomin. com/s/Home. asl2> 
accessed on 15.02.2008. 
1212 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Gul'de to Kenya, op cit, pp. 17,44; van Buren 'Kenya: 
Economy, ' op cit, p. 578- 
1213 Further proposals seek to reduce the reliance on biomass as the principal source of 
domestic household energy to reduce associated environmental pollution and 
deforestation, and harness renewable energy sources such as solar energy and wind- 
power: IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp. 55-58. 
1214 Van Buren 'Kenya: Econorny, ' op c1t, p-578. 
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Y 
(Exploration & Production) Act 1984 are assessed to tax in terms of the Ninth 
Schedule, ITA 1973 on the basis of their production values less deductible 
allowances. Payments by petroleum companies to non-resident petroleum 
service subcontractors are subject t oa withholding tax on profits deemed 
equivalent to 15% of taxable service fees. 1215 Finally, a tax on refining activities 
is applicable in terms of the Refineg Tbrougbput Act 19 82 at 15% in respect of 
all sums charged by a refinery in connection with the refinery of crude 
petroleum. 1216 
There are relatively few incentives for economic activities in the energy and 
power sectors. Recent incentives include symbolic measures such as removing 
import duties on energy-saving bulbs 1217 and oil, fuel and air filters. 1218 
Electrical power companies may benefit from wear and tear deductions 
permitting the deduction of 2.5% per annum of eligible capex over 40 years. 
Eligible capex here covers outlays for 'industrial buildings' including facilities 
for the generation, transformation, conversion, transmission or distribution of 
electrical power. 1219 Petroleum products, liquefied natural gas and power 
generating sets of certain specifications of output are exempted from VAT. 1220 
Losses sustained by petroleum companies may be carried back up to 3 years 
against taxable profits upon cessation of business. 1221 Petroleum companies 
licensed under production sharing contracts may obtain VAT remission on 
imported capital goods including motor vehicles and aircrafts. 1222 
Mining activities enjoy more incentives than the energy/power sectors, 
possibly due to the greater potential this extractive sector has to generate 
revenues. Generous capital allowances permit the accelerated depreciation of 
qualifying capex. A 40% initial allowance is granted in the first year, followed 
1215 T9(1), Ninth Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1216 lBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op c1t, p. 25. 
1217 K Budget Speech 2006, ý127/p-29- 
1218 Ibid, T152/p. 34. 
1219 T5, Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1220 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 18; First Schedule, Kenyan VAT 
Act. 
IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 9. 
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by annual deductions of 10% over the next 6 years. Outlays may be expensed 
faster if the taxpayer can satisfy the Commissioner of Taxes that the economic 
life of the mine is less than 6 years. The scope of qualifying expenditure is 
quite wide and includes sums expended searching, winning and testing 
deposits; outlays to acquire rights over or access to depo S It S; 1223 and other costs 
intrinsically associated with mining activities. 1224 However, income and 
expenditure in respect of non-contiguous mines must be ring-fenced. 1225 
Finally, expenditure incurred in respect of certain minerals may benefit from 
immediate expensing by 100% first year investment allowances. This 
allowance operates in exclusion to the 40: 10: 10:, 10: 10: 10: 10 allowances and 
only applies in respect of minerals specifically designated by the Minister for 
Finance. 1226 
I Tax incentives to promote financial activities are reviewed in the next section. 
5.2.3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
5.2.3.1. Overview 
The Central Batik of Kenya (hereafter: CBK) is responsible to the Finance 
Minister for financial regulation and monetary policy. CBK implements 
monetary policy by targeting inflation, controlling reserve money and broad 
money supply, and engaging in open market operations. Exchange controls 
have been eliminated and the Kenyan Shilling trades freely against foreign with 
international currencies under a flexible exchange-rate system. 1227 Positive 
developments such as the IMF's endorsement of the NARC governments 
1222 ý23, K-enyan VAT Act. 
122 3 Provided these outlays are not ite acquis't' s, i ion costs, itures or processing expendi 
purchase consideration for rights acquired from a previous mine owner. 
12-11 ýT16 & 17, Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1225 T 19, ibid. 
1226 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 8. 
12" However, CBK periodically intervenes to reduce short-term exchange rate volatility. 
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economic policies in September 2004 have assisted the appreciation of the spot 
and forward rates for the Shilling. 1228 
The banking sector consists of 47-odd commercial banks, the top decile of 
which holds over 75% of depositors' funds. 1229While commercial banks tend to 
be well capitalised, the prevalence oý large portfolios of non-performing loans 
among state-owned banks belles the sector's apparent stability. 1230 Insurance 
institutions include 43-odd registered insurance companies and 197-odd 
brokers as well as numerous agencies, loss assessors, risk surveyors and 
managers. Premium income and profitability increased significantly between 
2002 and 2006, although most insurers recorded underwriting losses for the 
2006 financial year. 1231 The sector is regulated by the Commissioner of 
Insurance who is responsible to the Minister for Finance. However, the 
regulatory framework under the Insurance Act, Cap 487 of 1987 requires reform 
to facilitate greater innovation and market development. 1232 
The Nairobi Stock Exchange is the centre of capital market activity in East 
Africa. Since it was established in 1954, it has grown currently listing 54 traded 
companies 1233 with a market capitalisation of Ksh. 851.1billion in December 
2007.1234AIthough before independence in 1963, trading was originally limited 
1228 Interest rates are benchmarked to the Central Bank Rate (CBR) set by the CBK on 
advice from the Monetary Policy Advisory Committee. Interest rates have been 
elevated by high oil prices, increased private sector borrowing, high imports of 
intermediate goods and increased public exp enditure. The CBR was 8.75% in both 
November and December 2007; 12-month inflation declined from 14.6% (November 
2006) to 12% (December 2007): Richard Harnley, 'Financial Markets: Regulation- 
Recent developments in banking and financial markets', [2007] J. I. B. L. R. N. 38; CBK 
Monthly Economic Review, December 2007, pp. 7,13; OECD/AfDB, African Economic 
Outlook 20017: Countg Notes (Keýya), p. 305. 
CBK Monthly Economic Review, November 2007, p. 28. 
1230 Non-performing loans constituted 5.6% of total loan stock (Ksh 103.3 billion) in 
October 2007 but declined to 4.2% (Ksh59.1 billion) in November 2007 due to write- 
offs and recoveries: CBK Monthly Economic Review, November 2007, p. 29; 
UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 24. 
1231 See Association of Kenyan Insurers: Insurance Industry Report for the Year 2006, 
p. 3 available at 
<httl2: / /www. akinsurc-com /images /A KI%20 In-, uranceý, 6201n. dustryý, 'o2Q Report. pdf>. 
1232 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 45. 
1233 48 equities and 6 bond issues. 
1234 ic Review, December 2007, p. 47. CBK Monthly Economl 
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to Europeans, current regulations favour all resident investors. 1235The Capital 
Markets Authority (hereafter: CMA) is responsible for regulation of the three 
operational segments of the stock exchange. 1236 The new Central Depository 
System provides scrip-less settlement on a T+5 cycle. 
Financial sector policy under ERS has been influenced by the IMF/World 
Bank1237 and focuses on faster privatisation and creating a favourable climate 
for increased private investment. 1238 Strategies to strengthen financial sector 
regulation include increasing the independence of CBK by transferring the 
Ministry of Finance's bank licensing, regulatory and supervisory roles to the 
Bank and by empowering the CMA to better regulate capital market 
institutions. Recent policy statements 1239 indicate that banks 1240 and insurance 
companies 1241 will be required to increase their capital in line with 
recapitalisation and consolidation developments elsewhere on the continent. 1242 
These measures are proposed to enhance the capacity of indigenous financial 
institutions to compete with their foreign counterparts. 
Tax incentives to facilitate financial development are considered in the next 
section. 
1235 40% of listings of equities are reserved for Kenyan and EAC-resident investors and 
the balance may be freely subscribed by all investors: Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
Kenya, 2007 Budget Bulletin: Miscellaneous, p. 2. 
1236 Viý., Main Investments Market, Alternative Investments Market, Fixed Income 
Securities Market and Futures and Options Market. 
1237 Under the Financial Sector Assessment Program. 
1238 Specific policies address controlling money-laundering and financing of terrorist 
activities by legislative reforms; enhancing the role of market forces in determining 
interest and deposit rates; and improving the ability of development/micro- finance 
institutions to provide targeted services to SMEs, agriculturalists and rural 
communities. 
1231 K Budget Speech 2007/2008, p-32. 
1240 From KShs250million to KShs1billion between 2007/2010. 
1241 Composite insurers (from KShs150milhon-KShs4ý0million); general insurers (from 
KShs100million-KShs300million); long-term insurance (from KShs50million- 
KShs150million)- 
1242 See above at §3.2.3.1 of this Thesis. 
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5.2.3-2. Tax Incentives 
Dividends, interest, pensions, charges, annuities and withdrawals from 
registered pension funds and home ownership savings plans are all taxable 
elements of income. 1243 Foreign exchange gains and losses are taxable and 
deductible (respectively) in computing the gains and profits of the relevant 
business. 1244Premium tax is charged at 11/2% of gross premiums underwritten 
and 5% of premiums paid to non-resident reinsurers. 1245 Resident financial 
service companies are liable to income tax at 30%. Financial and management 
advisory services,, custodian services, executorships and trusteeship services 
attract VAT levies. 12460ther financial transactions may also attract ad valorem 
stamp duty levies". Non-resident companies are taxed at 37.5% and suffer 
(final) withholding taxes on certain receipts. 
As noted above, withholding taxes are levied on numerous receipts including 
dividends, interest5 rents, royalties and fees. 1247 Withholding tax on dividends 
applies at 5% for residents and 10% for non-residents. Taxable dividends 
comprise distributions of profits as opposed to capital. 1248 Companies are 
obliged to establish special dividend tax accounts to ensure that dividends are 
payable only out of previously taxed profits. 1249Withholding tax rates for 
interest payments vary from 15% to 25% depending on whether the relevant 
bearer instruments are issued by the government or by private issuers. Interest 
paid to non-residents in respect of certain government stocks are tax 
exempt. 1250 Taxable rental income for residents includes royalties, rents and 
premiums. 1251 For non-residents, withholding tax is levied on rents at 30% (for 
1243 §3(2) & 8, ITA 1973. 
1244 §4A ITA 1973. 
1245 5197(A-G) Insurance 4ct 1987. 
1241 Third Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act. 
117 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cz . t, p. 14; Income Tax (Witbholding Tax) 
Ru les 2001. 
1148 As such, gains from voluntary liquidations, bonus and 
discounted issues of 
debentures and preference shares constitute taxable income: 
57 ITA 1973. 
1... ý7A ibid. See also IBFD, African 
Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 7. 
1251 §14 & First Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1251 §6 ITA 1973. 
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immovable property) or 15% (if from movable property). 1252 Fee income 
earned by residents forms part of ordinary income and is sub)ect to 
withholding tax at 5% on contractual fees and 10% on consultancy or agency 
fees. For non-residents, a final withholding tax of 20% is levied on certain 
fees. 1253 
Tax incentives for financial activities range from outright income and 
withholding tax exemptions to preferential deductions. Categories of exempt 
income include1254 interest on certain government tax reserve certificates; fees, 
royalties and interest where the Kenyan government is a counterparty to the 
relevant agreement if certified to be in the public interest; and incomes 
accruing to registered pension and trust schemes, pension and provident funds, 
and annuity funds owned by insurance companies. New and venture capital 
companies 1255 are promoted by the generous tax incentives to encourage 
listings to deepen the capital markets. Newly listed companies are liable to 
income tax at reduced rates of 27% (or 25%) for 5 years (or 3 years) if at least 
30% (or 20%) of the issued share capital is listed on any securities exchange 
approved under the Capital Markets Act. 1256 
Venture capital funds apparently enjoy a 10-year tax holiday. 1257 Dividends 
received by venture capital companies are tax exempt as are capital gains from 
trading the shares of such companies subject to certain conditions. A 
participation exemption/ affiliation privilege relieves tax on dividends if 
paid to a resident company owning at least 12.5% of the equity of the paying 
company. 1258 Dividends payable by certain financial institutions are tax 
1252 In both cases, tax withheld is the final tax for the non-resident. 
1253 The relevant services include management, professional, sports and entertainment 
services: §8 ITA 1973; IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, pp. 14-15. 
1254 See generally First Schedule ITA 1973. 
1255 Vlý., resident companies in which venture capital funds have 
invested which at the 
time of the first such investment had assets with market values or turnover of 
less 
than KSh500, OOOmillion: §2(l) ITA 1973; Income Tax (Venture Capital Company) Rules, 
1,9.97. 
1256 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 7. 
1257 See 'About of NSE' webpage at <httl2: 
//www. nse. co. ke/AboutNSE. htm>. 
1258 57(2) ITA 1973. 
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exempt. 
1259 Dividend and interest income from unit trusts and collective 
schemes investing employees' emoluments in listed securities are also tax 
exempt. 
1260 
Tax exemptions extend to indirect taxes on transacti ons. Insurance and 
reinsurance businesses are exempt from VAT. 1261 Stamp duty exemptions are 
provided for share transfers between group companies. These exemptions also 
apply to the parent directly or indirectly holds at least 90% of the issued share 
capital of the relevant companies, and also for the transfer of undertakings to 
special purpose vehicles involved in securitisation and the offering of asset- 
backed marketable securities provided approved by the CMA. 1262 
Interest incurred in connection with loans utillsed wholly and exclusively in 
the production of income is tax deductible subject to meeting certain thin 
capitalisation tests. 1263Deductibility is provided for capex on legal costs and 
incidental expenses in connection with the issue and listing of shares, 
debentures and other securities. A lessee may also deduct lease rentals and 
capex incurred on legal costs and stamp duties in respect of a lease of ninety- 
nine years or less for property utill'sed for the business. 1264 
Recent incentives include: increasing tax exemptions for individual depositors 
operating home ownership savings planS; 1265 extending the deductibility of legal 
and other costs of issuing securities to existing listed companies wishing to 
raise additional capital on any registered stock exchange; 1266 and to extend the 
scope for deducting lease expenses for equipment, machinery and non- 
commercial vehicles. 1267 These measures are aimed at increasing access to 
1259 §7(3) & Fourth Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1260 ý20 ITA 1973. 
1261 Third Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act (Cap 476) 2004. 
1262 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cz . t, p. 2 3. 
1263 ý16 ITA 1973 provides a minimum debt: equity ratio of 3: 1 where equity includes 
both revenue reserves and issued/paid up capital of all categories. 
1264 §15 ITA 1973. 
1265 Up to a maximum of KSh3million: K Budget Speech 2006,1136/p. 31. 
1266 To help deepen the capital markets: ibid, T145/p. 33. 
1267 Ibid, T174/p. 39. 
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finance or savings to indirectly encourage private sector investment. Other 
incentives proposed to directly promote development of infrastructure and 
basic services are considered in the next section. 
5.2.4. INFRASTRUCTURE& BASIC SERVICES 
5.2.4.1. Overview 
Kenya's infrastructure for communicatiofis, transportation and basic services is 
relatively better developed than other countries in EAC CU, strategically 
placing her to serve as the regional economic hub. However, existing 
infrastructure requires urgent upgrading if Kenya is to fulfil her potential of 
serving the region in this way. Past governments have relied on donor aid and 
foreign development finance to provide and upgrade basic infrastructure and 
services. Promises to increase private sector participation have not been 
fulfilled. This section highlights the use of tax incentives to facilitate 
improvements in the provision of infrastructure and basic services. 
5.2.4.2. Information, Communication & Technology (ICT) 
The private sector has been responsible for much of ICT growth in recent 
years. Investment by Kencell and SafariCOM1268has resulted in the phenomenal. 
increase of the mobile subscriber base from 24,000 in 1999 to 1.6million in 
20031269 and from 2.2. million in 2004 to 4.6million in 2005.1270 The fixed-line 
sub-sector remains inefficiently run by Telkom Kenya despite the removal of 
Telkom's monopoly in 2004 or indeed, the decoupling in 1999 of Kenya Posts 
and Telecommunications Corporation into Telkom Kenya, ' the Postal 
Corporation of Kenya and the Communications Commission of Kenya. 
1271 
Unfortunately, the licensing of a second national carrier and a third mobile 
1268 The sub sidiary of the state-owned Telkom Kenya. 
1261 Van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p. 579. 
1270 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Countrj, Studl*es: Kenya, p. 300. 
1271 The decline in fixed-line teledensity from 1 to 0.9 in 100 persons between 2003 and 
2004 underscores the need for the proposed second national carrier and 
the 
privatisation of Telkom Kenya. Telecommunications penetration remains 
low at 15% 
and 1% for mobile and fixed line services respectively: ibid. 
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telephony operator as proposed by the ERS 1272 Was aborted in 2004. 
Implementation of ERS policies vis-d-vis the l1beralisation of internet backbone 
and voice- over-intern et sub-sectors has led to cheaper services, more licensed 
internet service providers, and increased competition from private 
operators. 
1273 
5.2.4.3. Transportation 
Kenya's road network consists of 151,000km of classified and unclassified 
roads which are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works and 
other public agencies. The poor state of roads is often cited as a disincentive 
to investment by local and foreign investors. 1274 Due to inadequate public 
funding and dispersed official responsibility, road infrastructure has 
depreciated since the 1990s. Under the Roads 2000 project, labour-based 
construction and rehabilitation of roads is financed primarily through external 
financing from donors and development partners with the government 
contributing funds from the Fuel Levy Fund and a Constituency Development 
Fund. 1275 ERS policies also focus on rehabilitating and maintaining feeder roads 
in ASALs. 1276 
Despite their historical significance, Kenya's 2765km railway network has 
been poorly managed by the state-owned Kenya Railways, resulting in 
underutilisation of its 7million tonnes annual capacity. The need to provide 
efficient rail services is underscored by the potential to expand regional transit 
traffic beyond existing routes serving Kenya's landlocked neighbours. However 
in October 2005, Kenya Railways Corporation and its Ugandan counterpart 
jointly concessioned the South African Rift Valley consortium led by the 
Sheltam Rail Company to manage the Kenyan and Ugandan railway network for 
25years. The IFC advised on the concessioning which should see freight and 
1272 IMF/Ke"Ya: ERS 2003/2007, pp-42-47. 
1273 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, ob cit, p-18. 
1274 Ibid, p. 20. 
1275 OECD/AfDB, African Economi .c Outlook 2005106 - Country Sludies: Kenya, p. 305. 
1276 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p-59. 
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passenger services improve by better management and increased investment in 
irifrastruc tu re. 1277 
The port of Mombasa has traditionally served as the regional hub for marine 
transportation. Containerised trade has increased remarkably in recent years 
despite growing competition from Tanzania's port of Dar es Salaam. 
Mombasa's ports and the inland container depots at Nairobi, Kisumu and 
Eldoret are managed by the state-owned Kenya Ports Authority. However, 
proposals under ERS seek to redefine the Authority's role making it a landlord 
port authority, while ceding cargo clearing and other services to private sector 
operators. 1278 International air traffic is routed through international airports 
at Nairobi, Mombasa and Eldoret. Volumes of international and domestic air 
traffic rates have increased in recent years particularly since the successful 
privatisation of Kenya Airways in 1996. 
5.2.4.4. Basic Services 
Under ERS, the Kenyan government hopes to improve delivery of 
drinking/portable water, sanitation, housing, healthcare and other basic 
services to its citizens. Kenyans arc to benefit from increased private sector 
participation and greater community involvement in water supply schemes and 
sanitation services as envisaged by the VaterAct2002.1279The Act decouples 
the policy formulation, service delivery and regulatory functions of the state to 
improve the performance of parastatals. Reforms to improve water supplies 
and sanitation services in both rural and urban areas are being coordinated 
under the National Water Resources Management Strategy and the National 
Water Services Strategy and Investment Plan (both initiated in 2003). 1280 
1277 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Countg Studies: Kenya, pp. 305-306; 
UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 21. 
1278 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: Kenya, p. 306; see 
also UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 21. 
1279 Ibid, p. 19. 
1280 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Countg Notes (Kenya), pp-310-312. 
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Kenya's relatively high rates of school attendance and literacy1281 are set to 
increase under the NARC government's proposals with ERS. Increased 
spending on free primary education and teachers' salaries has corresponded 
with higher enrolment of 1.5million children in 2003. ERS also focuses on 
especially vulnerable groups such as the girl child and children from the 
disadvantaged ASALs. 1282 
While Kenya's healthcare delivery system fares well compared with her 
regional neighbours, 1283 there are significant health challenges particularly due 
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, drug-resistant malaria and other diseases. Some 
progress has been made particularly as regards reducing the HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rates from 14% to 7% between 2002 and 2006.1284 ERS policies 
respond to these challenges in a variety of ways including increased funding of 
healthcare for poor and disadvantaged groups, 1285 the provision of better 
treatment and drugs, and greater coordination of public efforts with the 
initiatives of donors and development partners. 1286 
Closely tied to the delivery of infrastructure and basic services for the urban 
poor is the provision of affordable housing. Slum and shanty-town occupants 
are to benefit from proposals under ERS to develop 150,000 housing units per 
annum, facilitate finance by way of secondary market mortgages and encourage 
increased private sector investment. 1287Kenyan- tax law and Budget proposals 
respond to some of these challenges by the provision of fiscal measures. 
"8' 88% of men and 79% of women were literate being the highest rates in the East 
African region: UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 22. 
1282 Other noteworthy initiatives include developing core skills in pupils and 
decentralising authority from the central government to local administrators: 
IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p-51. 
1283 See Table 11.4 Healtb: UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 19. 
1284 Further success is to be achieved under the HIV/AIDS Strategic Control Plan 2005- 
2010 implemented by the National Aids Control Council: see further OECD/AfDB, 
African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Country Studies: Kenya, p. 307. 
1281 By increasing the budget allocation for health from 5.6% to 12% by 2007. 
1286 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp-51-53; OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: 
Counig Notes (Kenya), pp. 313-314. 
1287 Ibid, p. 5 9. 
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5.2.4.5. Tax Incentives 
General rules apply in the taxation of entities engaged in infrastructure and 
services. 1288Kenyan tax statutes feature an eclectic collection of tax measures 
aimed at promoting activity in the infrastructure, ICT and basic services 
sectors. Several direct (income) tax incentives address these alms. For instance,, 
subject to reciprocity, incomes accruing to non-resident owners of air 
transportation businesses are exempt from income tax. 1289 Capital allowances 
are available by way of wear and tear deductions to relieve income tax 
liability. The relevant annual rates are 30% for computers, peripheral computer 
hardware, calculators, copiers and duplicating machines; 25% for self- 
propelling vehicles including aircraft; and 12.5% for ships and other 
machinery. 1290 
Firms may also benefit from wear and tear deductions by deducting 2.5% per 
annum of eligible capex over 40 years. Eligible capex covers expenditures 
incurred in connection with industrial buildings. 'Industrial buildings' 
comprise: docks, bridges, tunnels and inland navigation facilities; and 
undertakings for the supply of water for public consumption and of hydraulic 
power. 1291 Special provisions grant accelerated deductions -- to owners and 
operators of shipping businesses. Such owners or operators may deduct 40% of 
the cost of the purchase and refitting of a new or used ship of more than 495 
1292However, a special tax is imposed on tonnes gross in the first year of use. 
purchasers of second-hand motor cars assessed at varying rates. 1293 
1288 Although there are some unique provisions; e. g. a telecommunications tax is imposed 
on users of telecoms services and apparatus at 15% of the user fees: IBFD, African 
Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p-21. 
1219 First Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1290 T7 Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1291 T5 Second Schedule, ibid. 
1292 This is subject to the limitation of one of such deductions per ship; claw-back 
provisions are applicable if the vessel is disposed of within 5 years of the 
deduction: 
ý25 Second Schedule ITA 1973. 
1293 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 21. 
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Other tax incentives are implemented through indirect tax measures. 
Designated VAT-able services include certain computer services, 1294 engineering 
and telecommunication services, and services of clearing and forwarding 
agents. 1295 Certain provisions exempt the transportation of passengers by 
means other than hire from VAT1296while others provide for VAT remissions 
for taxable services provided to public road rehabilitation projects financed by 
private sector donations. 1297 Imported ships and boats are also exempt from 
customs duties. 1298 
Some incentive measures were proposed under the 2006 Budget. Some 
measures target the provision of basic services. For instance, the supply of 
portable water by public bodies was to be zero-rated for VAT. 1299Unspecified 
tax incentives were promised to promote private sector investment in road 
infrastructure and the management of Mombasa Freeport. 1300 Private sector 
finance of infrastructural development was to be further encouraged by tax 
deductions for the construction of public schools, hospitals and roads 
through private-public partnerships. 1301 Land transactions in respect of new 
schools were to enjoy stamp duties exemptions and industrial building 
allowances were to be extended to the construction of hostels and other 
educational buildings. 1302 Financial incentives were offered by way of income 
tax exemptions for interest from bonds and asset-backed securities issued 
to finance infrastructural development and social services. 13030ther unspecified 
measures were proposed to strengthen Kenya's ICT position in East Africa and 
provide employment for the youth. 1304These proposals would appear to deliver 
on government's commitment under ERS to introduce targeted incentives for 
1294 These include bureau services facilities, systems analysis and design, software 
development and training. Educational services are however excluded. 
1295 Fourth Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act. 
1296 Second Schedule, ibid. 
1297 §23, ibid. 
1298 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, o_p cit, p. 20; Customs & Excise Act 1978. 
1299 K Budget Speech 2006, T123/p. 29. 
1311 TT80 & 84/pp-19-20, ibid. 
1301 T140/p. 32, ibid. See also Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1302 K Budget Speech 2006, ýý137-138/p. 32. 
1303 T143-146/p. 33, ibid. 
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supplies of computer software /hardware to improve accessibility for micro- 
entrepreneurs and low income earners. 1305 
Only a few additional incentives were provided for by the 2007/2008 Budget. 
Leased aircraft equipment and certain maritime equipment/vessels were to be 
zero-rated for VAT. 1306Developers constructing low income housing for rental 
purposes would be eligible for industrial building allowances. Inputs utilised 
in construction low income housing in excess of 20-units in planned 
development schemes were to be zero-rated for VAT. 1307The trend of placing 
private sector initiatives at the fore-front and increasing linkages between 
education, entrepreneurship, trade and industry are reflected in the incentives 
examined next. 
5.2.5. MANUFACTURING, TRADE & INDUSTRY 
5.2.5.1. Overview 
Kenya's manufacturing and industrial base is driven 
sector involving significant foreign investment froj 
multinationals. Industrial FDI is complemented by 
indirect participation. Numerous opportunities exist 
by an established private 
m predominantly Western 
substantial public sector 
in textiles, 1308metal, steel 
and vehicle-parts assembly, 1309 electronics and engineering, cement and 
construction, cer amics and glass, plastics and chemicals, 13111 and 
1304 T86/p. 20, ibid. 
1305 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p-43. 
1316 PricewaterhouseCoopers Kenya, 2007 Budget Bulletin: VAT, p-2. 
"I' K Budget Speech 2007/2008, p-31. 
1308 In the early 1990s, the textiles /apparel industry attracted Asian inward investment 
exploiting Kenya's quota under the US African Growth and Qpportunity Act 2000 
(AGOA). Under AGOA (and AGOA Acceleration Act 2004) certain products 
(including apparel) from eligible African countries may be exported duty-free to the 
USA. However, recent changes in the AGOA policies mean greater competition from 
countries like China and a lack of investment in capacity building at lower levels in 
the local fabric supply chains: UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, 
Box 111.6, p. 47; van Buren 'Kenya: Econorny, ' op cit, p. 577. 
1309 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, Box 111.4, pp. 42-43; van Buren 
'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p. 577. 
"0 Refining and processing of imported petroleum by Kenya Petroleum Refinery 
Limited (a joint-venture substantially owned by Shell) to meet domestic demand and 
for re-export has spawned a large petrochemicals industry: ibid, p-578. 
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pharmaceuticals. 1311 Much industrial activity involves manufacturing or local 
assembly (utilising imported components, technology and machinery) for 
domestic or regional consumption (as opposed to world markets). This trend 
stems from the import- substitution policies of the 1960s/1970s and the late 
shift towards promoting export-oriented manufacturing and industrial activity 
in the late 1990s. 
While average growth in industrial output was 10.5% between 1965 and 1980, 
productivity stalled significantly in the 1990s with growth in manufacturing 
GDP averaging at- a record low of 1.9% between 1990 and 2002.1312Happily, 
manufacturing and industrial activity is gradually recovering: recent growth has 
been driven by rising domestic and regional demand causing output to increase 
from 2.7% (2003/04) to 4.1% (2004/05). 1313 In 2005, manufacturing 
contributed 14% of GDP growing by 5% due to certain tax incentives for 
intermediate goods and enforced anti-dumping measures. 1314Tax incentives and 
EPZ initiatives were also instrumental in increasing manufacturing output in 
2007.1315 
ERS policies to promote industrial productivity are couched in very general 
terms. Besides the removal of barriers to business, reduction of costs and 
improvement of the environment for labour-intensive industrial growth, other 
policies are to be determined in consultation with the private sector in a 
proposed Industrial Master Plan. 1316However, existing provisions in Kenyan 
tax law provide numerous and generous fiscal incentives to promote (export- 
oriented) manufacturing and industrial activity. 
1311 Ibid, pp. 41-43. 
1312 Van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op c, t, p. 577. 
1313 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2004105 - Country Studies: Kenya, p. 298. 
1314 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), p. 302. 
1315 CBK Monthly Economic Review, November 2007, p. 18. 
IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p. 50. 
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5.2.5.2. Tax Incentives 
Manufacturing and trading companies are taxable on normal rules depending 
on whether they are resident or non-resident entities. As noted above, losses 
may be carried forward indefinitely but not carried back. 1317 Industrial and 
trading companies benefit from normal deductions for R&D expenditure, 
advertising expenditure and employees' meals provided at office residences. 1318 
Certain depreciation allowances are specifically targeted at industrial firms. 
Annual capital allowances are granted for computers (at 30%), self- 
propelling vehicles (at 25%) and all other machinery (at 12.5%). 1319Modest 
wear and tear deductions permit 2.5% annual allowances for industrial 
buildings expensing related capex over 40 years. Eligible facilities include 
accommodation for employees, mills, factories, manufacturing facilities, 
storage and transport facilities. 1320More generous accelerated depreciation is 
provided by way of special investment deductions. These permit up to 
J00%1321 of capex incurred on buildings and machinery to be deducted by way 
of investment allowances in the first year the relevant asset is utilised. 
However, outlays on facilities for design, storage, transportation and 
administration facilities are excluded. 1322 Certain provisions extend these 
special investment deductions to manufacturing-un der- bond and export 
processing zones. 1323 
Export-oriented activities enjoy the most generous incentives available under 
Kenyan tax law, perhaps reflecting the importance of generating foreign 
exchange to improve the balance-of-trade and external debt positions. Export- 
oriented manufacturing activities at licensed customs bonded factories are 
promoted by numerous incentives. Imported capital equipment an-d machinery 
1317 IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. 6. 
1318 §15 ITA 1973. 
1319 T7 Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1320 T5 Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1321 Varying percentages are applied depending on the year in which the expenditure is 
incurred and the location of the investment. In the main, expenditures after 
2004 
enjoy 100% deductions as do investments outside Nairobi and 
Mombasa. 
1322 T24 Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
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utilised at such facilities are entitled to VAT remissions as are other capital 
goods acquired for sums in excess of -KSh5million for industrial and other 
activities to generate foreign exchange earnings. 1324 
The Export Processing Zones Act (Cap 517) 1990 (hereafter: EPZ Act 1990) 
provides a raft of liberal fiscal incentives targeted at promoting and facilitating 
export-oriented manufacturing and services. The enabling environment' is 
provided by the designation by the Minister for Trade and Industry of certain 
geographical locations as export processing zones to be supervised by an 
Export Processing Zones Authority. 1325 To be eligible for licensing, 
prospective enterprises must: be incorporated in Kenya with the sole objects of 
producing goods and services for export within a zone; intend to be engaged in 
eligible export-oriented activities which do not constitute a health hazard or 
have adverse effects on the environment; and engage in lawful activities in 
compliance with applicable laws. 1326 
Licensed export processing enterprises must be engaged in specified 
manufacturing, 1327 service1328 or commercial 1329 activities. 1330 Certain regulations 
circumscribe the freedom of EPZ enterprises to operate in the zones: 
manufactured goods and services must be for export only to other jurisdictions 
or export into Kenya's customs territory (whereupon they are deemed to be 
imported into Kenya and subject to normal import and customs procedures). 
Goods may be repaired, maintained and converted in Kenya under the 
supervision of the EPZ Authority. 1331 No retail trade is allowed within the 
1323 TT24A & 24B, ibid. 
1324 ý23 Kenyan VAT Act. 
1325 553 & 15, EPZ Act 1990. 
1326 ý23 ibid. 
1327 Manufacturing here excludes installation and agricultural activities and relates to 
conversion and assembly activities. 
1321 Eligible conversion activities include trading in, breaking bulk, grading, repacking or 
re-labelling goods and industrial raw materials. 
1329 ViZ., export-related consultancy, information, brokerage and repair services are 
eligible; however, services usually provided through off-shore financial centres are 
excluded. 
1330 §2 EPZ Act 1990. 
1331 5ý24 & 25, ibid. 
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zones though it appears this rule has been recently relaxed to allow 5% of 
goods to be traded in the local market. 1332 
The wide-ranging incentives granted to EPZ enterprises include exemption 
from existing and future VAT, customs and excise regulations and duties 
on all imports used for export production. The most generous measures are the 
income tax incentives: an extravagant ten-year tax holiday is granted 
providing income tax exemption for the first decade of productive operations. 
On expiry of the ten-year income tax holiday, a reduced income tax rate of 
25% applies for yet another ten years. Withholding tax exemptions are tied 
to this 20-year period in that payments to non-resident individuals and entities 
in respect of dividends, interest, royalties and other disbursements are tax 
exempt. Further exemptions apply for stamp duties, import and export 
provisions, foreign exchange regulations, rent and tenancy controls, and local 
provisions regarding individual income tax for non-resident employees. 1333 
Finally, the first year 100% special investment deductions applicable under 
the ITA 1973 are extended to expenditure by EPZ enterprises on buildings and 
machinery. 1334 
In the last decade, EPZ activity has increased significantly. However, the 
majority of EPZ operations are foreign owned1335 and engaged in the garments 
sector. 1336 Although most EPZs are located in Mombasa, 1337 the Athi River EPZ 
1332 §26, ibid; IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cit, p. vii. 
1333 529 EPZ Act 1990; IBFD, African Taxation Systems: Kenya, op cil, p. vill. 
1334 124B Second Schedule, ITA 1973. 
1335 Local Kenyans owned only 13.2% of firms and participated in another 29.4% by joint 
ventures in 2005. Foreign investors from Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
owned 57.4% of EPZ enterprises: see EPZ Authority Annual Report for the Year 
2005, (hereafter: 2005 KEPZA Report) Kenyan Export Processing Zones Authority, 
pp. 16, available at <httl2: //www. ei2zakenva. com/news. 12hP-etvpe=12ublication, >. 
1336 In 2005, garments contributed the greatest percentage of employment (90%), number 
of firms (36.8%), total sales (63.9%), exports (74.4%) and local resource utilisation 
(52.1%). Other active sectors included agro-proces sing, chemicals, services, printing, 
pharmaceuticals and electronics: 2005 KEPZA Report, p. 15. 
1337 Mombasa hosted 21 of the 43 gazetted EPZs in 2005; other EPZs were located in 
Nairobi, Athi River, Kilifi, Voi, Malindi and the Keria Valley: ibid, p. 10. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
2ueen Mary, University of London 
Page 246 of418 
The Role o'f Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan African Economies: 5: A Review of Kenyan Tax Incentives A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African & Kenyan Tax Law 
is the most active of the 43-odd zones. 1338 Unfortunately, recent EPZ 
performance has been disappointing: only 65% of the EPZs were operational in 
20051339with another 18.66% of the zones being listed for de-gazettement for 
numerous reasons including change in external policies, low demand for EPZ 
tenants) loss of investors' interest in the scheme and financial difficulties. 1340 
Operational EPZ firms reduced from 74 to 68 in 2005 matching declines in 
totals sales and exports. 1341 
Several factors contributed to this recession. First, key external policy changes 
affected demand. In particular, the expiry of textile quotas under the World 
Trade Organisation (hereafter: WTO) rules in early 2005 meant Kenyan 
garment exporters were exposed to fierce competition from more efficient 
producers in Asian countries notably India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. 
Secondly, on the supply side, relatively high Kenyan labour, electricity and 
other production costs which were acerbated by adverse government polIcies1342 
undermined export competitiveness. Low labour productivity contributes to 
the inability of the domestic cotton industry to improve the quality of supplies 
to take full advantage of the extension of the third country fabric requirements 
under the AGOA. 1343 
On a positive note, employment increased mýrginally by 0.9% as 38,051 
Kenyans were directly employed in EPZ firms. 
1344As a result of declining 
exports of garments to the US market, firms diversified and pioneered inroads 
Attracting the greatest percentage of firms (29.4%), local employment (23.3%), and 
investment (29.5%) in 2005: ibid, pp. 14-15. 
2.3% were complete but unoccupied: ibid, p. 10. 
1340 See Table 4,2005 KEPZA Report, p-12- 
1341 Sales and exports declined by 1.8% and 13.1% in 2005 to Ksh. 23.774billion and 
Ksh. 20.038billion respectively: ibid, p. 9. 
1342 Vis-, i-ws petroleum imports duties, labour laws, customs clearance regulations and 
immigration. 
1343 The AGOA which was to expire in 2008 was extended till 2015 by the African 
Investment Incentike Act of 2006 (20-12-06). In addition, the third country fabric 
requirements (under which AGOA accredited countries could source from third 
countries fabrics used to manufacture garments for export to the US market) has 
been similarly extended from September 2007 till September 2012. 
1344 Total employment stood at 50,735 in 2005: 2005 KEPZA Report, p. 9. 
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into the Canadian, European and Middle Eastern markets. 1345 Despite the 
extension of the AGOA till 2015, the dominance of the US market as the main 
export'destination underscores the vulnerability of the Kenyan EPZ scheme to 
changes in external poliCy. 1346 
On the whole, these generous EPZ incentives seem to have achieved some 
positive results, with total investment growing 109% from Ksh. 8.95billion in 
2001 to Ksh. 18.682billion in 2005.1347 Certain studies show that import duty 
waivers on capital goods and other imports have improved recent 
manufacturing performance. 1348 Evidently hoping to consolidate these 
successes, budgetary proposals promise additional incentives for 
manufacturing. In conjunction with Finance Ministers of the other EAC CU 
countries, import duty is to be removed for equipment utilised in the 
harnessing of solar power, oil and fuel filters, and inputs for metal fabrication. 
Import duty is also to be reduced for unprinted aluminium foil and increased 
for imported floor coverings, mats and matches. 1349 Sugar development levies 
and tariffs on certain imports are also reduced. 1350 These measures are to 
protect local infant industries and enhance their competitiveness. 
As noted above, industry is slowly recovering from years of decline. Some 
commentators have criticised poor government policies for the poor 
performance of the past. Specific policies attracting such censure include a 
focus on first-stage import substitution 1351 in lieu of export-oriented 
manufacturing; undue accommodation by successive governments of 
multinationals and importers' interests to the detriment of indigenous 
industrialists; preference for production of (non-essential) luxury goods 
instead of (necessary) agricultural inputs which could improve food security; 
1-345 Ibid, p. 19. 
1346 Ibid, p. 24. 
1341 Table 1,2005 KEPZA Report, P-9. 
1348 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2004105 - Country Studies: Kenya, p-268. 
1349 K Budget Speech 2006, TT152-154/p. 35. 
1350 K Budget Speech 2007/2008, pp-26,28. 
1351 The assembly of final products as opposed to intermediate components or value- 
additive manufacturing. 
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and corruption, mismanagement and policy inconsistencies as regards import 
controls and tariffs. 1352 
Other suggested causes for the decline are expensive and irregular power 
supply, poor infrastructure and excessive red-tape in customs clearing 
procedures. 1353 Much of these shortcomings disproportionately affect 
microenterprises. The next section considers some of the incentives granted 
specifically to improve investment conditions for smaller businesses. 
5.2.6. MICRO-ENTERPRISES 
5.2.6.1. Overview 
Kenyan micro - entrepreneurs face significant environmental challenges in 
competing with each other and their larger, foreign-owned counterparts. Prior 
to independence, Asian entrepreneurs emerged as successful merchants and 
industrialists supported by strong, mutually- supportive ethnic and lingual ties. 
Indigenous African entrepreneurship evolved much later capitalising on 
commercial opportunities facilitated by political reforms, demand for 
commodities associated with the Second World War and the indigenous 
demand for new goods and services. 1354 
The small and medium sized enterprises (SME) sector has since grown, 
contributing significantly to job-creation. 1355 Kenyan SMEs usually trade as 
sole traders or partnerships with a more a limited scale of operations than their 
foreign-owned counterparts. However, increased linkages between indigenous 
enterprises and foreign-owned industries have led to new opportunities in 
export-oriented agriculture and horticulture, tourism, small-scale and export- 
oriented manufacturing, local industrial assembly, retail trade and tourism. An 
1352 Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questjor Prosperity, op cit, pp-140-146. 
1353 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2005106 - Countg Studies: Kenya, pp. 298-299. 
1354 Miller and Yeager, Kenya: the Questjor Prosperqy, o_p cit, pp. 27-29. 
1355 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), p. 314. 
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emerging, industrious and capitalistic middle class augments local demand for 
indigenously-produced goods and services. 1356 
Problems with poor transportation, electrical and other infrastructure fall 
disproportionately on micro- enterprises. Access to finance is problematic with 
only 10% of the population enjoying access to banking services. 1357 Indigenous 
investors are more likely to complain of lack of government support, 
bureaucracy and corruption. 1358 ERS proposes to rectify the perceived lack of 
support by improving access to finance for SMEs-1359 Fiscal measures which 
may promote micro- enterprises within various economic sectors are considered 
in the next section. 
5.2.6.2. Tax Incentives 
Some provisions in Kenya's investment law appear to discriminate agal . nst 
SMEs. For instance, requirements for the investment certificate issued under 
the Investment Promotion Act 2004 make it mandatory for local investors to 
invest a minimum of KSh. 5million (US$65,000) to be eligible. 1360 Given the 
extensive nature of Kenya's business regulation and licensing requirements,, 
this provision would seem unduly onerous if not perverse. 1361 SMEs, however, 
may benefit from the numerous fiscal incentives applicable to the different 
sectors considered in this Chapter. Agricultural SMEs could take advantage of 
special deductions for farm works and agricultural equipment to reduce the 
financial burden of capital investment. Numerous opportunities exist to exploit 
VAT exemptions and zero-rating for agricultural supplies and inputs. 
"I, Van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p. 573. 
1357 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2004105 - Country Studies: Kenya, p. 274. 
1158 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 61. 
"" IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p-37. 
1360 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, p. 51. 
1361 Small companies less able to engage expensive business consultants and tax advisers 
to navigate through the regulatory maze would be deterred 
by the high financial 
threshold and yet, their better-heeled counterparties which are 
better equipped to 
deal with the extensive licensing regime would 
freely receive all necessary licenses 
and permits. 
Bode Oyetunde PhD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
. 
Queen Marj,, Universiýy of London 
Page 250 of 4 18 
The Role of Tax Incentit, es in A Trio of Suh-Saharan Aftican Economies: 5: A Revien, of Kenyan Tax Inceniives 
A Comparalive Stndy of Nigerian, South Aftican & Kenyan Tax Law 
Many SME suffer from inability to raise finance to fund expansion or acquire 
new technology. As noted above, new and venture capital companies are 
entitled to generous tax incentives by way of reduced income tax rates o&f 25% 
(or 27%) for 5 (or 3 years) to encourage them to list their securities. By 
definition, these venture capital companies are SMEs 1362with bright enough 
prospects to attract funding from venture capital funds. 1363 By exploiting the 
benefits for venture capital companies, some of these financing constraints 
may be mitigated. Leasing options also provide some advantages for SMEs 
unable to buy capital assets outright. 
Finance-related incentives would be of great benefit to SMEs active in the 
manufacturing and trade sectors given the capit al and technological intensive 
nature of these undertakings. However, by qualifying as EPZ enterprises, SMEs 
could exploit the extensive incentives available, particularly the generous tax 
holidays, reduced income tax rates and VAT/duty exemptions. Indeed, this has 
been the strategy of many SMEs engaged in the garment sector, given the large 
numbers located in Kenya's EPZs. However export-oriented trade comes with 
international risks, as the recent expiry of the Multi-fibre Arrangement in the 
textile sub-sector illustrates. Despite generous fiscal incentives and numerous 
AGOA opportunities, the sector has been unable to capitalise on recent 
successes to develop the high-quality price-competitive edge to compete with 
larger competitors such as China. 1364 
SMEs engaged in infrastructural development and basic services would 
generally benefit more from the structural reforms of these sectors to permit 
greater private sector participation. However, existing VAT, stamp duty and 
customs duty preferences would be useful. To expatiate, VAT provisions set a 
minimum financial threshold for taxable persons. Businesses making supplies 
1362 As their original market values or turnover would be less than Ksh. 500,000million: 
52(l) ITA 1973. 
1363 Income Tax (Venture CaPital Company) Rules, 1,9,97; IBFD, African Taxation Systems: 
Kenya, op cit, p. 7. 
1361 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2004105 - Country Studies: Kenya, p. 26; 
UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, oP cit, p. 47. 
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of taxable goods and services which do not exceed KSh. 3million over a 12 
month period1365 need not register for VAT. 1366 Budgetary proposals increase 
the threshold for compulsory VAT registration to KSh5million to reduce 
compliance costs for smaller taxpayers. A turnover tax was introduced to 
capture taxp ayers with turnovers of less than KSh5million. These firms would 
be liable to tax at 3% on turnover, subject to a maximum KSh150,000 charge. 
However, due to defective drafting, the commencement date was postponed to 
1 January 2008.1367 
The next section considers incentive opportunities for SMEs and other firms 
active in the tourism and entertainment sectors. 
5.2.7. TOURISM & ENTERTAINMENT 
Overview 
The growth of the tourism/ services sector over the last decade has been 
phenomenal, contributing 50% of GDP in 2005.1368 Local attractions range 
from the famous beaches, national and marine parks, game and blosphere 
reserves to archaeological sites attracting predominantly European and 
American tourists. Concerns over terrorism and insecurity instigated negative 
travel advisories by the British and American governments in 2003. These 
actions resulted in a massive loss of custom as tourist bookings were cancelled 
and arrivals shrunk. The introduction of tourist police, anti-terrorism squads 
and other security measures has allayed much of the security concerns. Arrivals 
from traditional tourist-generating countries (Germany, the UK, Italy, the US 
and France) have increased and tourism receipts are recovering due to 
Or KSh. 2.4million in 9months, KSh. 1.8million in 6months or KSh-1.2million in 
3months: Sixth Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act. 
1166 However, these SMEs may voluntarily elect to register if they so desire: T3, Sixth 
Schedule, ibid. 
1361 K Budget Speech 2006,1175/p. 39 cf. PricewaterhouseCoopers Kenya, 2007 Budget 
Bulletin: Direct Tax, p. 3 
1368 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), pp. 300,302. 
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enhanced marketing, diversification and security. 1361 However, international 
arrivals and departures have declined In late 2007/early 2008 due to the 
increasingly unstable political situation. The political aftermath of the disputed 
December 2007 elections is likely to acerbate this decline. 1370 
New ERS initiatives seek to attract visitors from the Asia -Pacific region, 
encourage domestic tourism, develop new tourist circuits, increase private and 
community participation in the sector, and ensure preservation of wildlife and 
environmental resources. 137'Entertainment services are also promoted with 
cultural performance, plays and other leisure activities. These initiatives seek 
to promote Kenya as a desirable Meetings, Incentives, Conference and 
Exhibitions venue. 1372 
5.2.7.2. Tax Incentives 
Tourism as a major earner of vital foreign exchange has been encouraged by 
non-tax measures1373 a Swell as fiscal incentives. Tax incentives include special 
first year 100% investment deductions which are allowed for expenditure on 
the construction of hotel buildings duly certified by the Commissioner of Tax 
as industrial buildings. These deductions extend to outlays on staff quarters, 
kitchens, entertainment and sporting facilities integral to the hotel complex. 1374 
Numerous VAT exemptions exist for tour operators and -travel agents, 
entertainment services, accommodation and restaurant services,, conference 
services and the transportation of tourists. 1375 In addition, supplies for 
materials and equipment for use in the construction or refurbishment of tourist 
hotels, and services supplied by hotels to foreign travel and tourism promoters 
Tourist arrivals increased by 14.5% in 2006 to 954,355 tourists mainly from Europe 
(56.3%): CBK Monthly Economic Review, February 2007, p-19- 
1370 CBK Monthly Economic Review, December 2007, p. 20. 
1371 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, pp-48-49. 
1372 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to Kenya, op cit, pp. 39-40. 
1373 E. g. the exemption of hotels in Mombasa and other coastal areas from electricity 
rationing scheme in 2000: van Buren 'Kenya: Economy, ' op cit, p. 580. 
1374 TT5 & 24, Second Schedule ITA 1973. 
1371 Third Schedule, Kenyan VAT Act. 
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are zero-rated1376 in line with ERS proposals for tax incentives for tourism 
infrastructure refurbishment. 1377 Finally, restaurant, bar and beverage services 
provided by restaurant owners or operators, and accommodation and other 
amenities provided by hotel owners or operators were previously subject to a 
reduced VAT rate of 14%. 1378ThIs reduced rate was replaced in 2006 with the 
uniform 16% rate for all VAT supplies. 1379 However, services provided by 
Kenyan artistes are to be exempt from VAT. 1380 
137, Fifth Schedule, ibid. 
1177 IMF/Kenya: ERS 2003/2007, p-49- 
1378 First Schedule, ibid. 
1379 K Budget Speech 2006, ý168/pp. 37-38. 
1380 Ibid, ý128/p. 30- 
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5.3. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter summarises key aspects of the historical and political 
development of the Kenyan legal and tax system. It notes salient features of 
the Kenyan investment and regulatory environment and highlights key aspects 
of the Kenyan tax system. It also reviews existing Kenyan tax incentives 
against the back ground of the economic sectors in which these measures 
operate. Finally, it concludes the part of this Study concerned with the 
exposition and review of tax incentives in Nigeria,, South Africa and Kenya. 
Diverse fiscal measures are utilised to build upon ERS/Vision 2030's policy 
initiatives and promote economic growth and development in Kenya. 
Numerous incentives promote agricultural productivity. In the main, these 
incentives tend to promote large-scale, mechanised and capital-intensive 
agricultural production. Other more general transaction-based tax incentives 
have a wider reach to benefit less-capital intensive modes of farming by 
smallholders and communities. There are considerably more incentives for the 
mining and power sectors than the energy sector, ''but this is understandable 
given the better prospects of the former. Various finance-based incentives 
are provided to promote new ventures and firms, deepen capital markets and 
promote private sector capital formation. The private sector's role in 
contributing to the provision of vital infrastructure and basic services has 
been recognised by several incentives targeted at promoting private 
investment. However, major structural reforms are long overdue. 
There is a noticeable emphasis on the promotion of export-oriented industrial 
activity particularly for regional trade within the EAC CU and global trade with 
the EU, Asia and the USA. This trend is mirrored by fiscal measures to 
promote economic sectors vital to generate foreign exchange earnings and 
improve Kenya's balance of trade position. Tourism, export-oriented 
agriculture, manufacturing for export and local assembly for regional 
markets are all actively encouraged. Less emphasis is placed on fiscal measures 
to address SME development, basic infrastructure /services, poverty 
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alleviation and domestic food security. These issues appear to be relegated 
except where addressed by joint initiatives with donor countries, development 
finance agencies and international lending consortiums. However, some fiscal 
support is provided for these sectors. Key issues emerging from this Chapter 
include the modest success Kenya has experienced in implementing its EPZ 
regime; the promotion of export-oriented agricultural and industrial 
production; and the relatively advanced economic integration in the EAC. 
Chapter 6 examines international tax law issues such as the dynamic interaction 
of source and resident country tax policies and the implications these pose for 
tax incentive design, tax treaty negotiation, and the wash-out or pass through 
of tax incentives. It considers the impact of regional integration arrangements 
on national tax incentive policies within the context of combating harmful tax 
competition and promoting regional fiscal cooperation. However, international 
tax obligations are not the only international influences constraining tax 
incentive policy. Chapter 6 also considers two other constraints international 
trade regulations and international finance arrangements - and their effect on 
tax incentive policies. The discussions in Chapter 6 lead on to more critical 
analysis in Chapter 7 of Nigerian tax incentives law and policy with lessons 
from the South African and Kenyan experiences. 
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6. REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL 
TAX, TRADE & FINANCE POLICY ISSUES 
"Experience has shown that the more quickýy the econom grows, y 
the more quickly afairer distribution of income takesplace ... 
the basic recipe for success remains much the same: we need to maintain fiscal discipline 
and continue our struggle against inflation; we must encourage domestic andjoreign 
investment; we must continue witb privati. Zation; we must open our economy in a 
responsible manner to domestic andglobal competition; and if we wisb to createjobs, 
we must above all develop a moreflexible andproductive labour system. 
Fe sbouldfurtbermore insist on cost-effective, efficient and bonest government. 111381 
6.0. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding three Chapters have reviewed the tax incentive policies of 
Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya in varying degrees of detail. These Chapters 
demonstrate h ow tax incentive policies have been codified into fiscal 
legislation in these countries. However, there are certain international 
influences that affect these policies. The constraints they impose on the tax 
incentive policies of Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya form the subject matter 
of the present Chapter. By considering the works of various authors, 
commentators and institutions, this Chapter analyses and reviews certain 
aspects of the international tax, trade and finance matrix that developing 
countries such as those considered in this Thesis must necessarily navigate in 
the pursuit of economic development through fiscal incentives. 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate F. W. de Klerk, The Last Trek: A New Beginning: The 
Auto biography, (Macmillan, London: 1998), p. 396. 
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6.1. INTERNATIONAL TAx LAW & POLICY ISSUES 
6.1-1. Introduction 
This Chapter starts with a consideration of aspects of international tax law 
which affect tax incentive policies in developing countries. The interaction of 
international tax law with national fiscal policies raises numerous issues not 
least of which concern mechanisms for targeting FDI incentives, designing 
withholding tax policies, ensuring unilateral or tr&aty relief from international 
double taxation and expanding the scope of tax treaty networks. 1382 
A general review of th. e principles and practices of international tax law is 
beyond the scope of this Thesis. 1383 Indeed, due to the complexities of some of 
these issues Richard Vann advises that the 'taxation of foreign investors is the 
last international taxation issue that a developing or transition country should 
seriously tackle'. 1384While developing countries have various draft model tax 
conventions to choose from, the OECD Mod-el Double Taxation Convention 
on Income and Capital has been by far the most influential model despite 
suggestions that the UN Model Tax Convention is more desirable for 
developing nations due to its preference for source country taxation. 1385Given 
the constraints of time and scope, the discussion here would be confined to a 
few international taxation matters that directly impinge on the tax incentive 
policies of developing countries. The rest of this section (§6.1) considers these 
matters with a special emphasis on tax sparing provisions. 
1382 David Holland and Richard J. Vann, 'Income Tax Incentives for Investment' in 
Victor Thuronyi (ed) Tax Law Design and Drafting, Vol. 1, (IMF, Washington D. C: 
1998), pp. 986-1020. 
1383 For a South African view, see Olivier and Honiball, International Tax: A South African 
Perspective, op cit. More generally, see Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions and 
International Tax Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell: 2005); Jonathan Schwarz, Tax 
Treaties: UK Law and Practice (London, Sweet & Maxwell: 2001); and Richard J. Vann, 
'International Aspects of Income Tax' in Victor Thuronyl (ed) Tax Law Desý n and 
Drafting, Vol. 1, op cit, pp. 718-810. 
1384 Ibid, p. 810. 
p Olivier and Honiball, International Tax: A South African Perspective, o cit, p-8. For a 
fuller critique on alternative model conventions from the perspectives of developing 
countries see: Kibuta Ongwamuhana The Taxation of Income from Foreign Investments: A 
Tax Study of Some Developing Countries (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer: 1991). 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Srbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Oueen Mam, Universiýy of London 
Pqge 258 of 4 18 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies 6: Regional -" International Tax, Trade A Comparalive Study of Nigerian, South African & KenYav Tax Law & Finance Policy Issues 
6.1.2. Viherkenttii's 1991 Study 
6.1.2-1. Introduction 
One of the more comprehensive works in the literature on tax incentives policy 
issues for developing countries is a study by Timo Viherkenttý focusing on the 
relationship between income tax incentives for inward FDI in developing 
countries and the taxation of foreign income in capital- exporting countries. 1386 
He examines the complexities created in international tax law by the 
interaction of typical developing country tax incentives and the tax treatment 
of foreign sourced income by the tax codes of 4 capital exporting developed 
countries, vi5, -.: the USA, the UK, Germany and Finland. He considers the 
impact of these developed countries' tax codes on developing country tax 
concessions primarily by analysing the extent to which these codes 'wash-out' 
or cpass-through' the benefit of the tax incentives directly to developed 
country resident parent companies, or indirectly through third country resident 
holding or investment companies, and (ultimately) to the shareholders of such 
parent companies resident in these capital- exporting countries. 
Viherkenttd adopts a policy approach in his study, noting that it would be hard 
to envisage a study which could yield precise and reliable empirical results of 
frustration ratios for developing country tax incentives. 1381 However, 
ViherkentWs study differs considerably from the present Thesis in several 
respects. 1388Unlike the present Thesis, ViherkenttH's study adopts a wholly-FDI 
focused and capital- exporting country-centric approach which essentially 
examines the effects of dated, 1389 alternate policies of 4 industrialised 
countries. 1390 Indeed, he notes that as developing countries as a group exhibit a 
wide range of economic and social structures, legal systems and natural 
1116 Viherkenttii, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, OP cit. 
1387 Ibid, p. 230. 
1388 There are certain similarities in both approaches. Both studies focus primarily on 
corporate as opposed to personal income tax. While, this Thesis, like his study, does 
not seek to set out a truly comprehensive presentation of the tax regimes of any 
countries, this Thesis provides a sufficiently comprehensive exposition of the 
Nigerian tax incentive regime to inform the applications of lessons from the South 
African and Kenyan experiences to the Nigerian situation. 
1389 Vlherkenttý's study was published in 1991. 
1390 Vlherkenttii, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, qP cz . t' P. 5. 
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resource endowments, he makes certain necessary generalisations which must 
be approached with caution and which itnpose limits on his findings. 1391 
Viherkenttý emphasises issues raised by dividend distributions given his 
preoccupation with the financing side of FDI in developing countries. 
Conversely, this Thesis examines the other side of the coin: the tax incentive 
policies influencing investments' in three developing countries, closely 
analysing the implications that lessons from two of the countries pose for the 
third. Nevertheless, to the extent that Vlherkenttd's findings may inform the 
tax incentive policies of developing country pollcy-makers in Nigeria, South 
Africa and Kenya, this Researcher finds his study particularly useful in 
highlighting salient aspects of developing- developed country tax interactions 
that might otherwise be obscure. 
6.1.2.2. Summary of Viherkenttii's Main Points 
Viherkenttý examines the interaction between developing country tax 
incentives and various tax regimes including the exemption, foreign tax 
credit, 1192tax sparing credit, deduction and reduced tax rate systems. He finds 
that evaluating the wash-out or pass-through of tax incentive benefits is a 
complicated affair largely dependant on the intricacies of capital- exporting 
countries' tax codes and the peculiar circumstances of the relevant enterprises. 
Various issues therefore arise for developing country policyrnakers to consider 
when granting tax incentives to foreign resident companies. 1393 
Where the capital- exporting country applies the exemption system, the issue 
is fairly straightforward and involves determining the extent to which the 
exemption is available. 1394Viherkenttý demonstrates that for the full-exemption 
1391 Ibid, p. 7. Viherkenttd also avoids the consideration of investment from one 
developing country to another; this Thesis takes a different approach In light of the 
significant investment South Africa makes to countries in the Sub-Saharan region. 
1392 Both direct and indirect credit methods. 
1393 Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, 
pp. 228-229. 
1394 Ibid, p. 229. 
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method, 1395 there is a complete pass-through of tax incentive benefits attached 
to dividend repatriations. While there may be potential for a modest wash-out 
under the exemption -with -progression method, 1396 for both this type and the full- 
exemption specieý any wash-out will be marginal. Consequently the exemption 
system is relatively neutral to tax incentives and should raise few concerns for 
developing country policymakers. 1397 
Matters assume greater complexity where the capital- exporting country applies 
a variant of the foreign tax credit method1398wh1ch increases the likelihood 
that tax incentives would be washed-out on the repatriation of income to the 
residence country. 1399The operation of the foreign tax credit may result in a 
corresponding increase in residence country taxation commensurate to the tax 
incentive granted by the source country. Should this occur the outcome is a 
perverse transfer of tax revenues from the source (developing) country's 
Treasury to that of the residence (developed) country. 140OThe foreign tax credit 
method features several varieties providing for ordinary credit, full credit, per- 
country or source-by- source limitations, foreign tax basket limitations and 
overall limitations. 1401 Certain types of limitation rules increase the risk of a 
Here, international double taxation is relieved by the residence/home country 
completely exempting from tax income derived from or capital situated in the 
source/host country: IBFD International Tax Glossary, op cit, p. 160. 
1396 This is similar in function to the full exemption method, but while there is the 
recognition of source/host country income or capital, this is solely for the purpose 
of determining the taxation of income and capital from the residence/home 
country's tax base: ibid. 
119, Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, pp. 62- 
63. 
1391 The foreign tax credit relieves international double taxation by permitting, 
unilaterally or pursuant to tax treaty provisions, taxes imposed on foreign-sourced 
income to be credited against domestic tax in on that income (often subject to a 
limitation): IBFD International Tax Glossary, op cit, p-100. 
1399 However, only income tax incentives would be affected and certain features of 
existing capital- exp ortin g tax systems counter-act this tendency. 
... Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, OP cit, p. 72. 
The ordinary credit method limits the credit to the lower of (a) the amount of foreign 
tax on the amount of domestic tax that would have ordinarily been imposed on the 
foreign-source income in the absence of the credit, or (b) the foreign tax on that 
income. Conversely, the full credit method extends the credit to domestic tax of any 
kind. Under per-country or source -by-source limitation methods, the credit is restricted to 
domestic income tax on income from a particular foreign country or source, 
respectively. Source-by- source limitations could use 
foreign tax credit baskets or 
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wash-out of tax incentives. 1402 Viherkenttý extensively analyses interactions 
thrown up by alternative formulations of the foreign tax credit system and 
finds that the potential, for wash-out varies with the precise formulation of the 
foreign tax credit in tax laws (or treaties) and depends on the circumstances of 
the relevant enterprise. 1403 
Further complications may arise where economic double taxation is relieved by 
the grant of indirect credit for the underlying tax levied on profits out of 
which dividends are distributed. Viherkenttý observes that the potential for a 
wash-out are enhanced where indirect credit systems possess certain features. 
Such features include gross-up for tax paid by the source country subsidiary's 
underlying profit S; 1404 the 'pooling' method for determining the order in which 
dividends are deemed to be distributed from profits; 1405 and the use of current 
(as opposed to historical) rates for foreign currency translation over periods 
when the source country's currency is devalued. 1406 
However, the potential for wash-out under foreign tax credit systems could be 
mitigated by the deferral of tax liabilityI407 where source country income is 
feature overall limitation devices: IBFD International Tax Glossary, op cit, 
pp. 101., 181. 
1402 For instance, where regular tax in the source country is lower than that in the 
residence country, and income is derived from few activities or few other source 
countries, per-item and per-country limitation rules may wash-out tax concessions. 
The harder it is for companies to exploit averaging rules and use low-tax passive 
income to absorb excess credits from high-tax active operations, the more likely tax 
concessions would be washed-out. However, though the overall limitation method 
provides the greatest opportunity for averaging tax rates (as here, the maximum 
foreign tax credits are computed with reference to aggregate taxes paid and income 
derived from all source countries), Viherkenttý argues that this perversely reduces 
the incentive effect of source country tax concessions: Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in 
Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, pp. 111-118,119. 
1403 Ibid, p. 128. 
1404 Ibid, pp. 100-101. 
1405 Viherkenttý illustrates that under a LIFOPrhythm method' utilised under the pre- 
1987 US tax regime, CFCs and offshore subsidiaries could preserve the benefits of 
tax incentives by skilfully timing income repatriations and profit distributions. 
Conversely, the pooling method introduced under the US 1986 Tax Reform Act 
would gradually recoup tax incentive benefits in tandem with profit distributions: 
ibid, pp. 103-106. 
1406 Ibid, pp. 106-107. 
1407 As a parent company's tax liability for income derived from a foreign subsidiary does 
not arise until the parent repatriates such income, parent company can postpone the 
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neither repatriated immediately to the residence country nor subject to current 
taxation due to complex controlled- foreign- company (CFC) legislation. 1408The 
use of 'soak-up' taxes1409 could theoretically target tax incentives exclusively to 
countries whose exemption or foreign tax credit rules ensure the pass-thrc? ugh 
of tax incentive benefits. However, there are certain practical difficulties 
impeding the use of 'soak-up' taxes such as the challenge of conducting regular 
and accurate tax surveillance to identify circumstances where such taxes can 
prevent revenue transfers from source to residence countries. 1410 Finally, it may 
be the case that the benefits of subsidies and other non-income tax incentives 
may be preserved in circumstances where the wash-out rate for income tax 
incentives is high. 1411 
To a lesser extent Viherkentta considers both the deduction and reduced tax 
rate methods. While the deduction method generally results in a partial wash- 
out, where the reduced tax rate method excludes the right to a credit or 
deduction, the potential for a total pass-through of tax incentive benefits is 
high. 1412Vlherkentta's analysis of the tax sparing credit is considered below in 
§6.1.3. Nevertheless, he ultimately finds that '... an immediate and complete wasb- 
. 
porated subsidiag conducting out of bost countg tax incentives granted to a locally incor 
active business seldom takes_place (but) ... when incentives are attached to various 
tax day by reinvestment in the source country or redeploying the capital in third 
countries. Deferral improves the source country subsidiary's cash liquidity and 
operates as an interest-free loan from the residence country depending on the length 
of deferral, the relevant discount rate and extent which income is reinvested in the 
source country: ibid, pp. 91-96. 
`08 However, Viherkenttý notes that these CFC rules are more likely to affect passive 
income from certain industries (e. g. financial services) routed through tax havens 
between related parties: ibid, pp-86-87. 
"0, Le. a tax or levy which is conditional on the availability of a foreign tax credit in 
another taxing jurisdiction. US tax rules disallow such taxes from being credited 
against US income tax: IBFD International Tax Glossary., op cit, p. 371. 
1410 VIherkenad Tax Incentives in Develobing Countries & International Taxation, op cz . t, 
pp. 123-125. 
141 1 As non-income tax incentives increase pre-tax source country income, the extent to 
which incentive benefits may be washed-out depends largely on the relevant marginal 
tax rate: ibid, pp. 126-127. 
1412 Ibid, pp. 182,185. 
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items of income such as interest, royalties or portfolio dividends, a wash-out 
of incentives is a (sic) highly likely. -'1413 
6.13. The Tax Sparing Credit 
6.1.3.1. Historical Development of Tax Sparing 
Viherkenttý examines the impact of tax sparing credits (hereafter: TSCs) 
utillsed to mitigate the potential wash-out of tax incentives as integral part of 
his analysis on the interactions between the tax codes of developed capital- 
exporting countries and their developing country treaty counterparts. 1414TSCs 
are credits typically granted by residence countries under tax treaties for 
source country taxes notionally borne by dividends, interest, royalties and 
other kinds of income, in exces s of the actual tax borne. TSCs affirm the 
economic sovereignty of the source country which grants tax incentives to 
non-resident investors. 1415 The operation of both foreign tax credit and 
exemption systems may potentially wash-out tax incentive benefits. 1416 TSCs 
ensure that tax incentives granted by source countries are not negated by 
residence taxation of the same income but rather, that non-residents obtain 
foreign tax credits for taxes 'spared' by source country incentives or have such 
taxes considered in satisfying conditions imposed under exemption systems. 1417 
TSCs were initially suggested by Professor Surrey in 1953 as a mechanism to 
promote British foreign investment through tax policy. While this proposal was 
initially rejected, 1418 TSCs later gained currency in UK legislation providing 
relief for taxes spared under source country incentives for economic 
1413 Ibid, p. 231. 
1414 Ibid, Chapter 6. 
1415 IBFD International Tax Glossary, op cit, p. 409. 
1416 For the foreign tax credit method, this is self-evident as if credit is only given for 
source country taxes actually paid residence country taxation is increased to the 
extent that source country taxation is reduced by incentives. Similarly, where 
exemption systems require a certain level of taxation in the source country, if this 
threshold is not achieved due to source country incentives, residence country 
investors may be denied exemption benefits. 
T172-73, '2003 OECD Commentary on Article 23A & B, OECD Model Convention 
on Income and on Capital' in Kees van Raad (ed) Materials on International and EC 
Tax Law, Vol. 1 (41h ed, Leiden, International Tax Centre/IBFD: 2004), pp. 288-290. 
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development. 1419 Early attempts to include tax sparing provisions into the 1957 
tax treaty between the US and Pakistan were rejected by the US Senate. 
However, despite the unwavering refusal of the US Senate to ratify tax treaties 
containing provisions for TSCs in this and all other US tax treaties, the draft 
tax sparing provisions under the US-Pakistan treaty influenced the design of 
tax sparing provisions on other treaties, particularly as TSCs became more 
popular in the 1960s/1970s. 1420 Viherkentti observes that although TSCs are 
frequently considered in the context of treaties on the avoidance of double 
taxation, they actually operate to prevent income enjoying tax incentives from 
being fully taxed at all. 1421 Today, a great number of tax treaties between 
developed and developing countries (and indeed, among developing countries) 
feature tax sparing provisions. However, it appears that US opposition to TSCs 
resulted in the non-inclusion of draft tax sparing provisions in the UN Model 
Convention possibly undermining the Convention's impact and influence. 1422 
The Commentary on the OECD Model Convention highlights the following 
forms often assumed by tax sparing proViSlonS. 1423 The residence country may 
allow a deduction of the amount of tax which the source country could have 
imposed under its general legislation but waived due to incentives. 
Alternatively, instead of relying on source country general legislation to 
determine the quantum of the phantom tax, the tax spared could be subject to 
limitations provided in the tax treaty such as those for dividends and interest. 
The residence country could also allow a matching credit deduction against 
residence taxation of an amount fixed at a higher rate. Then again, the 
residence country could elect to exempt income derived from the source state 
which has benefited from tax incentives. 
By the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1957, following parliamentary debates on the 
issue in 1953 and 1956. 
1419 §788(5) UK ICTA 1988; OECD, Tax Sbaring: A Reconsideration (Paris, OECD: 1998), 
p. 15. 
1420 Ibid, p. 16 - 17. 1421 Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cz . t, p. 141. 
1422 Ibid, pp. 142-3. 
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6.1.3.2. The OECD's Reconsideration of Tax Sparing 
The OECD has expressed reservations regarding the use of tax sparing by its 
member states. In a 1998 Report, 1424 the OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
considered reasons behind the growing reluctance by member states to grant 
tax sparing. In the new global economic framework, some emerging 
economies 1425which traditionally were net capital-importers had now evolved 
into net capital- exporters. Such countries would increasingly approach treaty 
negotiations from the same perspective as traditional residence countries. 
Conversely, some OECD countries which were natural resource producers 1426 
shared some common interests with developing source countries. As such, 
traditional distinctions underlying existing international tax arrangements 
which distinguished between OECD countries and other countries were 
potentially misleading. 1427 
Other concerns were expressed over the effectiveness of tax sparing as an 
instrument for promoting foreign aid 1428 and indeed, of tax incentives 
generally. 1429 Tax sparing was vulnerable to taxpayer abuse and caused 
significant harmful effects 1430which were not only costly to both source and 
residence states but also difficult to detect or prevent. Finally, tax sparing 
1423 T74 OECD Commentary on Article 23A & B, OECD Model Convention on Income 
and on Capital, op ca, p. 289. 
1424 OECD, Tax Sparing: A ReconsZderation, Q cit. 
1421 E. g. Russia, Chile, Taiwan and Singapore. 
1426 E. g. Australia, Canada, Norway, the UK and the US. 
1427 OECD, Tax Sparing: A ReconsZderation, op cit, pp. 10,21-22. 
1421 Direct foreign aid was considered a more transparent means of assisting developing 
countries. Tax sparing could create incentives for rapid repatriation of profits and 
favour short-term investments in developing countries. Where source country 
incomes were reinvested, repatriated after an extended period of time or routed 
through averaging mechanisms like 'mixer companies', the potential for the wash-out 
of tax incentives was low. In these scenarios, the basic assumption underlying tax 
sparing was considered invalid: ibid, p. 22-25. 
1429 Several traditional criticisms of tax incentives were mentioned based on the 
experiences of OECD and transition economics (including: cost-benefit concerns; 
questions over targeting incentives; and the potential of tax incentives to complicate 
tax systems, encourage tax competition, undermine tax neutrality and encourage 
lobbying by special interests): ibid, pp. 25-28. 
1430 Such as transfer pricing abuses, conduit and routing schemes, artificially high tax 
rates and exacerbating administrative difficulties in monitoring tax sparing: ibzd, 
pp. 28-30. 
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could aggravate the problem of harmful tax competition utilised by tax havens 
to attract highly-mobile and tax-sensitive financial and other services. 
Despite these criticisms, the Committee did not conclude that OECD member 
states should not grant TSCs. Rather, it encouraged member states to adopt a 
coherent approach to the issue and consider the legitimacy of reasons advanced 
by treaty counterparties seeking TSCs during negotiations. The CommIttee 
advised that tax sparing should only be granted where the treaty Counterparty's 
state of economic development is objectively as. sessed to be considerably below 
that of OECD member states. Finally, guidance provided by certain 'best 
practices" would ensure that when tax sparing was provided, this would apply 
exclusively to genuine efforts to promote the economic development of source 
countries and not encourage harmful tax competition. 1431 
While the Committee raises many valid points, some of the premises on which 
its Report is based are not necessarily relevant from the perspective of the 
countries considered in this Thesis. The Report notes that certain non-OECD 
countries which in the past had been developing capital-importing countries 
could be more accurately described as middle-income, capital- exporting 
countries today. Of the countries examined in this Thesis, only South Africa 
can be classified as a middle income economy. 1432 Regrettably, Nigeria and 
Kenya still have relatively low levels of economic development. Given the 
significant income disparities within South Africa, the potential for economic 
development there is still considerable. Further, all three countries are also net 
capital-importers. 1433 Finally, none of these 3 countries have ever been 
classified as tax havens and relatively little investment is routed to these 
countries by highly-mobile and tax-sensitive financial and other services 
seeking solely to avoid or evade tax. As such, it would be appropriate to 
consider the Committee's conclusions bearing in mind the potential that the 
1431 Ibid, pp. 41-43. 
1432 Indeed, of these three countries only South Africa appears to be on track to meeting 
the Millennium Goals by 2015. 
1433 Although, in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is a net capital exporter. 
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legitimate use of tax sparing might have for improving economic development 
in these study countries. 
The Committee noted recent trends and best practices in designing tax 
sparing provisions. 1434Defining precisely the scope of eligible tax incentives 
could minimise the risk inherent in general references to tax concessions. 
Static references could be made more flexible by automatically permitting 
minor modifications to incentive legislation to qualify for tax sparing if of 
substantially similar character to the agreed concessions. Alternatively, the 
treaty could fix the percentage of deemed tax paid at the ceiling rate provided 
in the treaty, at a level above or below this, at the rates set by source country's 
general tax law or at the lowest of these levels. Appropriate definitions were 
crucial in determining the categories of taxpayers and incomes which were 
eligible for TSCs. Certain conditions could limit TSCs to investments by 
companies or taxpayers with substantial holdings, promote active as opposed 
to passive investment in source countries and avoid abuses associated with 
providing TSCs for interest income. 
The Report suggested that it was inappropriate to grant TSCs where income 
was ordinarily exempt under domestic or treaty law. Time limitations could be 
applied to each individual taxpayer to avoid the TSC from becoming a 
permanent concession. Alternatively, sunset clauses could limit the period a 
developing country could benefit from TSCs such that the advantage was 
phased out with the progressive economic development of the source country. 
Finally, the use of anti-abuse clauses and interpretative provisions could 
reduce inappropriate tax planning, counter illegitimate rewriting of contracts 
to exploit TSCs and enhance the effectiveness of controlled- f oreign-comp any 
legislation. 
Although Viherkenttý's study was conducted prior to the OECD Report, he 
illustrates various formulations of TSCs in treaties with the UK, 
Germany and 
"" OECD, Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration, Q cit, pp. 31-39. 
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Finland (all OECD countries). He finds that these countries' tax sparing 
provisions varied greatly in scope, design, methods of determining the 
creditable amount and degree of generosity. 1435 Such variety is a function of the 
bilateral negotiations between treaty counter-parties reflecting the 
idiosyncrasies of domestic tax laws, individual country preferences 1436 and 
indeed, the dynamics of the bartering process intrinsic in treaty 
negotiations. 1437 The next section highlights the diversity of tax sparing 
provisions in tax treaties between Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya on the one 
hand and both OECD and non-OECD member states on the other. As seen 
below, many of the CIE CD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs' best practices have 
been adopted in some of these treaties. 
6.1.3.3. Tax Sparing in Treaties with South Africa, Kenya & Nigeria 
South Africa frequently utilises tax sparing provisions in its treaties despite 
only being an OECD observer member. South African tax treaties typically use 
the deduction method for tax sparing provisions tied to source country 
domestic legislation designed to promote economic development. 1438While 
most South African treaties follow this form, Olivier and Honiball observe that 
there are certain variations to this theme. 1439 Although most tax sparing 
provisions the authors review were reciprocal, a few were granted only in 
favour of South Africa 1440 or its treaty couriterparty. 1441 Certain tax sparing 
provisions were extended to cover future source country Ia WS, 1442while others 
followed OECD best practice in that they were time-bound due to sunset 
1435 Viherkenttý Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cit, 
pp. 145-161. 
1431 For the foreign tax credit, exemption or deduction methods of eliminating 
international double taxation. 
porate Tax Incentives For Foreign Direct Investment, OECD Tax Policy Studies 1437 OECD, Cor 
No. 4 (Paris; OECD: 1998), p. 44. 
1438 Or indeed, to promote decentralisation: see South Africa's tax treaties with Romania 
(concluded on 12.11.93) and Taiwan (concluded on 14.02.94). 
1439 Olivier and Honiball, International Tax: A South African Perspective, op cit, p. 290. 
"0 Article 23(6), South Africa-Ireland (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 07-09.97; 
Article 23(2)(b), South Africa-Israel (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 10.02.78. 
Article 23(2) South Africa-Mauritius (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 05.07.96. 
1442 Ibid (Mauritius). See also Article 23(3) South Africa-Romania (Income) Tax Treaty 
concluded on 12.11.93. 
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provisions stipulating expiry dates 1443 or would expire when the particular 
specific source country legislation to which they relate lapsed. 1444 
A perusal of 6 Kenyan tax treaties containing tax sparing credits reveals few 
similarities with South African practice. 1445 Unlike the South African trend 
towards reciprocity, of the 6 tax treaties reviewed by this Researcher all but 2 
had provisions for TSCs couched unilaterally in favour of Kenya. 1446 Kenya's 
treaties with Denmark and Sweden share remarkable similarities: besides 
operating exclusively for Kenya's benefit, these tax sparing provisions make 
precise reference to specific Kenyan incentive legislation with a proviso 
extending the provisions to future incentives for promoting economic 
development that may be agreed by competent authorities of the contracting 
states. 1447Both treaties have sunset clauses and provide for possible extensions 
beyond the initially stipulated ten years of operation. However, this period has 
only been extended by 14 additional years in the case of the treaty with 
Sweden. 1448 
Kenya's tax treaty with the UK has several unique features. Like the treaties 
with Denmark and Sweden, the UK treaty refers to particular sections of 
Kenya's income tax law. However, in line with OECD best practice its 
provisions curtail the extension of the tax sparing provisions to, future 
incentives as agreed by the contracting states' competent authorities 
exclusively to those incentives which possess substantially similar character to 
those contained in specific Kenyan legislation with only minor modifications. 
A time-limitation also applies to exclude claims in respect of sources of 
1443 Article 23(6)(c), South Africa-Ireland (Income) Tax Treaty. 
1444 Article 23(2)(b), South Africa-Israel (Income) Tax Treaty. 
1441 Most of Kenya's tax treaties utilised the credit method of applying TSCs. 
116 Only those with India and Zambia had reciprocal provisions: see Article 25(2) 
Kenya-. India (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 12.04.85 and Article XVI(4) Kenya- 
Zambia (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 27.08.68. 
1447 Compare Article 25(4) Kenya-Denmark (Income and Capital) Tax Treaty concluded 
on 13.12.72 with XXII(4) Kenya-Sweden (Income and Capital) Tax Treaty concluded 
on 28.06.73. Kenya's treaties with India and Norway (concluded on 13.12.72) confer 
similar powers on competent authorities. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
. 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Page 270 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Saharan A-frican Economies 6: Regional 6- International Tax, Trade A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African & Kenyan Tax Lan, Finance Policy Issues 
income arising ten years after the Kenyan tax incentives were first granted in 
respect of that source of income to prevent individual taxpayers from enjoying 
a permanent concession. 1449 
Dr. Gavin McEwen1450 observed that Kenyan revenue authorities have not 
contacted their UK counterparts to update this tax sparing provision since the 
treaty was signed in 1974. Consequently, corporate income tax exemption 
under subsequently- enacted legislation (e. g. EPZ Act 1990) has led to a loss of 
credit for underlying tax when repatriated dividends are taxed in the UK 
clearly undermining the effectiveness of tax sparing as a tax policy tool. 1451 
Nigeria's treaty with the UK shares some of the distinctive features of the 
Kenya-UK Treaty. 1452The tax sparing provisions favour only Nigeria and refer 
specifically to specific tax incentives provided in certain Nigerian tax JaWS. 1453 
A similar proviso extends tax sparing provisions to other incentives only if 
agreed by competent authorities to be of a substantially similar character or 
slightly modified versions of the incentives specifically referred to. An 
identical ten-year limitation also applies from the time the incentives were first 
granted. However, the Nigerian tax sparing provisions feature a unique anti- 
avoidanc e rule to prevent their abuse by artifi cial transactions designed to 
exploit the availability of TSCs. 1 454Consequently, the Nigeria-UK treaty seems 
closer to OECD best practice than the Kenya-UK treaty. 
1148 Apparently extended by an exchange of letters dated 23.03-87 and 11.05.87 between 
Kenya and Sweden. 
`9 Article 26 Kenya-United Kingdom (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 31.07.73. 
1451 Gavin McEwen is an expert on Kenyan tax law and led PricewaterhouseCoopers' 
Kenyan tax team from 2001 to 2007. 
1411 Statement by Gavin McEwen, former Head of Tax/Senior Tax Partner, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kenya: (personal communication 12 September, 2007). 
1452 Article 22(2) Nigeria-United Kingdom (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 09.06.87. 
1453 The references are to the 'pioneer industry' tax incentives and certain finance-related 
incentives tied to loans to certain economic sectors. 
1454 Article 22(5) preclude transactions giving rise to profits which 'are not such as might 
be expected in a bona fide commercial transaction' or whose main or collateral 
objective is to obtain the TSC. 
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Nigeria's tax sparing treaty provisions with Canada are quite similar to those 
with the UK except for the absence of the special anti-avoidance rule. 1455 
Nigeria's treaties with Pakistan, 1456 the Philippines, 1457 Romania 1458 and the 
Slovak Republic 1459 have much simpler tax sparing provisions which make 
general references to domestic tax incentive laws. 1460While those with Pakistan 
and the Philippines are reciprocal, the Romanian and Slovakian treaties benefit 
only Nigeria. Nigeria's treaty with Sweden1461 (an OECD member country) has 
more complicated and very specific tax sparing provisions. These provide 
targeted TSCs for Nigerian taxes spared on investments by Swedish permanent 
establishments in specific sectors considered to promote economic 
development. 1462The tax sparing provisions feature unique matching credits set 
at specific ceilings for royaltieS1463 and other income. 1464 
Both parallels and distinctions may be drawn between the tax sparing 
provisions in Nigeria's treaties with France1465 and the Netherlands. 1466Both are 
similar in favouring only Nigeria. However, while the Dutch promote FDI in 
Nigeria, the French support more generic economic, industrial and comm. ercial 
development. Furthermore, the Dutch treaty is limited to incentives relating to 
interest, dividends and royalties, but the French provisions are slightly more 
1455 Article 23(2) Nigeria-Canada (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 04-08-92. 
1451 Article 23(2) Nigeria- Pakistan Tax Tfeaty concluded on 10-10-89. 
1457 Article 23(4) Nigeria- Philip pines (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 30.09.97. 
1451 Article 23(3) Nigeria-Romania (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 21.07.92. 
1,59 Article 22(2)(b) Nigeria-Slovak Republic (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 31.08.89. 
1460 Of these 4 countries, only the Slovak Republic is an OECD member country. It is 
useful to note that the Nigerian-Slovak treaty was concluded before the Slovak 
Republic joined the OECD in December 2000. 
1461 Article 22(2) Nigeria-Sweden (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 18-11-04. 
1462 The permanent establishment's activities must have been conducted in Nigeria and 
relate to investments in exports, mining, telecommunications, manufacturing and 
industry, energy-, agriculture or tourism. 
1463 A 5% matching credit is added (or substituted) for Nigerian withholding taxes 
imposed (or waived, respectively), on gross royalty receipts enhancing TSCs. 
1464 Dividends paid by Nigerian companies to Swedish companies are tax exempt. Other 
income receipts enjoy TSCs set at 15% irrespective of the relevant Nigerian 
domestic 
tax rates. Despite OECD best practice of not granting TSCs for 
income exempt in 
residence countries, it appears that a TSC of 15% may be granted 
for dividend 
income if earned from certain active investment activities. 
1465 Article 23(2) Nigeria-France Tax Treaty concluded on 27.02.90. 
1466 Article 23(3) Nigeria- Netherlands Tax Treaty concluded on 11.12.91. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for Com, -týercial Laiv Studies 
Queen Mary, Unlversiýy of London 
Page 2 72 of 4 18 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio o' /* Sub-Sabaran A' frican Economies 6: Regional & International Tax, Trade A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African & Kenyan Tax Lan, & Finance Policy Issues 
restrictive and do not apply to dividends. 1467 Both treaties limit TSCs to the 
lower of rates agreed in the relevant treaty articles and those normally imposed 
under general Nigerian tax law. Unlike the French treaty, the Dutch treaty 
features a sun-set provision though the initial ten-year period could be 
extended by the mutual agreement procedure. 
6.1.3.4. Practical Implications for Developing Country Policyrnakers 
One can discern the clear trend of OECD countries adopting OECD best 
practices in the design of tax sparing provisions in their treaties with Nigeria, 
Kenya and to lesser degree, South Africa. 1468 However, the extent to which 
developing country tax policymakers consider the strategic motivations of 
OECD member states in tax sparing negotiations is unclear. Vlherkentti argues 
for greater consideration of international tax interactions by policyrnakers of 
both developing and developed countries vis-d-vis the grant and facilitation (or 
frustration) of tax incentives when formulating tax policies. In particular, he 
urges developing country policyrnakers to examine key, critical tax treaty 
provisions1469with their most important trading partners especially where these 
(developed) countries adopt any variant of the foreign tax credit method as 
such analysis could prove vital during tax treaty negotiations. 
Vlherkenttd's research further suggests that though developing country 
negotiators may place a premium on exemption systems or TSCs, generally 
preferring these methods to the foreign tax credit system, this preference may 
be misplaced. Much of the consequences for the flow-through or wash-out of 
tax incentive benefits depend on the precise circumstances surrounding the 
relevant taxpayer and it may well be that 'variations relating to each individual 
taxpayer's circumstances or the detailed formulation of the relevant provisions 
.... Nigeria's treaty with Belgium also provides TSCs only for dividends, interest and 
royalties but its provisions are simpler and unlike those of the French and Dutch 
treaties: Article 23(3) Nigeria-Belgium (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 20.11.89. 
1468 South African treaties with OECD member states (e. g. Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US) tend not to feature tax sparing provisions. 
1461 E. g. limitation rules, restrictions on deferral, particular provisions conducive to tax 
planning opportunities for foreign investors from major trading partners. 
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within each method often outweigh the differences between methods. -' 1470 To 
underscore this point, Viherkentta notes that 
... 
(the foreign) tax credit does not quite live up to its bad reputation as 
the obstructor of developing countries' national sovereignty in their tax 
policy. In the absence of empirical studies, it is still impossible to assess 
the actual effects in aggregate quantitative terms. What must be 
emphasised is that least-developed country (hereafter: LDC) policy- 
makers should gather information on the crucial features of the foreign 
tax credit systems prevailing in their most important countries of 
incoming investment. 1471 
Consequently, he argues that developing country negotiators should not 
concede vital advantages to secure the application of the. exemption system or 
indeed, TSCs without giving due consideration to these issues. 1472 
6.1-3.5. Focus Group Perspectives from the Nigerian Field Trip 
This Researcher presented some of these concepts to personnel of FIRS' Tax 
Policy Research and Development Department at a Focus Group Discussion 
organised during the Nigerian Field Trip. 1473AIthough tax sparing was but one 
of many issues involved in tax treaty negotiations, tax sparing was relevant vis- 
d-. vis emerging trading partners like China. 1474 If unduly generous tax incentives 
were provided in the absence of tax sparing provisions, there was the potential 
risk that concessions would be 'washed-out' and captured by, say, Chinese tax 
authorities resulting, perversely, in aid-in-reverse. 1475This Researcher presented 
the following hypothetical investment scenario to illuminate these issues 
during the Discussion. 1476 
1470 Vlherkenttd Tax Incentives in Developing Countries & International Taxation, op cz . 1, p-235. 
1471 Ib id,. p. 13 9. 
1472 Ibid, p. 232. 
1473 The Focus Group Discussion was conducted on 07.02.07 at the FIRS Headquarters, 
Abula, Nigeria. Whereas tax treaty negotiations are usually led by the Ministry of 
Finance, FIRS traditionally has provided technical support. It remains to be seen if 
this role remains with FIRS or becomes part of the mandate of the Ministry of 
Finance's emerging Fiscal Department. 
1474 E. g. as noted in §3.2.5.2 above, the N2billion Lekki EPZ in Lagos is being financed 
primarily by Chinese investors. 
1471 Nigeria's treaty with China does not presently provide for tax sparing: see Article 23 
Nigeria-China (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 15.04.02. 
1471 However the actual operation of international taxation has been greatly simplified in 
this example to improve clarity. 
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BASE CASE: NoRMAL NIGERIAN & CHINESE TAX; No TSCs 
Assume that a Chinese company (C Coy) invests USPhillion in a Nigerian production 
sharing contract (PSC) subsidiary (N Coy) earning an annual 25% rate of return (ROR). 
All income net of Nigerian tax is repatriated as dividends. Ný erian tax compri . ses: (1) 50% 9 
PSC tax on corporate profits under §3, Deep OffsborelPSC Act 19991477 & (2) 10% 
withholding tax on outbound dividends. There is no tax treaq between Nigeria & China 
providing relieffor double taxation or tax sparing. Chinese tax at 10% i's levied on inbound 
divi de n ds. 
Chinese Tax 
@10% on 
diVidends 
CHINA 
C Coy ROI -- j$405ml 10.1 3"/o $45m 
After Tax Recel"Pts $450m 
WHI Nigenan -6 
tax @ 55% Dividend $500m $550m 
I -S Ctax (ýi) 50'/o = $500m 
Income - $lb FDI $4b 
NIGERIA 
ROR N 
25% Coy 
Fhowre 6.1 Normal Tax & No TSCs 
. 11.91 
In this scenari . o, the Nýgerian Treasury receives US$350million in aggregate taxes impoing 
an effective tax rate of 55%. The Cbinese Treasug's tax take is US$45million on 
repatriated dividends. C Coy's investment in N Coyyelds an after-tax return on investment 
(ROI) of 10.13% (i. e. ROI = US$405millionl 4 billion) less than half of the pre-tax ROR 
of 25% actua14 earned by N Coy (i. e. ROR = US$l billionI4 billion). 
1477 See §3.2.2.1.4 of this Thesis. 
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CASE H. - TAxHOLIDAYS UNDER OGEPZ A cT1996 WiTHoUT TSCs 
Assume further that N Coy is located in Nigeria's Onnellkpokirt EPZ & entitled to 
I. ndefinite tax holidays from PSC tax & withholding tax under the OGEFZ Act 1996.1478 
Conseqmentýi, Nigerian tax is 0%. There is a tax treaq between Nigerian & China which 
provides foreign tax credits, but cred"t Is ono given for taxes actualo paid in source 
countries. There is no tax sparingfor notional taxes. All other assumptions are unchanged. 
Chinese Tax 
@10% on 
dividends 
mr 
jý , I'ax 
c(i), 1 o"/o =S1 oom 
After Tax Receipts = $1 b 
FDI = $4b 
Nigetian tax 
G&O'! /o- $0 
Income = $lb 
NIGERIA 
ROR N 
25% COY 
Figure 6.2 Tax Holidays under OGEFZ Act 1996 without TSCs 
As the tax treaq between Nigeria & China does not provide for tax sparing credits (TSCf) 
gerian tax waived, Chinese tax remains at 10% on inbound d' Wends. I. n respect of Ni Ivi 
Nigeria hasjoqone US$550mi'llion i. n taxes, USPOOmillion of which has been captured by 
the Chinese Treasury whose tax take increases b US$55million over the Base Case. The 9 
outcome i. s perverseo aid-in -reverse: Nigeria _providing 
a transfer of revenues to China. C Coy 
also benefits as its ROI has more than douhled from 10.13% to 22.5% 
(i. e. ROI 
UM900millionl 4 billion). The Chinese Treasury &C Coy bothgain at Nigeria's expense. 
1478 See §3.2.2.1.7 of this Thesis. 
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CASE IM. ' TAX HOLIDAYS UNDER OGEPZ A cT1996 wITH TSCs 
Finally, assume that the tax treay between Nigeria & China provides a full tax sparing 
credit (TSQ in respect of all taxes waived by Nigeria. As N Coy is entitled to indefinite tax 
holidays under the OGEFZ Act 1996, Nigerian tax i's 0%. Due to the TSC, Chinese tax 
on repatriated dividends is also 0%. All other assumptions remain unchangedfrom Case II. 
TSC for 
Notional 
Nigerian Tax 
= Chinese 
Tax @0% on 
diVidends 
FDI = $4b 
CHINA 
Rol 
25", /o 
After Tax Receipts = $lb 
NN IT Ca) 00/o = 80 
Dividend - $lb 
$0 
Income - $lb 
Figure 6.3 Tax Holidays under OGEFZ Act 1996 with TSCs 
The Chinese Treasug spares from tax dividends received by C Coy from N Coy under this 
simplifiedforet, gn tax credi . t1tax sparing credit system. This preserves Nigerian tax incentive 
benefits. Nigeria has waived US$33million in taxes but China has respected this concessi . on 
by providing a corresponding TSC. C Coy is the sole beneficiary of the concession: its ROI 
now equals the actual 23% KOK earned by N Coy. C Coy has incentives to reinvest earnz . ngs 
I. nN Coy or otherwise apply its dividend receipts. (Of these three scenarios, the worst outcome 
for the Nýgerian Treasury occurs in Case 11 which corresponds to the current realiq under the 
Ni *an & Chinese Tax Treaq). 1479 gert 
1479 See Article 23 Nigeria-China (Income) Tax Treaty concluded on 15.04.02. 
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It became quite apparent during the Discussion that while it was accepted 
these international tax law interactions were vital issues that should be 
carefully considered from both residence and source state perspectives when 
negotiating tax treaties in general and tax sparing provisions in particular, 
these matters were often not thoroughly evaluated in actual treaty negotiations. 
Specifically, FIRS' Tax Policy Research & Development Department had not 
yet done detailed scenario analyses of model tax treaties and domestic tax laws 
of treaty counter-parties in the context of past treaty negotiations. Nigeria did 
not adopt either the UN or OECD Model Convention as a template for treaty 
negotiations but adopted a flexible approach in selecting which particular 
articles from both Model Conventions would best advance its national interest. 
However, it was unclear if a specific set of strategies were adopted when 
negotiating with OECD member countries as opposed to non-OECD states. 
It was explained that normally tax treaties were concluded with Nigeria's major 
trading partners, in which circumstances the Nigerian negotiating team would 
embark on an exchange of model tax treaties and gather relevant information 
on the domestic tax provisions of counterparty. All these analyses go into 
treaty negotiations to be addressed in conjunction with issues raised by other 
departments including the Ministries of Finance, justice and Foreign Affairs. 
Political or non-tax issues were sometimes given greater weight in tax treaty 
preparations and negotiations. 1480 However,, there were circumstances where the 
negotiating counterparty had refused to accede to certain requests (such as the 
grant of TSCs) causing negotiations to stall. Finally, while some consideration 
of the content of the domestic tax laws of the treaty counterparty was 
conducted, there was no evidence to suggest that there was a policy flow in the 
reverse direction in that the Nigerian negotiating team's experiences were 
reflected in broader Nigerian tax policy. This lapse heightens the risk that 
there could be a proliferation of Nigerian tax incentives despite a trend among 
Reference was made to treaty negotiations between Nigeria and an Islamic state with 
which there was relatively modest economic trade possibly motivated by purely 
political reasons. 
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treaty counterparties to grant tax sparing only subject to stringent conditions 
or possibly not at all. 
The implications of the foregoing findings for Nigeria's tax incentive policies 
are further considered in Chapter 7 of this Thesis. However, it is clear that 
Nigeria could benefit significantly from adopting Viherkenttý's advice to 
gather and analyse critical information on the salient aspects of the foreign tax 
credit systems prevailing in their most important countries of inward 
investment in determining which strategies to adopt in negotiating tax sparing 
and other treaty provisions. 
6.1.4. Outline of the Subsequent Sections 
§6.1 has considered some international tax law issues that have a significant 
impact on the policies and design of developing source country tax incentives 
and double taxation treaty strategies. §6.2 highlights some influences that 
treaties promoting regional integration initiatives may have on the tax 
incentive policies of Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria. This brief overview is 
complemented by a more extensive consideration in 56.3 and §6.4 of the more 
significant influence of three international organisations on the fiscal incentive 
policies of South Africa, Kenya anct, to a greater extent, Nigeria. 
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6.2. REGIONAL INTEGRATION & TAX COMPETITION ISSUES 
6.2.1. Introduction 
There are few instances of the significant effect of regional integration 
treaties, laws and regulations on tax incentive policies that are as profound as 
the imposition of state aid rules on the member states in the European 
Community (or EC). In his study, Raymond Luja pays particular attention to 
the constraints imposed by these rules and those arising from the World Trade 
Organisation's subsidies regulations on EC member states. 1481 While it is 
conceded that pan-African regional integration is a distant 
-prospect 
when 
compared to the advances made in the EC, African regional blocs, like many 
other regional unions, look closely at the ECs example. As such, while not 
directly relevant, some of the lessons from the experiences of EC member 
states may increasingly prove to be important from an African perspective. 
6.2.2. African Regional Integration Arrangements 
African political, economic and cultural unity ranks high among current 
regional priorities. However, it appears that the majority of African Union 
leaders prefer a more gradual integration initially focused on strengthening 
regional economic blocs as the foundation for future, pan-African political 
integration. 1482 There are hordes of regional integration treaties in Sub-Saharan 
Africa promoting regional economic bourses. 1483 Nigeria, South Africa and 
Kenya are the largest economies in their respective regions and play significant 
leadership roles in the ECOWAS, SADC/SACU and EAC/COMESA regional 
blocs. However, very few of these regional integration arrangements (hereafter: 
RIAs) are actually effective at promoting economic growth. The tendency of 
African RIAs to constitute 'stumbling blocks' to (and not 'building blocks' for) 
regional free trade may be due to limited patterns of trade, high dependence on 
Luja Assessment & Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC & the IFTO, op cit. 
1482 'African governments opt for time on single government', N, 'gerian 
Guardian 
Newspapers article, 5th July 2007 accessed at 
<httT):, -'-/www. guafdiannýwsnar-com/--ne-,, 
ý, s/. -irticleO4> on 05.07.07. 
1483 Evidently, West Africa boasts of 30 of such treaties: AfDB, African Development Report 
2000: Regional Integration in Africa, (Oxford University Press, New York: 2000) p. 135. 
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primary products, suboptimal inter-country trade and challenges with 
increasing the volume and variety of goods and services. 1484 
ECOWAS was established in 1975 by Nigeria and 15 other West African 
countries and presently has a market of 211million people with a combined 
GDP of US$82billion. 1485 Despite visionary plans to establish a common 
market, introduce a single currency and harmonise agricultural, industrial, 
infrastructural, monetary, environmen'tal and other national policies, 1486 very 
little progress has been made on most fronts. 1487The disappointing progress of 
ECOWAS can be contrasted with the relative success of SACU, which is the 
continent's oldest customs union. SACU has developed since 1898 under South 
Africa's leadership and features a strong common monetary area, central 
customs organisation, good transport linkages and sound outward-looking 
trade policies. 1488 SACU has also been instrumental in the development of the 
wider Southern African Development Community (SADC). 1489 
Kenya's economic dominance over Uganda and Tanzania was one of the 
reasons that led to the demise of the original East African Community (EAC) 
in 1977.1490 However, the union was revived in July 2000 and currently features 
a customs union (EAC CU) although proposals exist to establish a political 
union by 2013.1491 Integration has been strengthened this time around by the 
attenuation of Kenya's regional industrial supremacy and the introduction of a 
declining tariff regime. Dual RIA memberships occasionally create overlapping 
commitments,, 1492 but they also increase prospects for broader, pan-African 
economic integration. 
1484 Ibid, pp. 127,162-165. 
1485 Ibid, p- 16 1. 
1486 Articles 3-5, Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States 
(E. C. O. W. A. S. ) concluded 24-07.93: African Tax Systems: Section E, (Amsterdam; 
IBFD: 1999), pp. 14-15. 
1411 AfDB, African Development Report 2000, op cit, pp. 161-162. 
1488 Ibid, pp. 149-152. 
1489 Ibid, p. 154. 
1490 Ibid, p. 157. 
1491 UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide to East Africa (UN, New York/Geneva: 2005) p. l. 
1492 Kenya and Uganda belong to COMESA; 
Tanzania is a member of SADC. 
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6.2.3. Fiscal Integration & African RIAs 
There has been some degree of fiscal cooperation within the EAC, SACU and 
ECOWAS, particularly vis-d-vis maintaining a common external tariff (hereafter: 
CET). In this respect the EAC has been very active at harmonising fiscal 
policies. Corporate taxes and the highest personal income tax bands are 
uniform at 30%. VAT rates cluster between 16% (Kenya) and 20% 
(Tanzania) 1493 although these (and excise duties) are to be further harmonised 
to reduce the scope for regional tax competition. A tri-band CET 1494 is 
complemented by declining rate internal tariffs stilted in favour of Tanzanian 
and Ugandan exports into Kenya. 1495 More fundamental proposals seek to 
harmonise and rationalise tax incentive policies and facilitate the 
promotion of export-oriented investment within the region. 1496Under the EAC 
Customs Union Protocol, common policies and regulations are to be provided 
for duty-drawback schemes., 1497 duty/ VAT-remis si on schemes, 1498 
manufacturing-under-bond programmes1499 arid EPZs. 1500 
A key aspect of the SACU's trade liberalisation is the Free Trade Area1501 and 
CET applied on goods imported into the SACU. 1502The CET is administered by 
the South African Board of Tariffs and Trade which determines the rates of 
excise duties. 1503Under the Treaty of Windhoek, one of the means of attaining 
the objectives of regional integration is the harmo-nisation of political and 
socio-economic policies. 1504 Trade integration has been pursued through the 
1493 Uganda: 17%. 
1494 This CET features rates at 0%, 10% and 25%. 
1495 Exports to Kenya are zero-rated. Exports from Kenya to these countries are subject 
to a declining tariff to be phased out over 5years: UNCTAD-ICC, An Investment Guide 
to E ast Africa, p p. 27-29. 
1496 Ibid, pp. 50-51. See generally Part F, EAC Customs Union Protocol. 
" Article 26, ibid. 
1498 Article 27, ibid. 
1499 Article 28, ibid. 
"00 Article 29, ibid; cf. Easson Tax Incentivesfor Foreýgn Direct Investment, op ci . 1, p. 217. 
1501 Ensuring the free movement of domestic goods within the common customs area: 
Article 18, Southern Africa Customs Union Agreement of 2002. 
1502 Articles 19-26, ibid. 
1511 AfDB, African Development Report 2000, op cit, p. 149. 
1504 Article. 1(2), Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community. 
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harmonisation of fiscal polices. In relation to tax incentives, member states 
are required to achieve a common approach to the treatment and application of 
incentives. 1505A fiscal framework and certain guidelines were to be established 
to evaluate the effectiveness of tax incentives within the SADC5 the resultant 
impact of revenue costs to member states, the effectiveness of tax incenti in ves 
the absence of tax sparing arrangements within double taxation treaty networks 
and the impact on tax burdens and administration within SADC. 1506 
It is unclear how far ECOWAS has progressed with the harmonisation of 
regional tax incentive policies. 1507 However, the CET has been the major 
instrument for trade liberalisation and economic integration within ECOWAS. 
One stumbling block to this process has been Nigeria's notoriously high 
import tariffs. Given the size of the Nigerian economy relative to the region, 
such tariff barriers to entry are significant. On a positive note, Nigeria recently 
rationalised its tariff regime by harmonising it with the ECOWAS CET. 1508 
These new tariffs cluster mainly around 4 bands: basic necessities (0%), raw 
materials (5%); plant and machinery (10%); and consumer goods (20%). 
However, a protectionist 5th band (50%) still remains in force till January 2007 
and was to be reviewed in January 2008. This band protects agriculture, which 
remains the most sheltered sector with average tariff protection set at levels 
50% higher than that of the industrial sector. Import levies were increased on 
cigarette and rice imports to maintain pre-reform levels of protection for local 
agricultural production. 1509AS such, fiscal competition based on tariff rates still 
remains an outstanding issue within the ECOWAS bloc. 
`05 Article 4(l), SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in Taxation. 
1501 Ibid, Article 4(4)&(5). 
1511 Under the original 1975 ECOWAS Treaty, specific reference was made to the 
harmonisation of industrial incentives and development plans (Article 30). This 
provision is absent in the revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty. 
1508 Total tariff bands dropped: from 19 to 5 bands; from a maximum rate of 150% to 
50%; from an un-weighted average tariff of 28.6% to 12.1% jrom 51% to 16.4% for 
agricultural products and 24.8% to 11.4% for industrial products). 
1511 See Box 1: 'Nigeria: The October 2005 Tariff Reform', FGN; First Review under 
Policy Support Instrument Staff Report; Staff Statement, Press Release on the 
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6.2.4. Harmful Tax Competition or Fiscal Cooperation? 
One recent initiative to promote regional fiscal policy harmonisation was a 
study on tax incentives commissioned by SADC Tax Subcommittee. 1510 In this 
monograph on fiscal incentives, Bruce Bolnick considers the economics of 
harmful tax competition in relation to the SADC region. Bolnick examines the 
relevance of the OECD's harmful tax competition initiative 1511 to SADC by 
drawing parallels between the OECD's definition of tax havens1512 and harmful 
preferential tax regimes, 1513 and SADC's concept of harmful tax 
competitioill5l4.1515 
The OECD's 1998 Report considers tax havens and harmful preferential tax 
regimes as potentially harmful because they distort financial and real 
investment flows, undermine the integrity and fairness of tax structures, 
discourage compliance by all taxpayers, warp the desired mix of taxes and 
public spending, cause undesired shifts of the tax burden to less mobile tax 
bases, and increase administrative costs and compliance burdens (respectively) 
for revenue authorities and taxpayers. 1516 However, none of the countries 
studied in this Thesis was listed among offensive tax regimes in the OECD's 
Executive Board Discussion, & Statement by Executive Director for Nigeria, IMF 
Country Report 06/180; March 31,2006. 
1510 Bruce Bolnick/Nathan-MSI Group; Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in 
the SADC Region (Technical Report) (Arlington; Nathan Associates Inc: February 2004). 
'51, OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Paris, OECD: 1998). 
1512 Essentially, regimes able to finance their public services with no or nominal income 
taxes, which consequently hold themselves out as attractive locations for non- 
residents to escape residence country taxation. Tax havens lack mechanisms for the 
effective exchange of information; transparent legislative, legal or administrative 
procedures; and requirements stipulating that economic activities be substantial to 
qualify for minimal tax treatment: ibid, pp. 20,22-24. 
1513 Regimes which raise significant revenues from their income tax but whose tax 
systems have features (e. g. no or low effective tax rates on rele-,, ant Income, ring- 
fencing provisions, lack of transparency and absence of eflective e.,: change of 
information procedures) which lead to harmful tax competition: ibz, -, pp. 20,22-24. 
See also IBFD International Tax Glossary, op cit, p. 204. 
SADC equates harmful tax competition, to tax systems designed to erode the tax 
bases of other jurisdictions and attract investments and savings originating 
elsewhere, and so facilitating the avoidance of taxes in other jurisdictions: Article 1, 
SADC Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation in Ta--.,: ation. 
1511 Bolnick Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives ir the SADC Region, op cit, 
pp. 6-1 - 6-4. 1516 OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging G1, , al Issue, op cit, p. 16. 
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2000 Report. 1517 Indeed, there are some arguments suggesting that tax 
competition is potentially beneficial in forcing governments to provide the 
most attractive yet cost-effective investment environment. Investors should be 
at liberty to choose between high-tax/high public-expenditure states on the 
one hand, and low-tax/low public- expenditure states on the other. 1518 
Bolnick expresses concerns about the negative fiscal externalities that tax 
competition imposes on neighbouring countries by promoting perverse 
outcomes such as those obtained under the 'prisoner's dilemma' and 'winner's 
curse) scenarios. 1519 He notes the well-documented instance of South Africa 
losing out to Namibia in a tax incentive contest over Malaysian Ramatex's 
Rlbillion investment in a new textile production facility. 1520However, he notes 
cmost tax incentives in the SADC region appear to be driven by a legitimate 
desire to create an attractive investment environment, rather than a deliberate 
intent to deprive other Member States of investment and revenue. " 1521 
This view was corroborated by this Researcher during a Teleconference with 
Martin Grote, the South African National Treasury's Chief Tax Policy Adviser 
and Tax Specialist. 1522 Grote noted that since 2006 there was a general 
proliferation of tax incentives among the SADC community despite Bolnick's 
generally adverse findings on tax incentives in the region. The only exceptions 
to this trend were South Africa and Mauritius (which is apparently scaling 
down the scope and extent of its tax incentive schemes). Regrettably, other 
SADC countries were increasing the number of tax incentives they grant. 
However, in Grote's opinion this development was not so much a case of tax 
competition among SADC countries but rather, because theý- countries' 
1517 OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION, Report to the 2000 
Ministerial Council Meeting, June 2000 (Paris, OECD: 2000). 
'51, Easson, Tax IncentivesfOr Foreign Direct Investment, o_p cit, p. 224. 
1519 See further: Bolnick, Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax 'ncentives in the SADC 
Region, op cit, pp. 6-4 - 6-8. 1520 Ibid, Exhibit 6-2. 
1521 Ibid, p. 6 -11. 
1522 The Teleconference was held on 279.06.07 from 07.00hrs o 07.17hrs GMT. 
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policyrnakers persisted in the belief that tax incentives are necessary to attract 
FDI and ensure their economies remain attractive investment locations. 
6.2.5. Concluding Comments 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the prospects for severe tax 
incentive competition among countries within the ECOWAS, SACU/SADC and 
EAC/COMESA economic blocs appear to be low. 1523 Modest regional 
arrangements exist to encourage fiscal cooperation on tax incentives but the 
actual implementation of these arrangements is mixed across these regions. As 
the study countries play significant leadership roles within their respective 
bourses, their efforts to enhance fiscal integration have great impact on the 
progress of these initiatives. While South Africa's role within the SACU/SADC 
region has been progressive, Nigeria has been quite reluctant to harmonise its 
CET due to national economic priorities. However, as economic and political 
integration progresses among the continents regional blocs, the prospect for 
wider, pan-African fiscal cooperation on tax incentives should improve. 
The rest of this Chapter (Pi. Z., §6.3 and 56.4) examines the pervasive influence 
of international constraints on tax incentive policies imposed by the global 
trade order brokered by the World Trade Organisation, and the global financial 
architecture regulated by both the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. The nature, incidence and rationale for these constraints are examined 
from the perspective of developing countries and in light of criticism levied 
against the so-called 'unholy trinity' of the World Trade Organisation, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 1524The implications of these 
constraints for the politics, 'ownership' and sustainability of fiscal incentives 
reforms are considered next. 
1521 Relative to instances of intra-country and intra-regional incentive competition in the 
Americas, Central Europe and South-East Asia: Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign 
Direct Investment, op cit, Chapter 4. 
1524 Richard Peet et al, The Unholy Trinqy: The IMF, Vorld Bank and WTO (Zed Books, 
London: 2003), Chapter 6. 
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6.3. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW & POLICY ISSUES 
6.3.1. Introduction 
In all treaty situations where sovereign states cede control over policies 
otherwise within their domain5 issues of defensive and affirmative sovereignty 
arise. 1525Easson notes that while in theory fiscal sovereignty is an undeniable 
aspect of a sovereign state's liberties, there are practical internal and external 
constraints on the use of tax incentives by any sovereign state as a tool to 
promote of economic development. 1526Developing, nations grapple with basic 
revenue constraints as well as political and economic influences which impose 
conditions on the design and administration of investment incent ive policies. 
Domestic political pressure over the targeting of these policies to foreign or 
local investors may be a major consideration. However,, developing countries 
are also i nfluenced by more international pressures and there are few areas of 
international law that provoke more concerns for fiscal policy than 
international trade law. 
6.3.2. The Disciplines of the World Trade Organisation & International 
Trade Constraints 
6.3.2.1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organisation (hereafter: WTO) was established in 1995 by 
the Uruguay Round of negotiations 1527 as the successor organisation to the 
international trade arrangements established under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (hereafter: GATT). Its purpose is to manage world trade 
liberalisation and serve as a multilateral forum for governments to settle 
disputes arising put of trade agreements. The WTO acts to improve the flow of 
trade between member countries through negotiated agreements on tariffs, 
trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights. 1528The WTO aims at 
1525 Mary Tsai, 'Globalisation and Conditionality: Two Sides of the Sovereignty Coin' 
1511 
(2000) 31 Law and Policy in International Business, pp. 1317-1318. 
Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, p. 199. 
1527 This series of trade negotiations commenced in September 1986 in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay and concluded in April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. 
1521 The WTO acts mainly by enforcing binding tariff levels, reducing and eliminating 
quotas on imports, promoting transparent trade policies, and maintaining rules on 
dumping and subsidies. . 
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1529 ensuring open, fair and undistorted competition achieved by freer trade, 
predictable trade policies and fairer competition. These alms are complemented 
by a commitment to promote the interests of developing countries. At the 
heart of the WTO system is the original GATT of 1947, which is now part of 
GATT 1994 (the Marrakesh Agreement) with its dual principles of non- 
discriminationl530 and national treatment. 1531 
Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya are members of the WTO having all )oined 
the organisation on 1 January 1995. Consequently, the disciplines instituted by 
the WTO over international trade are some of the most formidable legal 
impediments to the fiscal incentive policies of these three countries. The WTO 
consists of 12 Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) which country members 
must accede to. 1532 0f these MTAs, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) 1533 and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) 1534 have limited application to fiscal and other incentive measures. 1535 
However, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing M easures 
(hereafter: SCM) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (hereafter: TRIMS) have certain provisions constraining the use of 
fiscal incentives as considered below. 
1521 Freer trade connotes liberal trade policies which promote the unrestricted flow of 
goods and services, sharpen competition, motivate innovation, breed succ ess and 
reward producers of the best priced products. 
1530 Member countries should receive most- favoured-nation treatment and trade policies 
discriminating against member countries are disallowed. 
1511 Once initial bound import tariffs have been paid, imported goods should be treated 
no less favourably than comparable domestic goods. 
1532 AfDB, African Development Report 2004, Chapter 5: Africa's External Trade Relations, 
op cit, pp. 207-224. 
1533 See the GATS Agreement accessed at 
<http: //www. wto. o legal e/26-gats. 12df> on 04.06.07. 
1534 See the TRIPS Agreement accessed at 
ý, W. wto. o e le(, al e/27-tri s. 
df> on 04.06.07. 2 2/ Ltr ijLs .p 4d <http: //www wto. org en lig1h doc, -c-LIe(yal 1535 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, p. 2U1. 
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6.3.2.2. The Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures 
6.3.2.2.1. Introduction 
SCM was concluded during the Tokyo Round in 1979 and entered into force on 
January 1,1995. The SCM initially was quite limited in scope 1536 and 
application. 1537UNCTAD notes that these led to few cases on incentives being 
determined. 1538Much of these shortcomings were addressed during the Uruguay 
Round which led to the conclusion of GATT 1994. Of significant importance 
for developing countries was the concept of a 'single undertaking, ' applying 
the new SCM to all member countries. This however, was moderated by the use 
of special and differential treatment targeted-at developing and least-developed 
countries. The revised GATT 1994 applies to all WTO member countries, has 
enhanced dispute resolution mechanisms that are not contingent on the 
consensus rule and features more robust disciplines on both export related and 
non-export related FDI incentives. SCM has specific provisions regarding the 
use of subsidies which have been categorised as specific, prohibited, actionable 
and non-actionable. 
6.3.2.2.2. Specific, Prohibited, Actionable & Non-Actionable Subsidies 
Under SCM, subsidies are deemed to occur when a government or public body 
within a WTO member country provides a financial contribution which confers 
a benefit. Such a financial contribution could be by way of a direct transfer of 
funds, potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities, the foregoing or non- 
collection of government revenue that is otherwise due, the provision of public 
goods or services other than general infrastructure, public funding or 
establishment of arrangements whereby private bodies are charged with 
carrying out public functions involving grants, fiscal and financial incentives, 
1131 In that SCM's disciplines addressed mainly export subsidies relating to trade. 
151, SCM had limited enforcement procedures, applied only to members who specifically 
acceded to it, and its dispute resolution mechanism relied on consensuses which 
were difficult to achieve in practice. 
1538 UNCTAD, Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment, p. 60. 
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the provision of special infrastructure or indeed, certain forms of income or 
price support. 
1539 
SCM's definition of subsidies is broad enough to include most types of fiscal 
incentives considered in Chapter 2 of this Thesis. For instance, the grant of 
tax holidays usually results in revenue forgone and the practice of providing 
special, subsidised infrastructure on preferential terms under many EPZ 
regimes may fall within the scope of the provision of public goods and 
services. Financial incentives such as grants and other direct financial transfers 
also fall within the ambit of SCM. There is also the concept of specific 
subsidies which are brought under certain disciplines restricting their use by 
WTO member countries. Specificity, within the meaning of SCM, describes 
circumstances where a government targets subsidies to certain enterprises, 
industries or geographical regions within that member state's territory. 1540 
Specific subsidies may further classified as prohibited, actionable and non- 
actionable subsidies. 
Prohibited subsidies are subsidies contingent in law or in fact on export 
performance or on the use of domestic supplies over imported goods. 1541 Such 
prohibited subsidies include non- agricultural subsidies conditional on export 
performance requirements and subsidies linked to local content requirements. 
An Illustrative List of Export Subsidies expatiates on the scope of subsidies 
prohibited as being contingent on export performance. The List includes the 
exemption, remission or deferral of both direct and indirect taxes and 
enumerates the types of subsidies which would be deemed offensive. 1542 
UNCTAD notes (in respect of the Illustrative List) that: the exemption or 
remission of indirect taxes (such as VAT) on exported products or the 
remission or drawback of import charges on goods not used for the production 
of exported products, and prior-stage' cumulative indirect taxes levied on 
.... Article 1, Subsidies & Countervailing Measures Agreement (hereafter: SCM), 
accessed at <http: //ww, ýx-. wto. org/english/ýdocs e/legal c/24-scm. 12cif> on 04.06.07. 
15" Article 2, SCM. 
15" Article 3, SCM. 
1542 See Annex I: Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, SCM. 
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(capital) inputs which are consumed in the production of exported products 
are all permissible under SCM's disciplines, provided that these are not 
contingent on export performance requirements. 1543 
Actionable subsidies are subsidies w. hich have 'adverse effects' 1544 on another 
member state's trading interests in that they occasion injury to that country's 
domestic industry; 1545 nullify or impair WTO benefits that should accrue to that 
country under GATT 1994; 1546 or otherwise cause cserious prejudice' 1547 to the 
interests of another WTO member country1548.1549 To reduce the evidentiary 
burden of establishing allegations of adverse effects, a presumption is raised in 
respect of certain subsidies which must be displaced by the subsidising 
country. Finally, non-actionable subsidies include all non-specific subsidies 
and those specific subsidies in respect of: assistance to R&D activities in 
respect of no more than 75% of the costs of industrial research or 50% of pre- 
competitive development costs; aid to disadvantaged regions of a member 
state's territory; and assistance to meet the costs of adapting to new 
environmental requirements. 1550 However, these subsidies lapsed with effect 
from 1 January, 2000 due to the lack of consensus on their extension. 1551 
Despite the constraints SCM's disciplines impose on the use of subsidies there 
are significant opportunities for developing countries (such as Nigeria, South 
1543 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations Exporl 
Competitiveness, (UN, New York/Geneva: 2002) p. 209. 
1544 Adverse effects generally connote the distortion of trade flows by subsidised goods 
either increasing the volume of exports from or imports into the subsidising country 
member: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002,6_p cit, p. 209. 
1545 E. g. by promoting subsidised imports. 
1541 E. g. benefits like the improved market access secured by bound tariffs. 
1... Article 6, SCM describes the scope of 'serious prejudice' which includes subsidies: 
covering operating losses of an industry or enterprise which displace or impede the 
importation of similar products in the m* arkets of a subsidising or third country or 
which result in significant price undercutting, price depression or lost sales. 
1548 E. g. export displacement of that country's products in the domestic market of the 
subsidising country or a third country. 
1549 Articles 5&6, SCM; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002, op cit, p. 209. 
1551 Article 8, SCM. 
1151 Luja Assessment & Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC 6- the WITO, op cil, p. 127; WTO 
2001 Annual Report, p. 63 
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Africa and Kenya) to benefit from export and local content subsidies due to 
special and differential treatment provided for developing country members. 
These opportunities are highlighted in the next section. 
6.3.22.22.3. Special & Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 
In recognition of the important role subsidies play in the economic 
development of least-developed and developing countries, SCM provides for 
special and differential treatment for these members StateS. 1552 Consequently, 
certain countries in Annex VII of SCM are wholly exempt from the prohibition 
against export subsidies. Annex VII countries are least-developed country 
members of WTO designated as LDCs by the UN and certain listed countries 
until their GNP per capita income reaches US$1,000 for 3 consecutive years as 
certified by the World Bank. 1553 Annex VII countries had a generous 8-year 
window within which they must have phased out export subsidies for products 
in which they have attained export competitiveness1554.1555 Crucially, two of the 
study countries in this Thesis, viýZ. Nigeria and Kenya, fall within this latter 
category and consequently would have enjoyed this special and differential 
treatment until their economic fortunes improve beyond the specified per 
capita threshold. 
Special and differential treatment for developing country members (such as 
South Africa) which are not listed in Annex VII tends to be less generous. 
These countries: had 8-years 1556 to phase out their export subsidies; may not 
increase the levels of subsidies during this transition period under certain 
standstill provisions; and must phase out over 2-years export subsidies in 
<httl2: //www. wto. orpý/english/res e/booksp e/, anrej2- c/wto ailreT201 C. 12df> 
accessed 09.10.07. 
1552 Article 27, SCM. 
1553 Annex VII, SCM. 
1554 Le. until 2002: see Articles 27.4 & 27.5, SCM. 
1555 Export competitiveness is defined as an export share of world trade in that 
particular product in excess of 3.25% sustained for at least 2 consecutive years: 
Article 27.6, SCM. 
1556 Expiring at the end of 2002: UNCTAD, 
Forld Investment Report 2002, op cit, p. 21 1. 
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respect of products which they have attained export competitiveness. 1557 
Finally, as a result of the 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, certain 
export subsidy regimes adopted by smaller economies with fragile export 
markets could be extended to 31 December 2007.1558 UNCTAD notes that 29 
countries have applied for extensions to their export subsidy programmes in 
relation to EPZ regimes. It is unsurprisingly that Kenya features among these 
29 countries, given the economic importance of its EPZ garments industry. 1559 
The role of EPZs in relation to subsidies regulation remains a controversial 
issue with opponents and proponents of these measures citing examples of 
successful and not-so-successful cases where EPZs were utilised. However, 
given the importance of EPZs in the industrialisation policies of developing 
countries, it would appear that these measures would continue to be used 
despite the WTO's concerns regarding destructive subsidisation. 1560 
SCM's disciplines are complemented by the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (or TRIMs) which provides restrictions on the use of 
incentives contingent on export performance and local content requirements. 
6.3.2.3. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIMs elaborates on WTO requirements Pis-d-vis trade in goods by providing 
enhanced mechanisms for more effective enforcement. 1561 TRIMs prohibits 
investment measures inconsistent with the national treatment principle 
especially the grant of advantages or incentives contingent on local content or 
export performance requirements. Offending investment measures are to be 
notified to the Council for Trade in Goods and eliminated over periods of 2- 
1557 Provided that if such subsidies are justified by that developing country member, they 
may be phased out over a longer period: Article 27.4. 
15" Decision of 14 November 2001: WTO Document WT/Min(01)/Dec/17. 
1,51 UNCTAD, Forld Investment Report 2002, op cit, p. 21 1. 
15" WTO, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the links between subsidies, trade and 
the WTO, pp. xl-xli, 77-82 
<httn: /, "-, vww.. wto. org/Enalishý/res e/booksp e/-, -tnrel2 e/world trade reportQ6 e. 12d 
f> accessed 09.10.07. 
1161 Article 1, the Agreement on Trade Related' Investment Measures (hereafter: TRIMs), 
accessed at <httl2: //-, ý7ww. wto. orgý/engýlishý/ýdocs e/leýýale/18-trims. pdf> on 
04-06.07. 
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years for developed country members, 5-years for developing country members 
and 7 -years for least -developed country members. 1562 
An Illustrative List enumerates at length investment measures inconsistent with 
GATT 1994. In the main, the Illustrative List practices relate to the use of 
domestic laws or administrative rulinzs to tie advantag-es conferred on 
enterprises to their use of domestic products or their compliance with 
restrictions on the use of imported products to specified volumes or values of 
exported goods. 1563 
Easson notes that TRIMs imposes constraints on the use of customs and other 
indirect taxes to provide protection for domestic industries by offending 
countries exceeding bound tariff limits agreed during trade negotiations. 1564 
Easson also observes that that SCM's disciplines raise issues about the 
propriety of income tax incentives and reductions tied to export performance, 
particularly for various EPZ incentives conditional on export performance 
criteria where '(a) zone enterprises are required to export some part of their 
production, and, (b) the tax privileges that are granted to zone enterprises are 
not available more generally in the rest of the country. 11565 
Despite the significant limitations inherent in the SCM and TRIMs Agreements 
on the use of fiscal incentives, there are notable practical constraints on the 
ability of WTO disciplines to promptly address adverse effects caused by 
offending subsidies as examined below. 
6.3.2-4. Practical Constraints on Countervailing Measures 
The WTO permits an aggrieved member country to retaliate against an 
offending one by imposing countervailing measures where the latter fails to 
comply with a resolution issued under the dispute resolution procedure. 
1562 Article 5, TRIMs. 
'5" See the Illustrative List: Annex to TRIMs. 
1564 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Intestment, op cit, p. 202. - 
1165 Ibid, p. 206. 
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UNCTAD notes that such retaliatory measures are more robust than unilateral 
countervailing measures in that they are not confined to the territory of the 
aggrieved party and are therefore more effective measures in contemporary 
global markets. However, before such countervailing measures are imposed, 
the aggrieved member country must establish the existence of an adverse effect 
by demonstrating that there is a causal link between subsidised imports and the 
injury complained of. 1566 
There are instances of specific domestic tax provisions which would otherwise 
appear to offend against WTO rules but which, in practice, may not actually 
violate specific WTO disciplines or indeed, may be of little practical 
consequence given the opportunities available for firms to achieve identical 
commercial ends by utilising other, non-offending domestic tax provisions. For 
example, Easson, referring specifically to Nigeria, questions certain practices 
involving direct tax advantages - namely the grant of 'investment allowances' 
to firms purchasing locally manufactured plant 1567 and the conferment of 
(pioneer' tax holidays to enterprises coritingent on their use of domestic raw 
materials1568 -as being contrary to GATT/WTO disciplines. 1569 
However, Nigerian tax law does not presently provide investment allowances to 
companies purchasing locally manufactured equipment. Easson's reference to 
the grant of investment allowances probably relates to provisions of ý38(2) 
CITA 1979 which provide 15% investment tax credits to companies 
purchasing locally manufactured plant, machinery or equipment on such fixed 
assets. In any event, the standard rates of initial capital allowances at 50% for 
manufacturing, construction and other plant expenditures under the CITA 1979 
15" Part V, SCM; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002, op cit, p. 210. 
1561 Easson cites . an article by A. Ajayi as the source of his information on these 
incentives: see A. Ajayi, 'Nigerian Government Introduces Far-reaching Tax 
Incentives to Lure Business Investment', Tax Notes International, March 3-, 2002 
[2002 WTD 114-3]. 
1561 This probably refers to §35 CITA 1979 which confers 3-year tax holidays on wholly 
export-oriented companies conditional, inter alia, on their export proceeds 
constituting at least 75% of turnover. 
1561 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, p. 202. 
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regime are significantly more generous than the 15% investment tax 
creditl570.1571 
Similarly, under the ID/ITR Act 1971, companies are eligible for up to 5-years 
of tax holidays which are not necessarily linked to export performance or local 
content requirements. These provisions are rather wide in theory and are even 
more flexibly applied in practice. Well-advised Nigerian companies might find 
the provisions of that Act easier to navigate than those (presumably) referred 
to by Easson. As such, it is likely that both these provisions queried by Easson 
may actually be of less practical significance, reducing the actual impact of 
WTO disciplines. 
UNCTAD enumerates further limitations on the efficacy of the SCM regime. 
SCM disciplines only regulate subsidies on goods, not on services, 1572 and 
cannot be easily applied to locational incentives. SCM rules are of limited 
effectiveness as the incidence of 'adverse effects' may occur well after 
subsidies by way of fiscal or other incentives have been granted. Further, a 
recommendation to withdraw or modify a subsidy (or the imposition of a 
countervailing duty due to the failure to give effect to such a withdrawal or 
modification) may fall to remedy the initial grant of an offending subsidy. 
Easson observes that violations of WTO rules tend to continue for extended 
periods of time prior to resolution, citing as an example the EU-US dispute 
over the US Foreign Sales Corporations which could be traced to the US DISC 
regime of 1971.1573He further questions the enforceability of WTO rules where 
disputes arise between developing countries who are fierce competitors for 
1570 T6 of, and Tables I& II to, Second Schedule, CITA 1979. 
1571 As is the 25% investment tax credit granted to companies that fabricate (as 
opposed to purchase) spare parts, tools and equipment for local consumption and 
export. However, the local content requirement here is less stringent so it is 
questionable if this provision actually offends TRIMs: 538(2) CITA 1979. 
1572 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does not deal specifically with 
subsidies. 
1573 The FSC dispute was only resolved by WTO dispute settlement panel in 1999, some 
28 years later: see R. S. Avi-Yonah, 'Tax, Trade, and Harmful Tax Competition: 
Reflections on the FSC Controversy' (2000) 21 Tax Notes International, 2841. 
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FDI but have very little common trade with each other. The remedy presented 
by retaliatory action becomes illusive, undermining the effectiveness of this 
remedy. In relation to fiscal competition between neighbouring countries to 
attract FDI to their EPZs, Easson notes that 
... the eventual importing countries have no cause to complain - they did not seek the investment and their consumers benefit from lower 
prices. The losing bidders may find it difficult to establish that they 
have suffered any damage as a result of the subsidy but, in any event, 
they have virtually no trade with the winner and thus are in no position 
to impose sanctions. 1574 
In these circumstances SCM disciplines may simply be too little too late. 1575 
6.3.2.5. Implications for Local Content & Export Subsidies 
Under SCM's disciplines, both local content and export-oriented subsidies are 
required to be phased 0Ut. 1576Developing countries such as South Africa that 
are not listed in Annex VII to the SCM must review any export subsidy and 
related incentive programmes by the end of the transition periods. Indeed, 
even developing country members such as Nigeria and Kenya which are listed 
in Annex VII must consider these issues as future economic prosperity 
promises to translate them over the US$1,000 GNP per capita threshold. 
Numerous Nigerian fiscal incentives appear to be presently or potentially 
inconsistent with WTO rules and which would require immediate rectification 
or gradual elimination once Nigeria crosses the specified per capital threshold. 
Similarly, SCM rules on subsidies linked to export performance requirements 
raise significant questions about the long-term sus-tainability of Kenya's 
successful EPZ-based garment industry. 
A criticism directed at the SCM regime is that it may affect developing 
countries which are more likely to use prohibited subsidies linked to export 
performance and local content requirements. Their better endowed 
1574 Easson, Tax IncentivesJor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, p. 207. 
1575 Part V, SCM; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002, op cit, p. 209. 
1576 In 2000 for developed countries and 2003 for LDCs: WTO, World Trade Report 
2006: Exploring the links between subsidies, trade and the WTO, op cit, p. 192; Luja 
Assessment & Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC & the VTO, op cit, pp. 135-136. 
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contemporaries are more likely to use non-actionable subsidies including R&D, 
regional aid and environmental requirements as these subsidies are common in 
these developed countries. 1577Middle income developing countries like South 
Africa may find that their efforts to promote R&D activities may fall foul of 
the WTO disciplines as being too generous. 
UNCTAD provides a series of recommendations for developing countries 
including an evaluation of the respective merits and demerits of the use of 
incentives to promote FDI possibly as part of an overhaul of the country's tax 
regime. Other measures include using subsidies as part of an integrated policy 
package to attract FDI alongside other measures to enhance the level of skills, 
technology and infrastructure, improve the business environment, and embed 
FDI into the local economy by fostering linkages. Countries may find that 
financial subsidies are to be preferred to fiscal incentives as the former are less 
prone to challenge under countervailing measures. In particular, it may be 
harder to establish the existence of causal connections between cash grants 
given upfront and adverse effects. Similarly, while dispute resolution 
recommendations could require the withdrawal of fiscal subsidies, it is unlikely 
that SCM's disciplines would require a beneficiary enterprise to repay a cash 
grant. As SCM aims at eliminating distortions of market access and not the 
diversion of investment flows, it may be difficult for an aggrieved country 
member to establish adverse effects as a result of investment incentives 
diverting FDI away from its territory to that of a competing country 
member. 1578 
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns,, member countries not benefiting 
from the Annex VII exemptions could reform their EPZ programmes by 
removing requirements* restricting sales within the domestic market or by 
establishing new incentive regimes that are not contingent on export 
performance requirements. Other solutions include the judicious use of border 
15" UNCTAD, Incentives & Foreign Direct Investment, op rz . t, p. 6 2. 
157' UNCTAD, Vorld Investment Report 2002, op cit, pp. 211-213. 
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tax adjustments, duty drawback and duty exemption schemes, and the reduction 
or the elimination of import duties. 1579 
6.3.3. Concluding Comments 
Multilateral agreements on international trade exert significant constraints on 
developing countries hoping to utilise tax incentives linked to local content 
rules and export performance targets. Such international trade obligations 
influence the selection and content of domestic trade policies of developing 
countries. Ongoing discussions on the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
initiatives have proved challenging. For instance, while South Africa would 
prefer the EPA to supersede the current Trade, Development & Cooperation 
Agreement, EU trade officials object to this. 1580 
Developing countries voluntarily accede to WTO disciplines to benefit from 
the economic opportunities created by freer and fairer trade. Similar, indirect 
influences have been exerted by multilateral lending agencies on the economic 
and fiscal policies of many developing and highly-indebted countries which 
seek to benefit from the credit facilities and advisory services offered by these 
multilateral lending agencies. The International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have been at the 
forefront of tax reform initiatives which influence (and discourage) the use of 
tax incentives in client countries. Some of these issues are highlighted in the 
next section (§6.4). 
1579 Ibid, pp. 214-219. 
1580 OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Soutb Africa) p-493. 
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6.4. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs, TAX CONDITIONALITY & 
FISCAL POLICY REFORM 
6.4.1. Introduction: The IMF, World Bank & Tax Reform 
In addition to the constraints on tax incentive policies imposed by WTO's 
disciplines are strictures imposed on developing countries which use the credit, 
surveillance, technical assistance, advisory and other services provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (hereafter: the IMF) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (hereafter: the World Bank). The World 
Bank provides and supplements capital, loans, guarantees and other. forms of 
investment to promote development, trade, balance of payment equilibrium 
and higher living standards in member countries. 1581 The IMF provides credit 
intermediation, credit-related public goods 1582 and bilateral services 1583 to its 
member countries. 1584As regards structural adjustment programmes, Denters 
observes that the IMF's macroeconomic and 'top-down' approach contrasts 
with the World Bank's 'bottom-up', microeconomic approach. 1585While both 
Bretton Woods' institutions collaborate closely in fiscal reform initiatives, the 
IMF has had more significant global impact on tax reform by providing 
technical assistance and tax policy advice to member countries. 1586 
South Africa joined the IMF as an original member on 12 December 1945 while 
still a British Dominion. 1587Nigeria and Kenya became members, respectively, 
on March 30,1961 and February 3,1964.1588 IMF membership is a prerequisite 
1581 Article I: Articles of Agreement of the IBRD/World Bank. 
1582 By way of oversight of the international monetary system, bilateral and multilateral 
surveillance, cross-currency statistical information and methodologies, general 
research and financial sector assessment. 
Including technical assistance, external training and financial assistance to low 
income countries. 
1584 Final Report of the Committee to Study Sustainable Long-Term Financing of the 
IMF (the 'Crockett Report), (Washington D. C., IMF: 2007), p. 5. 
1515 Erik Denters Law and Policy of IMF Conditionality (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague: 1996), p. 158. 
1516 Parthasarathi Shome, 'Introduction', in Parthasarathi Shome (ed) Tax Policy Handbook 
(FAD/IMF, Washington D. C.: 1995), pp. 19,20. 
1587 Denters Law and Polity of IMF Conditionalily, op cit, p. 36. 
1511 'Financial Position in the Fund as of April 30,2007', of Nigeria, South Africa and 
Kenya respectively, generally available from the 
IMF website at 
<h ttT): L/mrwa -imf. orL:, 
/external /countq-/index. htm >. 
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for membership of the World Bank under the Bank's Articles. 1589While all 
three countries are members of the World Bank5 1590 only Kenya belongs to all 
World Bank Group organisations. 1591 South Africa is not a member of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes1592 and Nigeria is 
not a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee AgenCy1593.1594 
This section (§6.4) considers the policy constraints imposed by IMF/World 
Bank tax conditionality and the incidence of tax conditions in the IMF- 
supported tax reform agendas of Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. Tax 
conditionality imposed by the IMF/World Bank completes the triangulation of 
obstacles that member developing countries must carefully navigate in using 
fiscal incentives to promote economic development. - 
6.4.2. Tax Conditionality & Tax Reform in Nigeria, South Africa & Kenya 
Conditionality associated with IMF credit support is predicated on the need to 
use adequate safeguards in the deployment of IMF resources made available to 
members requiring temporary credit support from the Fund. 1595 CoMpliance 
with IMF conditionality is critical for countries grappling with adverse 
economic conditions as IMF approval of such countries' economic po licies is 
not only a prerequisite for World Bank credit but is of enormous influence in 
securing the confidence of commercial lenders. 1596As a result, elements of the 
IMF/World Bank's tax policy reform agenda have increasingly featured in the 
fiscal policies of developing countries. Such countries frequently find their 
domestic fiscal policies constrained by varying degrees of tax conditionality. 
Article II, T1: Articles of Agreement of the IBRD/World Bank. 
South Africa (1945), Nigeria (1961) and Kenya (1964). 
1591 Le. International Development Association and International Finance Corporation 
(1964); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (1967); and 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1988). 
1592 South Africa belongs to International Finance Corporation (1957); International 
Development Association (1960); Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1994). 
1591 Nigeria belongs to International Development Association, International Finance 
Corporation and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (all in 
1961). 
1594 See generally the World Bank's website at <httj2: //www. worldbank. oro, />. 
1595 Denters, Law and Policy of IMF Condilionalio, op cit, pp. 25-26. 
159, Such as the London and Paris Clubs: ibid, p. 51. 
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Stewart and jogarajan present a comprehensive critique of IMF-supported tax 
conditionality and review salient aspects the IMF's tax reforms through its tax 
conditionality and technical assistance activities. 1597The authors compare data 
on tax conditions in an internal IMF review of reform programmes 1598w1th 
their survey 
. 
of official country policy intentions disclosed by 95 member 
countries in 490 Letters of Intent1599 for periods between 1997 and 2004. They 
link the rising influence of tax conditionality to several factors including: the 
increasing preoccupation by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department (hereafter: 
FAD) 1600 with the structural and social aspects of fiscal policy in member 
countries' tax systems: the growth of IMF-sponsored conditional lending on 
concessional terms since the 1970s; and the considerable reliance by 
commercial banks on IMF endorsement of macroeconomic policies adopted by 
member countries. 1601 
Citing Stotsky's review of IMF's tax policy advice in the 1990s, 1602Stewart and 
jogarajan identify the following specific elements in the IMF's standard tax 
reform package: the early introduction of a broad-based value added tax with a 
single rate close to 20%; low-rate, investment-neutral corporate and personal 
income taxes; fewer and simpler import and export tariffs, excise duties, 
1597 Miranda Stewart and Sunita jogafalan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax 
Reform' [2004] 2 British Tax Review pp. 146-175. 
1598 Over the decade between 1985 and 1995: see G. T. Abed el al, Fiscal Reforms in Low- 
Income Countries: Experience under IMF-Supported Programs (March 1998) IMF 
Occasional Paper No. 160 (IMF, Washington D. C.; 1998). 
1599 Denters observes that the letter of intent is prepared by (and therefore remains the 
responsibility of) the member country. The stabilisation policies it declares do not 
create legal fights or obligations. This supports the IMF's contention that such 
policies are those of the country member and not of the Fund, despite the fact that 
such letters of intent are prepared in close consultation with relevant IMF mission: 
Denters, Law and Policy of IMF Conditionaliýy, op cit, pp. 87-88; 99-100. 
"o, Particularly under the leadership of Vito Tanzi as Chief of Tax Policy (1974-1981) 
and Director (1981-2000) of the FAD. 
Stewart and jogaralan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op cit, 
pp. 148-152. 
1602 Janet Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice', in Parthasarathi Shome (ed), 
Tax Policy Handbook, op cit, pp. 279-284. 
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payroll and land taxes; and tax administration reform. 1603 Stotsky notes that 
broader, reoccurring themes in the FAD's technical assistance on tax policy 
include the simplification of existing tax systems to reduce inefficiencies, 
inequities, high compliance costs and tax evasion, and enhancing revenue 
generation in the most economically-neutral manner possible. 1604 
IMF-advised tax conditionality features prominently in recent policy 
documents issued by the Nigerian, Kenyan and South African governments. 
This trend is unsurprising as all three countries ut'llse IMF's technical 
assistance expertise in fiscal policy matters. A cursory perusal of their recent 
letters of intent, annual reports and other policy documents validates Stewart 
and jogarajan's views on the pervasiveness of tax conditionality. In these 
policy documents, the three governments undertake to implement (or make 
reference to) fiscal policies broadly consistent with the IMF/World Bank's tax 
reform advice. 
With respect to Nigeria., instances of tax conditionality feature in recent 
policy documents related to the IMF's Policy Support Instrument (or PSI) 
which under-girds Nigeria's 'home-grown' Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 
NEEDS. 1605 Prior to NEEDS, the Nigeria government aimed at 'broadening the 
revenue base and strengthening tax administration generally' with an emphasis 
on improving VAT administration under the Vision 2010 economic plan. 1101 By 
2005, the FIRS was being restructured with technical assistance from the IMF's 
FAD, and the '... tax system reformed in order to broaden the tax base and 
address distortions, as well as to make the budget less vulnerable to Oil Price 
Stewart and jogarajan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op cit, 
p. 15 2. 
Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice', op cit, p. 279. 
1605 The IMF notes that PSIs are designed for low income countries that may not need, 
or want, IMF financial assistance, but still seek IMF's advice, monitoring and 
endorsement of their policies. Consequently, PSIs are voluntary, demand-driven and 
based on country-owned poverty reduction strategies involving civil society and 
development partners as articulated in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: IMF 
Press Statement #05/229: 'IMF approves a 2-year PSI for Nigeria'. 
1611 T21, Nigeria: Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic & Financial Policies of 
Federal Government for 2000, dated July 20,2000. 
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shocks' 1607 in line with fiscal policy under NEEDS. In 2006, the Nigerian 
government promised to continue restructuring FIRS with the introduction of 
an automated tax administration system and individual tax identification 
numbers (or TINs). The federal government also undertook to establish a Tax 
Policy Unit based in the Ministry of Finance by December 2006 1608 and 
institutionalise tax reforms through the passage of a Tax Reform Bill in the 
second quarter of 2006.1609 
Comparable IMF/World Bank influenced tax reforms have been implemented 
in Kenya and South Africa. In Kenya, recent fiscal policies in terms of the 
ERS correspond'to those supported by IMF's FAD technical assistance. 161(l Tax 
administration reforms in respect of income tax, customs and VAT feature 
prominently fiscal pollCy. 1611 The in current significant input of international 
financial ins titutions into Kenya's economic , 
budgeting and fiscal policy has 
already been noted elsewhere in this Thesis. 1612Moving South, during the 2006 
Article IV consultations, the IMF commended South Africa on its declining 
budget deficit, driven by tax revenues consistently exceeding projections and 
noted with approval that '... tax policy is generally sound, aiming at reducing 
tax rates while broadening the base'. 1613 
1607 T23, Nigeria: Request for a 2-year Policy Support Instrument - Staff Report; Staff 
Statement, Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion, & Statement by 
Executive Director for Nigeria, IMF Country Report 05/432; October 7,2005, p. 11. 
1608 Nigeria: Authorities Letter of Intent, Policy Statement, & Technical Memorandum; 
March 30,2006, p. 9. 
1609 Ibid, T6, p. 10. Incidentally, the tax reform legislation was not passed until the second 
quarter of 2007, a full year later. 
1611 Kenya: Republic of Kenya/Ministry of Planning & National Development; 'Annual 
Progress Report: 2004/05, Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery 
Strategy for Wealth & Employment Creation 2003-2007; May 2006. 
1611 ibid, p. 8. 
1612 See S5.1.3 of this Thesis. 
1613 South Africa: Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; Staff Statement; Public 
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the 
Executive Director for South Africa; IMF Country Report 06/327; Sept 2006, T27, 
pp-8,15. 
Bode Oyetmnde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
, 
Queen Mary, Universiýy of London 
Pa 
, ge 
304 of418 
The Role of Tax Incenlives in A Trio o'f Sub-Sabaran African Economies 6: Regional & International Tax, Trade 
A Comparative Study of Nigerian. South African & Kenyan Tax Lan, & Finance Policy Issues 
There is some ambiguity surrounding this recurring objective of 'broadening 
the tax base'. 1614However, in relation to IMF-supported structural adjustment 
programmes, the concept has been closely associated with the introduction and 
expansion of broad-based consumption taxes such as the VAT. 1615 The 
discussion in this section concludes by examining the recent Nigerian VAT rate 
increase and the implications of this development for the future of Nigerian 
tax incentives. However, it is useful to first highli I ict the underlying confli 
between efficiency and equity in relation to IMF-supported tax policy reforms. 
6.4.3. Equity vs. Economic Efficiency in Tax Policy Reform 
Stewart and jogarajan highlight a decline In the importance attached to fiscal 
equity since the 1980s and link the subordination of tax progressivity to the 
increasing importance of economic neutrality, economic efficiency and the 
revenue function in IMF-supported tax policy reform. 1616As certain IMF staff 
members have addressed some of the issues raised by the concept of fiscal 
equity and the frequent trade-off with the of ten- conflicting concept of 
efficiency, it may be useful to consider their views here. 1617 
Zee considers the promotion of both efficiency1618 and equity1619 as desirable 
goals, but notes however, that where there is a trade-off between these often 
competing concepts, the ultimate outcome would depend on the particular 
1614 Stewart and jogarajan note that this concept has been associated with diverse IMF- 
supported tax reforms ranging from removal of exemptions and tax incentives, profit 
declaration requirements, reform of large taxpayer administration to national health 
levies: Stewart and jogaralan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op 
cit, p. 15 6. 
1615 Box 5: 'Why the VAT? ' Chapter III: Revenue Policy and Performance in Fiscal 
Reforms in Low-Income Countries: Experience under IMF-Supported Programs, op cit, p. 22; 
see also pp. 3-4,10. 
1616 Stewart and jogarajan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op cit, 
p-164. 
1617 While Tanzi, Zee, Stosky and Shome were IMF economists, the IMF reiterates that 
their views are the responsibility of these authors and do not necessarily represent 
those held by the IMF. Nevertheless, it may be fair to say that it is unlikely that the 
IMF's official position would vary significantly from those expressed 
by these IMF 
staff. 
1611 Howell H. Zee, 'Taxation and Efficiency', in Parthasarathi Shome (ed), Tax Policy 
Handbook, op cit, pp. 25-29. 
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notion of distributive justice that the policymaker prefers. 1620 Indeed, concepts 
of vertical and horizontal equity are said to be of '11 ited practical value unless m 
and until (a) the basis for measuring equality (and Inequality) among 
individuals is defined; (b) the meaning of equal (and unequal) tax treatment is 
specified; and (c) implementable tax principles to guide policy are derived. 11621 
Zee recommends the use of social welfare formulae to explicitly describe these 
elusive concepts. 
Zee notes in conclusion that '... the importance of achieving redistributive 
goals through increasing the progressivity of the income tax system should not 
be overemphasized, as the efficiency co sts of doing so are likely to be 
extremely high'. 1622 Similarly Tanzi opines that the pressures of globalisation, 
tax competition, and increasing mobility of capital and labour imnose 
constraints on the ability of governments to give expression to the concept of 
equity by pursuing progressive taxation and other redistributive policies. 1623 
Nevertheless, given the increasing gap between the rich and poor (globally and 
particularly in developing countries), issues of equity and politics in relation to 
economic development reoccur frequently in contemporary development policy 
discussions. The next section highlights the manner in which the World Bank 
considers the concept of 'equity' and draws parallels with the IMF's approach 
to these issues. 
6.4.4. The World Bank, Tax Conditionality & Equity 
A recent World Bank report considers the concept of equity in a development 
context. 1624Equity here is conceived as the provision of equal opportunities to 
'119 Howell H. Zee, 'Taxation and Equity', in Parthasarathi Shome (ed), Tax Policy 
. 
Handbook, op cit, pp. 30-34. 
1620 Howell H. Zee, 'Personal Income Tax: Theory of Optimal Income Taxation', in 
Parthasarathi Shome (ed), Tax Policy Handbook, op cz . t, P. 119. 
1621 Zee, 'Taxation and Efficiency' in Tax Polig Handbook, op cit, p. 30. 
1622 Zee, 'Personal Income Tax: Theory of Optimal Income Taxation' in Tax Policy 
Handbook, op cit, p. 118. 
1623 Vito Tanzi, 'Changing Role of the State in the Economy', in Policies, Institutions and 
the Dark Side of Economics, op cit, p. 27. 
1624 World Bank, World Development Report, 2006: Equity & Development, (Oxford University 
Press, New York: 2005). 
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individuals to pursue lives of their own choosing and to be spared from the 
ravages of extreme deprivation, irrespective of the conditions of their birth, 
sex, race, culture and levels of access to health, education and other 
opportunities. 1625As regards taxation, the World Bank notes that while fiscal 
collections are vital to finance equity- enhancing public services, tax evasion or 
avoidance, and the lack of accountability may result in a break-down of the 
social compact between governments and taxpayers. 1626 The Bank notes that 
alternative sources of financing for social services can raise equally severe 
accountability issues. For instance, countries which depend on 'unear. ned' 
natural resource rents may find that while these resources may relieve 
expenditure constraints, they potentially 'undermine the accountability 
imbedded in the social compact underpinning sound public finance. 11627 
However, as regards fiscal policy and tax design, the World Bank's views are 
consistent with the IMF's economic ef ficiency- oriented policies as noted 
above. In relation to tax design, the World Bank enumerates seven key 
principles necessary to ensure that efficiency costs are minimised without 
impairing pro-equity outcomes. These principles include: broadening the tax 
base by the use of a broad-based consumption tax and applying income tax 
uniformly to all sources of income; reducing tax rates to minimise efficiency 
costs and economic distortions; avoiding regressive indirect taxes; increasing 
collections from personal income taxes initially through improved tax 
compliance but ultimately by equalising personal and corporate income tax 
rates; implementing property and inheritance taxes as appropriate; arid 
reducing the incidence and impact of hidden, implicit taxes such as bribes, 
inflation and regulatory charges. 1128 
1625 Ibid, pp. 2-3; 18-19. 
1626 lbid, 'Focus 5 on Taxation', pp. 176-7. 
1627 lbid, p. 17 6. 
1628 lbid, pp. 176-7. 
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6.4.5. Equity, Politics and Tax Conditionality 
Stewart and jogara)an also consider the issue of equity, but from a quite 
different perspective than that of the World Bank's report. The authors 
criticise the dearth of attention directed by IMF-induced tax reform to crucial 
issues of politics and equity. Here, equity exists on several dimensions. 
'Internal' or domestic equity refers to the domestic, political bargaining 
process between the state and a wide spectrum of potential taxpayers, public 
interest groups and other stakeholders, while 'external' or international equity 
corresponds to power dynamics underlying the relationships between the IMF 
and client countries in the international arena. 1629 
As regards internal equity, the authors advocate tax reform '... tied to the 
specific local politics, taking into account the historical origins of the local 
state, the inequalities and classes in the society, and other forms of 
16300n the issue stratification such as ethnic, gender or religious stratification'. 
of external equity, the authors criticise the closed and opaque manner in which 
tax conditions are negotiated between finance ministry officials and IMF staff,, 
preferring tax reform to be the outcome of open, transparent and inclusive 
political negotiations between the relevant country member and its internal 
constituency of taxpayers. 1631 
The authors call for a re-examination of the nexus at which the internal and 
external dimensions of politics and equity are juxtaposed, arguing that these 
dual issues are intricately involved in, and consequently, should be explicitly 
addressed by the processes of tax reform and conditionality. 1632 Citing the 
example of Ghana, the authors draw connections between the sparse analysis 
of tax and equity issues in country member policy documents 1633 on the one 
hand, with the lack of ownership of tax reforms by member country 
1621 There is also an aspect of fiscal 'equ, * 
ty' associated with progressive taxation. 
1611 Stewart and jogarajan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', o. P Cit, 
p-166. 
1611 Ibid, pp. 166-168. 
1632 Ibid, p. 163. 
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governments on the other. Ultimately, Stewart and jogarajan opine that '... the 
"non-public", secretive and expert-driven process of tax condltionalltY 
militates against. ownership of tax reform in the national conteXt'1634with dire 
consequences for the sustainability of such IMF-driven fiscal reform. 
Stewart and jogarajan criticise the IMF for rarely addressing issues of politics 
or equity vis-d-vis the process of tax reform and for preferring to perceive this 
process as '... a matter of economic efficiency and administrative efficacy - of 
technical or technocratic expertise - rather than as a matter requiring 
"Judgement of social and political priorities". " 1635The authors argue that unless 
and until equity and politics are explicitly addressed in the context of public 
opinion, interest groups and local political factors, developing countries 
advised by the IMF would fail to achieve 'sustainable tax reform (which) 
involves a new political bargain that will produce a revenue system that is 
widely accepted as fair, so that there will be sufficient voluntary 
compliance'. 1636 
Murungal637makes similar observations regarding Kenya's policy relations with 
the IMF and World Bank in the 1980s vis-d-vis structural adjustment lending. 
He notes that negotiations on critical matters of economic policy were 
conducted in secret between the international financial institutions and key a- 
political, technocrats in the Kenyan government. While this process reduced 
the risk of opposition from potential dissenters, the success and pace of 
reforms were dependent on the political fortunes of technocrats favoured by 
the IMF/World Bank, ironically increasing the risk, uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the progress of reforms. 
Particularly in the brief Letters of Intent and more comprehensive 
Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers surveyed. 
1634 Stewart and jogarajan, 'The International Monetary Fund and 
Tax Reform', op cit, 
p. 16 8. 
1635 Ibid, pp. 162-163. 
1636 Ibid, p. 166- 
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Murunga comments that: 
The question of technocrats raises issues regarding ownership of the 
reforms. Their dominance in negotiations had serious political 
implications that donors failed to face. By limiting negotiations to a few 
technocrats, the donors were in effect depoliticising the reform process 
and ignoring the wider public, the very constituency that needed to 
legitimate the reforms. ... the WB/IMF succeeded in having most of 
their policy decisions passed in parliament with little, if any, debate... 
This approach contradicted donor rhetoric about participatory 
development, democracy and good governance. It prevented popular 
discussion of policies before they were enacted; yet the same people 
who were denied access to the decision-making process were expected to 
implement them or bear the cost and consequences of implementation. 
Reform began to appear more and more as a transaction between 
technocrats and the donors Depoliticising the process simply 
compounded the problem of ownership of the reform process, 
prompting one politician to complain that the technocrats alienated the 
cabinet from the reform process. 1638 
As noted above, the IMF has been very active and influential in promoting the 
spread of the VAT. However, in certain instances, the manner in which such 
IMF/World Bank-supported fiscal reforms are implemented has possibly 
undermined the political legitimacy and broad-based support necessary to 
guarantee sustainability. Public dissatisfaction often manifests in industrial 
action as seen in the 1991 2-day strike by 3.5million South African workers 
protesting against the introduction of a 'regressive' VAT. 1639 
The next section highlights how equity and politics have become particularly 
relevant in light of the more recent increase of the Nigerian VAT rate. As the 
VAT increase came about partially as a result of IMF/World Bank and other 
regional pressures, this development raises the prospect of a possible decline 
in tax incentives due to compliance with IMF-tax conditionality. This, in turn, 
raises further issues concerning the sustainability of tax reforms in the absence 
of a deep sense of ownership forged through negotiations 
based on both 
internal equity and external equity. 
Godwin R. Murunga, 'Governance and the Politics of Structural Adjustment in 
Kenya", in Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. 
Nasong'o (eds) Kenya: the Struggle 
for Democracy (CODESRIA/Zed Books, London; 2007) pp. 272-276. 
1638 Ibid, pp. 275-6. 
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6.4.6. Tax Conditionality & Ownership of Nigeria's VAT Rate Reform 
The IMF has been extremely influential in the spread of the VAT across 
developing member countries to replace outmoded turnover and sales taxes. 
Such sales, turnover, gross receipts or transaction taxes result in tax cascading: 
incremental taxes levied on various stages of production and distributi-on result 
in the inflation of the ultimate price paid by the final consumer. For this 
reason, IMF staff recommend the replacement of these taxes with a 'good tax' 
such as the VAT1640 which avoids tax cascading and associated economic 
distortions. 1641 
Stewart and jogarajan note that the IMF's VAT reforms have generally been 
focused on strengthening VAT administration, removing exemptions, 
modifying taxation of imports and zero-rated goods, consolidating and 
increasing the VAT rate. 1642More specifically, Stotsky indicates that a key 
aspect of the IMF's tax policy advice has been on encouraging the adoption of 
consumption-type, single-rate VAT between 10% and 20%, applied to both the 
manufacturing and retailing sectors, with few exemptions for necessities and 
essential items. 1643As seen below, IMF fiscal policy advice on VAT appears to 
have significantly influenced recent Nigerian VAT reforms. 
As early as July 2000, the Nigerian federal government had promised in its 
undertakings to the IMF to broaden the VAT base over the medium term by 
10%. 1644 Fiscal policies under NEEDS increasing the VAT rate from 5% to 
indicated a preference for a low, stable, simplified tax and tariff regime 
although NEEDS warned that '... a few new taxes may be imposed and some 
Patrick Bond, Against Global Apartbeid, (Lansdowne, UCT Press: 2001) pp. xii, 68. 
1611 Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice' in Tax Policy Handbook, op Cit, p. 280. 
1611 Howell H. Zee, 'Tax Cascading: Concept and Measurement', in Tax Policy Handbook, 
op cl t, p. 7 5. 
1642 Stewart and jogarajan, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op cit, 
p-155. 
1641 Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, ' op cit, p. 280. 
1644 ý21, Nigeria: Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic & Financial Policies of 
Federal Government for 2000, dated July 20,2000. 
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existing ones increased to raise revenues. ' 1645 In particular, Obasan)o's 
government intended to target indirect taxes such as the VAT and observed 
that although '... these taxes are generally regressive, the high rate of evasion 
of direct taxes - attributed mainly to poor data on people and sources of 
income (the result of the large informal sector) - makes these taxes 
attractive'. 1646 However, the NEEDS Report, did not specify in greater detail 
proposals for VAT reform beyond indicating that fiscal reforms would be 
executed by the legislative means of a Tax Reform Bill. 
This Tax Reform Bill comprised various amendments to the main tax 
statutes. 1647 §4 of the draft VAT Bill proposed the increase of the rate of tax 
from 5% to 10%. 1648This proposal generated much controversy when eventually 
considered by the National Assembly. Despite the best efforts of the Obasanjo 
administration to persuade the National Assembly, the organised private sector 
and the Nigerian populace of the need to increase the VAT, there was 
evidently little local 'ownership' of this particular piece of fiscal policy. 1649 
Ultimately, the increased rate was rejected by the Senate and VATA 1993 was 
amended on 20 February 2007 with the 5% rate remaining unchanged. 1650 
However, in the final days of the Obasanjo administration, the Minister of 
Finance increased the VAT rate by a ministerial directive to 10% despite the 
earlier rejection of this proposal by the National Assembly. 1651 The Minister 
1645 NEEDS Report, Chapter 11: Implementation and Financing, p. 115. 
1646 NEEDS Report, Chapter 3: The Macroeconomic Framework, p. 21. 
1647 Vi -Z. 
, 
CITA 1979, PPTA 1969, PITA 1993, ETA 1993 and VATA 1993: see Nine 
Draft Bills on Tax Reform, Federal Inland Revenue Service Bill 2005, (Abula FCT, 
FIRS; 2005). 
1648 §3, Bill for an Act to Amend the Value Added Tax Act 2004 and for Matters 
Connected Therewith: Nine Draft Bills on Tax Reform, Federal Inland Revenue 
Service Bill 2005, p. 86. 
1649 'No plans to raise Value Added Tax, say manufacturers', Nigerian Guardian Newspapers 
article, 11 th January, 2007 accessed at 
<htt. 12: //www. guardiannewsngr. com/iie, ws/--articleO4ý/ýý11010"i7> on 11.06.07]. 
1650 §3, A Bill for an Act to Amend the Value Added Tax Act 1993 and for Matters 
Connected Therewith: Value Added Tax (Amendment) Bill 2007 (Harmonized), 
(Abuja FCT, The Senate of the FRN; 2007). 
1611 'Senate faults increase in VAT rate', Nigerian Guardian Newspapers article, 241b May, 
2007 accessed at <httl2: / /www. guardiatinewsngr. com /news /article2l /24050"7 > on 
11-06.07]. 
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purportedly exercised powers under §34(a) VATA 1993 authorising the 
amendment of the rate of tax by ministerial directive. 1652The Minister advanced 
several reasons to Justify the VAT increase. 1653 Nigeria's VAT rate, unchanged 
since VATA 1993 was enacted 14 years ago, was the lowest in the African sub- 
region and constituted a source of distortion to trade and competition. 
Nigeria's regional obligations to neighbouring ECOWAS countries required a 
harmonisation of VAT rates across the region by 2009 under policies agreed by 
the ECOWAS Commission on Harmonisation of VAT and Excise Duties. A 
two-Year transition period was. elected for the VAT rate increases to ensure 
that regional VAT rates clustered between 10-20% by 2009. 
It seems quite a coincidence that this 10-20% band corresponds to that advised 
by the IMF. 165 4 Several ECOWAS countries are currently pursuing IMF/World 
Bank-advised fiscal policies, many of which inevitably include reforms to 
increase tax re venues and promote broad-based indirect taxes. Consequently, it 
would appear that the adoption of IMF/World Bank tax conditionality across 
the ECOWAS sub-region is likely to be a contributing factor in the recent 
Nigerian VAT rate increase. 1655 
The VAT increase was not well-received by the majority of Nigerians. The 
policy was harshly criticised by politicians from the main opposition parties. 1656 
The Nigerian Labour Congress commenced an indefinite strike action on 19 
1652 It appears the Minister was mistaken, and intended to rely on §38(a), and NOT 
'534(a) of VATA 1993 (as amended)'. While §38(a) VATA 1993 vests the Minister 
with such powers, there is presently no such provision as '534(a)' in VATA 1993. 
1653 'Notice of Increase in VAT Rate to 10% and other New Tax Related Regulations' 
issued by the Office of the Honourable Minister, Federal Ministry of Finance 
published in Nigerian Guardian Newspapers, Wednesday, May 23,2007. 
1654 Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, ' op cil, p. 280. 
1155 This finding is borne out by a perusal by this Researcher of recent PRSP and Letters 
of Intent available at y7ww. imf. aLg between the IMF and the larger economies in the 
15-state ECOWAS economic block. 
1656 See 'ACF Scribe faults fuel price increase, new VAT rate', Nigerian Guardian 
Newspapers article, 6th June, 2007 accessed at 
<http: //wwv,,. guardiani-icwsnýZr. com/i-iews/ý,,, irticle28/06060-1, > on 11.06.07], and 
'Hike in fuel prices, VAT inimical to poverty alleviation programme, says Falae', 
Nigerian Guardian Newspapers article, 6th June, 2007 accessed at 
<httl2: / /w-, N7w. guardianne-wsngr-com /business 
/artJc1e0Z/06Q6()7> on 11.06.07]. 
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June 2007, effectively paralysing public and private sector activities across the 
entire nation. 1657 President Yar'Adua's sought to appease Labour by meeting 
key demands including a suspension the VAT rate increase but the strike action 
continued unabated1658 till 24 June 2007 when Labour agreed to the concessions 
earlier offered by the federal government. 16-19 Notwithstanding this setback, 
recent fiscal pro)ections indicate that VAT will become an increasingly more 
important source of revenues between 2007 and 2010. (See Figure 6.4 below. ) 
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The recent VAT increase is not the only significant IMF/World Bank- 
supported economic reform to have been rejected by Nigerians. The IMF- 
'151 'Strike Paralyses Nigerian cities, businesses, Nýgerian Guardian Newspapers article, 21st 
June, 2007 accessed at <Intrp articief)2> on 
21.06.07]. 
1658 'FG Reduces Fuel Price, Suspends New VAT Rate', This Day newspaper report, 19th 
June, 2007 accessed at <11ttp- thic davo nhne. corn /nx-1cw. p1hp -rid= 8 13 31 > on 
19.06-07. 
1659 'As FG Promises One Year Ban on Fuel Price Hike, Labour Suspends Strike', This 
Day newspaper report, 24, h June, 2007 
accessed 25.06.07. 
1660 Source: 2008-2010 Medium Term Fiscal Strategy Paper, op cit, slide 20. 
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supported Structural Adjustment Programme (hereafter: SAP) of 1986-1990 
remains probably the most controversial economic policy ever undertaken by 
any Nigerian administration. As seen below, a lack of local ownership of the 
reforms and the mismanagement of issues of equity and politics contributed to 
its failure. 
6.4.7. Lessons from Nigeria's Structural Adjustment Program 
The military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babang1da seized power on 
August 27,1985 in a palace coup against the regime of Gen. Muhammadu 
Buhari, who himself overthrew the democratically elected government of Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari in December 1983. At this time, the Nigerian economy was 
faring poorly, still reeling from the deteriorating of balance of payments and 
poor terms of trade precipitated by the oil glut of the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Despite the austerity programme, expenditure cuts and tax increases 
introduced by Shagari and vigorously pursued by Buhari, the Naira remained 
overvalued, import shortages persisted and the spiralling debt crises defied 
solution by short-term stabilisation measures. 1661 Shortly after assuming power, 
Babangida instigated a national debate over the whether Nigeria should 
undertake an IMF-supported SAP. Despite an overwhelmingly negative 
response from the Nigerian public in the 1985 referendum, 1662 the Babangida 
regime nevertheless commenced a comprehensive SAP in June 1996 supported 
by three (unused) IMF standby arrangements and a US$450million World Bank 
trade policy and export diversification loan. 1663 
SAP's objectives comprised: restructuring and diversification of the Nigerian 
productive base to promote non-oil sectors and reduce dependency on oil 
revenues and imports; restoration of medium-term balance of payments and 
fiscal equilibrium; promotion of non-inflationary economic growth; and 
Gary Moser et al, Nigeria: Experience with Structural Adjustment (March 1997) IMF 
Occasional Paper #148, (IMF, Washington D. C.; 1997) pp. 7-10. 
1662 Adebayo 0. Okoshi, 'The Management of Nigeria's External Debt: Issues and 
Problems' in Adebayo Okosi (ed) Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management 
(Malthouse Press/Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos; 1990), pp. 36-37. 
1661 Moser et al, Nigeria: Experience witb Structural Adjustment, op cit, pp. 
7-10. 
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reducing unproductive investments in the public sector while intensifying the 
growth potential of the private sector. Key strategies to attain these objectives 
included: currency devaluation; trade and payments liberalisation; frugal 
financial and fiscal policies; rel axation of exchange and interest-rate controls 
in favour of a market- determined system; decontrol of commodity prices and 
elimination of commodity boards; restructuring public expenditures; 
privatisation or cornmercialisation of public enterprises; and removal of 
subsidies on fuel and agricultural fertilisers. 1664 
SAP's policies provided confidence for debt rescheduling with the Paris and 
London Club creditors in 1986 and 1989.1665While SAP had a positive effect on 
exports by productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing, 1666 
runaway inflation was fuelled by an expansion of money supply due to the 
financing of government deficits by the central bank. The Nalra was greatly 
devalued from US$1: NGN1.538 to US$1: NGN22 between 1986 and 1994,1667 
eroding the savings and incomes of the vast majority of Nigerians. The limited 
popular support for the SAP further dwindled and ultimately the government 
withdrew from the programme in 1994. 
The jury seems still out on whether SAP was a partial success or an 
unmitigated failure. Critics of SAP accuse the IMF-supported SAP for the 
economic re-colonisation of Nigeria; 1668 generating growth without 
development, creating benefits for the 'rich and strong' while imposing 'the 
burden of adjustment ... on the weak and poor who are 
least able to bear it"; 1669 
1664 Adedotun 0. Phillips, 'A General Overview of. SAP' in Adedotun 0. Phillips and 
pgcnM Eddy C. Ndekwu (eds) Structural Adjustment Programme in a Develo in Eooy: the Case 
of Nigeria (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan; 1987), p. 2. 
1161 Moser et al, Nigeria: Experience with Structural Adjustment, op cit, pp-16-17. 
1666 Ibid, p. 27. 
1667 Ibid, pp. 14,43. 
1668 John F. E. Ohiorhenuan, 'Re-colonising Nigerian Industry: the First Year of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme' in Adedotun 0. Phillips and Eddy C. Ndekwu 
(eds) Structural Adjustment Programme in a Developing Economy: the Case of Nigeria, op cit, 
pp-133-143. 
1661 Bade Onimode, 'IMF and World Bank Programmes in Africa' in Bade Onimade (ed) 
Vol. 1: the Economic Impact, The IMF, the Vorld Bank and the African Debt, (Zed Books, 
London: 1989), p. 32; see also pp. 26-31. 
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and imposing pure market solutions designed for developed markets on 
underdeveloped market economies consequently undermining them. 1670 These 
views are shared by popular opinion held by the vast majority of Nigerians who 
associate SAP with the dismal fiscal fortunes, unprecedented currency 
devaluation and economic decline of Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Conversely, IMF staff argue in defence of SAP that ' (in) terms of results, and 
despite reversals and setbacks, the analysis shows that the SAP paid off; 
economic growth accelerated, and the improvement in economic conditions 
contrasted rather sharply with the pre- and post-adjustment periods' despite 
'..., the inability to bring inflation effectively, under control ... (and the) 
attendant substantial depreciation of the naira. ' 1671 IMF staff attribute the 
failure of SAP to: the 'lack of effective coordination of fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies (which) undermined the realization of the broader 
reform agenda and brought the adjustment process to a halt'-1672 the mistake of 
leaving public finances and other vital sectors of the economy outside the 
scope of reforms; deteriorating public services and inadequate infrastructure; 
and, finally, a '... lack of transparency in the management of the country's oil 
wealth (which. ) contributed to a distrust in government and prevented a broad- 
based support for fundamental economic reforms'. 1673 
The resolution of this debate is beyond the scope of this Thesis. It is this 
Researcher's opinion that, had the implementation of SAP been sustained 
within a broader matrix of economic and political reforms and (more crucially) 
executed with the best interests of Nigerians at heart, the IMF's views might 
have been ultimately validated in practice. Regrettably, history shows that this 
was clearly not the case. However, the final point advanced by IMF staff 
1670 Bright Okogu, 'Structural, Adjustment Policies in African Countries' in Bade 
Onimade (ed) Vol. 1: the Economic Impact, The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt, 
op cit, p. 4 2. 
1671 Moser et al, Nigeria: Experience with Structural Adjustment, op cit, p. 45. 
1672 Ibid. 
1673 Ibid. 
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(regarding the lack of transparency and public trust) correlates, wIth the issues 
of equity and politics examined earlier. 
The Babangida government was illegitimate, unelected and increasingly 
perceived as both corrupt and repressive. SAP had been rejected by the 1985 
referendum and lacked local 'ownership'. What little popular support SAP 
possessed from inception vanished in the wake- of the devalued Naira, 
mounting p. overty, social unrest and political discontent. Despite numerous 
assurances of its commitment to the restoration of democratic rule, the regime 
ultimately confirmed its critics' fears by failing to hand over to a 
democratically elected government in 1993 leading to the rise of Gen. Sani 
Abacha's repressive military dictatorship. In any event, the dearth of local, 
domestic and popular support exacerbated by the lack of political legitimacy of 
Babangida's military regime contributed to the reversal of SAP reforms. 
It was always unlikely that the VAT dispute and the Nigerian Labour 
Congress's strike action would result in the demise of the recently elected 
administration of President Yar'Adua. Happily, political dynamics have 
changed greatly since Nigeria's return to civilian democratic rule in 1998. 
However, it is ironic that due to widespread election malpractices committed 
during the poorly administered Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 
April 2007, the Yar'Adua administration initially grappled with significant 
legitimacy issues. It remains to be seen if these challenges can be overcome, 
and the Yar'Adua administration can not only assume greater legitimacy but 
continue to successfully engage with Labour, opposition parties and Nigerian 
taxpayers in a genuine manner to gather support for its economic reforms. 
The willingness to suspend the VAT rate increase resulting from negotiations 
between the government and Labour seems to be a step in the right direction. 
However, unless Yar'Adua can achieve 'a new political bargain that will 
produce a revenue system that is widely accepted as fair, so that there will be 
sufficient voluntary compliance' by ensuring 'widespread political consultation 
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and participation" 1674 and addressing issues of external equity, politics and IMF- 
tax conditionality in a more open, transparent and public manner than the 
Obasanjo administration, it is unlikely that fiscal reforms such as the VAT rate 
increase, no matter how beneficial, can be sustained long enough to yield 
permanent, positive outcomes. It stands to reason that similar considerations 
may well apply to the elimination of tax incentives -a policy which is also an 
intrinsic aspect of the IMF/World Bank-supported fiscal reform agenda. 
6.4.8. The IMF/World Bank & the Elimination of Tax Incentives 
The IMF consistently opposes fiscal incentives and frequently includes the 
removal of tax incentives and concessions as a condition for credit 
assistance. 1675 IMF-supported structural adjustment programmes typically stress 
the need for fiscal reforms which reduce or eliminate the role of tax incentive 
schemes, exemptions and deductions to advance the general policy objectives 
of raising revenues and broadening the tax base. 1676 Specifically, the IMF 
maintains a widely held view that tax incentives of all sorts have proved to be 
largely ineffective, while causing serious distortions and inequities in corporate 
taxation' and consequently recommends '... broadening the base of the 
corporate income tax by eliminating sector- or activity- specific tax incentives) 
and the uniform treatment of foreign enterprises and both public and privately 
owned firms. 1677 
The World Bank sets forth a more cautious position, considering that while tax 
incentives might sometimes affect investment decisions, this is often at the 
margin and dependant on the particular circumstances. 1678However, the Bank 
argues that tax incentives are often not enough to. cancel out other more, 
fundamental disincentives to investment such as poor infrastructure, weak 
contractual enforcement, rampant corruption and crime. Ultimately, the 'better 
1674 Stewart and jogaral'an, 'The International Monetary Fund and Tax Reform', op cit, 
p. 16 6. 
1675 Ibid, p. 15 6. 
1676 Abed et al Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries: Experience under IMF-Supported 
Programs, op cit, pp. 10,22. 
1677 Stotsky, 'Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice', op cit, p. 282. 
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strategy is to improve the quality of the overall investment climate, thus 
reducing the pressure to compete on taxes. 1679 
Chua outlines some criticisms against tax incentives that may broadly 
correspond to the views of the IMF. 1680 He observes that as there tend to be 
more compelling reasons informing investment decisions, the merits of tax 
holidays and other incentives should not be overrated. Tax holidays may not 
actually benefit unprofitable companies which ideally should be the intended 
beneficiaries and a policy of rewarding'profitable firms for investments that 
they would otherwise undertake was questionable. Tax holidays had other 
harmful effects such as eroding the tax base, rendering debt finance less 
attractive due to lost interest tax shields, promoting short-term investments 
and providing avenues for tax planning. More generally, tax incentives promote 
economic inefficiencies, inequitably select certain sectors for preferential 
treatment, distort relative prices, misallocate resources and undermine tax 
administration simplicity by escalating monitoring COS tS. 1681 
Such stringent opposition justifies Easson's observation that for some time, 
the IMF/World Bank had been waging a not entirely successful campaign to 
persuade governments to eliminate or reduce special tax incentives. 1682 He 
attributes the limited success of this campaign to the beliefs of governments in 
their ability to positively influence market ouctomes or that the elimination of 
tax incentives would adversely affect the competitive position of such 
countries vis-d-vis their economic rivals in attracting FDI. He notes that efforts 
to dissuade governments from holding on to the-se beliefs are often forcefully 
complemented by the IMF/World Bank imposing strict conditions tying the 
repeal of tax incentives to the receipt of financial assistance, citing countries 
1678 World Bank, World Development Report 2005, pp. 168-170. 
1679 Ibid, p. 17 0. 
1680 Dale Chua, 'Tax Incentives', in Parthasarathi Shome (ed), Tax Policy Handbook, o-P cit, 
pp. 165-168. 
1681 Ibid. Other reasons advanced for the elimination of tax incentives have been 
examined in greater depth elsewhere in this Thesis (see S2.5.3 above). Consequently, 
these reasons will not be repeated here. 
1682 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cz . t, p. 211. 
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like Indonesia, 1683 the Philippines, Turkey, Uganda and the Ukraine as 
examples. However, in all these countries, such reforms have been transient as 
these governments ultimately capitulate to pressure by investors and other 
constituencies and revert to tax incentives. 1684 
Tax incentives typically affect a smaller percentage of taxpayers than the 
broad-based VAT, reducing the prospects for nation-wide industrial action in 
protest to fiscal policies intent on reducing tax exemptions and preferences. 
However,, it is often the case that powerful, politically- connected and well- 
advised individuals and entities are able to influence, behind closed doors, the 
formulation the government policies in more fundamental ways that the public 
masses can achieve by riots on the streets. Special concessions, preferences 
and exceptions can be negotiated in favour of select investors, investments and 
interests. Such concessions are often supported by quite legitimate reasons 
particularly where subjective, discretionary criteria are applied. 
It stands to reason that the equity and political consid. erations applicable to 
VAT reform may well apply to the elimination of tax incentives -a policy 
which is also an intrinsic aspect of the IMF/World Bank-supported fiscal 
reform agenda. As seen above, this failure of the IMF/World Bank to ensure 
sustained fiscal reforms in respect of tax incentives can often be directly linked 
to the overarching issues of internal and external equity raising grave 
implications for the political legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of fiscal 
reform. 
1683 Note the critique by Wells and Allen of Indonesia's reintroduction of 
fiscal 
incentives noted above in S2.5.3.7 of this Thesis: Wells and Allen 
'Tax Holidays to 
Attract FDI: Lessons from Two Experiments' in Wells et al Using Tax Incentives to 
Compete for Foreign Investment Are They Vortb the Costs? op cit, pp. 3-67. 
1611 Easson, Tax Incentivesjor Foreýgn Direct Investment, op cit, p. 212. 
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6.5. CONCLUSION 
6: Regional & International Tax, Trade 
& Finance Policy Issues 
International tax, trade and finance arrangements impose certain constraints on 
the tax incentive policies of developing countries. Interactions between 
countries' tax codes may result in the wash out or pass through of tax 
incentive benefits. Regional integration arrangements which involve the'ceding 
of control over sovereign economic and fiscal policies to centrallsed decision- 
making bodies within regional economic blocs. Multilateral agreements on 
international trade constrain developing countries tax incentive policies based 
on local content rules and export performance targets. While developing 
country members voluntarily accede to WTO disciplines to benefit from free 
and fair trade or to the IMF/World Bank's strictures to access credit facilities 
and policy support, they necessarily surrender a degree of fiscal sovereignty in 
the process. 
However, the dearth of local support and inadequate treatment of equity and 
political considerations have adversely affected the sustainability of 
IMF/World Bank supported economic and fiscal reforms. Critics of the 
IMF/World Bank posit that these efficiency/neutrality initiatives should also 
address underlying equity and political issues to ensure that the resultant 
reforms are not only owned by developing member countries but are 
consequently sustainable. By drawing on Nigeria's past experience with IMF- 
induced structural adjustment programmes and more current developments 
with the controversial 100% increase in the Nigerian VAT rate this Chapter has 
evaluated some implications of tax conditionality for the future of tax 
incentives in Nigeria's fiscal policy. 
An exhaustive consideration of WTO trade restrictions, IMF/World Bank- 
supported tax conditionality and the constraints these developments pose for 
tax incentive policies in South Africa and Kenya is beyond the scope of this 
Thesis. The next Chapter, however, critically reviews the evolution of current 
Nigerian fiscal policies on tax incentives in context of equity and political 
considerations, drawing lessons from international experiences as noted in 
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Chapters 2 and 6 of this Thesis, ýand more particularly the local experiences of 
South Africa and Kenya as highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5. This critical 
examination of Nigeria's tax incentive policies will lead to an exposition of 
possible lessons from the South African and Kenyan experiences and certain 
constraints, on the applications to the Nigerian fiscal realities. 
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7. A CRITIQUE OF NIGERIAN TAX INCENTIVE POLICY WITH 
LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA & KENYA 
"Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the veg 
essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, 'Yu, u 
nobun tu', - 'Hey, be or she has ubun tu'. This means the are gen. erous, hos :y _pitable, 
friendly, caring and compassionate. They share what they have. It also means my humaniy 
is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in theirs. We belong in a bundle of life. We say 'a 
person is a person through other peo_Ple'. It is not 'I think therefore I am'. It is rather: 'I 
am a buman because I belong. 'I participate, I sbare. 
"1685 
7.0. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter traces the recent evolution of Nigeria's tax incentive policy as set 
out in the Federal Ministry of Finance's Draft National Tax Policy. It criticises 
specific aspects this Policy and considers certain lessons which could be 
gleaned from international and regional experiences with a special focus on 
exemplars derived from South Africa and Kenya. It further notes certain 
peculiarities of Nigerian tax culture that may influence the applicability of 
South African and Kenyan exemplars to the practical realities of Nigerian tax 
incentive policy formulation, implementation and review. This Researcher 
finds 
that there are real prospects for a significant improvement in Nigeria's ability 
to enhance sustainable development through the prudent use of tax 
incentives. 
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, No Future Irlitbout 
Foqiveness, 
(Rider & Co, London: 1999), pp. 34-35. 
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7.1. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTEMPORARY NIGERIAN TAX INCENTIVE 
POLICY 
7.1.1. The Study Group & Working Group on Nigerian Tax Reform 
7.1-1-1. Introduction 
Prior to 2006, there was no comprehensive national tax Policy specifying 
precisely the scope and extent to which tax incentive policy would be utilised 
in attracting local and foreign capital, promoting growth and otherwise 
enhancing sustainable economic development. As noted in Chapters 3 and 6 
above, fragments of tax incentive policy may be discerned in NEEDS and its 
underlying Policy Support Instruments. Other references to tax incentives were 
less by way of clear policy statements and more by way of the enumeration of 
available tax incentives provided under the Nigerian fiscal regime. 1686However 
the status quo changed in 2002. 
7.1.1.2. The Report of the 2002 Study Group 
On August 6,2002 a 20-member Study Group was commissioned by the (then) 
Federal Minister of Finance Mallam Adamu Ciroma to comprehensively review 
all aspects of the Nigerian tax system and make appropriate recommendations 
to significantly improve the overall fiscal system. The Study Group was chaired 
by an eminent economist, Professor Dotun Phillips. Other members were 
drawn from the federal and state tax authorities and the private sector. The 
Group's work was divided among sub-committees and its Report was 
completed in July 2003.1687 
One of the terms of reference was to 'evaluate and confirm the desirability or 
otherwise of the retention of the portfolio of fiscal incentives en-shrined in the 
tax laws. ' 1688 This issue was considered by the Sub-Committee on Tax 
Incentives and Disincentives. The Sub-Committee questioned the efficacy of 
E. g. Federal Ministry of Industry, 'Industrial Policy of Nigeria: Policies, Incentives, 
Guidelines and Institutional Framework', Chapter 9: Incentives to Industry (Federal 
Ministry of Industry, Abuja: 2003), pp. 44-55. 
Study Group on the Review of the Nigerian Tax System, 'Nigerian Tax Reform in 
2003. and Beyond: Main Report of the Study Group on the Nigerian Tax System', 
(Abula: July 2003) [hereafter: Study Group's Report]. 
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tax incentives in Nigeria citing a recent IMF study which indicated that these 
rneasures ranked low among critical factors for investors. 1689 The Sub- 
Committee outlined some of the tax incentives available for various economic 
sectors. The Sub-Committee's work schedule indicated that it intended to 
examine the costs, benefits and impact of tax incentives using findings from 
international comparisons and a local survey of beneficiaries conducted by the 
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) 1690.1691 However, 
besides confirming the general view of most taxpaying households that the tax 
structure was harmful to investment, it is unclear whether the survey yielded 
any specific empirical results on the role and efficacy of tax incentives in 
Nigeria to aid the Sub-Committee in its deliberations. 1692 
The Sub-Committee recommended that fiscal incentives should be reserved for 
the oil sector, rural development, solid-minerals development and to promote 
the development of utilities. Only a few recommendations were made in 
respect of specific tax incentives. 1693 Curiously, the Sub-Committee was more 
concerned about 'tax disincentives' to development including: complex, poorly- 
administered and uncoordinated taxes and incentives, 1694mismanagement and 
poor control over public expenditures, 1695. a lack of transparency and 
accountability in collection and utilisation of tax revenues, 1696 and multiple 
1688 Ibid, p. 2. 
1681 Ibid, p. 45. This reference is Probably to the 2001 study by Wells et al. see Wells et al, 
Using Tax Incentives to Competefor Foreign Investment: Are They Worth the Costs? OP Cit. 
1690 Chapter 19 'Survey of Taxpayers, Study Group's Report, op cit, pp. 324-333. 
1691 C Subject-matters for Committees', Attachment II to Chapter I, Ibid, p. 24. 
1692 Ibid, pp. 325. Indeed, a major shortcoming for the entire exercise was the lack of 
available statistics on taxation (&xcept for Delta, Lagos, Kaduna and Katsina States, 
and the Customs Service) and the lack of funds for NISER to process more survey 
data: lbid, pp. 3-4,333. 
1691 These recommendations included that: (1) the restriction on the absorption of 
capital allowances to 66 2/3 of assessable profits be removed; (2) unrelieved capital 
allowances and losses should be carried forward indefinitely instead of expiring after 
4 years; (3) taxpayers be allowed to deduct capital allowances and other relief on a 
self-assessment basis without needing prior approvals from the tax authorities; (4) 
small companies be required to pay a 2% turnover tax; and (5) the general companies 
income tax rate be reduced to 20%: ibid, pp. 62-64. 
1694 Ibid, p. 5 6. 
1695 Ibid, pp. 41,57. 
1696 Ibid, p. 5 7. 
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taxation due to uncoordinated initiatives by the three tiers of government. 1697 
The Sub-Committee consequently concluded that the best 'tax incentive' was 
the judicious management of fiscal revenues on genuine projects that had a 
direct and tangible bearing on the welfare of taxpayers such as social services, 
security and human capital development. 1698 Essentially, expenditures focused 
on enhancing taxpayer morality ranked high on the Sub-Committee's agenda. 
Remarkably, the Study Group recommended some controversial policies: all 
current taxes were to be replaced with just two - an income tax and an 
expenditure tax; each tier of government -1 federal, 36 state and 786 local 
governments - should be free to establish and operate independent tax 
administrations potentially resulting in over 800 distinct tax agencies; and the 
capital gains tax should be abolished due to its perceived complexity and 
inequity only to be reintroduced when the Nigerian economy had sufficiently 
matured. 1699 
x 
The Study Group concluded that Nigeria's tax system must be reformed to 
encourage rapid economic growth on a sustainable basis by stimulating savings, 
investment, job-creation and steadily-increasing per capital income. 1700 A 
simplified, low-tax regime relying on broad-based taxes was seen as ideal. As 
incentives made the tax system unduly complex, the Study Group suggested an 
outright cancellation of all preferential tax provisions replacing these with a 
low tax rate regime. 1701 A less radical but probably the most important 
recommendation was that Nigeria adopt, as a matter of urgency, a National Tax 
Policy which would ensure that exemptions, waivers, tax holidays and tax- free 
status for individuals and firms would be strictly minimised, streamlined and 
granted only after due process, with an overall limit on the revenue loss to 
1697 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
"'8 Ibid, p. 6 0. 
1699 Ibid, pp. 18,27,228-229. 
1701 Ibid, p. 17. 
1701 Ibid, pp. 321-322. 
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government. 1702This particular recommendation was further developed by the 
Working Group which reviewed the Study Group's Report in 2004. 
The Review by the 2004 Working Group 
The policy implications of the Study Group's Report were not comprehensively 
addressed until a 12-member Working Group was commissioned by the (then) 
Federal Minister of Finance, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, on January 12,2004 to 
critically , evaluate the 
Study Group's recommendations and to propose 
prioritised strategies to implement the necessary tax reforms. The Working 
Group's analysis was also divided among sub-committees and its Report was 
submitted in March 2004.1703 This Working Group was chaired by Seyi 
Bickersteth (the Country Partner of KPMG Nigeria) and included the former 
FIRS' Chairman, 1704 officials from FIRS and the Delta State Board of Inland 
Revenue, 1705 chartered accountants, 1706 a lawyer 1707 and economists from the 
World Bank, Lagos Business School and the University of Oxford. 1708 The 12- 
member Working Group was essentially a private-sector, expert-driven affair 
and this bias was ultimately borne out in its recommendations which generally 
favoured investments, savings and private sector interests. 
Some of the Study Group's more controversial recommendations were rejected 
on technical grounds. 1709 The Working Group concurred with the Study Group's 
recommendation that the restriction on the absorption of capital allowances 
should be removed. Similarly, the tax incentives regime for petroleum 
companies (under the 2000 revised Memorandum of Understanding) and 
1702 Ibid, pp. 26-27. 
Working Group, 'Nigerian Tax Reform 2003 and Beyond: Report of the Working 
Group on the Review of the Report of the Study Group on the Nigerian Tax 
Reform', (Abula: March 2004) [hereafter: Working Group's Report]. 
1704 Ballama Manu. 
1705 J. A. Arogundade and Uvioma Akpo- 
1706 Igho Dafinone, Zubairu Abdullahl, G. F. Fasoto and Tunde Ale. 
1707 Dr. Koyinsola Al'ayi, SAN. 
1708 Victoria Kwakwa, Pat Utoml and Paul Collier. 
1719 Notably, the Study Group's recommendations on income and expenditure taxes, 
capital gains tax and independent (overlapping) tax administrations were rejected as 
being idealistic, impractical and encouragement for tax evasion: Working Group's 
Report, op cit, pp. 7-8,16,20. 
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indigenous marginal field operators were to be discontinued and replaced with 
a statutory low tax regime with a flat rate of 50%. However, the graduated 
royalty rates which served as incentives for deepwater onshore and offshore 
production were to be maintained. The Working Group also recommended that 
income from gas production and royalties payable by marginal field operators 
to oil majors should be taxed at the lower CITA rate apparently as a 
concession to energy multinationals. 171OThe CITA rate itself was to be reduced 
from 30% to 20% but corporate taxation was to remain a matter of federal 
competence. 1711 
Other specific recommendations were made in relation to specific provisions 
of the various taxing statutes. 1712The Working Group also recognised the need 
for a National Tax Policy to guide efficient revenue generation, achieve 
economic diversification and promote sustainable economic development. 1713 
The Working Group concluded that tax incentives should be rarely utiliscd as 
policy instruments and the best 'tax incentive' was the availability of a low tax 
regime,, good governance, political arid economic stability, efficient 
infrastructure and public services. 1714 
The public-private sector partnership for fiscal policy reform forged through 
the work of the Study and Working Groups eventually culminated in the 
formulation of a Draft National Tax Policy by a special committee led by the 
Federal Minister of Finance. 1715 The Federal Attorney-General led a White 
Paper/Bill Drafting ý--ommittee which finalised proposals for the Nine Draft 
Bills on Tax Reforms to codify the reforms as legislative amendments to the'. 
1710 Ibid, pp. 3,12-13. 
1711 Ibid, pp. 4,15. 
1712 See the Appendix to the Working Group's Report, ibid. 
1713 Ibid, p. 2. 
1714 Ibid, pp. 2,10. 
1715 Other members were the Ministers of Agriculture & 
Water Resources, Commerce & 
Industry, FCT Abula, National Planning Commission, Petroleum Matters, and Special 
Adviser (Export Expansion), C. E. O. NEPC and Chairperson FIRS: Mathias Okwe, 
'Draft National Tax Policy wants VAT raised to 15%, ' Nigerian Guardian (Lagos 
10.10.07) <http: / /www. guardiannewsngr-com /news ZarticleQ2> accessed 10.10.07. 
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main tax statutes 1716.1717 The policy prescriptions for tax incentives Indicated in 
the Draft National Tax Policy are considered in the next section. 
7.1.2. Tax Incentives Under the Draft National Tax Policy 
The Draft National Tax Policy (hereafter: Draft NTP) seeks to provide 
guidance and a stable reference point for all stakeholders in the Nigerian tax 
system. 1718 The Ministry of Finance is to coordinate all tax reform initiatives 
and legislation by cooperating with other -stakeholders. While the Draft NTP 
recognises the legislative supremacy of the National Assembly, it emphasizes 
the role of the Ministry of Finance in proposing changes in tax legislation. 1719 
The Draft NTP states that the overriding purpose of the Nigerian tax system is 
to contribute to the well-being of all Nigerians by enabling economic growth 
and development, providing stable resources to fund prudent public 
expenditures, ensuring economic stabilisation, horizontal and vertical equity 
and cor recting market failures in appropriate circumstances where taxation is 
the most efficient device and only in a manner that would minimise the 
negative effect of taxation on economic efficiency. 1720 
In relation to 'tax incentives, the Draft NTP offers the following policy 
prescriptions, numbered from (1) to (5) for ease of reference: (1) existing 
incentives would only be extended to favoured economic sectors where there 
are overwhelming reasons to do so and this would result in tangible benefits to 
the overall economy (and not just that favoured sector); 1721 (2) the Nigerian tax 
system would minimise and steam-line the number of tax incentives to restrict 
their use to instances where they help to achieve a national objective that 
'Current Tax Policy Reforms', FIRS webpage 
<www firs. aov. ngý/about us/mission and ma n date /index. html> accessed on 
06.09.2007. 
1717 Federal Government of Nigeria; Federal Inland Revenue Service: Nine Draft Bills on 
Tax Reform, Federal Inland Revenue Service Bill (Abu)a FCT: 2005). 
1718 Federal Government of Nigeria; Draft Document on National Tax Policy: 
Presentation by the Presidential Committee on Tax Policy (Abuja FCT: 2007). 
171, Draft NTP, pp. 2,9-12,17. 
1720 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
1721 Ibid, p. 6. 
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cannot be achieved more efficiently in any other way; 1722 (3) certain tax 
incentives that were difficult to implement and monitor would be deleted or 
simplified; 1723 (4) investment tax credits should be provided to encourage 
investment in long-lived capital goods in all economic sectors; and (5) pioneer 
tax holidays should be targeted at private sector investments in providing 
public goods such as infrastructure, basic services (power, transportation, 
education, health) and in other key sectors (gas, exports and agriculture). 1724 
This Researcher obtained valuable information on the formulation of the tax 
incentive aspects of the Draft NTP during the Nigerian Field Trips particularly 
from discussions with Mike Hugman, Technical Assistant to Olabode Agusto, 
(then) -the Director- General and Special Adviser to the President on the 
Budget. 1725Hugman explained that the Budget Office was conducting an on- 
going review of the National Tax Policy in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Finance and FIRS. The overarching strategy of the Budget Office and Ministry 
of Finance Pis-d-vis fiscal policy was to simplify the complexity of the Nigerian 
tax system and replace the existing high effective tax rate with a regime of low 
effective tax rates, simple structures and a broad tax base. 1726 Sustaining 
employment and productive capacity in the economy were considered to be 
more important fiscal policy objectives than simply increasing public 
revenues. 1727 Therefore, a specific policy thrust to achieve these ends was to 
1722 Ibid, p. 22. 
1723 The following incentives were to be withdrawn: small companies' relief; the 
capitalisation of R&D expenditures (to be expensed instead); investment tax credits 
on locally made spare parts; tax holidays for agricultural and solid-mineral 
development companies; and relief for reinvestment in tourism facilities: Appendix 
Three: Appraisal of Existing Tax Incentives, Draft NTP, op cit, pp. 46-54. 
1724 Appendix Two: Strategy for Implementation of the Proposed Policy, Draft NTP, ibid, pp. 38- 
40. 
1721 Teleconference/Interview with Mike Hugman, Technical Assistant to the Director- 
General/Special Adviser on Budget, Budget Office of the Federation, Federal 
Ministry of Finance (Abuja FCT, Mon 5 February 2007). 
1721 Tax compliance was to be improved by increasing the awareness of tax morality 
especially for higher income earners who had a greater incentive to evade, improving 
tax collection mechanisms and reducing tax loopholes. 
1727 Olabode M. Agusto, Dire ctor- General, Budget Office of the Federation; Presentation 
on 'The Role of Tax Policy in Driving Economic Growth and Development in 
Nigeria' delivered at Retreat organised by the joint Tax Board (August 22-24,2005; 
Abula), slides 10-15. 
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extend the scope of tax incentives to target investment in key infrastructural 
sectors and promote sustainable economic development. 1728 
Other efforts were being made to redesign the Nigerian tax system to compete 
internationally against certain benchmark countries namely South Africa, 
Ghana and Kenya. The IMF had been consulted on this pro)ect and had 
provided considerable input. The IMF (as usual) disapproved of tax incentives 
due to unfavourable results in other Jurisdictions and recommended the generic 
policy prescription of lower tax rates, broader taxes and fewer tax incentives. 
Nigeria concurred with the IMF's advice and desired to utillse VAT as the 
principal non-oil tax given its incidence on expenditure and relative ease of 
co 11 ec ti o ri. 1729 
Despite the IMF's reservations, the Budget Office believed that tax incentives 
could still play a role in fiscal reform. However, the Budget Office was not 
naively expecting tax policy alone to attract or repel investment, but sought to 
utilise fiscal measures as tools to encourage vital investment in essential 
infrastructure. For instance, tax holidays were to be targeted precisely to 
promote investment in electric power supply, gas projects, export-oriented 
markets, transportation, agriculture, education and healthcare. Specific, time- 
bound incentives were to be provided to remove infrastructural disincentives 
to local and foreign investment making Nigeria more attractive for productive 
sector industrial activity and diversifying the industrial base. Private investors 
would be also allowed to charge user-fees to accelerate key investments. Simple 
strategies were to be implemented through-out to achieve these ends as 
experience had demonstrated that complex economic strategies were seldom 
successfully implemented in Nigeria. 1730 
However, Mike Hugman observed there were significant challenges particularly with 
forming tax incentive policy in a statistical vacuum as reliable fiscal data was 
extremely difficult to generate. 
1129 Budget Office of the Federation; Presentation on 'IMF Comments on FGN Tax 
Strategy: FGN Strategy and Position on Issues Raised' (January 24,2007; Abula), 
slides 5,8,10. 
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Unfortunately, the adoption of a Draft NTP was not consummated under the 
Obasanjo administration and it fell to President Yar'Adua's government to 
complete the process. The underlying political dynamics have changed 
significantly with the change in administration. Key members of the previous 
Presidential Economic Team who played active roles in generating the Draft 
Policy are no longer relevant; 1731 new officials have risen to the fore. However, 
several key officials involved in recent economic and fiscal policy remain in 
the same or similar positions of authority. 1732 
The new Presidential Economic Team has indicated its commitment to build on 
past successes and adapt existing economic policies to present realities. It is 
probably the case that much of the fiscal and economic policy content will 
remain the same as that under the O'basanjo regime but with a different 
approach to implementation, given the greater emphasis placed by Yar'Adua's 
administration on the rule of law and due process. This may result in slower 
progress in implementing reforms but paradoxically may lead to more 
sustainable results and less erratic policy reversals. Only time will tell. 
The next section criticises specific aspects of the Draft NTP with a view to 
highlight certain -shortcomings which, if remedied, would improve the 
prospects that Nigerian tax incentive policy may enhance sustainable economic 
development. 
1730 Ibid, slides 3,8. 
1731 Notably, the former Director- General, Budget Office (Olabode Agusto), the Federal 
Ministers of Finance (Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Nnenadi Usman) and the 
Minister of the FCT (Nasir El-Rufai) are no longer senior government officials. 
1732 Ifueko Omoigui and Professor Charles Soludo retain their positions (respectively) as 
the FIRS Chairperson and the CBN Governor. Soludo's deputy, Dr. Usman 
Shamsuddeen, is now the Federal Minister of Finance and replaces Soludo as the 
Chairman of the new Presidential Economic Management Team (Omoigui is also a 
member of the Team). Dr. Bright Okogu (former special assistant to the Minister of 
Finance) has replaced Agusto as the Director- General, Budget Office. Nasir El-RUfai 
has been appointed as a member of the new National Energy Council. Yar'Adua's 
administration is implementing economic policies under NEEDS, Vision 2020 and 
the 7-Point Agenda. 
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7.2. A CRITIQUE OF AsPECTS OF NIGERIAN TAX INCENTIVE POLICY 
7.2.1. Introduction 
The Draft NTP is a commendable effort by the Nigerian government to set out 
key principles and concepts that would guide policy in respect of tax incentives 
and other important fiscal issues. There is a clear consistency in fiscal policies 
designed to achieve certain objectives by the prudent but limited use of tax 
incentives. This theme runs through varl policy documents ranging letters 1 
of intent, 1733 poverty reduction strategy papers (i. e. NEEDS), national 
industrial policies and ultimately to the Draft NTP. 
The government supports fiscal policies that would complement and not hinder 
efforts to promote strong and competitive firms, increase national employment 
and enhance industrial productivity. The provision of essential infrastructure 
and adequate security would foster a stable and progressive investment 
environment. The proponents of the Draft NTP consider that ar egime of low 
and competitive taxes, with targeted tax incentives for key sectors, is a vital 
aspect of this strategy. Prudent fiscal policy is deemed to be a useful tool to 
generate sufficient resources to finance and maintain infrastructure, secure life 
and property and ensure that investor s find the Nigerian corporate tax 
environment more attractive than any other country in Sub-Saharan Africa. 1734 
The Draft NTP reflects these policy priorities in stating that: '(the) Nigerian 
tax system will minimise and steam-line the number of tax incentives and 
restrict their use to instances where they help achieve a national objective that 
cannot be achieved more efficiently in any other Way. 11735 For instance the 
Draft NTP recommends the withdrawal of tax holidays from cement producers 
1733 In 2000, review of energy sector tax incentives indicated that while the Memorandum 
of Understanding incentives were broadly appropriate, there was scope to target 
incentives by restricting the ability of petroleum companies to offset gas and power 
projects' expenditure from tax liabilities: ý19, Nigeria: Letter of Intent and 
Memorandum on Economic & Financial Policies of Federal Government for 2000, 
dated July 20,2000. 
1734 Olabode M. Agusto, Director- General, Budget Office of the Federation; Presentation 
on 'The Role of Tax Policy in Driving Economic Growth and Development in 
Nigeria', op cit, slides 10-17. 
1715 Draft NTP, p. 22- 
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considering that there are more direct (and less distorting) means of addressing 
the national shortage in cement supplies. 1736 However, there are certain 
shortcomings evident in the Draft NTP that may impede the very development 
objectives sought to be attained. 
7.2.2. Constitutional Competence & Expertise for Tax Policy Formulation 
Legislation 
The Draft NTP refers to the National Assembly as the guardian of Nigeria's 
national tax poliCy1737 apparently recognising the Legislature' s exclusive role in 
enacting statutes for the federation and the states. However, the Ministry of 
Finance considers itself to be directly responsible for the formulation of fiscal 
policy and tax legislation reform. The Draft NTP pointedly states: 
The Ministry of Finance should be the body charged with providing the 
oversight function over the activities of the tax and Revenue Authorities 
in Nigeria, as well as being the sole organisation responsible for tax 
policy matters including drafting any amendments to laws or legislations 
on taxation ... no Government Ministry or organisation or persons will have the laxity to propose legislation for drafting on tax and revenue, 
except such that is routed through the Federal Ministry of Finance ... 
the Ministry of Finance shall have the sole responsibility to propose to 
the Legislature any amendment or addition to existing and new Tax 
Legislation. This centralisation of the system for proposing tax policy by 
the Ministry of Finance will enable sustained co-ordination in the 
number and thrust of tax legislations being passed to the legislature for 
ratification ... The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vests 
the powers to make laws on the legislative arm of the government 
comprised of by the National Assembly and the respective State Houses 
of Assembly. It is therefore- the constitutional responsibility of these 
'Houses' to make tax laws or amend existing laws, after obtaining the 
recommendations from the Federal Ministry of Finance. 1738 
Certain provisions of the main tax statutes support this position. The Federal 
Minister for Finance has traditionally exercised powers to amend certain 
provisions and schedules of tax StatUteS. 1739 The President may also delegate 
responsibility for any business of the federal government to other 
171, APbendix Tbree: Appraisal of Existing Tax Incentives, Draft NTP, o. P cit, p. 47. 
1737 Draft NTP, p. 2. 
1738 Ibid, pp. 9,11,12. 
1739 See §§2 & 63, PPTA 1959; 555 & 105, CITA 1979; §38 VATA 1993. 
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functionaries such as the Minister of Finance. 1740 However, this power to 
delegate extends only as far as the act concerned is within the competence of 
the executive arm of the federal government. 1741 There are instances where the 
executive has been accused of usurping legislative powers and not fully 
complying with obligations imposed by due process and the rule of law. 1742The 
legislative and judicial powers of the other arms of government impose 
necessary checks on the competence of the executive to propose and 
implement policies through legislation or regulations. Federal legislative 
competence to enact statutes on matters on the Executive and Concurrent 
Legislative Lists remains with the National Assembly. 1743 Consequently, the 
Draft NTP cannot derogate from constitutional pro-visions regarding the 
proposal and enactment of legislation by the National and State Legislature. 
An issue ancillary is ensuring continuity in the Finance Ministry's tax policy 
expertise. The competence and expertise of Ministry officials, functionaries 
and staff has been enhanced over the years by local training and development 
programmes and by international technical assistance from international 
financial institutions (hereafter: IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF's 
FAD. The Federal Ministry of Finance has benefited from international 
initiatives including the establishment of a Tax Policy Unit (designated as the 
Fiscal Department) based in the Ministry of Finance in December 2006.1744 
1740 §148 CFRN 1999; §100 CITA. 1979. 
1741 55(l)-(2) CFRN 1999. 
1742 Case in point were allegations by the Senate that the Obasanjo, administration 
approved the Minerals and Mining Bill 2006 before the Senate had formally sent a copy 
of the Bill to the executive for the presidential assent: Sufuyan Ojeifo and 
Onyebuchi Ezigbo, 'New Mining Act: Senate Rejects Presidential Assent' This Day 
(Lagos 07.02.07) <htrl2: / /www. this da3: online. com /nview. PhJ2? id=6995n> accessed 
11-09-07. 
1743 §4(l)-(5) CFRN 1999. 
174' Nigeria: Third Review under the PSI, Appendix I: Authorities Letter of Intent; May 
28,2007, p. 38. 
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This Researcher was opportune to interview two recently appointed officials of 
this Fiscal Department. 1745 Both officials acknowledged the tremendous task 
ahead of the Fiscal Department in advising the Finance Minister on fiscal 
affairs, collating statistics and coordinating fiscal activities with other relevant 
agencies such as FIRS, the Customs Service and the National Planning 
Commission. However, the Department had only been recently constituted; 
much of the policy work had relied substantially on the expertise of external 
consultants. While it was acknowledged that the Department was responsible 
for fiscal research and policy development, many responsib ilities roles were 
likely to be outsourced by commissioning external experts and consultants. 
The Fiscal Department was still in an embryonic, formative stage at the time 
the officials were interviewed. There were specific, sequential plans to upgrade 
the capacity of the Fiscal Department to ensure that it was well equipped to 
discharge its functions. Significant progress has been made in this regard since 
February 2007. However, it does give one cause for concern that such an 
important task - that of fed eral fiscal policy formation - was delegated to a 
new department that had not been fully empowered to discharge its weighty 
duties. The use of external experts and consultants remedies some of these 
shortcomings. However, there were other indications that there was a degree of 
resentment in some quarters of the federal civil service towards a proliferation 
of external experts and consultants. Some of this resentment may be 
legitimately disregarded as being simply misplaced. However, to the extent that 
this practice impedes capacity building in government ministries, departments 
and agencies, the use of external experts and consultants could be 
counterproductive. 1746 
Interview with Mrs. M. O. Olowu: Director (Fiscal) and Mr. Tor Tsavsar: Assistant 
Director (Fiscal), Fiscal Department, Budget Office of the Federation, Federal 
Ministry of Finance (Abuja FCT, Tue 6 February 2007). 
1746 Interview with Mr. Fidel Oday, Chief Administrative Officer, Multilateral 
Relationships Department, Federal Ministry of Finance (Abula FCT, Fri 2 February 
2007); Interview with Ms. Rita Maselia, Official, Federal Ministry of Finance (Abula 
FCT, Sat 3 February 2007). 
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In this Researcher' s opinion, it is incumbent on the federal government to 
staff its ministries, departments and agencies with the best talent available and 
to adequately train, resource and otherwise empower such staff to achieve their 
stated objectives. Insofar as the necessary human and material resources are 
not allocated to these functions it is unlikely that the relevant ministries, 
departments and agencies will be able to deliver the quality and scope of 
results required to promote sustainable economic development. Where talent 
and resources exist within other ministries, departments and agencies, such 
talent could be formally or informally co-opted or coordinated to ensure that 
human and material resources are efficiently and effectively utilised. In this 
regard, there may be scope for greater collaboration between the Ministry of 
Finance's Fiscal Department and FIRS' Tax Policy Research and Development 
Department. Similar collaborations could also be forged with the relevant 
statistical and research departments of the Nigerian Customs Service, National 
Planning Commission and CBN. 
7.2.3. Criticism of Particular Tax Incentive Policies 
The last section set out concerns regarding the constitutional competence of 
the Federal Ministry of Finance in legislative affairs and the expertise of the 
Ministry's Fiscal Department. Beyond these criticisms are other concerns 
regarding particular policy statements in the Draft NTP. As the formulation of 
the Draft NTP appears to be a closed process, there may well be certain 
procedures involved in policy-making that may have been less obscure had 
more information been available. 1747 Notwithstanding this opacity, this 
Researcher submits' the following observations. 
It has been noted that the Draft NTP prescribes that (1) incentives should be 
extended to only those sectors which yield positive externalities for the overall 
This Researcher encountered a marked reluctance by civil servants to venture 
personal views or opinions that may illuminate actual policy decisions taken by 
Ministers. There seems to be an unwritten rule that civil servants should be rarely 
seen and never heard in public: Focus Group Discussion with Richard Ough and 
other members of the FIRS Tax Policy Research & Development Department, FIRS 
Headquarters (Abuja FCT, Weds 31 January 2007). 
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economy. 
1748 This begs the quest" 1 ion as to how the impact of such positive 
externalities on economic development would be measured. Will parameters 
include the quantum of investment, numbers of employees, duration of 
economic activity or indeed, relative significance of the particular economic 
sector? How will borderline cases be resolved? Further, would measurement be 
conducted ex ante (based on proposals or projections), expost (based on actual, 
achieved results) or a combination of both to determine the variance,, and 
extend or withdraw incentives as appropriate? At first glance, it appears that 
discretionary approvals would be best suited to target incentives to desirable 
investment. However,, such discretionary systems create avenues for rent- 
seeking and official corruption, and may divert scarce public resources from 
revenue- generation to investment promotion. 
Certain tax incentives are to be deleted or simplified under the Draft NTP 
including (3) small companies' relief, capitalisation of R&D expenses, 
investment tax credits for locally ma nufactured spare parts, tax holidays and 
reinvestment relief for tourism facilities. This restriction on incentives is to be 
relaxed only where national objectives cannot be achieved more efficiently in 
any other way (2). 1749However, would political expediency qualify as a valid 
justification for the retention of an incentive? For instance, it may be more 
politically expedient to give SMEs tax incentives as opposed to cash grants, 
though latter may be less distorting and more valuable incentives. The Nigerian 
Constitution has certain provisions regarding the allocation of federal 
resources to the various tiers and arms of government that disallow extra- 
budgetary allocations and could conceivably impede the award of grants to 
deserving micro- enterprises. 1750 The best option of course would be to amend 
constitutional provisions restricting the purposes for which federal funds may 
be applied. However, given the realities of Nigerian politics, achieving such 
constitutional amendments may prove to be exceedingly difficult. 
"'I Draft NTP, p. 6. 
1749 lbid, pp. 22. 
1750 §§80-83, CFRN 1999. 
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Expensing R&D expenditures (instead of capitalising them) seems consistent 
with WTO obligations and economic policies under NEEDS. Howeverl, in 
general, accumulated tax losses may only be carried forward for 4 years. 
Consequently, the absence of indefinite tax carry-forward periods in sectors 
other than energy and agriculture may render the incentive benefits of 
expensing R&D outlays illusory. 
It is unclear if tax holidays are to be continued for agriculture. 1751 The rationale 
for withdrawing tax holidays from solid minerals development seems similarly 
obscure, particularly in view of the proliferation of tax holidays in all 
economic sectors except financial services. 1752 Investment tax credits and 
capital allowances may prove to be less costly and more effective in this 
regard. It may be the case that a combination of fiscal, financial and other 
incentives is necessary to attract sustainable investment away from the 
dominant energy sector and into the agriculture, mining and tourism sectors. It 
appears presumptive of the Draft NTP to rule out the use of tax incentives for 
these sectors in the absence of studies on the feasibility of integrated 
development plans coordinating initiatives by the Ministries of Solid Mineral 
Development, Tourism and Finance. Conversely, it may be the case that no 
incentives are needed other than the availability of affordable finance, basic 
infrastructure, essential services and adequate security. 
The Draft NTP does not indicate if any studies have been conducted to rule 
out (or rule in), th ese alternatives. Indeed, it appears from some of the policy 
statements that more background researýh may have been useful in informing 
proposed policies. The Draft NTP suggests that pioneer tax holidays should be 
extended to 7-years for EPZ firms. However, under existing laws EPZ firms 
are entitled to indefinite taxl holidays. Also, the Draft NTP seeks to preclude 
Budget Office of the Federation; Presentation on 'IMF Comments on FGN Tax 
Strategy: FGN Strategy and Position on Issues Raised' (January 24,2007; Abuja), 
slide 3 cf. Draft NTP, p. 48- 
1752 The Draft NTP justifies the withdrawal of tax holidays with the observation' that 
mining companies do not seem to exploit these measures but no analysis is made as 
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the possibility of EPZ firms exporting any quantity of goods into the Nigerian 
customs territory. 1753Many jurisdictions permit the export of a small percentage 
of goods into their customs territories from EPZs, subject to certain 
restrictions. 1754 Given the notoriously porous nature of Nigeria's national 
borders, it may be prudent to allow the export of a certain percentage of goods 
rather than providing additional incentives for smuggling. 
The formulation of the Draft NTP is a useful and essential activity that seeks 
for the first time to coordinate Nigerian fiscal policy around a set of key 
concepts and principles. However, in this Researcher's opinion, there are 
cert ain aspects regarding tax incentive policy which are not the product of 
rigorous research or analysis and could be better conceived. There is a clear 
need for more empirical work on reliable statistics to inform policy decisions. 
It is regrettable that at present the capacity to conduct such studies and 
generate vital information from available data appears to be lacking as this will 
inevitably undermine the quality of any efforts at policy design, 
implementation and review. 
The foregoing discourse has considered specific criticism of certain aspects of 
the Draft NTP's tax incentive policy prescriptions. The next section considers 
other issues which could have been addressed in the Draft NTP but were, for 
whatever reason, excluded. These issues include those previously developed 
above in Chapter 6. 
7.2-4. Limited Regional & International Influences on the Draft NTP 
Chapter 6 of this Thesis has demonstrated that certain regional and 
international influences constrain the tax incentive policies of developing 
nations, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the fact that 
numerous studies corroborate this view, there is precious little direct reference 
to why this is so (ibid, p. 49). As indicated in S3.2.7 above, it has only 
been in recent 
years that the government has encouraged investment in mining. 
1753 Draft NTP, p-40- 
1754 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, pp-1 85-186. 
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in the Draft NTP 1755 to the important interactions between domestic tax 
incentive policy and the realities of international tax law, regional integration 
arrangements, global trade regulations and tax conditionality imposed by IFIs. 
The only direct reference to international issues is where the Draft NTP 
indicates the government's commitment to expand the network of international 
tax treaties to reduce double taxation; realise a common VAT, tariff, trade and 
competition policy for ECOWAS; and provide adequate international training 
for middle and top level revenue officials to ensure the maintenance of global 
best practices. 1756 Besides these matters, the Draft NTP seems to maintain a 
strictly national perspective and overlooks significant international influences 
on and interactions with domestic fiscal policy. In this Researcher's opinion, 
these matters merit consideration and possible inclusion in the Draft'NTP. 
Viherkentta's study indicates that countries would do well to examine the tax 
provisions of their most important treaty partners when formulating tax 
incentive policy to minimise the scope for the wash-out of tax incentive 
benefits. It does not presently appear that this idea or any relevant experiences 
from Nigerian tax treaty negotiating teams are reflected in the Draft. NTP. The 
Draft NTP does not specifically examine the harmonisation of tariffs and tax 
incentives across the ECOWAS bloc to promote regional fiscal cooperation 
even though Nigeria's CET regime has been cited as an impediment to regional 
tariff convergence. 1757 Similarly, the Draft NTP appears to completely ignore 
trade issues concerning the use of tariffs and subsidies contingent on exports 
and local content. 
Consideration of these international influences is critical particularly where 
Nigeria's fiscal policies are perceived by international investors and their tax 
1755 Or indeed in the previous Reports of the Study Group and Working Group. 
175" Draft NTP, P-15. 
1757 However, one of the reasons why the Working Group saw the Study Group's 
recommendation for dual direct and indirect taxes as idealist and impractical was 
that the proposal's implementation would conflict with Nigeria's tariff policy 
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advisers to discourage investment. Discussions with Michael Honiball 
(Director of International Tax, KPMG South Africa) indicate that many of 
KPMG's Southern African clients had a negative perception of the Nigerian 
revenue authorities' attitude to granting treaty benefits and otherwise applying 
tax laws in a consistent manner to promote inward FDI. He noted that having 
a regional pan-African body of tax experts in similar fashion to the regional 
SADC arrangements could go a long way to promoting consistent tariff, tax 
incentive and other fiscal policies that would encourage private investment 
within Sub-Saharan Africa. In his opinion, this arrangement would be useful in 
harmonising of tax rates and fiscal incentives to combat tax competition as 
well as permitting poorer Sub-Saharan African countries greater latitude with 
tax incentives. 1758 
Given the significance of South Africa to regional trade (and particularly, trade 
with Nigeria) these concerns should not be ignored as immaterial. In this 
Researcher's opinion, a comprehensive study of the manner in which these 
issues - international tax law, regional integration arrangements, global trade 
regulations and IFI tax conditionality - affect or interact with Nigerian fiscal 
and tax incentive policy would have been immensely useful in formulating the 
Draft NTP. A cursory enquiry into the tax practices of Nigeria's top ten 
trading partners might reveal other important issues that could well affect the 
design, implementation and review of the Draft NTP- 
Lessons could be learned from benchmarking Nigerian fiscal incentive policies; 
against those of similar developing countries within and outside Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This Thesis does not purp ort to be such a comprehensive study; its 
aims and objectives are limited. However, the next 'section suggests a few 
lessons 'that could conceivably be learned from the South African and Kenyan 
experiences. 
obligations under ECOWAS and other bilateral or multilateral agreements: 
Working 
Group's Report, op cit, p. 20. 
1758 Interview with Michael Honiball: Tax Partner and Director (International 
Tax), 
KPMG Services (Proprietary) Ltd, KPMG RSA National Office (Johannesburg, Thurs 
24 May 2007). 
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7.3. SPECIFIC LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA & KENYA 
Caveat 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this Thesis respectively review the tax incentive policies 
and provisions operative in South Africa a* nd Kenya. As indicated in Chapter 1, 
much of this research was conducted using bibliographical methodology. This 
method was complemented by interviews and teleconferences. While the South 
African enquiries were entirely successfully, some difficulty was encountered in 
obtaining data, information and perspectives on tax incentives in Kenya. 
However, these difficulties were largely resolved and in the opinion of this 
Researcher, do not materially impair the comparisons made with Nigeria. 
7.3.2. Lessons from South Africa 
7.3.2.0. Introduction 
Nigerian tax incentives, particularly for the petroleum sector, tend to be more 
complicated than equivalent South African measures given the fact that the 
Nigerian tax system is comparatively less sophisticated than the South African 
tax system. The role of tax incentives in South Africa is rapidly evolving as 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. There is much greater sophistication in 
the design and -variety of incentives utilised 
though some of these are being 
phased out in lieu of subsidies. The following lessons may be gleaned from the 
South African experience. 
7.3.2.1. Targeting Incentives 
Targeting incentives is an important process that involves identifying the 
specific kinds of investment the government wishes to promote and reducing 
the revenue forgone by limiting incentives to the appropriate class of 
individuals and entities. Targeting may well determine how successful or cost- 
effective an incentive will be. 1759Michael Honiball observed that there was a 
perceptible attenuation of tax incentives with the decline of the Strategic 
Investment Programme, Industrial Development Zones' tax holidays and the 
apparent replacement of these with financial incentives such as the cash grant 
1159 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, op cit, chapter 5. 
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under the Motor Industry Development Programme. However, there was a 
recent resurgence of tax incentives by way of accelerated deductions of R&D 
expenses in terms of 511D, ITA. 1760 
This view was corroborated by Martin Grote (Chief Director of Tax 
Policy/Head of Tax Unit, South African National Treasury) during a 
teleconference interview with this Researcher. 1761 He 'stated that South Africa 
presently has a strong aversion to tax incentives. Tax incentives were 
increasingly perceived as 'quick fixes' which generally did not resolve long- 
standing industrial, infrastructural and economic problems. As such, tax 
incentives were being phased out to a large extent and replaced by other non- 
fiscal measures such as duty rebates, subsidies and grants. The only exception 
to this general rule was in respect of R&D which the government was 
encouraging by targeted incentives in terms of §11D, ITA. 
Nigerian incentives remain rather blunt, diversified and unresponsive to 
changes in current economic realities. As discussed below in §7.4.3.2, the 
proliferation of pioneer incentives for 'infant industries' has led to the rise of 
a de facto 'infant economy'. Nigeria could learn much from South Africa in 
implementing the Draft NTP policy prescription of steam-lining tax incentives 
to restrict their use to instances where they help to achieve a national objective 
that cannot be achieved more efficiently in any other way. 1762 
7.3.2.2. Fitness For Purpose 
South African tax incentives often feature special techniques such as ring- 
fencing and claw-back provisions to erýsure that they remain cost-effective 
tools to achieve desired policies. The reform of South African tax incentives 
has been a progressive, incremental affair that has seen blunt measures like tax 
holidays being replaced with more cost-effective measures such as the Strategic 
Interview with Michael Honiball, op cit. 
1761 Teleconference Interview with Martin Grote: Chief Director of Tax Polcy/Head of 
Tax Unit; South African National Treasury Department, Pretoria, South Africa 
(London -Pretoria, Fri 29 June 2007). 1762 Draft NTP, p. 22. 
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Industrial Projects' incentives. Even these new measures are being phased out 
as results indicate that non-fiscal measures may be more effective. The 
operative rule appears to be using measures that are fit for the purpose 
intended. An example of this approach can be seen in the phase-out of the 
Strategic Industrial Projects. 
Ian MacKenzie (Head of Corporate Tax, Webber Wentzel Bowens) observed 
that it has been unclear to the business community whether the Strategic 
Industrial Projects programme was designed to promote investments in plant 
or in personnel. 1763The incentives emphasised capital-intensive investments as, 
at the time, the government believed machines were essential for development. 
However, there may have been a policy mismatch in tying incentives to high 
capex thresholds and still expecting the investors to reduce unemployment by 
creating jobs particularly in modern, computerised and high-tech 
manufacturing. Whether or not this programme was deemed to be a success 
had not been officially published. In his opinion, it could be that the decision 
to discontinue the programme was evidence that it was not as successful as 
expected. 1764 The Strategic Industrial Projects created jobs and promoted 
investment but it is unclear how many of these projects would have gone ahead 
without the incentives. To the extent that this proportion was large, the 
incentives were redundant. His view was that the government had not been 
able to accurately target marginal investments. As such, many investors may 
have gone ahead with sound investments which would only have been made 
better by the incentives. 
Theses views were confirmed by Martin Grote. 
1765 He noted that there was 
ongoing work on a report to assess the merits or otherwise of the Strategic 
Investment Project incentive scheme. 1766 However the general consensus that 
1763 Interview with Ian MacKenzie, Head of Corporate Tax, Webber Wentzel Bowens 
Uohannesburg, Fri 18 May 2007). 
1764 Alternatively, the desired objectives had been achieved and there was no need to 
continue the incentive regime. 
1765 Interview with Martin Grote, o_p cit. 
1766 However, this report was confidential and Martin Grote declined to discuss it. 
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the scheme was expensive and costly: R3billion was spent by way of tax 
expenditures yet only R10billion in investment was generated. More crucially, 
the main object of the programme was job creation line with a government 
employment target for 2014. Only 7,000 jobs were created at an average cost of 
R428,571 per job. Consequently, the scheme was not seen to be a cost effective 
way of increasing employment and this contributed to the decision to 
discontinue it. Other means of promoting job creation have been pursued 
including job training allowances, apprenticeship schemes deductions etc. 
Finally, Martin Grote noted that as many of the Strategic Investment Project 
investments were very profitable it is probable that there were high levels of 
incentive deadweight and redundancy rates as many projects would have 
proceeded without the incentives creating windfall gains for investors. 
A review of energy sector tax incentives in 2000 found Memorandum of 
Understanding incentives for Nigerian petroleum operation companies to be 
broadly appropriate. 1767 However, it is unlikely that most Nigerian tax 
incentives would pass the test of fitness for purpose. Policy statements favour 
accelerated depreciation and investment tax credits to promote investment in 
productive assets. 1768 Like the South African Strategic Investment Projects, 
such a policy may lead to large revenue losses and redundancy rates if investors 
would have invested in any ca-se. Besides discouraging the assimilation of 
newer technologies and techniques, this policy may distort investment in 
favour of plant over personnel hampering efforts at job-creation. 
Admittedly, certain economic sectors (e. g. energy) traditionally employ high 
levels of capital and low levels of labour. However, it is precisely in such 
sectors that the Nigerian government seeks to create jobs, promote greater 
local content inputs and balance ethnic participation based on the 'federal 
1767 T19, Nigeria: Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic & Financial Policies of 
Federal Government for 2000, dated July 20,2000. 
1768 Olabode M. Agusto, Dire ctor- General, Budget Office of the Federation; Presentation 
on 'The Role of Tax Policy in Driving Economic Growth and 
Development in 
Nigeria?, op cit, slide 17. 
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character' principle. 1769 Combining these social objectives with a fiscal policy 
that favours capital-intensive, production may prove counterproductive if not 
well conceived or implemented. Finally, where infrastructural deficiencies such 
as erratic power supply remain unresolved it is difficult to see how incentives 
for capital investment, however well suited for purpose, would deliver the 
desired results. Happily, the Draft NTP addresses this problem by targeting 
pioneer holidays to private investments in infrastructure and basic services. 1770 
7.3.2.3. Sound Economics or Petty Politics? 
On February 20,2008 South Africa's Trevor Manuel in his Budget Speech 
noted that '... this House and every taxpayer shares with us a responsibility to 
question continuously whether our incentives are based on sound policies and 
criteria, not on favours or special interests masquerading as the public 
good'. 1771Where tax incentives generate political as well as economic dividends, 
care must be taken to honestly determine the precise rationale for these 
incentives. Although it may be convenient to conceal political motives under a 
veneer of sound economics, when the associated incentives cease due to 
political or other changes, investors may withdraw from the sectors unravelling 
any economic gains achieved. 
Ian MacKenzie made similar observations while assessing the historical 
approach to tax incentives in South Africa over the years. 1772Between the 1960s 
and 1990s, certain tax incentives were used for political rather than economic 
reasons. As noted in §4.2.5.2 above, incentives were given to industrialists to 
relocate manufacturing plants to rural areas ostensibly to promote the 
decentralisation of industry and reduce congestion in heavily industriallsed 
areas. Such incentives included tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and 
investment allowances. However, the industrial decentralisation scheme also 
1711 The Federal Character Commission enforces constitutional provisions prohibiting 
the predominance of persons from a few states or -ethnic groups in the 
federal 
government or its agencies: see §§14 & 153, CFRN 1999. 
1770 Appendix Two: Strategyfor Implementation of the Proposed Polig, Draft NTP, p. 26. 
" SA 2008 Budget, p-10. 
1772 Interview with lan MacKenzie, op cit. 
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had the political objective of promoting racial segregation under apartheid. 1773 
As the underlying motives of the policy were more political than economical5 
the scheme encouraged otherwise economically unviable investments in rural 
areas. Unsurprisingly, when the incentives were withdrawn much of these 
investments were discontinued as they were unsustainable. Other adverse 
effects were instances of abuse and sharp practice. 1774 
Tax incentives in Nigeria have rarely been used so overtly for political reasons. 
However, adverse political conditions have played a role in the grant of very 
generous incentives. Omorogbe has criticised the generosity of incentives 
under the NLNG/FIGA Act as the attempt by the then military government to 
legislate for stability in the unstable, p olitically- charged investment 
environment of the early 1990S. 1775Happily, Nigeria now has a relatively stable, 
democratically- elected government. However, as Kofo Dosekun (Partner, 
Aluko & Oycbode) observed the NLNG incentives were continued for ten 
years despite the restoration of a significant degree of normalcy to the polity in 
the late 1990S. 1776 Contemporary political objectives that may creep into 
investment incentive policy include maintaining 'federal character' in official 
appointments in public enterprises, promoting the employment of indigenous 
individuals in multinational firms and encouraging local content in 
subcontracting and production. The constraints imposed by WTO rules on 
local content provisions have been highlighted in Chapter 6. Nigerian 
policyrnakers should carefully weigh the merits of advancing political ends 
through tax incentives against the risk of the distortions that incentives 
inherently create. As with South Africa, it may be that any political gains prove 
to be transient while negative economic consequences endure. 
1773 Black, 'Decentralization incentives and investment in the South African periphery, 
op cit, pp. 121-141. 
1774 Ian MacKenzie mentioned the typical scheme of claiming more jobs had been created 
than was the case to enjoy unduly generous incentives tied to job creation. 
1775 Omorogbe, 'Law and Investor Protection in the Nigerian Natural Gas Industry', op 
cit, pp. 188-191. 
1776 Interviews with Mrs. Kofo Dosekun: Partner, Aluko & Oyebode (Lagos, Fri 26 and 
January and Thurs 08 February 2007). 
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7.3.2.4. Count the Cost Wherever Possible 
Ian MacKenzie made certain practical observations regarding cost-benefit 
assessments of tax incentives. 1777Companies who benefit from incentives would 
always emphasize the merits of incentives but how does one really measure 
their tangible benefits? If investments are viable without incentives, their grant 
may lead to high redundancy rates and large costs in revenues forgone. If 
investors insist that incentives are essential for marginal investments, how 
shall these assertions be proven empirically? 
Bolnick recommends the use of marginal effective tax rates (METRs), tax 
expenditure budgeting and explicit screening criteria as three techniques that 
policyrnakers could use to analyse the efficacy of tax incentives. 1778 South 
Africa has utilised tax expenditure budgeting in setting financial ceilings for 
incentive schemes such as the Strategic Industrial Projects (set at R10billion). 
Martin Grote's suggestion that the scheme was perceived to be wasteful was 
based on the cost-benefit assessment of the RlObillon spent in tax 
expenditures. However, Martin Grote , noted that while Bolnick's 
recommendation of marginal effective tax rates is an interesting point,, these 
have not been used in South Africa due to the data-intensive nature of the 
analysis required. Bolnick's analysis was only in respect of a circumscribed data 
set. Martin Grote suggested that METR analysis may have been conducted for 
individual projects but not for the general tax incentive regime. Consequently, 
South Africa could not presently conduct METR analysis for all possible tax 
incentives in diverse economic sectors. 1779 
Nevertheless, South Africa usually provides, as part of its national budget, a 
tax expenditure estimate of the cost of tax incentives to the fiscus in terms of 
revenues forgone. Luja suggests that where such tax expenditures are excluded 
from the national budgeting process, this undermines fiscal transparency and 
1777 Interview with Ian MacKenzie, op cit. 
1778 Bolnick, Effectiveness and Economic Impact of Tax Incentives in the SADC Region, op cit, 
chapter 4. 
1779 Interview with Martin Grote, op cit. 
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prevents politicians and taxpayers alike from perceiving the true fiscal impact 
of these measures. 1780 He notes the observation by certain commentators that 
such fiscal opacity is often a deliberate ploy by politicians or policymakers to 
conceal tax expenditure from probing public scrutiny or to reduce lobbying by 
interest groups for similar incentives. However, he argues that while cash 
subsidisation may increase fiscal transparency, it may further complicate 
income tax systems, and increase administrative costs and burdens for both tax 
authorities and taxpayers. He concludes that: '(like) any other kind of 
government subsidisation tax expenditure requires an in-depth analysis and 
discussion about its necessity in the public interest. 11781 
This Researcher did not find any indication of any studies or reports which 
empirically considered the costs and benefits of Nigerian tax incentives using 
tax expenditure budgeting or METRs. Given the dearth of reliable statistical 
data on the Nigerian tax system in general and tax incentives specifically, it is 
likely that any such analysis would encounter significant difficulty. However, 
for incentives tied to petroleum operations there may be sufficiently accurate 
data sets available from the Department for Petroleum Resources and the 
FIRS' Oil and Gas Department to arrive at reliable results. The significance of 
petroleum tax revenues to Nigeria underscores the importance of such a study. 
The use of these techniques may derive information on energy sector 
incentives that ma y be useful in identifying redundant incentives for 
withdrawal and effective incentives for greater targeting. Tax expenditure 
budgeting would also be useful on wider scale to assess the cost of fiscal 
incentives provided in other economic sectors. However, given Nigeria's 
complicated system of allocating federal revenues among the states and local 
governments, it is likely that tax expenditure budgeting would provoke 
contests among various constituencies jostling for greater shares in the 
allocation of tax expenditures. 
1780 Lula Assessment & Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC & the WTO, op cit, pp. 14-19. 
1781 Ibid, p. 19. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, School of Tax 
Centre for CommercZal Lam Studies 
, 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Pqe 351 of418 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Suh-Sabaran African Economies: 7: A Critique of Nigerian Ta--, Incentive Policy A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South African & Kenyan Tax Law 
7.3.2.5. Adequate Consultation with the Private Sector 
The South African experience indicates that consultation with private sector 
interests - the inte nded recipients of tax incentives - is imperative. This 
Researcher found that in respect of §11D, ITA R&D incentives, there was a 
prevailing pri vate sector perception that there had been inadequate 
consultation regarding the new incentives. 1782 Martin Grote strongly 
disagreed. 1783He noted that tax legislation in South Africa goes through a very 
public process involving the public, private sector, media and parliament. 
Consultation is also conducted electronically. When policy measures are 
proposed, there is adequate public consultation. When draft bills are sent 
through parliament, there is yet more consultation. There are procedures where 
public input can be given to the portfolio and other committees that examine 
draft laws and policy proposals. All these processes occur before the policies 
of the Minister of Finance eventually become law. 1784 As such, the private 
sector had sufficient opportunity to be consulted on tax incentive and other 
tax legislation. Grote attributed the criticism of the private sector to the fact 
that all legislation is the outcome of compromise: no one gets all they want as 
not all proposals are affordable or practically workable. As such, there would 
always be dissatisfaction with the outcome and this fuelled complaints of 
inadequate consultation. 
Ian MacKenzie presented a particularly balanced private sector perception of 
the issue of adequate consultation. MacKenzie explained that incentives are a 
manifestation of the larger issue of the government's challenges with fiscal 
policy implementation. Often, at higher policy levels, policy is agreed upon to 
promote a particular set of strategic objectives. However, SARS would be 
charged with drafting legislation and by the time this was produced, the intent 
of the policy may have been defeated by the restrictive manner in which the 
legislation was drafted rendering it unworkable. More piecemeal reform would 
1782 Interview with Michael Honiball, Q cit. 
Interview with Martin Grote, Q cit. 
1784 Grote gives the example of the Royalties Bill which has been in the pipeline since 
2003 and was still undergoing consultation. 
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then be proposed to remedy this lapse. In his opinion, consultation with 
private sector could improve. In the past, SARS, distrust of private sector 
inputs was exhibited in narrow windows for consultation procedures and 
criticism of private sector views. MacKenzie conceded that the private sector 
often pursued narrow sectarian agendas which conflict with the need for policy 
to take a broader view. However, as a result of SARS not taking into account 
private sector views resulting legislation may be practically unworkable. 1785 
MacKenzie gave the particular illustration of the R&D incentives. Here, there 
was a clear policy espoused by government to promote investment in R&D. 
When SARS came out with the legislation without sufficient consultation it was 
unworkable in many respects. For instance, the definition of what constitutes 
R&D was so vague that there were few objective standards. Effectively SARS 
decides what qualifies as R&D. Further, there was a requirement that the 
Minister of Science & Technology should be given a report in 'in such form 
and manner (including electronically) and at such place as that Minister may 
fromItime to time prescribe'. 1786 In practice, the Minister had not yet given this 
much thought and issued regulations about modalities for the submission of 
such a report. 1787 Such deficiencies render the R&D incentives illusory. 
Recently SARS has been taking input from selected members of the private 
sector whom they trust and this has helped to make legislation such as those 
on corporate rules regulating business organisations and mergers more 
workable in achieving policy objectives as well as being accessible to 
taxpayers. 1788AIthough there are meetings between the President and leading 
businesspeople, these deal with high level policy as opposed to detailed 
application. 
"I, Interview with Ian MacKenzie, op cit. 
1781 §11D(11) & (12), ITA. 
1717 Moreover, the Minister will report to Parliament on the investor's report; as such, 
the provision seems geared more to improving Parliamentary oversight and 
less to 
helping to SARS decide whether to grant the incentives or not. 
1781 Apparently, MacKenzie was consulted In this process. 
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The Draft NTP is essentially the product of a partnership between the 
Nigerian government and the private sector. There were significant private 
sector influences at all stages in its formulation. At the relevant time the 
Budget Office's Director- General, the Federal Minister of Finance and the 
Chairperson of FIRS were all accomplished private sector professionals that 
had been appointed to serve in the public sector. This development is welcome 
and should be continued. However, care should be taken to ensure that a 
balanced view to tax incentive policy is adopted to prevent private interests 
from subverting policies to serve narrow, sectarian ends. The wellbeing of 
Nigerians, as taxpayers and consumers of public goods and services, should 
remain paramount. 1789 
7.3.2.6. Tax Policy is Tax Administration 
Tax policy tends to be only as effective as its administration. Discretionary 
approvals have been identified as features that increase the scope of 
mismanagement of tax incentives. Martin Grote observed that the South 
African government seeks to ensure that where tax incentives are granted, they 
are designed to reduce the scope of discretion involved. Incentives such as 
those for the- Strategic Investment Projects which require considerable 
discretion have been phased out and the preference is for incentives with 
automatic approval procedures. 1790 
Ian MacKenzie traces a distinct change in South African tax administration in 
the last dec, ade. The period between 1994 and 1998 was characterised with low 
taxpayer morality acerbated by poor tax administration. However since 2001, 
SARS has changed the face of tax admin istration by evolving into a more 
efficient and effective organisation with better skilled and remunerated staff 
who are focused on revenue collection. Although SARS' new vigorous 
application of tax laws is a good development which has lead to increased 
1189 Draft NTP, p. 3. 
"90 Interview with Martin Grote, Q cil. 
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revenues, the effect of the new aggressive drive has been felt mainly by the 
larger taxpayers. 1791 
While the SARS aggressive revenue drive has resulted in revenue projections 
being consistently exceeded in recent years, it appears to have contributed to a 
decline in taxpayer morality. Professional tax advisers complain that SARS' 
often pursues unreasonable disputes relentlessly even where the revenue's 
position is clearly untenable. Ferdi Vorster and Robyn Nath'an (Director, 
Corporate Tax; Partner, International Tax: KPMG South Africa) observe that 
this issue of tax morality vs. legal obl igation to pay tax is a growing issue 
which is now widely debated. SARS argues for tax morality and insists that 
taxpayers should render returns as due. However, SARS's aggressive attitude 
discourages clients and investors from seeking fiscal incentives given SARS' 
reluctance to grant any incentives at all possibly undermining the government's 
economic arid social development goalS. 1792 
The implications of tax administration for the execution of Nigerian tax 
incentives are considered at length below in §7.4.3. From However, as seen in 
the South African experience, tax administration is a critical factor in tax 
incentive design, implementation and review. The next section considers what 
lessons may be gleaned from the Kenyan experiences with tax incentives, 
particularly those for special sectors like agriculture and exports. 
1791 Interview with Jan MacKenzie, op cit. Nathan: Partner, 1792 Interview with Ferdi Vorster: Director, 
Corporate Tax and Robyn 
International Tax; KPMG Services (Proprietary) Ltd, KPMG RSA 
National Office 
(Johannesburg, Thurs 17 May 2007). 
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7.3.3. Lessons from Kenya 
7.3.3-0. Introduction 
7: A Critique of Nigerian Tax Incentipe Policy 
As seen in Chapter 5, the Kenyan tax incentive regime is a relatively simple 
one compared to those of Nigeria and South Africa. Key incentive policies 
target agriculture, export-oriented manufacturing and tourism. While more 
research might have yielded greater insights into the Kenyan tax incentive 
system, the following lessons may nevertheless be learned from Kenyan 
experiences. 
7.3.3.1. Simplicity is Golden 
Dr. Gavin McEwen (former Head of Tax/Senior Tax Partner: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Nairobi, Kenya) observed that from his experience of 
negotiating tax concessions for Kenyarl multinationals, tax incentives were 
reluctantly given by KRA even where significant investments where being made 
in priority sectors such as mining and manufacturing. In general, fiscal policy 
favoured few tax incentives provided precisely in line with existing legislation 
with a view to maintaining equity across taxpayers. 1793 Gavin McEwen noted 
that while KRA's administrative capacity had improved over the years 
(particularly in the use of information technology) there were still 
administrative shortcomings such as maintaining sufficiently reliable taxpayer 
records to facilitate routine tax audits. It stood to reason that if maintaining 
taxpayer records consumed so much administrative capacity, resources would 
be better allocated to improving this capacity rather than monitoring tax 
incentive programmes. 
7.3.3.2. Consider Non-Tax Incentive Measures for Special Sectors 
Agriculture is Kenya's primary economic sector and there are numerous tax 
concessions granted to agriculturalists by way of VAT exemptions and capital 
allowances. However, Gavin McEwen considered that these concessions are 
not materially different from concessions granted in other countries where 
Interview with Gavin McEwen: former Head of Tax/Senior 
Tax Partner, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kenya; at the Caledonian Club (London, Weds 21 
November 2007). 
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agriculture is a significant economic sector. He saw these concessions not as 
tax incentives per se but rather measures which seek to recognise the 
peculiarities of agricultural enterprise such as the seasonal nature of cultivating 
and harvesting crops. Such measures should be encouraged and this pragmatic 
approach to the design of tax incentives is desirable. In his opinion, as tax 
incentives usually operate at the margin and rarely are the critical factor 
determining investment decisions, care must be taken to target incentives in 
such a manner as to actually achieve the desired policy objective. In certain 
cir . cumstances, this may not require the use of tax incentives but rather a 
pragmatic, appreciation by the relevant tax authority of the commercial realities 
of the taxpaying enterprise. 
He gave the example of incentives for mining activities: a greenfield mining 
company's profile typically features negative cashflows in the early years 
followed by positive cashflows in later years. Offering this company an initial 
tax holiday is not very meaningful in the absence of loss and capital allowance 
carry-forward provisions. Indeed, this company may prefer import waivers or 
concessions given the large amounts of capex incurred in early years. Unless 
tax policyrnakers appreciate the particular circumstances of the taxpayer, 
ineffective tax incentives may be offered which may prove counterproductive 
in the long term. 
7.3.3.3. The Need for Dynamic, Sustainable Tax Incentive Policy 
In this era of regional integration and open international trade, tax 
policymakers must consider the impact of regional and international trade 
commitments on fiscal policy. Gavin McEwen noted that the less-than- 
seamless transition of powers over duty exemptions and VAT/import duties 
remissions from the KRA in Nairobi to the EAC CU in Arusha had an adverse 
impact on Kenyan taxpayers seeking duty remissions. He observed that care 
should be taken to ensure that while' tax incentive policy remains dynamic 
enough to maximise international trade opportunities, global trends are 
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carefully analysed to avoid large revenue losses arising from excessively 
generous incentives. 
Case in point was the Kenyan EPZ regime. While the EPZ incentives have 
created significant investment and employment in garment production and 
manufacturing, many of the EPZ firms were of the footloose variety, attracted 
more by third-country opportunities under AGOA and other trade agreements 
than Kenya's economic fundamentals. Gavin McEwen believes there is 
considerable risk that when these preferential trade opportunities expire these 
firms would simply relocate to other locations taking with them the jobs and 
investment. To his knowledge, some EPZ enterprises had wound-up operations 
over marginal reductions in the amounts of goods that could be sold Jn the 
Kenyan custom area. Given the ease with which EPZ enterprises could cease 
operations and relocate to other Jurisdictions, any perceived gains from EPZ 
regimes should be dispassionately appraised and greater attention directed at 
targeting more enduring investment. 
7.3.3.4. Tax Policy is Tax Administration 
If the administrative capacity to implement policy initiatives is lacking or 
inadequate, the efficiency and effectiveness any fiscal initiative would 
inevitably be undermined. Case in point was the use of tax incentives to 
promote manufacturing and job creation. Gavin McEwen considered that the 
informal/SME sectors may have a greater potential to create employment for 
thousands of Kenyans than manufacturing given the gl. obal shift to service- 
oriented enterprise. 1794 However, it was only recently that the 
Kenyan 
government had encouraged SMEs. Under the Moi regime large multinational 
businesses were feted while few policies were implemented to 
directly improve 
the fortunes of smaller enterprises. 1795 Some recent policies such as the 
introduction of a turnover tax in early 2008 may ease the tax 
burden on SMEs 
1794 Indeed, most of the 471,000 jobs created in 2005 were in the informal sector: 
OECD/AfDB, African Economz'c Outlook 2007: Country Notes (Kenya), p. 314. 
1795 Gavin McEwen observed that this 'big business' hang-over still persists 
in practices 
like KRA's annual award ceremonies celebrating the 
largest taxpayers who invariably 
are large multinational companies: 
Interview with Gavin McEwen, op cl . t. 
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by reducing the degree of accounting records to be maintained in filing tax 
returns. 1796 However , in other areas the KRA's administrative record is clearly 
inadequate. 
Gavin McEwen gave the practical example of VAT refunds. While the use of 
withholding methods to collect VAT has increased the level of receipts, KRA's 
handling of VAT refunds had negative implications for many SMEs. All 
revenue collections by the KRA are remitted to the Treasury. Consequently, 
KRA only has access to such funds that the Treasury budgets for refunds and 
in reality, there are never enough funds to cover all legitimate applications. In 
theory, the process involves securing official approval for the refunds, passing 
certain techn ical checks or audits, and obtaining cash-office authorisation. In 
practice, the assistance of senior revenue officials is often sought to ensure 
that a client's refunds comes through in the monthly refund 'round'. 
Gavin McEwen observed that in the past, it was common knowledge that the 
use of political connections and outright graft was sometimes utillsed by 
unscrupulous and unprofessional individuals to secure refunds. In these 
circumstances successful refunds were often dependent on the ability of a 
taxpayer to engage professional tax consultants, 
1797 wield sufficient political 
clout or in certain cases,, exploit corrupt revenue officials. Smaller enterprises 
that lacked political connections or professional tax advice often could not 
secure VAT refunds. The resultant cash-flow problems contributed to the 
demise of many smaller enterprises, discouraging others from seeking VAT 
registration. In Gavin McEwen's view, resolving this critical lapse in the VAT 
refund system would provide a much greater fiscal encouragement 
for SMEs 
than many of the tax incentives targeted at SMEs. Happily, proposals under the 
2007/2008 Budget seek to address these issues by increasing funds dedicated 
to the monthly refund 'rounds' and introducing a fast-track processing 
1796 Pricewaterhous e Coopers Kenya, 2007 Budget Bulletin: Direct 
Tax, p-3. 
1797 Gavin McEwen rioted that this was an important function PricewaterhouseCoopers 
performed for many multinational clients 
in Kenya: Interview with Gavin McEwen, 
OP cz t. 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, 
Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial Law Studies 
Oueen Mary, University of London 
Page 359 of 4 18 
The Role o Tax Incentives in A Trio of Sub-Sabaran African Economies: 7: A Critique of Nigerian Tax Incentive Polic .fY A Comparative Study ýf Nigerian, Soulb African & Kennyan Ta.,,: Lan, 
procedure. 1798 However, it remains to be seen how effective these measures will 
be. 1799 
An important factor determining the quality of any revenue authority's tax 
administration capacity is the calibre of staff that authority can attract, train 
and retain. Gavin McEwen drew an interesting distinction betwe en KRA and 
South A fri c a's SARS. While professional consulting firms like 
PricewaterhouseCoopers regularly recruited outstanding KRA staff, their South 
African-based tax professionals were regularly 'poached' by SARS evidently 
enticed by offers of better remuneration and service conditions. The 
significantly different administrative competencies of SARS and the KRA 
highlighted the positive impact of SARS's latitude to operate independently 
from civil service controls. By investing a small percentage of revenue receipts 
in funding operations' and the remuneration of first-class professionals, SARS 
was able to build sufficient tax capacity to drive record collections, increase 
gross revenues, reduce tax evasion and ultimately finance tax reductions and 
con cessions. 1800 
Conversely, highly-skilled Kenyan tax professionals often were discouraged 
from working in the KRA due to perceived poor service conditions. Indeed, 
Christine Muga (Tax Associate: PricewaterhouseCoopers Channel Islands) 
observed that the fact that the KRA's Commissioner General was a former 
Ernst & Young tax partner did not seem to encourage more junior tax 
professionals to seek careers with the KRA. 1801 There was also the reality that 
political or ethnic considerations were often more critical to advancement or 
I'll K Budget Speech 2007/2008, p. 28. 
1799 PricewaterhouseCoopers Kenya, 2007 Budget Bulletin: VAT, p-1. 
"00 In 2006, SARS' tax collections increased by 4.5% (VAT/indirect tax: 14.5%; 
corporation tax: 18.1%) due to higher domestic demand, broadening the tax 
base and 
strong tax compliance: OECD/AfDB, African Economic Outlook 2007: 
Country Notes 
(Soutb Africa) p. 491. 
Statement by Christine Muga: Tax Associate, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Channel 
Islands; formerly of Ernst & Young Eastern and Central African Advisory Services' 
Tax Department, Nairobi, Kenya: (personal communication 7 December 2007). 
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promotion than mere merit or technical competence. 1802Unless the KRA was 
able to address these perceived lapses it would be unable to fully unleash the 
full potential of its staff further undermining its administrative capacity to 
deliver on tax incentives and other policy initiatives. 
7.3.4. Outcomes 
The foregoing discussion in §7.3 has outlined lessons that Nigeria could learn 
from the South African and Kenyan experience of utilising tax incentive policy 
to promote investment, trade development and economic growth. However, the 
successes of South African and Kenyan tax incentive policies have been greatly 
influenced by local conditions prevalent in these jurisdictions. As such, the 
direct applicability of these lessons must be considered in light of the local 
factual and cultural circumstances obtaining in Nigeria. The next section (57.4) 
considers some constraints on Nigeria's ability to learn from the South African 
and Kenyan experiences due to such local peculiarities. 
1802 Gavin McEwen observed that some (unnamed) revenue officials had blamed their 
lack of advancement on being from the '-, vrong' ethnic group: 
Interview with Gavin 
McEwen, op cit. 
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7.4. CONSTRAINTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF LESSONS FROM 
REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL EX PERIENCES 
7.4-0. Unique Aspects of the Nigerian Fiscal Environment 
The previous section (§7.3) has highlighted key lessons from the South African 
and Kenyan experiences which may be useful in improving the design, 
implementation and review of Nigerian tax incentive policy. However, the 
Nigerian tax system differs fundamentally in many important respects from 
those operative in South Africa and Kenya due to historical, political, 
economic and cultural reasons. In this Researcher's opinion, some of these 
differences are crucial in understanding the possibilities for and limitations on 
the application of these lessons to Nigerian tax incentive policy. This section 
(§7.4) explores some of these differences and considers their impact on the 
applicability of the exemplars derived from South Africa and Kenya. 
7.4.1. Tax Morality & Nigeria's 'National Cake' 
Robyn Nathan raised the interesting possibility of tax morality being impaired 
by SARS' aggressive revenue-maximising attitude. 1803 Tax morality in South 
Africa has traditionally been relatively high compared to what obtains in other 
Sub-Saharan African countries .. 
due, in part, to historical, political and 
economic conditions. Liebermann notes that '... in South Africa, where a 
unitary and racially exclusionary definition of NPC1804produced more coherent 
class relations within the white polity, analogous upper groups have largely 
accepted the state's demand for progressive taxesý ensuring that the 4 ... 
policies of deliberate racial exclusion were responsible for a legacy of a much 
more effective and progressive tax system, such that black South Africans 
today benefit from that legacy... ' 1805 Liebermann emphasises this causal 
relationship between the racial and political realities of the pre-apartbeid period 
and the development of an effective, progressiv, e and cooperative tax system 
characterised by high levels of tax morality, significant voluntary tax 
"0' Interview with Ferdi ýTorSter and Robyn Nathan, op cit. 
110, Liebermann defines NPC (or National Political Community) as the group of people 
officially entitled to the rights and responsibilities of citizenship: Liebermann, Race 
and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Braýil and South Africa, op cit, p. 3. 
1805 Ibid, pp. 122,271. 
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compliance and relatively few, highly-targeted tax incentives. 1806Conversely, in 
rentier states, Liebermann notes that the ease of extracting mineral or other 
natural resource rents from a particular, high-value economic sector may result 
in less emphasis on deriving revenues from broad-based direct taxes in other 
sectors. 1807 
Tax morality in Nigeria is an almost alien concept. However, the aversion of 
everyday Nigerians to paying tax stems predominantly from the pervasive 
perception that the Nigerian state has repeatedly failed in keeping its side of 
the social contract by providing security, infrastructure and basic services to 
the common man. Derrick Wogu (Tax Manager, British American Tobacco 
[Nigeria] Ltd) confirmed this private sec tor perception, arguing that while in 
theory, the Nigerian fiscal regime looks attractive with generous allowances, 
numerous incentives and relatively low VAT, personal and corporate income 
tax rates, the reality faced by lo cal and multinational companies is of 
inadequate incentives for investment due to poor coordination of taxes and the 
lack of basic services. In his view, there was precious little value to be had for 
taxes paid where businesses were taxed on income, capital and salaries yet had 
to provide their own infrastructure in terms of security, water supplies, 
electricity, roads, transportation, postage delivery and other services one would 
expect a functional state to provide. 1808 
1t may be recalled that the findings of 
both the Study Group and the Working Group corroborate this view. Both 
Groups concluded that the best tax incentive was the judicious use of fiscal 
resources to improve infrastructure and so enhance taxpayer morality and 
compliance. 
Consequently, a strong sense of tax morality cannot thrive among Nigerian 
taxpayers where corruption and mismanagement are perceived to be continually 
perpetuated by politically exposed persons. Critical citizens legitimately 
1806 Ibid, p. 59. 
1807 Ibid, p. 58. 
eria) 1808 Interview with Derrick Wogu: Tax Manager, British American Tobacco 
(Nig 
Limited, BAT Headquarters (Lagos, Tues 13 February 2007). 
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wonder what exactly, by way of infrastructure and services, the Nigerian state 
can show for decades of collecting trillions of Naira in taxes5 oil rents and 
other fiscal resources. Indeed, Ifueko Omoigui (FIRS' Chairperson) tellingly 
observes that '... the government also needs to win the trust and confidence of 
people if we are to get them to pay taxes. If the hard-earned money they pay to 
the government's coffers is being stolen or misused, they will do everything to 
evade tax'. 1809 Poor fiscal accountability among political office holders and the 
dearth of sufficiently punitive consequences for corruption discourage tax 
morality and this undermines the fiscal system through which tax incentives are 
provided. 
An ancillary issue is the local metaphor of the 'national cake' symbolising how 
opportunities, wealth, influence and power are shared or otherwise distributed 
among the individuals, constituencies, ethnic groups, states and regions that 
constitute Nigeria. There are positive aspects of this 'national cake' metaphor 
such as the 'federal character' principle which posits that such opportunities be 
shared equitably among these constituencies. 1810 However, the 'national cake' 
metaphor is more usually associated with the negative, rent-seeking attitude of 
individuals or groups who seek to divert such opportunities for selfish 
aggrandisement or sectarian exploitation. Corrupt politically exposed persons 
are wont to argue that graft is simply their means of 'obtaining their piece of 
the national cake'. 
Both these concepts - tax morality and the 'national cake' - are important in 
understanding local attitudes and perceptions to tax incentives. For instance, 
unscrupulous investors may seek to exploit loopholes in tax legislation to 
access incentives which they are clearly not entitled to, justifying such 
undesirable conduct as their opportunity to 'grab their piece of the national 
cake' by using publicly-funded tax expenditures to finance the reduction of 
`9 0 Obayiuwana, Interview with Omoigui Ifueko, Chairperson, FIRS: 0 Obayiuwana, 
'Are Nigerians ready to pay tax? ' BBC NewslAfrica news article (London 6 June 2005) 
<httj2: //ne-, ), R i)bc. co. ukZ2/hi/africaý/4614121. stm> accessed 26 September 2007. 
1811 §§14 & 153, CFRN 1999. 
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private commercial risks or the enhancement of rates of return on private 
investment. Conversely, investors might decline to invest in projects that have 
high social rates of return but low financial rates of return, arguing that it was 
the role of the public sector, not private enterprise, to 'bake more national 
cake' by developing public infrastructure or providing basic services for 
modest profit. 
These issues pose several implications for the role of tax incentives in Nigeria. 
First, if tax incentives are not properly desi' ned and targeted at specific 9 
sectors perceived to pose real opportunities for the cost-efficient use of such 
measures, incentives may be exploited by rent-seeking, politically connected 
persons with low tax morality, seeking to extract their 'share of the national 
cake' by unduly accessing incentives. Indeed, the recent suspension of 
discretionary import waivers and other tax exemptions by the current Federal 
Minister of Finance, Dr. Sharnsuddeen Usman, has been attributed to the 
abuse of such preferences by persons connected to the previous Obasanjo 
government leading to large customs and tax revenue JOSSeS. 1811 
Secondly, in such conditions of low tax morality automatic approval 
mechanisms are clearly preferable to the discretionary grant of incentives given 
the real risk of corruption and abuse. An enquiry has being made into the 
degree of compliance of the recently- suspended exemptions and waivers with 
due process amid allegations that presidential discretion was abused in certain 
instances. 1812 Finally, an administrative environment of regular monitoring, 
rigorous review, constant disclosure and fiscal transparency would reduce the 
incidence of tax preferences being granted to the few resulting in their 
competitive advantage over the many in key economic sectors. It is only when 
the fiscal regime is perceived to be fairly administered, tax revenues are 
properly applied to the provision of security, infrastructure and basic services, 
'8" Mathias Okwe, 'Govt Suspends tax, import waivers, ' Nigerian Guardian (Lagos 
24.08.07) <hutp: Z. Zww-v7. guardiannews n gr. c om /news /article 01> accessed 24.08.07. 
1812 Kunle Aderinokun, 'FG Audits Tax Waivers, Exemptions' This Day (Lagos 28.07.07) 
<http: //v, Tww. thisdaý,, c)nline. com/n, \riew. 12hl2? id=90-/O')> accessed 28.07.07. 
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and corruption on the part of politically exposed persons is vigorously 
discouraged by real and severe penalties that tax morality among taxpayers 
wou improve. 
In this Researcher's opinion, this enhanced sense of tax morality would in turn 
improve the effectiveness of any tax incentives in that only those persons 
legitimately entitled to incentives would tend to seek them and those not 
entitled would tend to be more conscientious about paying their taxes as and 
when due to play their part in baking and not taking from the 'national cake'. 
7.4.2. Politics: Policy Inconsistency, Fiscal Federalism & Rule of Law 
Nigeria has experienced significant policy changes since independence. In 
recent years, the general trends have been in line with the Vision 2010/2020 
and NEEDS agendas which remain quite consistent in outlook. However, 
policy inconsistency and reversal is a major impediment to implementing 
national economic plans. Nigerian ministers and functionaries, on assuming 
office, are notorious for suddenly scrapping existing policies often in a bid to 
stamp their individuality -on policies and administration. 
Sudden, unexpected 
policy reversals are the norm, undermining policy consistency and impairing 
the ability of the private sector to plan ahead and respond to opportunities and 
challenges in the investment environment. 
Recent . instances of policy inconsistency include the dramatic reversal of the 
CBN's Naira re-domination policy ostensibly for non-compliance with due 
proceSS5 1813 the cancellation of the sale by privatisation of the Port Harcourt 
and Kaduna petroleum refineries by the Obasanjo government to certain well- 
connected private investors 1814 and the VAT rate increase policy reversal 
discussed at length in §6.4.6 above. Yar'Adua's new 7-Point Agenda is 
increasingly replacing the NEEDS framework as the national economic 
1813 Madu Onuorah, 'Why Govt Suspends Naira Denomination Policy, ' Ný erian Guardiall 9 
(Lagos 26.08-07) <h ttp: / /www. guardiannevvs n ýZr. c om /news /article 02 > accessed 
26.08.07. 
1114 Godwin Haruna, 'A Sale Too Many' This Day (Lagos 20.07.07) 
<httl2: / /www. thisday. online. com /nvie-,, -, 7. phj2? id= 84083 > accessed 20.07.07. 
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blueprint. The 7-Point Agenda focuses on power and energy; food security and 
agriculture; wealth creation and employment; mass transportation; land reform; 
security; qualitative and functional education. Despite the broad 
correspondence of these issues with economic themes under NEEDS,, the 
Yar'Adua administration seems to be at pains to differentiate these two 
p oll ci e s. 1815 
In relation to tax incentives, there was the threatened withdrawal of tax 
incentives in 2005 from MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd by the National 
Assembly due to perceptions that the incentives were excessively generous. 
Ultimately, the incentives were retained due to high-level pressures applied by 
influential South African business interests on the Nigerian government. 1816 
However, the uncertainty generated by the telecoms tax incentives debacle 
damaged Nigeria's investment image and increased perceptions of risk 
associated with investing in Nigeria. 
Policy reversals also occur during the legislative process which transforms 
policy into law. It appears that under the original Mining Policy, 1817 tax holidays 
were to be replaced by a less liberal, more targeted cocktail under the Minerals 
and Mining Bill 2006.1818The Bill proposed to replace current cumulative 5- 
year tax holidays with loss carry forward provisions and a low corporate tax 
rate of between 20% and 30%. Accelerated depreciation by capital 
allowances were to be increased to 100% on qualifying capex coupled with 
Emeka Anuforo, 'Yar'Adua orders review of NEEDS 2 framework, ' Nigerian Guardian 
(Lagos 15.01. 
, 
08) 
<h ttj2: /, /www. gu ardiannewsn gr. c omJ news /articleQ 5/ /indexn2 html? j2d-, Ite=150108& 
]2tltle=Yar'Adua orders review of NEEDS 2 framework> accessed 15.01.08. 
Cletus Akwaya, 'GSM: Five-Year Tax Holiday Still in Force, Says MTN CEO, ' 
Nigerian Guardian (Lagos 06.05.05) 
<httl2: / /www. guardianncwsngr. com /news /articleO2> accessed 07.02.07. 
1817 Proposed when Obi Ezekwesili was Federal Minister of Solid Minerals Development 
during the Obasanjo administration. Ezekwesill is now a Vice President at the World 
Bank. 
1`8 Federal Ministry of Solid Minerals Development's Miaing journal special 
publication, 'Nigeria: An Exciting New Mining Destination', op Cit, p. 
6: Box 
'Summary of the Fiscal Regime for Mining'. 
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deductions for exploration and other expenditure. 1811 However) as seen above 
in §3.2.7.2 of this Thesis, NMMA 2007 presently provides for cumulative 5- 
year tax holidays. 1820 
One cause of policy inconsistency is the lack of clarity in defining the scope 
and extent of the responsibilities and authority of various functionaries, 
agencies, departments, ministries, and arms or indeed, tiers of government. 1821 
Derrick Wogu highlighted the proliferation of overlapping, spurious state and 
local government taxes on vehicle emissions, advertising and vehicles licensing 
as a major impediment to inward investment. He observed that while legitimate 
user charges were valid, in many instances, unenlightened lawmakers and local 
government officials were desperate to increase revenues without providing 
any service or considering the broader, macroeconomic implications of their 
actions on inward investment and private capital formation. 1822 
Even where constitutional provisions appear to put these matters beyond cavil, 
some authorities ignore the clear letter of the law in their pursuit of greater 
authority or revenues. Recently, the Lagos State government sought to impose 
a stealth tax by way of an infrastructure levy on the erection of 
telecommunication masts, towers and other infrastructure under the Lagos State 
Infrastructure Maintenance and Regulatog Ageng (LIMB-A) Act. 1823 This law was 
challenged by the industry's umbrella Association of Licensed 
Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria (ALTON). ALTON contended that 
the law was unconstitutional as the regulation of telecommunications came 
Cf. reports indicating that the Bill would include exemptions for capital gains tax, 
stamp duties and VAT: see 'Nigeria's New Mineral and Mining Bill, 2006', This Day 
newspaper article contributed by Peter Leon of Webber Wentzel Bowens, 27th 
February, 2006 accessed at <httl?: //wwv7 this da. vonline-com /nview. j2hj2? id =417 94> 
on 03.03.06. 
1820 §28 NMMA 2007. 
1821 As noted in S3.1.2 above, taxing powers are shared between the various tiers of 
government in accordance with the Second Schedule to the CFRN 1999; the Taxes & 
Levies Act 19-98 also clarifies the allocation of legislative powers between tiers of 
government. 
1822 Interview with Derrick Wogu, op cit. 
1823 Suit No. FHC/L/CS/517/2006-LASIMRA Law AWRE by justice Ibrahim Auta, 
February 2007. 
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under federal, not state, legislative competence. 1824 In his judgement, justice 
Ibrahim Auta concurred, ruling that state's attempt to usurp federal legislative 
powers was unlawful. 1825 
Multiple- taxation is just one aspect of the wider contest over determining the 
boundaries of power over taxing powers, economic policy and fiscal 
federalism. In other instances, the outcome of this contest is the violation of 
the rule of law and due process. As Richard Ough (Member, FIRS' Tax Policy 
Research & Development Department) observed, there was a clear tendency in 
Nigerian tax system to treat the law as a malleable tool in policyrnaking leading 
to administrative decisions being taken without adequate consideration of 
either appropriate procedures or legal restrictions on the powers of the 
relevant functionary. In his opinion, this was the source of some of the 
difficulties encountered by FIRS' Tax Policy Research & Development 
Department in discerning the legal basis for many tax incentives, waivers and 
exemptions purported to have been granted to taxpayers often without 
complying with due process. 1826 
In this regard, lessons can be learned from the South African example of 
cooperation between the Ministry of Finance, the National Treasury and SARS 
vis-, ý-vis tax incentive policy formulation and implementation. According to 
Martin Grote, there is no conflict in roles between the SAjýS and the National 
Treasury. SARS is clear on its role as a revenue collection agency and not as an 
agency responsible for monitoring arid implementing industrial policies. Both 
the Treasury and SARS report to the Ministry of Finance where tax policy is 
determined. The Finance Ministry ensures that the official tax incentive policy 
is common to both SARS and the Treasury, and duly reflected in their work. 1827 
1 
1824 In terms of Items 46,66 and 68 on the Exclusive Legislative List, Second Schedule 
to the CFRN, 1999. 
1825 Mohammed Shosanya, 'Lagos has no right to regulate telecorn operators, ' Dai4 Trust 
(Lagos 02.03.07), p. 30; Oluwaseun Ayantokun, 'Telecoms industry and the battle 
against taxation by States, ' National Tribune (Lagos 01.03.07), p. 19. 
1826 Focus Group Discussion with Richard Ough and other members of the FIRS Tax 
Policy Research & Development Department, op eit. 
1827 Interview with Martin Grote, op cit. 
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Sunet Myburg (Official, SARS) also corroborates this view. She confirmed 
that fiscal and tax incentive policy-making is the responsibility of the National 
Treasury and SARS would not get involved until a policy decision was actually 
taken. 1828 
Returning to Nigeria, in this Researcher's opinion, the federal government 
through the Federal Ministry of Finance should be solely responsible for 
coordination of economic policy in general, and more specifically, fiscal policy. 
This is vital to ensure that the state and local governments do not implement 
suboptimal strategies that may increase local revenues, but ultimately impair 
broader strategies to increase social welfare, economic growth and 
development. The state ministries of finance and revenue bodies do not 
generally possess the administrative capacity and macroeconomic data to 
design and implement independent national economic policies in all economic 
spheres. Even if they were seized of such endowments, their motives could 
tend to enhance state or sectarian interests over national policies or objectives. 
The 36 states have legitimate interests in promoting investment and economic 
growth within their constituencies. However, in respect to fiscal policy, it may 
be best in most circumstances to have federal ministries or bodies coordinate 
initiatives across the various tiers of government. For instance, such inter-tier 
coordination would be useful to control the proliferation of tax-free zones in 
various regions of the federation. 1829 1n this regard, the Draft NTP makes an 
important contribution towards the promotion of consistent fiscal policy. 
However, as argued in §7.2.3 above, the Draft NTP is not sufficiently 
comprehensive or rigorous in. formulating tax incentive policy. There are also 
concerns over the constitutionality of the Federal Ministry of Finance's 
purported role in making tax legislation. Care must be exercised that the 
1821 However, SARS had a limited role in interpreting tax legislation in line with fiscal 
policy: Statement by Sunet Myburg, Official: SARS, Pretoria, South Africa (personal 
communication 9 May 2007). 
1829 Ondo and Ogun States recently established another free trade zone: Niyi Bello, 
'Govt to relocate Naval base to free trade zone in Ondo, ' Nigerian Guardian (Lagos 
19.09.07) <http: / /www. guardiannewsngr. com /news /articl. e06> accessed 19.09.07. 
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legislative powers of the National Assembly are not usurped. Finally, the 
relevant finance and fiscal committees of the National Assembly should be 
properly constituted, staffed and empowered in such manner as to assist, not 
impede, constructive and progressive economic policies. 
7.4.3. Tax Policy is (limited by) Tax Administration 
7.4.3.0. Introduction 
Ultimately, tax administration is tax poliCy. 1830 No matter how well designed tax 
incentives or other fiscal polices are, the manner in which they are 
administered will significantly impact their effectiveness. As Newbery 
observes, administrative capacity is a particularly important constraint on the 
ability of developing countries to: collect and process information for the 
design of taxes; audit, assess and enforce taxes; increase tax compliance, 
reduce tax evasion and otherwise improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their tax systems. An evaluation of the efficieng of the effective tax system is much 
more relevant than that of the nominal or legally defined system. Developing countries 
may encounter difficulty in predicting precisely all the consequences of tax 
reforms and may be constrained in choice regarding the range of available 
taxes. Consequently, in such developing countries, there is a case for fewer tax 
reforms, greater policy stability and simplicity in tax design and 
implementation. 1831 The importance of improving the qualitative and 
administrative capacity of the effective tax system to implement tax incentive 
policy is well illustrated by considering the following criticisms of Nigerian 
pioneer i ndustry tax holidays. 
7.4.3.1. The Gap between Law and Fact 
There is a clear gap between the nominal or legally-defined pioneer incentive 
system and the practical realities of the effective system. While the 
1830 Milka Casanegra de jantscher, 'Problems of Administering a Value-Added Tax in 
Developing Countries: An Overview', Paper prepared for the Conference on Value- 
Added Taxation in Developing Countries, (IMF, Washington D. C.: 1986). 
1831 David Newbery 'Taxation and Development, ' in David Newbery and Nicholas Stern 
(eds) The Theory of Taxation for Dezeloping Countries (Oxford University Press, 
Washington D. C.: 1987) pp. 200-202. 
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administrative power to approve pioneer industry applications was previously 
vested in the Federal Minister for Industries and the National Council of 
Ministers, the law has been amended to vest this power in the President. It 
presently appears that the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission 
(NIPC), as a Presidential agency, has been delegated the duty of acting for the 
President. However, the legality of this position is not entirely clear. 1832 
Honourable Bala Bello (Official, NIPC) explained that NIPC handles the 
normal administration of the pioneer incentives under the ID/ITR Act 1971.1833 
Accordingly, an investor may apply to NIPC for a tax holiday if it falls within 
specified sectors. The preferred investment vehicle is a company with a 
minimum paid-up capital of N10million. The investor's application is 
supported by a presentation made to NIPC's management which must indicate 
relevant plans, potential and promised performance levels. An NIPC inspection 
team subsequently visits the investor's factories, plants and other facilities to 
verify the assertions made in the application and presentation. The investor 
must apply well before the tax due date because once it has been assessed for 
tax and pays, is no longer eligible for tax holidays. NIPC inspection team 
reports to NIPCs management which then determines the application. If 
satisfied, NIPC approves the application, grants the pioneer status to the 
company and notifies FIRS, the Ministry of Commerce & Industry's Industrial 
Development Department and the state Ministry of Industry in the state in 
which the investment is to be located. However, notwithstanding the tax 
holiday, the company must still file annual company and tax returns in 
compliance with all other laws. 
Discussions with Olajide Yesufu (Tax Unit, MTN Nigeria Communications 
Ltd) confirm that NIPC and FIRS cooperate in ensuring that pioneer 
companies maintain separate accounts for pioneer and non-pioneer profits. 
Olajide Yesufu also confirmed that FIRS usually certified these pioneer profits 
1832 5§1 & 2, ID/ITR Act 1971. 
Interview with Honourable Bala Bello, Official, NIPC, NIPC Headquarters 
(Abula 
FCT, Fri 02 February 2007). 
Bode Oyetunde PbD Candidate, Scbool of Tax 
Centre for Commercial La; v Studies 
, 
Queen Mary, University of London 
Page 3 72 of 4 18 
The Role of Tax Incentives in A Trio of Suh-Sabaran A-frican Economies: 7: A Critique of Nigerian Tax Incenfive Policy A Comparative Study of Nigerian, South A. frican iZý' Kenyan Tax Law 
as such to ensure that (withholding) tax-free dividends were only paid out of 
these profits in accordance with 517, ID/ITR Act 1971.1834 
However, other discussions with Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun (former 
Minister of State for Commerce & Industry Trade) indicate that NIPC did not 
always exclusively administer pioneer incentives. 1835Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun 
stated that pioneer incentives could be rnade in three ways. Minor applications 
could be dealt with by the Ministry of Commerce & Industry based on 
applications by local, indigenous investors. Other applications by mostly 
foreign investors were handled by NIPC. Finally, applications relating to major 
investments were sent to a Presidential Committee which considered such 
applications and recommended deserving applications to the President for 
approval. 
Honourable Bala Bello attributes this dispersion of administrative authority 
to the realities of NIPC's evolution into an independent agency. 1836However, 
there was considerable scope for the exercise of presidential discretion under 
Obasanjo's regime. In 2001, there were no clear provisions for the grant of tax 
holidays to mobile telecommunications operators. MTN Nigeria 
Communications Ltd blazed the incentive trail by applying to NIPC which was 
under the Vice-President's office at the time. The grant tax holidays for the 
telecommunications sector was evidently by way of ministerial discretion as 
Statement by Olalide Yesufu, Tax Unit Officer, Financial Planning Department, 
MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd, Lagos, Nigeria (personal communication 9 March 
2007). 
Interview with Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun, the Honourable Minister of State, 
Federal Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Ministry of Industry, Old Secretariat, 
(Abula FCT, Tues 30 January 2007). 
1136 Honourable Bala Bello volunteered the following explanation for the confusion: 
previously, an Industrial Development Coordination Committee under the Ministry 
of Finance carried out functions later assumed by NIPC. NIPC grew out of the 
Ministry of Industry and was empowered, staffed, resourced and ultimately placed 
under the Presidency. It later moved into its own offices in the Ministry of Finance 
before getting the new NIPC Headquarters Building in line with its independent 
status: Interview with Honourable Bala Bello, op cit. 
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opposed to government gazette as prescribed by 51, ID/ITR Act 1971.1837This 
Researcher has not discerned the legal. basis for this apparent allocation of 
responsibilities among NIPC, the Commerce & Industry Minister, the President 
and the Vice-President. It is also not clear what oversight role, if any, the 
Minister of Finance had during the Obasanjo regime in granting pioneer 
incentives. 
Beyond unnecessarily complicating the administration of pioneer incentives, 
this dispersion of authority undermines transparency and increases the 
potential for the undue exercise of discretion. It would be interesting to see if 
the ongoing inquiry into the award of presidential waivers, exemptions and 
incentives examines the implication of this dispersion of administrative 
authority for pioneer incentives. Successful reform commences with a sound 
understanding of the merits and demerits of the existing status quo. However, 
the greater the gap between the formal, legal tax incentive system and the 
practical realities of the effective incentive system, the less likely it would be 
that Nigeria can collect and process information to understand and improve 
the design and delivery of pioneer and other tax incentives. 
7.4.3.2. Infant industry or infant economy? 
Some economists have argued that the temporary protection of infant 
industries may serve the useful purpose of protecting a branch of local 
production from superior foreign competition while that local industry closes 
the temporal gap by acquiring the necessary skill and experience. In time, such 
protection may be withdrawn once that industry matures sufficiently to 
compete with foreign enterprises. 1838 While there may be some merit in 
temporary protection for select infant industries, critics have faulted the 
extension of infant industry arguments to support measures protecting entire 
developing economies from foreign competition. Such infant economy policies 
Interview with Mrs. Kofo Dosekun, op rit; Interview with Ms. Oyeronke Oyetunde, 
Regulatory Affairs Manager, MTN Nigeria Communications Ltd (Lagos, Fri 09 
February 2007). 
1838 John Stuart Mill, On the Principles of Political Economy, (London, Green, Longman, 
Roberts and Green: 1867). 
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may result in inefficient, highly diversified and unspecialised manufacturing 
sectors that cannot survive in the absence of protective tariffs and 
incentives. "" 
The current list of approved pioneer industries shows a distinct leaning 
towards promoting an infant economy as opposed to pioneer industries. 
Currently, there are 69 items on NIPC's List of Pioneer 
Indus tries /Products. 1840 As indicated in 53.2.5.2 above, the scope of preferred 
manufacturing industries has been significantly expanded since 1971. Besides a 
few exceptions, 1841 it is hard to conceive of any significant manufacturing 
activity in Nigeria which cannot be brought w ithin the scope of NIPC's 
extended list. No clear policy progression may be discerned from a comparison 
of the original list of 37 items and NIPC's extended list of 69 items beyond the 
inclusion of certain sectors that were virtually non-existent in 1971.1842 Indeed, 
most of the original 37 items have been retained in some form in NIPC's new 
I* St. 1843The original 1 new list, yet 1 import-substitution strategy is evident in the 
it cannot be said that Nigeria has since acquired any significant competitive 
advantage in any of the sectors indicated in either lists. 
In response to these shortcomings, Honourable Bala Bello admitted that the 
concept of 'pioneer industry' tended to be a rather flexible one extending 
beyond the Schedule to ID/ITR Act. 1844 Essentially sectors in which the 
government wished to promote clusters Of industries to augment insufficient 
industrial activity were designated as pioneer industries from time to time. He 
however conceded that more clarity was- needed in discerning the scope of this 
concept, perhaps by way of a ministerial directive. He also agreed with this 
1839 AfDB, African Development Report 2004, op cit, pp. 133-134. 
1140 List of Pioneer Industries /Products, Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure, 
Chapter 1: General Incentives, op cit, pp. 2-6. 
1141 E. g. indigenous GSM operations: ibid, p. 6. 
1842 E. g. the manufacture of computers and computer chips: item 37, ibid, p-4- 
1843 With the exception of cocoa production, bone crushing, and the manufacture of 
surgical dressings, starch, animal foodstuffs, . leather, medical and dental equipment, 
stationery and furniture. 
1844 Interview with Honourable Bala Bello, op cit. 
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Researcher that there should be some empirical analysis to assess when a sector 
is sufficiently mature enough to allow for a withdrawal of the incentives. 
This last point is of particular concern to this Researcher. The pioneer 
incentive has been operational in some form or the other since 1957. 1845 Yet it 
is unclear if there has been any comprehensive study reviewing the merits or 
otherwise of the policy since its inception and redesigning the regime in light 
of past performance. Sunset provisions are conspicuously lacking. The tax 
holidays granted to individual concerns may expire, but any particular sector 
could conceivably enjoy indefinite tax exemptions. There is no explicit 
expectation that designated infant industries are expected to 'grow up' and 
mature out of the pioneer incentives within an agreed timeframe. Clearly, it 
would be beneficial if certain indices were built into the regime to ensure that 
once an industry reaches a certain level of saturation, performance, output or 
some other index, incentives should be phased out. Such an exercise may well 
determine that many items on the current list are redundant. This would help 
target incentives to only those industries that rank high in the government's 
priorities conserving scarce fiscal revenues. 
7.4.3.3. Perceived Successes and Lapses 
There are many aspects of the administration of the pioneer incentive regime 
that are clearly beneficial and should be enhanced. The initial grant of tax 
holidays was influenced by NIPC-s preliminary assessment of the proportion of 
local content in inputs, export potential, the prospects of employment 
generation capacity for Nigerians and the degree of value addition, transfer of 
skills and expertise involved. 1846When renewing tax holidays, NIPC considers 
the extent to which the company ploughs back profits into current operations 
and business expansion. Consequently, approvals are the result of a composite 
grading system improving the targeting of incentives. 1847 
'84' See the Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act of 1,95.7. 
'841 However, it was not evident that the impact of any restrictions imposed 
by WTO 
regulations had been explicitly considered. 
Interview with Honourable Bala Bello, op cit. 
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There is a commendable degree of cooperation between NIPC (which grants 
the pioneer incentives), the Industrial. Development Department (which 
certifies the company's production date) and FIRS (responsible for tax 
assessment and administration). The Industrial Development Department made 
up for the lack of technical capacity of NIPC's Inspection Teams which did 
not have engineers and other experts to examine the operational integrity of 
plant and machinery at prospective pioneer industry sites). NIPC implements 
several anti-avoidance measures to detect and prevent incentives abuse. These 
measures include requiring FIRS tax clearance certificate reviews, examining 
the CAC business registration of companies, and auditing immigration and 
work permit documentation. Recalcitrant companies are denied incentives, 
blacklisted for renewals and referred to the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission and FIRS. 
However, there have been clear instances of costly lapses in incentive 
administration. For instance, at some point in the past, NIPC evidently 
misapplied provisions regarding the length tax ho lid ays, 'granting initial 
exemptions of 5 years renewable for 2 more years, resulting in cumulative tax 
holidays of 7 years. This practice is clearly contrary to the ID/ITR Act 1971 
which only authorises a maximum of 5 years (3 years at first instance, 
renewable for another 2 years) for tax holidays. 1848 It appears that FIRS 
eventually brought this lapse to NIPC's attention. The Presidency apparently 
resolved this lapse by directing that if any company had received initial 
holidays of 5 years at once, this could stand but no further extensions would 
be granted. 1849 
However, no '"statistics were available in respect of how long this lapse 
persisted for, how many companies benefited from it or what was the aggregate 
Investment Incentives in Nigeria Brochure (Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission), pp., 1,8,10,15,16 cf. §10 ID/ITR Act 1971. 
It appears this may have been the case with MTN Communications 
Nigeria Ltd's 
incentives: Interview with Honourable Bala Bello, op cit. 
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cost to the fiscus. While one does not expect government agencies to be 
infallible, it is worrisome that despite the inherent generosity of the tax 
holiday programme such lapses persist, causing greater revenue leakage than 
necessary. It is also a cause of concern that in the absence of tax expenditure 
budgeting, no single government ministry, agency or department appears to 
maintain comprehensive statistics on precisely what the pioneer tax holiday 
scheme costs the fiscus per annum since inception. 1850 1f such statistics do not 
exist or are unreliable, it is hard to conceive how the benefits of the incentive 
regime may be compared with its costs to arrive at any reasonable assessment 
of its efficiency as an investment measure. 
7.4.4. Concluding Remarks 
Newbery rightly observes that a key challenge of tax administration for 
developing countries is attracting and retaining suitably skilled personnel and 
equipping them with adequate facilities and resources. 1851 In the past, FIRS had 
suffered from this shortcoming due to poor conditions of service for staff. 
This position has improved with the passage into law of the Federal Inland 
Revenue Service (Establisbment, etc) Bill 2007 in April 2007. Under the new Act, a 
percentage of tax revenue is to be retained by FIRS to fund its operations and 
a new, competitive salary structure for its staff andoffiClalS. 1852 
It is hoped that some of these resources would be invested in reviewing the 
pioneer tax h oliday regime and other aspects of Nigeria's tax incentive system 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these investment measures. 
Adequate resources should spent on closing the gap between the nominal or 
legally defined tax incentive system and the practical effective system, 
rigorously analysing and reviewing statistics on the existing system with a view 
to targeting incentives at specific pioneer industries and not an entire infant 
'110 Teleconference/Interview with Mike Hugman, op cit. 
David Newbery 'Taxation and Development, ' in David Newbery and Nicholas Stern 
(eds) The Tbeory of Taxation for Developing Countries, op cit, p. 200. 
1852 Mathias Okwe, 'Jumbo pay for tax officials, chairman to get N10.5m yearly, ' Nigerian 
Guardian (Lagos 29.08-07) <httl2: / Zwww. ýýuardiannewsngr. com /news /articleo, ^) > 
accessed 24.08.07. 
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economy, building on actual successes and redressing perceived failures. In this 
Researcher's opinion, only if such resources are prudently applied to the 
resolution of these issues and the reform of the wider tax incentive system will 
Nigerian tax incentives stand any chance in promoting sustainable economic 
development. 
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7.5. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has traced the recent evolution of Nigeria's tax incentive policy 
from its origins in NEEDS and the work of both the 2002 Study Group and 
the 2004 Working Group. It has set out and comprehensively criticised specific 
aspects of Nigerian tax incentive policy as indicated in the Draft NTP. In 
particular, concerns have been expressed in relation to the practical expertise 
and constitutional competence of the Federal Ministry of Finance in designing, 
implementing and legislating on tax incentive policy. 
Overall, the Draft NTP is a welcome development which provides a focal point 
for the conception, communication and coordination of national fiscal and tax 
incentive policies. However, there are certain aspects of the Draft NTP that 
could be better conceived to ensure greater consistency with overarching 
policy initiatives under the NEEDS, Vision 2020 and the 7-Point Agenda 
strategies. In this connection, important lessons could be learned in general 
from international experiences with tax incentives and more specifically from 
regional exemplars in the South African and Kenyan experiences. 
From South Africa, Nigeria could learn to: target tax incentives by restricting 
them to only those sectors where the benefits justify the attendant revenue 
losses; ensure that tax incentives are fit for purpose and apply other, less 
costly investment measures where the use of, tax incentives is inappropriate; 
review the design and delivery of tax incentives to ensure that they remain 
grounded in sound economics and are not subverted by undue political 
considerations; count the cost of tax incentives in terms of revenues forgone 
to appreciate the quantum of tax expenditure support provided and to guide 
their withdrawal where costs exceed benefits; and continuously consult with 
the private sector to enhance tax incentive design, implementation and 
review. 
From Kenya, Nigeria could learn that: simplicity is golden in implementing 
fiscal policies in developing countries with relatively unsophisticated tax 
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systems; in certain circumstances, bespoke non-tax incentives might be more 
effective in encouraging investment and development in special sectors such as 
agriculture and mining; and dynamic, sustainable tax incentive policy was 
critical for governments to seize global trade opportunities. 
In this Researcher's opinion, the most important lesson from these countries' 
experiences is the common theme that tax policy is tax administration: tax 
incentive policy is only as good as the practical means by wbich it is implemented. If there 
are real and significant shortcomings in tax administration, these lapses will 
undermine any efforts at enhancing sustainable development through the use 
of tax incentives. 
Finally, although profound lessons may be gleaned from the South African and 
Kenyan experiences, prudent Nigerian policyrnakers would do well to bear in 
mind the peculiarities of the local tax culture - the low level of tax morality, 
the scramble for slices of the 'national cake', the tendency towards policy 
inconsistency, the challenges of fiscal federalism, the vital role of the rule of 
law and the real constraints on tax administration. If the lessons derived from 
international and regional exemplars are integrated into bespoke policies 
designed with the realities of the Nigerian environment in mind, there will be a 
greater likelihood that tax incentive programmes, if prudently and selectively 
applied in conjunction with other economic policies, may yet contribute to 
sustainable economic development. 
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8. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
'A dream can be the bigbest point of a life. "'l 853 
8.1. THE THESIS IN PRtCIS 
This Thesis has presented this Researcher's findings and views concerning the 
role of tax incentive law and policy in promoting sustainable economic 
development, comparing the South African and Kenyan experiences with those 
of Nigeria, with a view to suggesting ways in which Nigerian tax incentive law 
and policy may be improved. All three countries in their respective economic 
master-plans - GEAR, ERS and NEEDS - seek to actualise the dream of 
improving opportunities and quality of life for their peoples. Tax incentive law 
and policy seem to be one of many strategies adopted by all these countries to 
attain this end with varying degrees of success. 
In Chapter 2,1 have considered the nature of tax incentives and identified 
some of the various forms that these fiscal measures may take including 
preferential tax rates, investment tax credits and allowances, accelerated and 
enhanced depreciation, favourable treatment for tax losses and deductions, 
incentives targeted at economic activities such as finance and employment, and 
tax incentives applied through the indirect tax system. I have evaluated 
economic reasons for and against tax incentives for both foreign and 
indigenous direct investment, highlighting the sharp differences in opinion 
among economists, policymakers, academics and other commentators. While- 
there is a general consensus among IFI economists that tax incentives are 
generally ineffective and inefficient policy tools the use of which should be 
generally discouraged, this view has not been universally accepted among 
1853 Okri, The Famisbed Road, op cit, p-574. 
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8: Concluding Thoughts 
policyrnakers particularly in developing countries where the use of such 
measures persist. 
In my opinion,, tax incentives are generally unwieldy tools: where applied in 
weak and inefficient tax systems, their propensity to do more harm than good 
may be significantly enhanced. However, from a Nigerian perspective, it is 
clear that the use of these policy tools is likely to persist notwithstanding 
arguments to contrary or indeed, pressures exerted by tax conditionality to 
discourage the proliferation of tax incentives. 
In this regard, I could not agree more with Easson who observes that: 
The reality is that this particular discussion - whether the general tax 
system is more important to potential investors than are special 
incentives - is, in one sense, rather pointless. What has attracted many 
investors ... 
is the low rate of CIT that they would be required to pay: 
whether that rate is the 'standard' rate, or is a cspecial' rate, is unlikely 
to be of any importance to the investor that qualifies for the low rate. * A 
more constructive approach is to ask whether a country seeking to 
attract FDI would be better advised to rely upon special tax incentives 
or on a CIT1854 system with no special concessions and a relatively low 
standard rate... The real issue is whether, given the existence of a 
reasonable general tax system, special incentives may still have a role to 
play in attracting FDI: in other words, would the more effective policy 
be to further reduce the standard CIT rate or to combine a reasonable 
general system with selective special tax incentives? 1855 
Policyrnakers tend to persist in the belief that they can use such selective 
interventions to address market failures, investment gaps and other ills citing 
as examples those (few) countries that have successfully utillsed tax incentives 
(usually alongside other prudent investment policies) to promote investment, 
economic development and growth. Merely citing the vastly more numerically 
significant examples of other countries in which tax incentives have not 
achieved the desired results may not deter the pursuit of economic objectives 
through the use of tax incentives. 
1854 C ompanies income tax. 
1855 Easson, Tax Incentivesfor Foreign Direct Investment, o-P cit, p-81. 
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Consequently, this Study does not seek to answer conclusively the broad query 
'do tax incentives work? ', but rather illuminate the more narrow discussion of 
what may be done to improve the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of 
Nigerian tax incentive law and policy, given the propensity of Nigerian 
policyrnakers to use tax incentives. 
8.2. KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
In Chapter 1, certain key research questions were posed. This Researcher 
discovered the following findings in response to those questions. Regarding 
the general role of tax incentive law and policy in promoting sustainable 
economic development in Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya, Chapter 3,4 and 5 
demonstrate that tax incentives play significant and similar roles in promoting 
sustainable economic development in all three countries. These chapters review 
the content and scope of tax incentive practices in these countries and 
demonstrate the wide variety in measures used across these countries. 
However, there are notable differences in the results and emphasis placed on 
tax incentives across the three countries. 
In the main, the targeted tax incentive policies of South Africa are more 
successful than those in the two other countries. In terms of trends in tax 
incentive law and policy, South Africa increasingly espouses and implements 
policies aimed at replacing fiscal incentives with non-fiscal measures such as 
grants and subsidies. Where tax incentives are retained, there are greater 
efforts to target incentives at specific sectors (e. g. R&D investment) and phase 
out incentives where these fall to achieve key policy objectives (e. g. Strategic 
Industrial Project incentives). Kenya's incentive policies are relatively simple, 
modestly successful and tend to emphasise export-oriented investment and 
production. However, legitimate questions could be asked about the 
sustainability of Kenya's tax incentive practices for EPZs. 
In Nigeria, there is a distinct trend towards the proliferation of tax incentives 
with the introduction of new, export-oriented incentives without any 
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noticeable reduction in existing tax incentives based on import-substitution 
strategies. This trend Is well illustrated by Nigerian mining tax Incentives. 
Despite declared policy intentions to phase-out tax incentives, the NMMA 
2007 provides for these and other fiscal measures to encourage investment in 
this sector. 1856 
This is not to say that I disapprove of tax holidays for mining activities: I am 
of the opinion that that, given the need to divert investment away from the 
dominant energy sector, this measure, if prudently implemented alongside 
other initiatives,, may encourage investment in the mining sector and so 
promote economic growth and development. However, where tax holidays are 
utilised for special sectors, they should be: targeted at specific kinds of 
investment proven to be sensitive to such measures; they should be time-bound 
both for individual firms and the specific sectors providing such 'infant 
industries' a limited time to grow; the outcomes of these tax incentives should 
be carefully monitored; and ultimately, the incentives themselves should be 
phased-out when they have achieved their purpose (or be discontinued and 
replaced with more effective measures where they fail to achieve their 
objectives). I also agree with the Draft NTP in that priority should be give to 
encouraging investment in infrastructural development. Unless key sectors 
such as power supply and transportation are improved, growth in other sectors 
(e. g. agriculture, mining, industry) would be either illusory or unsustainable. 
In Chapter 6,1 highlight some of the influences imposed by international tax 
law, regional integration arrangements, and international trade and financial 
architecture on tax incentive law and policy. In particular, I note that while 
these issues potentially may have a significant impact on the role of tax 
incentives in all three study countries it would appear little consideration has 
been given to these matters in the case of Nigeria. Nigerian tax incentive 
policy exhibits little responsiveness to the changing realities of international 
1816 §28 NMMA 2007 cf. Federal Ministry of Solid Minerals Development's Mining 
Journal special publication, 'Nigeria: An Exciting New Mining Destination', op cit, P. 
6 [Box 'Summary of the Fiscal Regime for Mining']. 
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tax obligations, regional'integration arrangements and the strictures of global 
trade. This position is quite unsatisfactory. Further, greater attention should be 
directed at the issue of tax conditionality to ensure that whatever fiscal 
policies are agreed between the Nigerian authorities and IFIs ultimately have 
the wellbeing of the Nigerian taxpayer in view. Failure to consider this crucial 
interest may render any fiscal policies agreed either unworkable or 
unsustainable. 
For this and other reasons, I find in Chapter 7 that Nigerian tax incentive law 
and policy while clear is not entirely consistent, prudent or appropriate in view 
of contemporary development needs, available resources and national 
priorities. Having traced the evolution of contemporary Nigerian tax incentive 
policy, I set out my key criticisms of the current position as indicated in the 
Draft NTP document. Drawing from findings from the Nigerian and South 
African field trips as well as discussions with Kenyan tax experts, I set out 
some aspects of Nigerian tax incentive policy that I find deficient, but which 
may be significantly improved if lessons from the South African and Kenyan 
experiences are carefully considered and applied. 
In particular, Nigeria should: target tax incentives to only those sectors where 
the benefits justify the attendant revenue loss to increase their effectiveness; 
ensure that tax incentives are not only fit for purpose but also cost-effective; 
dispassionately review the true economic rationales for tax incentives; count 
the cost of tax incentives to assess their cost-effectiveness; and adequately 
consult with the private sector. Further, Nigeria should: keep tax incentive 
policies and practices simple given her relatively unsophisticated tax system; 
use non-tax measures where possible to encourage growth in key sectors; and 
strive for a dynamic, sustainable tax incentive policy that is responsive enough 
to seize global trade opportunities. Finally, as tax policy is only as effective as 
the tax administration allows it to be, sufficient and sustained attention must 
be placed on improving the capacity, quality and effectiveness of Nigerian tax 
administration. 
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8.3. CAVEATS 
Given the important differences between the Nigerian tax system and the 
South African and Kenyan counterparts, there are limits to which such lessons 
may be applied. I consider in concluding Chapter 7 some of these limits arising 
from the peculiarities of Nigerian tax culture, tax administration, and political 
realities. 
Beyond these limitations are the practical constraints encountered during the 
course of this research that impose certain limits on the wider application of 
these findings. In concluding, two of these constraints deserve specific 
mention. First, it would have been desirable to have been able to visit Kenya 
and interview in person more tax experts, academics and officials to gain a 
deeper understanding and perspective into the operation of the Kenyan tax 
system. As noted earlier, this was not ultimately possible. However, every 
effort has been made to obtain most of the information required through other 
means and in my opinion this Study and its findings were not materially 
affected by this shortcoming. 
The second issue concerns obtaining materials and information from Nigeria. 
While I secured access to all persons that I had initially planned to see at some 
point during my research, several questions were left unanswered due to the 
lack of statistical data and other information. There were several situations 
where policyrnakers and officials were quite frank in indicating that the 
information I sought simply did not exists either because there was no data to 
extract it from or no efforts had been made to process any available data. 
Moreover, in some circumstances, there was a perceptible reluctance on the 
part of some civil servants and officials to go on record regarding certain 
policies and practices. Nevertheless, I do not consider that these constraints 
have significantly impaired the validity of my findings. In many instances,, they 
only serve to underscore my criticism of certain aspects of Nigerian tax 
incentive law, policy and practice. 
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8.4. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The South African and Kenyan Abiku have, respectively, made significant and 
notable progress on the road toward the river of sustainable economic 
development. The Nigerian Abiku would be wise to learn from the rich and 
varied experiences of these two countries. The success of all three nations is 
vital for economic development on the continent given their important roles in 
Southern, East and West Africa. - 
The attainment of sustainable economic develop ment, measured by the 
achievement of the UN's Millennium Development Goals by 2015, remains a 
dream for Sub-Saharan Africa. It is exceedingly unlikely that this modest 
Thesis will make that dream a reality. However, if this Thesis can in some way 
provide original ideas that may case the passage of the Nigerian Abiku on her 
onward journey towards achieving sustainable economic development - and 
encourage her to stay in the Land of the Living long enough this time around 
to improve the lot of her peoples - this Researcher will be deeply gratified. 
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